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Intellectual historians today continue to treat French intellectual history as the study 
of the figures, institutions, and ideas of the Left. This approach ignores the presence of self-
identified intellectuals of the Right who conceived of their values, role, communities, and 
their very identity as intellectuals, differently than those on the Left. By basing discussions of 
intellectual life on only one of two existing models, historians have done a disservice to the 
field. This study examines the construction of an alternative intellectual identity by the 
engaged thinkers of the extreme Right in France between 1898 and 1968. The work of self-
proclaimed right-wing intellectuals Maurice Barrès, Ferdinand Brunetière, Henri Massis, 
Charles Maurras, Abel Bonnard, Ramon Fernandez, Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Alphonse de 
Châteaubriant, Maurice Bardèche, Jacques Laurent, and Alain de Benoist is used to trace this 
process of identity construction. From these case studies, it becomes apparent that throughout 
the twentieth century, intellectuals of the Right felt excluded from the cultural and political 
world by what they believed to be a hegemonic Left. This exclusion was not entirely a matter 
of perception, however, since the Left appreciated the authority of the role of the intellectual 
and worked to secure the concept for their own camp and to label the Right “anti-
intellectual.” The Right’s resentment of this marginalization would become central to their 
construction of a new type of intellectual identity. In their struggle to legitimize their own 
iii 
vision of intellectual values, socio-professional communities, and experience while 
differentiating it from that constructed on the Left, they were attempting to redefine the 
concept of the intellectual according to their own perspective. This study attempts to bring 
the self-identified intellectuals of the extreme Right back into the narrative of intellectual 
history. It is also reveals the century-long struggle waged over the conceptualization of the 
intellectual between the Left and Right. While the model constructed by the Left has become 
synonymous today with the image of the intellectual, it was not the only version of 
intellectual identity throughout the century. It should, therefore, not be the only version 
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In 1944, Drieu la Rochelle proclaimed defensively, “I acted perfectly consciously… 
according to the idea that I had formed of the duties of the intellectual.”1 Although it is a seemingly 
simple statement, he was in fact making a complex claim about his identity and what he considered to 
be the preconceptions of his society. First apparent is his self-identification with the empowering title, 
role, and duties of the politically engaged thinker or “intellectual.” Then there is his suggestion that 
this identity of the “intellectual” is one that could be conceptualized in different ways based on the 
“idea” that one had of the duties. And finally, there is the underlying tone of resentment, frustration, 
and defensive pride indicating he expected his self-identification to be refused by a society 
preconditioned to recognize only one model of this identity. Drieu’s struggle to define himself as an 
intellectual according to his own, distinctive ideas of intellectual identity was not an anomaly. It was 
emblematic of a century-long struggle for legitimacy by a large segment of the French intellectual 
milieu that believed its political opponents had effectively excluded it from the empowering status of 
the “intellectuel.” His statement indicates, therefore, an unexplored historical conflict in the 
intellectual community between two competing concepts of intellectual identity.  
 Drieu’s suggestion that there was more than one concept of intellectual identity also 
challenges the current historiography. For scholars of French intellectual life, the models of the 
intellectual have ranged from Zola to Benda to Sartre but they have all shared a common premise: to 
be an intellectual was, “to be on the Left.”2 In a survey of the field, it quickly becomes apparent that, 
 
1 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Secret Journal, trans. Alastair Hamilton (New York: H. Fertig, 1973), 70.  
 
2 Jeremy Jennings, “Intellectuals and Political Culture,” The European Legacy 5, no. 6 (2000), 787. 
 
2for most intellectual historians, “the terms intellectuel and intellectuel de gauche are often taken for 
synonyms,”3 while, as a correlate to this rule, “anti-intellectual” has been applied with consistency to 
the figures and ideas of the Right. This complacency becomes problematic, however, when one 
recognizes that Drieu la Rochelle was a self-identified intellectual of the extreme Right.  
This study, therefore, has a dual aim. It argues that the history of intellectual engagement and 
debate from the Dreyfus Affair to the modern day can be seen as a series of struggles between the 
engaged thinkers of the Left and the Right. These engaged thinkers struggled to define and 
monopolize the empowering concept of the intellectual according to their own, fundamentally 
opposed, social and cultural values and their own distinctive experience of intellectual life. The 
intellectual Left, and its concept of the intellectual, emerged from these struggles increasingly 
hegemonic while the Right, and its alternative concept, emerged increasingly ostracized, resentful, 
alienated, and separatist. This mounting isolation of the intellectual Right from what would come to 
be seen as the intellectual mainstream would be in part a result of the Left’s successful efforts to 
exclude them and in part a result of their own withdrawal and radicalization in the face of this 
rejection. The vicious cycle of rejection, resentment, and self-imposed alienation would, by the post-
war era, contribute to the radicalization and separatism of the extreme Right and the shrinking of its 
audiences. Because of this, it is virtually impossible today for historians to construct an image of “the 
intellectual” outside of the left-wing values, programs, and thinkers that have dominated the concept, 
or to see their opponents on the Right as anything but “anti-intellectual.”  
The second aim of the study will be to challenge this tendency among intellectual historians 
to think “intellectual of the Left” when they write “intellectual” and, as a result, to treat French 
intellectual history as the study of the figures, institutions, and ideas of the Left. Throughout the 
twentieth century, there were two very different understandings of what it meant to “be an 
intellectual,” including the relationship that intellectuals had to government and society, the values, 
worldviews, and programs that they supported, and the types of communities and experiences that 
 
3 Michel Winock, Le siècle des intellectuels (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 612. 
3defined them. The current approach to intellectual history only acknowledges one of these models of 
identity: a model created by the engaged Left that cannot explain the engaged thinker of the Right. 
This study will explore the concept of intellectual identity developed on the Right and propose a new 
model of intellectual identity that inserts this previously excluded right-wing engagé into the 
historical narrative of the French intellectual. 
This study is an attempt to understand and analyze, without approbation or condemnation, the 
historical phenomenon that is the intellectual of the Right. It is important to clarify, therefore, that the 
approach to “the intellectual” used in this study does not invest the term with any special moral 
quality nor grant the role any particular relationship to the “Truth.” Being an intellectual, according to 
parameters borrowed from Jean-Francois Sirinelli and Michel Trebitsch, requires only that the thinker 
utilize his cultural capital in order to sway opinion in public affairs according to his own set of values 
and ideas.4 Identifying the engaged thinkers of the Right as “legitimate intellectuals,” therefore, does 
not imply legitimization of their values or give moral credence to their ideas. It is simply a 
recognition of the role they played in French affairs; a recognition that thinkers on the Right as well 
as the Left had cultural capital, that they engaged this authority in the nation’s political debates, and 
that they wielded significant influence over public opinion and political affairs. During some periods, 
the extreme Right enjoyed enormous audiences and circulations and at others had only a limited 
following. But regardless of the size of their public, the Right provided an important and continuous 
counterpoint to the intellectual Left for the French public. Because of this, whether historians approve 
of the nature of their ideas or not, the extreme Right cannot continue to be ignored in the historical 
narrative of the intellectual.   
 
4 The definitions of the intellectual constructed by Sirinelli and Trebitsch are explored in more depth 
later in the introduction. 
4The Historiographical Problem 
The practice of intellectual history has evolved over the years from a history of ideas and 
great thinkers to a broad-ranging discipline that incorporates advances in social and cultural history, 
psychology, literary criticism, and gender studies. One of the building blocks of the discipline, 
however, the concept of the person, role, and values of the intellectual, has not benefited from a 
similar evolution. The definition and understanding of the intellectual as a historical actor and, from 
this, the basic narrative of intellectual engagement over the century, has been accepted as a known 
quantity. As a basic social category, intellectuals are writers, thinkers, or “consummators of an 
ideology” who engage their art in support of a socio-political cause.5 But for the vast majority of 
historians, “intellectual” also carries deeply engrained connotations that tie it to the engaged thinkers 
of the liberal Republic and extreme Left. “Intellectuals in France,” Jeremy Jennings has summarized, 
“have sought to shape the political values and culture that have informed politics” and have done so 
either as “the ‘universal’ intellectual described by Julien Benda or the ‘committed’’ intellectual 
defined by Sartre. Sartre in fact embodied this model. It was to be engaged, to be on the Left.”6
For these historians, whether he is a defender of the Republic or a Marxist fellow-traveler, the 
intellectual is a “child of the Enlightenment”7 who upholds the Jacobin concept of citizenship, the 
ideals of egalitarianism and progress, and the promise of social revolution. He is a universalist, an 
internationalist, a socialist, who translates the abstract, absolute truths of the universe into idealistic 
theories for implementation in society. Jean-Francois Lyotard famously determined, in his assessment 
of the decline of the intellectual, that intellectuals are those whose “ambition since the philosophes of 
 
5 Jean-François Sirinelli and Pascal Ory, Les intellectuels en France; de l’Affaire Dreyfus à nos jours 
(Paris: A Colin, 1986), 10. 
 
6 Jennings, “Intellectuals and Political Culture,” 787. 
 
7 Ibid., 781. 
 
5the eighteenth century has been to think and incarnate the universal.”8 The Right’s adamant rejection 
of universalism, abstraction, Enlightenment principles, internationalism, social revolution, and the 
Jacobin image of the nation clearly place it outside of this dominant definition of intellectual values 
and identity and make it, by default, “anti-intellectual.” As Zeev Sternhell concluded in his survey of 
modern French intellectual life, while the intellectuals of the twentieth century could be identified by 
their devotion to the “spirit of the Enlightenment,” “the anti-intellectual intellectuals revolted against 
the rational tradition of the Enlightenment” and against “its Marxist, Socialist, and liberal 
manifestations.”9
This tendency to conflate the intellectual with the ideas and values of the Left occurs even in 
the social histories which tend to ignore differences in intellectual values. The intellectual is defined 
for these historians by engagement in certain causes, participation in certain organizations, and 
adherence to certain socio-professional networks. When an example of the “intellectual” as a social 
category is sought in these works, it is among the Dreyfusards, republican universitaires, writers for 
Nouvelle Revue Française, resisters, communist sympathizers, or regulars at Deux Magots that it is 
found, never among the anti-Dreyfusards, writers for Action Française, collaborationists, fascist 
sympathizers, or Sept Couleurs writers.  
It is clear that historians who consider the phenomenon of intellectual engagement from the 
Dreyfus Affair to the postwar era have a preconceived notion of what it means to be an intellectual 
and their narratives of the history of engagement reveal this bias. Whether intentionally or not, these 
narratives exclude the intellectual of the Right in two effective ways. The first is to ignore the 
presence of the Right by focusing the narrative on the figures, organizations, and engagement of the 
 
8 Winock, Le siècle, 608. Therefore, according to Lyotard and others like Bernard Henri Levy, the 
declining belief in universals in recent years has led to the decline in intellectuals. Jeremy Jennings, “1898-
1998: From Zola’s ‘J’accuse’ to the Death of the Intellectual,” The European Legacy 5 no. 6 (International 
Society for the Study of European Ideas, 2000), 829.  
 
9 Zeev Sternhell, The Intellectual Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945 (Jerusalem: Israel 
Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996), 104. 
 
6intellectual Center and Left. The second is to present the intellectual debates between Right and Left 
as a conflict between “the intellectuals” and the “anti-intellectuals.” Even when anti-intellectualism is 
not directly attributed to the Right, it is implied by the focus on the non-intellectual components of 
the right-wing opposition. When the Right is explored in these latter studies, it is the political parties, 
ligues, or street gangs, from the Anti-Dreyfusard Ligue des Patriotes to the interwar Croix de Feu to 
the postwar Front National, that are analyzed, not the organizations of right-wing academics, writers, 
and thinkers. In contrast, when the Left is discussed, the intellectual organizations are the central 
focus. Both of these strategies, whether employed consciously or not by the historian, have effectively 
removed the intellectual of the Right from the history of intellectual engagement. The following brief 
survey of the treatment of intellectual history from the Dreyfus Affair to the postwar reveals the 
imbalance that has resulted. 
Most historical narratives of the birth of the intellectual as social guide and political 
commentator during the Dreyfus Affair clearly find the intellectual to exist exclusively on the side of 
the Dreyfusard Left. David Drake begins one survey of intellectual life saying, “The term 
intellectual…was popularized in France at the time of the Dreyfus Affair. It was used to refer to those 
men of letters… and members of the university who lent their prestige to the call for the release of 
Alfred Dreyfus.”10 While Christophe Charle ends his work by concluding, “On the level of 
professional ethic, the Dreyfusard intellectuals, in their search for Truth, remain the models for 
today.”11 Because of this determination of intellectual identity, the intellectual history of the Dreyfus 
Affair has been written as the history of the Dreyfusards. Attention is focused first on Zola’s open 
letter in L’Aurore and on the petitions in favor of a retrial that it sparked. Care is taken to mention that 
it is Clemenceau, editor of L’Aurore, who first uses the term intellectuel to identify the Dreyfusards, 
 
10 David Drake, Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 1. 
 
11 Christophe Charle, Naissance des “intellectuels,” 1880-1900 (Paris: Minuit, 1990), 234. 
 
7but few acknowledge that it was the anti-Dreyfusard Barrès who actually popularized it.12 In general, 
the historical category of the intellectual is conflated with the Dreyfusard’s self-identification as the 
defender of the abstract, Enlightenment ideals and the Rights of Man.13 
The model of the intellectual in these histories of the Dreyfus Affair is the universalist 
defender of Truth, individual rights, and Justice presented in Julien Benda’s La Trahison des clercs. It 
is important to note here that Benda’s treasonous clerc was not the responsible engaged thinker of the 
Left who engaged in the name of universal values, but rather Barrès, Maurras, and the right-wing 
writers who defended the anti-intellectual “passions” of nationalism, anti-internationalism, “anti-
semitism, capitalism, and anti-democratism.”14 The primary figures in these historical narratives are 
Emile Zola, Anatole France, Emile Duclaux and the other Dreyfusards. In his study of intellectuals 
over the century, it is the Dreyfusard character M. Bergeret15 that Michel Winock describes as, 
“nearly a half-century before Sartre, the model of the engaged writer.”16 When the intellectuals are 
discussed as a collectivity, it is the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, signers of L’Aurore petitions, and 
other Dreyfusard organizations that are explored.17 Although Barrès, Maurras, Brunetière and others 
of the Right are occasionally mentioned as opponents to these intellectuals, they are ignored in all 
discussions of the elite category.18 
12 Interestingly, Barrès would popularize the term intellectuel but his use of it was intended to be 
pejorative. The Dreyfusards accepted the term despite its initial connotations and quickly convinced the public 
that all the traits that Barrès accused the intellectual of having were, in fact, positive attributes.  
 
13 Robert Holub, It’s Academic: Intellectual Responsibility and the Rise of Neo-Mandarinism,” in 
Responsibility and Commitment, 22-34 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996), 26. 
 
14 Julien Benda, La Trahison des clercs (Paris: Grasset, 1956), 18-35. 
 
15 From Anatole France’s novel Monsieur Bergeret à Paris.
16 Winock, Le siècle des intellectuels, 67. 
 
17 H. L. Wesseling, Certain Ideas of France: Essays on French History and Civilization (London: 
Greenwood Press, 2002), 64. 
 
18 Although Maurras and the Action Française are usually given the historical attention that their 
impact on the pre-World War I and interwar intellectual world demands, they are still seen as an anomaly. 
Rather than showing the AF intellectuals as “the statistical majority and ideologically dominant” force that they 
8In fact, most of the attention paid to the Anti-Dreyfusard Right is for its refusal to engage and 
its rejection of the term intellectual. Although the Anti-Dreyfusard camp would claim equal rights to 
the title and role of the intellectual within a year of “J’accuse,” historians rarely if ever acknowledge 
this change of heart.19 Even had they claimed the title from the beginning, the oppositional values of 
the anti-Dreyfusards would still have earned them the immediate categorization of “anti-intellectual.” 
Michel Winock, for example, declares that since, “the literary Right including Barrès, Brunetière, and 
Maurras expressed the anti-intellectualist demand for enracinement against the universalism of the 
intellectuals…one understands why, afterwards, the terms intellectuel and intellectuel de gauche are 
often taken for synonyms.”20 In discussing the origins of the phenomenon of anti-intellectualism, 
Pascal Balmand writes that the “explicitly anti-intellectualist position” is that of the thinkers who 
engage “against the Dreyfusard petitions.”21 His argument is that the anti-Dreyfusards refused the 
universalism and abstract rationalism of the intellectual Left in favor of national relativism and 
realism. “One sees here,” he concludes of this anti-Dreyfusard value system, “the quasi-totality of the 
ingredients of anti-intellectualism.”22 Historians therefore take from the Dreyfusard intellectuals their 
first and most enduring model of intellectual identity while conversely portraying the Anti-
Dreyfusard as the quintessential anti-intellectualist.  
This historiographical tendency continues in discussions of the intellectuals of the early 
1900s and World War I. The history of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates is presented as the conflict 
 
were in the interwar years, Sirinelli and Ory, Les Intellectuels en France, 41., most general intellectual histories 
tend to isolate discussion of the AF under a sub-title or separate chapter and to explore their intellectual world 
and views only to the extent necessary to show them as opponents of the intellectual Left. And, to remind 
readers of the unsuitability of the AF thinkers for the category of intellectual, these discussions usually end with 
a reminder of the AF’s fascist sympathies and later collaboration. 
 
19 For example, see the description of Barrès and Brunetière’s opposition to the term in Stephen T. 
Leonard’s “Introduction” in Intellectuals and Public Life: Between Radicalism and Reform, ed. Leon Fink, 
Stephen T. Leonard, Donald M. Reid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 10. 
 
20 Winock, Le siècle des intellectuels, 612. 
 
21 Pascal Balmand, “L’anti-intellectualisme dans la culture politique française,” Vingtieme Siècle 36 (1992), 35. 
 
22 Ibid., 35. 
 
9between the intellectuals, who are the socialist and republican proponents of the desirable ideals of 
democratized education, scientific progress, and international intellectual exchange, and the anti-
intellectuals, the conservative, royalist defenders of social elitism, backward traditionalism, and 
intellectual xenophobia.23 Much attention is admittedly paid to the right-wing “Agathon” who 
initiated the debates over educational reform, but his position is ultimately deplored as reactionary, 
closed minded, and Germanophobic. The dominant image of the intellectual is instead the left-wing 
university reformers from Gabriel Monod to Emile Durkheim. In histories of this period, the most 
persistent narrative is of the betrayal by the universalist intellectual during the Union Sacrée and his 
post-World War I redemption. Romain Rolland and Au-dessus de la mêlée are therefore given great 
attention in these analyses despite the fact that, in reality, Rolland was marginalized by his peers. 
Most analyses of the war-time intellectuals agree that “the intellectual” was frightened into an 
uncharacteristic, anti-intellectual nationalism and traditionalism during the war, but returned to his 
rightful responsibilities of universalism and internationalism soon afterward. In this way, historians 
continue to portray Benda’s left-wing universalist as the model that all intellectuals strove to emulate 
during the years surrounding World War I. Their narrative implies the behavior of the intellectuals of 
the Right, who supported continued intellectual mobilization after the war, was anti-intellectual.   
Benda’s “universalist” intellectual model remains a powerful image for historians well 
beyond their discussion of the Dreyfus Affair, Nouvelle Sorbonne, and World War I intellectuals. 
However, they increasingly merge it with the left-wing model of the committed, anti-fascist 
intellectual that first emerges in the Popular Front and will later be embodied by Sartre. In one 
example of this merger, Winock writes of the new committed intellectual, the “clerc of Benda found 
himself anew bound to intervene” in the Popular Front crusades since anti-fascist commitment 
concerned “as in the time of Dreyfusism, putting oneself in the service of universal values against the 
 
23 Martha Hanna’s The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and Writers During the Great War 
breaks this mold somewhat by showing the broad appeal of the intellectual Right’s cultural values during the 
war while emphasizing the underlying differences between the Left and Right. Even she, however, identifies the 
Right as the “counter-intelligentsia.” 
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menace of particular, nationalist, racist passions.”24 For narratives of interwar engagement, 
intellectual identity is derived from the Popular Front intellectuals of the NRF, CVIA, and AEAR like 
Gide, Malraux, and Nizan and is inextricable from the new essential intellectual value of antifascism. 
“The focus,” Paul Mazgaj writes of this historiographical tendency, “has been almost exclusively on 
the anti-fascist Left- so much so that the origins of intellectual engagement have come to be virtually 
equated with the individuals, organizations, and publications surrounding the Popular Front.”25 Being 
an intellectual, according to most historians of the interwar period and the Occupation, means being 
an opponent of fascism and its morally repugnant values. It is difficult for scholars today to reconcile 
the values and worldviews of fascism with rational, educated thought, so the concept of an extreme-
Right or fascist intellectual is unfathomable. Richard Golsan, for example, complains that the lack of 
critical reflection on the work of Drieu la Rochelle is “because Drieu was an artist, intellectual, AND 
fascist which poses problems for the [American] critic for whom, traditionally, there exists a 
discrepancy/gulf, or to say it better, an insurmountable abyss between art and culture on one hand and 
fascism on the other.”26 Because of this, histories of the interwar intellectual tend to focus primarily 
on the anti-fascist republican, socialist, and communist intellectuals of the Left and ignore their 
counterparts on the Right. However, the large audiences that supported the extensive extreme Right 
publications and organizations is a reminder that, although historians today find an abyss between 
fascism and culture, fascist intellectuals not only engaged, they wielded significant influence over 
public opinion in the 1930s and provided an authoritative opposition to the intellectual Left. 
Representatives of the extreme Right like Robert Brasillach and Drieu la Rochelle can seldom 
be completely ignored in the intellectual narrative of the interwar because of their notoriety. Instead, 
 
24 Winock, Le siècle des intellectuals, 613. 
 
25 Paul Mazgaj, “Engagement and the French Nationalist Right: The Case of the Jeune Droite,” 
European History Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2002), 207. 
26 Richard Golsan, “Drieu la Rochelle aux Etats-Unis: Entre l’Esthetique et le Fascisme” in Drieu la 




they are presented as anti-intellectual counter-examples to the anti-fascist intellectual or as 
aberrations in the fabric of intellectual society.27 Balmand makes the association of anti-
intellectualism with the interwar extreme Right quite clear by claiming that during these years it was 
right-wing thinkers Drieu la Rochelle, Péguy, Céline, and the movements like the Croix de Feu, the 
PPF of Doriot and others “close to fascism in the 1930s” which “integrate into their ideology a 
strongly marked anti-intellectualist component.”28 He claims to reveal Drieu’s clear anti-
intellectualism by quoting a line from Chronique Politique where Drieu wrote, “European statistics 
pronounce a crushing condemnation against the physical administration of the French nation by the 
old world gagged with intellectuals of the Left.”29 Balmand wants readers to focus on the word 
“intellectuals” in this sentence in order to make Drieu an anti-intellectualist. But Drieu, like many on 
the Right, in fact desired the title and role of the intellectual. It was the values, programs, and 
organizations attached to it by the Left that he rejected. He is revealed to be not an anti-intellectualist 
but rather an opponent of the intellectual model created by the Left when the phrase is completed to 
read “intellectuals of the Left.”
The inclination to write the history of intellectuals according to the perspective of the 
intellectual Left reaches its peak in discussions of the Occupation and postwar era. Intellectual life 
during the occupation is usually presented as the struggle of certain anti-fascists to write under 
censorship or from exile, the formation of an intellectual Resistance around the CNE, or the treason 
and subsequent decline of once respected intellectual outlets such as the NRF and the Sorbonne under 
collaborationist control. But, because the only authorized intellectual expression during the 
occupation was by the collaborationists, it is impossible to ignore the presence of the intellectual 
 
27 For example, Robert Soucy, Fascist Intellectual: Drieu la Rochelle (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979), or Alice Kaplan, Reproductions of Banality : fascism, literature, and French 
intellectual life (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), or Michel Laval, Brasillach, ou La 
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extreme Right during the period. Instead, historians, like Shlomo Sand, delegitimize the 
collaborationists and present them as pseudo-intellectuals, modern day “grub street” hacks who can 
only rise to prominence when the legitimate intellectual Left is suppressed.30 The aforementioned 
inability to reconcile fascism with intellectual responsibility is amplified when historians consider the 
abyss between the left-wing values, which are seen as in keeping with French intellectual traditions, 
and collaborationism, which is seen as its antithesis. “In contrast to republicanism or communism,” 
Sand notes, “the presence of fascism and nazism in French culture is considered a deformation of its 
national self-identity.”31 This is made quite clear by resistance to the idea of a native French fascism 
from both contemporaries of the interwar and occupation periods and from many historians.32 It 
follows easily, therefore, that writers and thinkers who promoted these ideologies were a deformation 
of the French intellectual. Historian Marie Balvet expresses this assumed incompatibility of 
collaborationism and intellectual identity in the introductory warning to readers, “fascist doctrine 
signifies the negation of all thought, of all culture,” while Alice Kaplan simply summarizes the work 
of Drieu la Rochelle saying, “it is nauseating.”33 Collaborationism and French fascism have 
irreparably damaged the ability of scholars, even half a century later, to view the extreme Right 
thinkers of the interwar and occupation as legitimate intellectuals. And, to a lesser extent, accusation 
of pre-fascism or neo-fascism has also affected interpretations of the intellectual Right as early as 
Dreyfus Affair and as late as the modern day. Yet, once again, if historians can appreciate the 
intellectual as a category derived from one’s role in French affairs and practice of political 
 
30 Shlomo Sand, “The Croix de Feu and fascism : a foreign thesis obstinately maintained,” in The 
Development of the Radical Right in France from Boulanger to Le Pen, ed. Edward J. Arnold (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000), 95. 
 
31 Ibid., 96. 
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Zeev Sternhell, Robert Soucy, and David Carroll, still influences historiography on fascism. 
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engagement, scholarly opposition to fascism and collaboration should not prove a barrier to analyzing 
and understanding the engaged thinkers of the extreme Right as intellectuals. 
The relative silence of the defeated and purged intellectual Right during the postwar era is 
made absolute in its historical retelling. For historians of the postwar, the intellectual landscape is 
dominated by the figure of Sartre and his camp around Les Temps modernes while Camus, Aragon, 
and the PCF intellectuals take secondary, though still important, places. The history of the intellectual 
of the post-war is consistently presented as the rise and decline of the CNE, the emergence of Les 
Temps modernes, the faltering of intellectual commitment to the USSR after 1956, the subsequent 
transfer of allegiance to China and Cuba, and the return to Enlightenment roots in the crusade against 
colonialism in Algeria and Vietnam. When the intellectual opposition to the communist and Sartrian 
camps is considered in these narratives, it is the liberal Aron and the republican, pro-American, 
capitalist, and anti-colonialist representation of the intellectual that is presented, not the writers of the 
extreme Right and their representation. It is true that many histories of the postwar critique the 
intellectual extreme Left for its commitment to communism and support for the USSR despite 
revelations of Stalinist suppression. What is important for this study, however, is not the historian’s 
disapprobation of the intellectual extreme Left but the fact that the intellectuals of the Left, even when 
considered irresponsible, are still considered the only representatives of intellectual engagement 
during these periods. The existence of intellectuals of the extreme Right in the postwar is seldom even 
considered a possibility. Even James LeSueur’s discussion of the intellectual support for French 
Algeria draws its image of the oppositional intellectual from Camus, Soustelle, and others previously 
aligned on the French Left, rather than the anti-colonialist writers of the extreme Right.34 It is clear, 
therefore, that for the historian of the postwar intellectual, the important debates that redefine 
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intellectual identity after the occupation are held internally among engagés of the Republic and 
extreme Left. 35 
The tendency among historians of intellectuals has therefore been to either ignore the 
existence of engaged thinkers on the extreme Right or to present their ideas and organizations as 
“anti-intellectual.” This tendency is not necessarily calculated or even intentional. It is simply an 
automatic omission, an engrained preconception among historians of what it means to be an 
intellectual. The identity of the intellectual has been drawn from the Left’s concept of intellectual 
values, roles, responsibilities, professional trajectories, organizations, causes, and experiences that 
have been hegemonic over the century. The hegemony has been so complete that today it is virtually 
impossible to picture the intellectual outside of its confines. Because the identity of the intellectual 
has been preconceived in this way, intellectual history has been written as the story of the engagement 
of the intellectual Left while the intellectual Right has been, at best, underrepresented. This, however, 
was not the historical experience. There were self-identified intellectuals of the extreme Right who, 
like those of the Left, chose to engage their name, talents, and work in public affairs. They were not 
opposed to the title, role or responsibility of the public intellectual but only to the associations that 
had been conflated with intellectual identity by the Left, associations that did not correspond to the 
Right’s understanding of what it meant to be an intellectual.  
 
The Historical Conflict 
The concern with defining intellectual identity and creating a model of intellectual 
engagement is not, therefore, simply an academic question or an historian’s quarrel. It was a concern 
that consumed the intellectuals themselves. The role and responsibility of the intellectual was one that 
conferred status, authority, legitimacy, and political influence in twentieth-century France. The ability 
 
35 LeSueur shows that the debates of the 1960s over who could be considered an intellectual were 
meant to determine if the intellectuals previously accepted as “of the Left,” like Camus, who were now 
promoting French Algeria could still be considered intellectuals. There was no thought at the time of according 
this consideration to the extreme-Right. LeSueur and other historians of the post-war have simply continued this 
trend. 
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to monopolize and control this identity as France’s intellectual, cultural, and moral guides was 
therefore highly contested over the century. Because the intellectual Left took an early and substantial 
lead in this contest, defining the intellectual according to their own, alternative, right-wing 
conceptualization became a particular obsession among the engaged thinkers of the extreme Right. 
Woven in the fabric of intellectual debates over the century, particularly on the part of the Right, is 
the underlying struggle to control what it meant to be an intellectual: what relationship the intellectual 
has to government, society, and particular institutions like the university, what set of political, social, 
and intellectual values an intellectual engages to defend, and what trajectories, communities, and 
experiences make one an intellectual. This century-long struggle to dictate the model of intellectual 
identity, particularly on the part of the extreme Right, has not received the attention of intellectual 
historians. Exploring the motivation, process, and result of this struggle to define a right-wing model 
of intellectual identity is therefore a central component of this study. It finds that during each crisis 
period over the century, when intellectuals felt themselves called to engage, this right-wing struggle 
to define true intellectual identity would follow a certain pattern: perceived exclusion, resentment, 
legitimization and differentiation, segregation, and, finally, alienation. These stages of their struggle 
would in turn become essential to their concept of the experience and identity of the true, right-wing 
intellectual. 
In 1898 when Zola and Clemenceau first outlined the fundamental program of the 
intellectual, the academics and men of letters of the Right intentionally excluded themselves from its 
company. For a full year, the Left gained increasing public influence by claiming their education, 
intelligence, and understanding of universal truths qualified them to direct public opinion in all 
matters cultural, moral, and socio-political. By 1899, when the Right decided to engage, the Left had 
effectively dominated public perception of intellectual values, causes, responsibilities and identity. Its 
intellectuals reinforced their monopoly by instructing the public, as Jaures would, that “intellectuals 
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of the Right have no right to the title of intellectuel.”36 From this point on, the Right perceived itself 
decidedly, and no longer happily, excluded from the general concept of the intellectual guide. After 
1898, the intellectual Right would identify itself as the excluded, ostracized, minority whose role was 
opposition to the mainstream, dominant intellectual and political world. 
With each successive crisis in French affairs, the intellectuals of the Right believed 
themselves increasingly ostracized from intellectual influence. They perceived their values and their 
presence to be marginalized in the university system and ensured their marginalization in reality by 
turning away from this professional path in ever-greater numbers. They also increasingly saw a left-
wing hegemony in political affairs. Whether real, as in the case of the Popular Front and Liberation 
government, or imagined, the intellectual Right believed it was opposed by a united bloc of the center 
Republicans and extreme Left socialists or communists. The Right saw itself as excluded from 
mainstream politics, intellectual institutions, and the very identification and influence of the 
intellectual guide by what it believed was a hegemonic left-leaning bloc. Rather than protest first two 
ostracisms, the intellectual of the Right incorporated them into his model of true intellectual identity. 
The true intellectual would always work outside and in opposition to the existing Republican 
government and would be prominent outside the narrow confines of the sterile university. Exclusion 
from the role of intellectual guide, however, was not tolerable. Their reaction was one of frustration 
and profound resentment of the hegemony of the Left.37 
The result of the Right’s resentment and irritation with the dominance of the Left would be 
their crusade to legitimize an alternative, right-wing intellectual identity outside of, opposed to, and 
clearly differentiated from the dominant identity of the Left. This onus on the Right to first legitimize 
and lend authority to their position as intellectuals before ever entering into the political fray would 
give them a very different mentality of engagement from the intellectual of the Left who had no such 
insecurities. Engagement for the Right involved not just commentary on a public issue, but also a 
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concerted campaign to claim the title and role of the “intellectuel,” delegitimize the Left as a viable 
representative of French culture and intelligence, and market their own, alternative values, 
worldviews, and programs as those most conducive to French intellectual life. Vocal anti-Dreyfusard 
Ferdinand Brunetière would be one of the first to express his resentment and attempt to legitimize the 
Right by writing in 1898, “It has irritated us to hear it said that all the men of study and thought, all 
the intellectuals, were on the same side. This is not true and we are proof of it. It is necessary to show 
that intelligence… did not take part in the abominable campaign [of the Dreyfusard intellectuals] 
against the army.”38 Claiming the title and role of intellectual while simultaneously delegitimizing the 
dominant, left-wing image of this identity required that the intellectual of the Right clearly 
differentiate his own sense of role, responsibility, values, and identity from those condemned on the 
Left.  
Differentiating the values and worldviews of the Right from those of the Left would be an 
evident priority in all of the engaged work of the intellectual Right throughout the century. The Left 
was accused of unfairly and unrealistically claiming to speak for the universal, to grasp absolute 
truths, and to incarnate the international citizen of the world. Instead, the intellectual Right proposed 
the more realistic, if less awe-inspiring, role of speaking for the French nation, revealing its particular, 
relative truths, and representing the intelligence of True France. To left-wing responsibility of 
developing utopian theories they opposed political Realism and practical reform, against the Left’s 
vision for France of egalitarianism, democracy, and social revolution they presented a France of 
hierarchy, elitism, meritorious leadership, and social order. Over the century, the political programs 
and platforms of the extreme Right would evolve, but the intellectual values and worldviews that 
inspired them would always be presented as distinctive, opposed, and extremely different alternatives 
to the values of the Left.  
The Right’s struggle to differentiate the values and worldviews that it associated with 
intellectual responsibility from those attached to it on the Left would contribute to a parallel 
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segregation of the intellectual community over time. Before the Dreyfus Affair, men of letters and 
journalists of different political persuasion often found themselves writing for the same revues, 
teaching in the same institutions, and sharing the same socio-professional network of mentors, 
friends, and colleagues. As intellectual engagement and political involvement increasingly polarized 
the intellectual community, however, these cross-political environments became more and more rare.  
Although the intellectuals of the extreme Right and Left might still participate in the same 
basic intellectual practices, from writing in revues to teaching students to signing petitions, the 
collective experience of these practices and, therefore, of daily intellectual life, became increasingly 
segregated and differentiated. Revues and journals became organs of engaged thought for either the 
extreme Right or extreme Left where intellectuals’ values and political positions were reinforced and 
radicalized. Even revues like the NRF that attempted to remain above the polarizing fray would 
eventually take a political stance and begin to exclude those writers who did not toe the political line. 
The university increasingly became a bastion of republican, socialist, and later communist 
intellectuals while the educators on the Right created alternative, right-wing dominated institutions to 
mentor the next generation. Social and professional networks, spaces of sociability and intellectual 
communities from petitions to cafes, and even private friendships showed increasing signs of a left-
right divide.39 As the collective spaces and experience of intellectual life became ever more polarized 
and segregated, the individual intellectual’s concept of his collective identity as a member of the 
genus “intellectual” would too.  
From the Dreyfus Affair to the post-modern era, the intellectuals of the Right perceived 
themselves to be excluded and ostracized from the political and, more importantly, the intellectual life 
and leadership of France. Their reaction was one of resentment and frustration against the dominant 
Left. In their resentment, they struggled to redefine true, legitimate intellectual identity according to 
their own, alternative intellectual values and communities and to clearly differentiate and even 
 
39 Friendships that crossed political divides like that of Romain Rolland and Alphonse de 
Châteaubriant did exist but are remarkable, and remarked upon, for their peculiarity. Even these friendships 
showed the strain of conflicting political passions and intellectual values in private letters. 
19 
physically separate these from the Left. The result of this pattern of exclusion, resentment, 
differentiation, and segregation, however, has been not a newfound right-wing monopoly over the 
definition and conceptualization of the intellectual. Instead, it has resulted in their self-imposed 
alienation from mainstream, Left-dominated intellectual life. In their effort to distinguish themselves 
from the intellectuals of the Left, they have created a vicious cycle in which they sense themselves 
excluded, react by differentiating and isolating themselves, and find themselves increasingly 
marginalized and alienated. This has, in the end, aversely affected both their ability to communicate 
effectively with the mainstream public and their recognition by contemporaries and historians as 
intellectuals. 
 The two aims of this study are therefore intertwined. The historiographical tendency to 
exclude the intellectual of the Right today is a result of the Left’s century-long success in 
monopolizing the concept and also of the Right’s self-imposed isolation. By revealing the historical 
struggle that the Right waged to be recognized as intellectuals, it seeks to expose and challenge the 
tendency among intellectual historians today to treat the intellectuel de droite as a contradiction in 
terms. The struggle to monopolize the concept of the intellectual and the right-wing effort to construct 
its own, alternative model of intellectual identity would peak at certain points over the century when 
intellectuals of the Left and Right perceived France to be in crisis and to need intellectual guidance. 
For each of these periods of conflict, the study explores the perception of left-wing dominance, the 
resentment of this hegemony felt by the Right, the struggle to legitimize their own values and 
worldviews while differentiating them from those of the Left, and the resulting division and 
segregation of the intellectual community. From this pattern of identity construction, the study will 
develop a new model of right-wing intellectual identity. But, before considering how the chapters will 
be structured in more detail, it is necessary to explain how three essential concepts will be understood 
for the purposes of this study: the intellectual, identity, and the Right. 
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Key Concepts: The “Intellectual” 
 The very premise of this study is that the definition of the intellectual is one that has been 
contested over the century and that remains a flawed category of analysis in the current 
historiography. The purpose is, therefore, to construct a new, right-wing model of intellectual identity 
and a more accurate picture of the intellectual community as a whole. To construct this model, 
however, some basic parameters of the intellectual as an historical actor are necessary. There are 
several existing approaches the intellectual that provide this starting point for discussion and that do 
not a priori exclude the concept of a right-wing intellectual. 
In historical scholarship, intellectuals have been categorized and defined as universalists and 
particularists, organic and traditional, legislators and interpreters, critics and experts, producers and 
mediators, and as teachers, writers, and celebrities to name only a few.40 As a general rule, the 
categorizations and definitions tend to be either ideological or sociological in nature. The first 
considers the intellectual as a product of his political and cultural values and ideas and leads to 
definitions like “child of the Enlightenment,” “universalists,” and “special custodians of abstract ideas 
like reason and justice and truth.”41 This approach has produced the definitions that most clearly 
exclude the intellectual of the Right. This does not mean, however, that a values-based approach is 
not useful for defining the intellectual of the Right if the ideas and values associated with the 
intellectual can be disassociated from the Left.  
The second approach defines the intellectual by his role in society, his behaviors, and his 
relation to power. This latter approach often borrows from Bourdieu’s sociology of knowledge to 
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consider the intellectual as a product of his habitus and as a being struggling to monopolize power 
over cultural legitimacy.42 These sociological studies have considered the intellectual as a product of 
his relationship to institutions and proximity to professional power,43 connections to the Republican 
government or the social elite,44 and placement within certain academic disciplines.45 They have led 
to differentiations between the organic and traditional intellectuals and between the terms 
intelligentsia and intellectual as well as to categorizations based on the intellectual’s role and 
behavior. Because these definitions are based on the role of the intellectual to intervene in public 
affairs rather than on a particular set of values, they do not automatically exclude engaged thinkers of 
the Right. Therefore, it is one such “value-free” approach utilized by French intellectual scholars 
Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli, that will provide the basic definition of an intellectual for this 
study.46
In contrast to the majority of their contemporaries, Jean-François Sirinelli and Pascal Ory 
have been instrumental in developing a concept of the intellectual that recognizes the existence of 
intellectuals of the Right. Several chapters in Les Intellectuels en France; de l’Affaire Dreyfus a nos 
jours are devoted to right-wing intellectual organizations and engagés, and their overall approach to 
the narrative of intellectual history appreciates the importance of including the intellectual Right. 
Sirinelli’s later study of the war of petitions between Left and Right, Intellectuels et passions 
française; manifestes et petitions au XXe siècle, continued this balanced appraisal of intellectual 
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engagement.47 The definition used in these works to determine who can be considered an intellectual 
is found in Pascal Ory’s Qu’est-ce qu’un intellectuel? which says, “The intellectual is the man of 
culture put in the situation of the man of politics. He belongs to one of the great universes of culture: 
creation or mediation.”48 In this way both the artists, writers, and scientists who produce culture and 
the universitaires and critics who mediate or comment on it are considered intellectuals.49 
Essential to their definition, and of great importance for this study, is the understanding that 
the intellectual is not defined by his social placement or his political values but by his action: “he is 
not defined by what he is but by what he does, i.e. a certain type of intervention in a certain place; la 
cite.” “The intellectual,” he explains, “will be political in that which he intervenes- civic debates, city 
planning, etc when he proposes a choice of society to his contemporaries in the name of cultural 
choice.”50 From this it can be concluded that the intellectual is necessarily engaged and that “engaged 
intellectual” is redundant. A writer or savant who does not lend his name, prestige, and work to the 
debate on political or social affairs is a “philosopher” rather than an “intellectual.” On the other 
extreme, a writer or savant who takes political office can also not be considered an intellectual but 
only a politician or civil servant.51 Therefore, according to this basic definition, writers and savants 
who intervened in public debates without taking office, whether their political affiliation was to Left, 
Center, or Right, must be considered intellectuals.  
A quick addition to this basic definition is made by Michel Winock who notes that it does not 
suffice for a writer to simply enter the field of public action or to make appeal to public opinion to 
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merit the name intellectual. It is also necessary to capitalize intentionally on the celebrity earned in 
another domain. This earned prestige in their respective literary or scientific disciplines is what 
Winock says causes intellectuals to believe they have the right to speak in the name of the public 
good and causes the average citizen to grant them this prerogative. An intellectual, he summarizes, is 
not just a signer of a petition but one who proposes to society an analysis, a direction, a morality that 
his previous work and education seems to qualify him to elaborate.52 Along similar lines, Manon 
Brunet and Pierre Lanthier have specifically introduced the concept of social influence to the 
definition of the intellectual. They argue that it is essential to the intellectual’s identity that he not 
simply intervene, but that he actively seek to build support for his position among the greater public. 
They say “the intellectual is one who, without proclamation of his title, affirms publicly his ideas 
while seeking to rally the greatest number of citizens to his cause, in the name of the safeguarding of 
national identity.”53 This requirement that the intellectual feel a responsibility for gaining legitimacy 
and social authority for an intellectual position is essential to understanding the right-wing’s struggle 
to reverse left-wing dominance. By claiming the title of intellectuel, the right-wing thinkers are 
demanding both the authority and responsibility to sway public opinion.  
Closely connected to these stipulations by Winock, Brunet, and Lanthier is a final 
requirement clarified by Jeremy Jennings and Herman Lebovics: the intellectual claims the power to 
speak in the name of “True France.” Jennings listed three preconditions for the model of the 
intellectual. The intellectual had autonomy, was granted status by society, and “spoke for France.” 
Unfortunately, Jennings continued by specifying only the Dreyfusard vision of France, “the France of 
the Enlightenment and of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Their France spoke 
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and proclaimed a universal Truth.”54 But, he does admit that there were “competing conceptions of 
France” and that the anti-Dreyfusards had their own vision. Herman Lebovics explains that, among 
intellectuals, these competing conceptions of France led to “combats between Left and Right for the 
right to speak on behalf of ‘True France.”55 While the Left claimed to speak for the universal, 
international values associated with France since the Revolution, the Right claimed to be the “sole 
representatives of the French heritage” and to speak for French national values which were vital for 
maintaining French identity and defending against foreign influence.56 Right-wing conceptions of an 
‘essential’ France, the “pays reel” based on blood, soil, religion, language, and shared history and 
tradition were pitted against those on the Republican center and Left of a civic French nation based on 
the documents and ideals of the Republic and the French Revolution.57 The struggle to monopolize 
the authority of the intellectual was therefore in part a struggle between Left and Right to determine 
whose vision of France would prevail.   
There are two final parameters for the use of the term “intellectual” in this study. First, 
although Venita Datta has made convincing arguments for the extension of the birth of the intellectual 
to the mid 1890s and several historians, including Shlomo Sand, have urged readers to consider 
Voltaire or Auguste Comte intellectuals, the majority of historians have agreed that the Dreyfus 
Affair of 1898 is the date for the birth of the modern intellectual.58 Although Voltaire and others may 
have engaged their work independently for a specific social cause, it is not until the Dreyfus Affair 
that writers and savants exercise, all at the same time, the right to public critique, the right to 
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symbolic power drawn from their titles and educations, and the right to league themselves to give 
their protest more force.59 It is also not until 1898 that the term “intellectuel” is found beyond literary 
circles and is popularized to the extent that it begins to appear in common language dictionaries.60 It 
is therefore with the Dreyfus Affair and the first debates over who can be attributed the title of 
‘intellectual’ and who must suffer the name ‘anti-intellectual’ that this study will begin. Secondly, 
although Nicole Racine’s article “Intellectuelles” argues for the inclusion of female intellectuals,61 
this study will maintain the masculine form of the noun. In the debates over intellectual identity, the 
contribution of female intellectuelles was negligible.62 Also, despite the association of the extreme 
Right, particularly during the interwar and occupation, with the homosocial and misogynistic 
elements of fascism, there is little evidence that the intellectual Right was any less inclusive of 
females than the intellectual Left.63 Because gender was not an issue in the construction of right-wing 
intellectual identity, it is not of interest for this study. 
According to these initial parameters, an “intellectual” is one who, as early as the Dreyfus 
Affair, engaged his earned prestige from literary, journalistic, or academic professional life in debates 
on political and social issues outside his immediate expertise. The intellectual assumed the authority 
to intervene because of his education and intelligence and believed he spoke in the name of True 
France. With this definition, it is quite possible to identify a large number of “intellectuals” on the 
extreme Right over the century. Such a definition does not, however, provide a very detailed tool for 
analysis and tends to provide only a vague picture of intellectuals that does not correspond to their 
 
59 Charle, Naissance des “intellectuals,” 8.  
 
60 Winock and Julliard, Dictionnaire, 15. 
 
61 Nicole Racine, “Intellectuels,” in L’histoire des intellectuels aujourd’hui, ed. Michel Leymarie and 
Jean-François Sirinelli (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2003).  
 
62 David Drake has attributed the general absence of engaged female intellectuals to the political 
restrictions on women throughout much of the twentieth-century. Even today, he writes, females are “largely 
absent” from the intellectual milieu. This absence was even more apparent in the debates over intellectual 
identity. Drake, Intellectuals and Politics, 5. 
 
63 For every left-wing Simone Weil or Simone de Beauvoir, there was an equally engaged, if perhaps 
less well known, Annie Jamet or Suzanne Labin on the extreme Right. 
26 
own complex self-identifications. In particular, it tends to group together intellectuals of the Left and 
Right based on their shared behaviors and to ignore the divisions they identified as clearly separating 
them.  
Sociological methodologies and their resulting definitions of the intellectual are therefore 
excellent for initial categorization but not for further conceptualization of the intellectual. As Leonard 
has concluded, “the sociological approach achieved nothing so much as the verification of the 
difficulty of carving out a definition of intellectuals that makes no reference to the moral purposes 
and epistemic contents of the life of the mind.”64 For a more complex understanding of intellectual 
identity, it is necessary to add some assessment of intellectual values, ideas, and worldviews to the 
foundation proposed by Ory and Sirinelli. For the purpose of this study, intellectual identity will be 
considered a product both of the social role, responsibility, and behaviors associated with engagement 
and of the intellectual, cultural, social and political values and ideas that drove this engagement. 
 
Identity 
The second concept used in this study that requires clarification, therefore, is that of identity 
and identity construction. The model of right-wing intellectual identity will be based on two 
contributing aspects: the personal identity of the individual intellectual and the collective identity of 
the community to which the intellectual sensed himself to belong. The first is formed by private 
reflection on ideas, values, personal responsibility, and purpose. The second is constructed by the 
individual’s identification with the values, ideas, actions and engagements of a larger group. The 
individual, therefore, conceives of himself as a composite of his social behaviors, associations, and 
experiences and of his values, ideas, and ideological affiliations. The individual nature of intellectual 
work, particularly for writers, has led scholars to consider the personal identity of intellectuals, 
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whether through biographies or literary critiques, more readily than their collective identity. This 
second component, therefore, deserves some elaboration. 
Social Identity theory explains that “our sense of who we are comes from two different but 
equally important aspects, “the personal identity component that is based on individual experience 
and thought and the social identity component which is based on participation in social networks and 
groups.65 The social or collective component allows any group with which the individual associates 
and identifies himself to be come part of his concept of self. Searle-White justifies this integration 
saying, “group identities are not something separate from us…that we can put on and take off. When 
we categorize ourselves into a group, in a sense, that group becomes part of us as well as creating the 
perception of a connection to other members.”66 Whether these groups are real and provide tangible 
interaction with others like committees and revue équipes, or are “imagined” communities where the 
group extends beyond the scope of physical interaction like petitions and international organizations, 
they all provide a sense of collective identity. This relational aspect of identity not only creates 
positive associations or “in groups” with like-minded peers, it also creates negative associations with 
the “out groups” who are seen as the “other.” Intellectuals on the Right gathered together in socio-
professional and intellectual communities in order to find support and reinforcement for their 
alternative ideas, create mentoring relationships, interact socially, and amplify the effectiveness of 
their individual engagements. The more actively they identified with these separate right-wing 
communities, the more they found themselves to be different from the “out group” communities of 
intellectuals on the Left and Center.   
The importance of this collective identity has been a focal point in the work of Sirinelli on the 
lieux and reseaux of intellectual sociability. According to Sirinelli, the structures of sociability where 
intellectuals gathered in their daily lives, from revue teams and publishing houses to educational 
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faculties, salons, khagneux, and even generations led to the creation of different groups of 
intellectuals who shared the same vocabulary, ideas, values, and worldviews. The shared behaviors 
and values within these organizations gave these groups their own identity in relation to the rest of 
society and created the sort of “in” and “out” groups discussed by Searl-White.67 These studies by 
Sirinelli have been invaluable to the understanding of intellectual collective identity, and his concept 
of lieux and reseaux of sociability will be an important part of this study. Sirinelli’s approach, 
however, tends to ignore the important political divisions within his larger communities of 
intellectuals that further separated them. As the work of both Diane Rubenstein and Robert Smith 
have pointed out, although members of a certain class at the ENS or a certain generation may have 
felt a sense of connection, it did not prevent them from identifying more strongly with those in other 
generations or classes who shared similar socio-political values and engagements.68 Like the other 
previously mentioned sociological categorizations, these structures of sociability remain vague tools 
for discussing identity because they do not take account of the important component of intellectual 
values and ideas. This weakness in Sirinelli’s approach to collective identity has been addressed by 
Michel Trebitsch and Philippe Dujardin. It is their approach to collective identity construction that 
will most heavily influence this study. 
Trebitsch has criticized Sirinelli for being so eager to not “reduce the history of intellectuals 
to a piece of the larger political history” by dividing them automatically by political affiliation, that he 
“puts left and right intellectuals on the same level simply because they share identical structures of 
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sociability like cercles, revues, and cafés.”69 For Trebitsch, histories of intellectuals that only consider 
the question of values as secondary, preferring instead a pure description of behavior and engagement 
of the individual within a collective, are ill founded. Relational practices like socializing within a 
certain group are always founded on adherence to common values which “determine a specific 
sociability where the established relationships are always primarily in rapport with those values.”70 
Dujardin continues in this vein warning that the tool of sociability can lead historians to ignore 
personal identities and a more complex sense of connection in favor of broad categorizations of 
intellectual identity based on a shared space or type of behavior.71 Identifying intellectual 
communities without the context of their political currents of thought ends up “confounding” the very 
different intellectual identities of the Left and Right that “their modes of sociability [alone] are not 
able to differentiate.”72 Trebitsch and Dujardin therefore provide strong justification for considering 
not only the sociological divisions within the collective intellectual identity but also the intellectual or 
value-based divisions between Left and Right that contribute to a more nuanced identity. 
This study will approach identity in two ways in order to account for both the individual and 
collective components of identity and the intellectual and sociological aspects of intellectual life. 
First, a view of the intellectual of the Right will be drawn from the individual statements, writings, 
and reflections of representative right-wing thinkers. Special attention will be given to their own 
definitions of what it meant to be an intellectual and the values and worldviews they believed the 
“intellectual” should defend. Secondly, the intellectual of the Right will be viewed as a collective 
through the groups, movements, organizations and organs with which he identified. These politically 
segregated communities of like-minded thinkers provided not only support, outlets for engagement, 
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and social interaction for members, they also reinforced a sense of separation, differentiation and 
alienation in intellectual values. Since it is the purpose of this study to identify those elements that 
distinguished the intellectual identity, both personal and collective, of the Right from that of the 
Center and Left, it is also important to clarify how this study will define the Right. 
 
The Right 
 It is necessary to clarify how the term “Right” will be used and who will be considered “of 
the Right.” To some extent, this study is as much an effort to define the ideological extreme Right as 
it is to define the intellectual. The engaged thinkers of the Right and Left played a large part in the 
construction and translation of the political ideologies to which they adhered. The values and 
worldviews that the intellectuals of the Right believed differentiated them from the Left were 
therefore also essential to their definition of what it meant to be “dits à droite.” Because of this, the 
exploration of right-wing intellectual identity construction in this study will reveal as much about 
right-wing identity as it does about intellectual identity. The model developed at the conclusion of the 
study to understand the intellectual of the Right will also, therefore, provide some insight into the 
world of the extreme Right. However, the focus of the study will remain on the intellectual. The rank 
and file political Right of the non-intellectual ligues, organizations, political parties, and youth groups 
will be mentioned only when they influence or interact with the intellectual groups or are necessary as 
context for the intellectual community.  
Although this study will focus on the intellectuals at the extreme ends of the political 
spectrum, it is important to recognize that historians have tended to ignore the ideological Right as a 
whole. Sirinelli has noted, in his three volume set Histoire des Droites en France, that the study of 
the political Right as a cultural and socio-political phenomenon has been sadly under-represented. He 
suggests that the term “droite” does not have the same connotation, the same “affective charge as the 
Left in our political life. There has been a sort of semantic ostracism against the Right. Added to this 
inequality of connotations is the problem of a differential memory. Our national memory has a center 
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of gravity placed on the left and this disequilibrium is no longer without effect on the depth and 
composition of material…with which the historian must work. If these constitute obstacles to the 
study of our political life, they also constitute its justification.”73 
Those few studies that have explored the world of the Right have tended to approach it in two 
ways. The first is to view the extreme Right before 1940 as “pre-fascist” or “proto-fascist” and the 
right-wing after it as “neo-fascist.” This approach, identifiable in the work of Robert Soucy and Zeev 
Sternhell among others, looks at the disparate right-wing groups and ideologies from the anti-
Dreyfusards to the Action Française with the goal of finding continuities in right-wing thought that 
prepare for fascism and collaboration. Christophe Prochasson has even felt the need to warn these 
historians to be careful about claiming pre-fascist ideologies in a time where fascism did not yet even 
exist.74 The second approach is to divide the Right into three or four “types” whose identity remains 
stable over the century. René Rémond created three divisions of the Right in his 1966 work: the 
Ultras, the Orleanists, and the Bonapartist/ Nationalists.75 Michel Winock claims that between the 
Boulangism of the 1880s and the Dreyfus Affair four separate Rights developed whose identities 
remained continuous until the end of World War II. Two were anti-parlementarian, one mixed 
populism with nationalism, and the last looked to monarchism. He argues that these account for all 
the movements of the pre-1945 era.76 Such categorizations and general genealogies of the Right are 
important, Winock claims, because the “contagion” of the Right does not limit itself to a certain 
social class, it remains a “latent danger in all French political life” and must therefore be recognized 
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by its hereditary traits.77 Both of these approaches to the Right tend to interpret the political values of 
the extreme Right as negations of existing, positive left-wing values. They define the Right by its 
anti-republicanism, anti-communism, and anti-Semitism and suggest it has no positive doctrine, 
political values, or worldviews distinct from its rejection of the Left. 
In contrast to these approaches, this study will explore the possibility of continuities in right-
wing intellectual values over the century but will not predetermine that the progression culminates in 
fascism. It shows the Right as an ideology of positive action and independent ideas, not just negative 
reaction. And it considers the Right to be a diverse body of thought with intellectual representatives 
that defy categorization in three or four ideological lineages. It therefore explores a range of 
intellectuals of the Right and a full spectrum of right-wing organizations without seeking to identify 
each with a nineteenth-century political origin. The only group considered “of the Right” that will not 
be represented in the study is the conservative, moderate Republicans. 
Instead, when used in this study, the designation “right-wing” will refer only to the extreme 
pole of the political spectrum rather than the moderates and conservatives of the republican Center. 
Since the dominant, mainstream concept of the intellectual was one that arose from the Dreyfusard 
camp, it was built and refined around the universalist, revolutionary, enlightenment principles shared 
by both the extremists of the Left and the republicans, both liberals and conservatives, of the Center. 
The alternative, opposing concept of the intellectual created on the extreme Right would reject these 
foundations in favor of an anti-parliamentarian and anti-republican set of political values. Because the 
conservatives and moderates continued to cooperate with the institutions of democracy and 
republicanism rather than reacting against them, they would not participate in this alternative 
intellectual identity construction. Since it would be the extremists of the Right who would lead the 
challenge against the dominant, mainstream understanding of intellectual identity, it is the extremists 
that will be intended when “right-wing” intellectuals are mentioned in this study. 
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 Conservative republicans are also excluded from this discussion of the “right-wing” because 
the question of identity construction is one that deals with perception as much as reality. Whether in 
reality the conservatives and moderates should be considered right-wing or not, the intellectual 
extreme Right that led the reconceptualization of intellectual identity perceived itself as distinct from 
the republican Right as it did from the extreme Left. Although they might be designated “of the 
Right” by historians and their contemporaries on the Left, republicans, like Aron and the Gaullists, 
were considered “of the Left” by the more extreme thinkers of the Right. In the Cartel des gauches, 
the Popular Front, and the Resistance government, the intellectual of the Right perceived that the 
Republic, and all those conservatives or moderates who were aligned with it, was allied in a bloc with 
the socialist or communist Left. And in the university, journalism, and the public debates over 
intellectual responsibility and values, they perceived the republicans to be firmly ensconced in the 
mainstream values that dominated and monopolized the intellectual world. Far from being included in 
their concept of an alternative right-wing intellectual identity, therefore, these conservatives and 
moderates were classed along with the extremists of the socialist and communist Left as the 
mainstream hegemons.  
The definition of the Right used for this study is also a relational and relative one. In its 
simplest form, to be “of the Right” in this study means being neither “of the republican Center” nor 
“of the Left.” As one historian has theorized, Left and Right are defined by their mirror image, 
“mutual relationship” to one another and by their “common effort of differentiation” from one 
another.78 They are not absolute entities and so, while they may evidence continuities in their 
manifestations over the century, they can also evolve. For example, the nationalism and anti-
Semitism identified as values of the Left during the nineteenth century would shift at the turn of the 
century to become defining values of the Right.79 But the shift was only possible due to a 
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corresponding shift of values on the Left that allowed the two political camps to remain each others’ 
foil.  
The image of a mirror for understanding the Right is valuable in another sense. There are 
many convincing arguments for relinquishing the extreme Left-Right division in favor of a division 
between the moderate Center and the extremist periphery. This perspective is often supported by 
evidence that former communists and left-wing extremists like Doriot and Deat freely “crossed over” 
into the right-wing fascist camps of the interwar. However, these political migrations from one 
extreme to another required a corresponding reprioritization of intellectual values and a new approach 
to political and intellectual life beyond a simple shift from anti-fascism to anti-communism.80 This 
study will therefore maintain that there is “an invisible but insurmountable line” of demarcation 
between the intellectual Left and Right that prevents its conflation. This line divides what Alain-
Gerard Slama calls “specific political temperaments.” He argues that, after reading the work of 
numerous writers on the Right, he has found psychological, intellectual and moral dispositions which 
clearly distinguish them from the Left.81 These distinctive temperaments would contribute to 
distinctive and opposing concepts of intellectual identity on the extreme Right and Left that cannot be 
conflated into an extremist versus centrist division.  
In this study, therefore, “the Right” is seen as a political and intellectual temperament that 
incorporates a diverse group of movements and programs that cannot all be associated with fascism. 
It has certain continuities in values and behaviors over the century, but it is also a fluid category that 
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has evolved, shifting its priorities to mirror corresponding shifts in the values of the Left. Finally, it 
identifies itself as a collective distinct from both the moderates of the Republican Center and the 
extreme Left which it most often believes to be operating as a bloc against it. The intellectual and 
social values, worldviews, programs, and organizations that defined what it meant to be “of the 
Right” will be identified over the course of the study along with the intellectuals’ definition of 
intellectual identity. With these essential concepts of the Right, Identity construction, and the 
Intellectual clarified, it remains to consider the overall structure of the chapters in this study. 
 
Structure of the Study 
 Intellectuals felt called to engage their work throughout the century, but it is during periods 
when they perceived France to be in crisis and seeking direction that they were most eager to restrict 
and define who could lay claim to the authority of the intellectual guide. These periods were 
politically divisive for all, but they dramatically polarized the intellectual community who saw 
France’s moral, cultural, and intellectual future to be at stake in each crisis. It is during these periods 
that the nature of intellectual identity: its values, responsibilities, behaviors, and proper affiliations 
became the subject of intense reflection and debate on both the Left and Right. This study is divided 
into five sections that correspond to five periods of perceived crisis in French society when 
intellectuals felt called upon to engage and to monopolize the role of intellectual guide for their cause. 
The first crisis is that of the Dreyfus Affair, from 1898-1902, when the title and role of intellectual 
first became a cause of conflict between the Left and Right. The second crisis, from 1910-1920, is the 
Nouvelle Sorbonne debate over the Republic’s reform to the educational system and the subsequent 
division over international relations before and after World War I. The third period of crisis is the 
interwar reaction to the rise of fascism and communism from 1933-1939. The fourth period is the 
crisis of German occupation from 1940-1944 and the divisive choices of collaboration or resistance. 
The final period is the post-war struggle from 1945 to 1968 to redefine France’s place in the world 
and answer new questions about communism, colonialism, racism, and the Republic.  
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 After a brief introduction to the particular time period and the important political, social, and 
intellectual issues at stake, each of these larger sections will be divided into four chapters. The first of 
the four chapters considers the position of the intellectual Left at the time. It notes the intellectual 
spokesmen of the republican Center and the extreme Left who played a prominent role in the debates 
of the time and who led the struggle to control the image of the intellectual. It also considers the 
values that united these republican and extreme Left engagés as the dominant intellectuals while 
excluding the Right. Finally, it explores the significant intellectual organizations, communities, 
networks, relationships to society, and experiences on the Left that segregated these intellectuals from 
those of the Right. 
The second two chapters begin the analysis of the intellectual identity constructed on the 
Right by presenting case studies of two significant right-wing intellectuals of the period. These 
selected intellectuals of the Right have been chosen for their self-identification as both intellectuals 
and members of the extreme Right. They also have been chosen based on their prominence in the 
debate over intellectual identity, role, responsibility, and values and their adherence to the important 
right-wing intellectual communities of the time. For each period, one case study is on an intellectual 
who has received some scholarly attention, though most often for being an “anti-intellectual,” and the 
other is on an intellectual who has been relatively ignored by historians. The intellectuals chosen for 
case study are: Maurice Barrès and Ferdinand Brunetière during the Dreyfus Affair, Charles Maurras 
and Henri Massis during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debate, Abel Bonnard and Ramon Fernandez during 
the interwar years, Drieu la Rochelle and Alphonse de Châteaubriant during the occupation, and 
Maurice Bardèche and Jacques Laurent during the postwar. In each of these case studies, the 
intellectuals reveal the same pattern of engagement and struggle: recognition of left-wing dominance, 
resentment of this hegemony, struggle to legitimize themselves as intellectual guides while 
differentiating their value system and worldview, segregation of their intellectual communities and 
networks, and a resulting alienation of their experience as intellectuals from that of the mainstream 
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Left and Center. These case study chapters will approach the issue of identity construction from the 
personal speeches and statements, literary work, journalism, and private reflections of the engagé.
The fourth chapter in each section will consider right-wing intellectual identity construction 
from the collective or social identity perspective. It will look at the significant right-wing intellectual 
organizations, revues, movements, parties, professional networks and social spaces and the 
segregated, polarizing nature of these communities for collective intellectual identity. It also 
considers the trajectories, behaviors, practices, relationships to their society, and experiences that 
were particular and distinctive to the intellectual Right and helped to separate their understanding of 
what it meant to be an intellectual from that of the Left. All together, the four chapters for each of the 
five periods will reveal both the changing conceptions of what it meant to be an intellectual of the 
Right and also the continuities in the Right’s perception of exclusion, resentment, distinctive values, 
and ideological segregation that linked different generations of the intellectual Right to one another.  
 The study concludes with the construction of a new model for understanding right-wing 
intellectual identity based on this pattern revealed by the intellectuals in the case studies. There are 
certain characteristics and experiences that the case studies reveal to be essential to being an 
intellectual of the extreme Right, no matter the time period. These characteristics are those that most 
dramatically distinguish right-wing intellectuals from their counterparts on the Center and Left, and, 
therefore, form the basis for the new model of right-wing intellectual identity. The intellectual of the 
Right is marked first by an intense resentment of what he perceives to be left-wing intellectual 
hegemony. Whether the exclusion is real or imagined, he feels himself ostracized from places of 
influence and power by a hegemonic Left. This has led him to identify intellectual identity with the 
role of the pariah, the heretic, and the prophet and to equate intellectual responsibility with resistance 
and opposition to the established academic and political world. This resentment of the Left and the 
desire to challenge it have led to a certain mentality of engagement that is characteristic of the 
extreme Right throughout the century. Right-wing intellectual engagement and its discourse are 
always colored by the underlying need to first legitimize the right-wing position as intellectually 
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viable. This added crusade has led to a distinctive language of engagement that emphasizes the idea 
of “true” and “false” intellectuals, “True France,” and the “responsibility” of intelligence.  
Legitimization by the intellectual of the Right also involves a differentiation of values from 
those of the dominant Left. There are certain core values which are found on the intellectual Right 
from the Dreyfus Affair to the postwar era: rejection of universal abstractions, promotion of Realism, 
opposition to internationalism as cosmopolitanism, advocacy of rooted nationalism, rejection of 
egalitarianism, and preference for elitism, hierarchy, and authority. Even when certain values, such as 
Realism or socialism, were also claimed by the intellectual Left, the intellectual Right had a 
distinctive interpretation of those values that continued to differentiate them. When these values were 
linked together as part of an intellectual itinerary, many of the internal contradictions of extreme 
Right wing thought would emerge. Yet the intellectual Right saw its program as a cohesive whole that 
both legitimized its claims to intellectual status and differentiated its engagement from the Left. The 
intellectual of the Right also separated himself from the model of the Left by his distinctive, 
segregated intellectual communities. Right-wing intellectuals participated in particular networks, 
communities, and collectives outside the mainstream, left-dominated milieu including right-wing 
political parties, ligues, cultural organizations, revue teams, publishing firms, and petitions. These 
communities and the networks that formed to interconnect them are different from those of the Left 
that have been the basis for the existing model of collective intellectual identity. Finally, the 
intellectual of the Right is also marked by an increasing alienation from the mainstream intellectual 
world. He believes he has a different relationship to the government, society, and certain intellectual 
institutions like the university than his peers on the Left. Even when they shared certain basic 
behaviors, these distinctive relationships when paired with the segregated intellectual communities 
and socio-professional networks, made being an intellectual of the Right a different experience from 
being an intellectual of the Left. 
This model is an effort to provide historians with a foundation for identifying and grappling 
with these other, right-wing intellectuals. Because the definitions that historians use today to analyze 
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intellectual life are based on left-wing engagement, intellectual values, and communities, they do not 
accurately reflect the right-wing intellectual experience. As a result, those few narratives of 
intellectual life that attempt to incorporate the right-wing intellectual tend to view them as anti-
intellectual engagés or curious aberrations of the intellectual. Instead, it must be recognized that the 
intellectuals of the Right, although they identified themselves as intellectuals and claimed the right to 
engage in public debates, had an extremely different understanding of what this identification meant. 
Because of this, they present a different model of intellectual identity that historians must contend 
with if they want to understand the intellectual Right. In order to judge the validity of this new model 
for understanding future intellectuals of the Right, the study will close with an examination its 
applicability to Nouvelle Droite intellectual Alain de Benoist and his circle of peers at GRECE.
SECTION II 
 
THE DREYFUS AFFAIR, 1898-1902 
 
Although the term intellectuel had been used in France before the Dreyfus Affair, it would 
not be until 1898 that control over who could be considered an intellectual became a point of 
contention among the educated elite. The Affair initiated an unprecedented polarization within the 
academic and literary milieu that would begin a century-long division of the intellectual world 
between those considered “of the Left” and those considered “of the Right.”82 Because the Left was 
first to accept the title of “intellectual” and the role of public engagement, they would mold these 
concepts according to their own values and deny them to their right-wing opposition. The 
effectiveness with which they excluded the thinkers, writers, and academics of the Right from this 
role would instigate a cycle of resentment, self-legitimation, differentiation, and segregation that 
provided the foundation for the alternative intellectual identity of the Right.  
The Dreyfus Affair proper began with the discovery of the “bordereau” in 1894 and the 
subsequent indictment and imprisonment of the Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus for treason. The 
suggestion made two years later by Maire Georges Picquart that Dreyfus had been unjustly accused in 
the place of the real traitor, Walsin-Esterhazy, would spark a new interest in the case, particularly 
among the educated elite. When Esterhazy was promptly acquitted and Picquart arrested based on 
evidence falsified by Major Henry, several men of letters and journalists began to suspect that the 
military was attempting to cover up an injustice to preserve its public image. It was with these 
suspicions that Emile Zola wrote the “Lettre à M. Felix Faure,” which Georges Clemenceau would 
 
82 “From June 1898 to February 1899, a gradual step by step clarification of the political scene was to 
take place: the Left after breaking with nationalism and anti-Semitism, would gradually come to identify itself 
with Dreyfusism. And it would be more directly opposed to a Right which was wholly anti-Dreyfusard.” Eric 
Cahm, The Dreyfus Affair in French Society and Politics (London: Longman, 1996), 108. 
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publish on January 13, 1898 under the title “J’accuse!” This open letter and the two subsequent 
petitions for full disclosure and revision of the Dreyfus case would spark a maelstrom of intellectual 
activity.83 By February 8, the number of savants, academics, and men of letters who had lent their 
name and title to the petitions in favor of Dreyfus would reach 1,482.  
Clemenceau quickly published a congratulatory article in L’Aurore saying, “is it not a sign, 
all these intellectuels come from all corners of the world grouping themselves around an idea.”84 
From this point on, the thinkers who lent their influence to the defense of Dreyfus would proudly 
identify with the title “intellectual.” The dreyfusard milieu of the Revue Blanche would quickly take 
up the name as would Lucien Herr in his response to Barrès’ February 1 article condemning 
intellectual engagement. More importantly, they would associate intellectual role and responsibility 
with the values and worldviews that the defense of Dreyfus came to represent: egalitarianism, 
individual rights, the universal ideals of Truth and Justice, and the rejection of anti-Semitism. To 
better promote these Enlightenment values, the Dreyfusard intellectuals created a collective 
organization aptly named the Ligue française pour la defense des droits de l’homme et du citoyen in 
February 1898.  
However, according to the extreme Right, being a Dreyfusard intellectual also implied a 
corresponding lack of patriotic nationalism, an attack on the military in a time of European instability, 
and a cosmopolitanism that risked deformation of the French national identity. 85 Therefore, although 
 
83 The first petition read “the undersigned, protesting against the violation of the judicial forms in the 
trial of 1894 and against the mysteries which have surrounded the Esterhazy affair, persist in demanding 
revision.” The second read “the undersigned, struck by the irregularities committed in the Dreyfus trial of 1894 
and by the mystery which surrounds the trial of commandant Esterhazy, persuaded in addition that the entire 
nation is interested in the maintaining of legal guarantees, the protection of citizens in a free nation, astonished 
by the findings of lieutenant-colonel Picquart and the findings no less illegal attributed to the latter, moved by 
the procedures of judicial information employed by the military authority, demand the Chamber maintain the 
legal guarantees of citizens against all things arbitrary.” L’Aurore, January 23, 1898. 
 
84 “A la derive,” L’Aurore January 23, 1898. 
 
85 The army, despite its defeat in 1870, had become for many on the Right, the great heroic force which 
would exact its revenge on Germany and return Alsace-Lorraine to the nation. Widespread insecurity about the 
military preparedness of France until this revenge led not only to glorification of military figures but to 
immediate opposition to anything that might damage its stability and stature. Nationalism, which had long been 
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Clemenceau had been the first to apply the term to the Left, it would be Maurice Barrès, one of the 
most outspoken Anti-Dreyfusard writers, who popularized the term in the more widely circulated Le 
Journal. His Februrary 1 article “La protestation des intellectuels” was a scathing condemnation of 
the “intellectuels” who, he said, attempted to apply their general intelligence to the diverse problems 
surrounding the Dreyfus Affair without the necessary information about the case to even form an 
opinion. By March, Ferdinand Brunetière, René Doumic, and other anti-Dreyfusard men of letters 
would write essays that asked “Qu-est-ce qu’un intellectuel?” and answered that they were men who 
claimed a superiority based on their intelligence, training, and erudition, who believed logic and 
rationality could comprehend the universal values of Truth and Justice, and that these abstractions 
could be applied to society. Rather than participate in this abuse of their talents, Barrès said he and 
the Anti-Dreyfusards preferred to “be intelligent, rather than intellectuels.” This meant leaving the 
fate of Dreyfus to the military courts to preserve the stability of the military, protecting the interest of 
the collective nation, and acknowledging the realistic limitations on grasping universal truths. 
Despite their best efforts to discredit the “intellectuals,” the “men of intelligence” on the 
Anti-Dreyfusard Right soon perceived that these Dreyfusard spokesmen for the universal were 
effectively influencing public opinion and political policy. Right-wing scorn for the Dreyfusard 
concept of an engaged intellectual turned to envy of their authority and resentment of their unrivaled 
dominance over the role of social and moral guide. To gain equal influence over public affairs, the 
anti-Dreyfusards realized they would need not only to engage their work in the delegitimization of the 
intellectual of the Left, they would need to claim for themselves both the title and role of the 
 
associated with Jacobin patriotism, had been redefined and popularized by Barrès in 1892 with a new anti-
Republican tone and became synonymous with defense of traditional values and institutions against internal and 
external enemies. Nationalism as a concept and a program would therefore switch, in these pre-Dreyfus Affair 
years, from the liberal, Jacobin and Republican Left to the monarchist and extreme-Right. The connection 
between the new, right-wing nationalism, Anti-Dreyfusism, and anti-Semitism also caused a noticeable shift of 
anti-Semitism. Before it had been prominent on the Left and particularly among the socialists who associated 
Jews with capitalism, during the years of the Affair, it would switch camps to the political and intellectual 
Right. Jennings, “Anti-Semitic discourse,” 19. The Ligue antisemitique of Guerin, the Ligue des Patriotes, and 
the work La France juive and journal La Libre Parole of Eduard Drumont would be instrumental in associating 
anti-Semitism with anti-Dreyfusism and the extreme Right. Peter M. Rutkoff, Revanche and Revision: the Ligue 
des Patriotes and the Origins of the Radical Right in France, 1882-1900 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981).  
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intellectual and the responsibility to engage. This crusade on the Right would begin with the creation 
of the Ligue de la Patrie françiase on January 1, 1899.86 Barrès expressed the members’ new claim to 
the title ‘intellectuel’ saying, “The important thing is that no one is able to say any longer that 
intelligence and the intellectuals- to use that questionable French word- are only on one side.”87 
Brunetière would follow suit saying “we have been irritated by hearing it said that all the men of 
study and thought, all the intellectuals, were on the same side. This is not true and we prove it.”88 
Yet, the anti-Dreyfusard claim to the title and role of the intellectual would not indicate a 
corresponding shift in intellectual values. They would maintain their nationalist relativism, anti-
Semitism, Realism, collectivism, rejection of universal abstractions, and opposition to the 
reconsideration of the Dreyfus trial.89 Because the anti-Dreyfusards still rejected what the 
Dreyfusards had come to see as essential components of intellectual identity, the Dreyfusard 
intellectual community refused them recognition as intellectuals and denied them the right to speak as 
authorities on public affairs. The anti-parlementarianism of the anti-Dreyfusard Right, coupled with 
its association with violent anti-Semitic street ligues would also result in its repression in 1899 by 
Waldeck-Rousseau’s “government of republican defense.” This turn in the political tides from a 
regime supportive of the military to one that “offered greater guarantees to the Left,”90 had begun 
with the Radical ministry of Brisson as early as June 1898.91 This governmental repression, the 1899 
 
86 The Ligue had an initial membership list that included 22 academicians in addition to men of letters, 
savants, university, law and medical professionals. 
 




89 For example, Anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals would be prominent in the “Henry Monument” that 
raised 14,000 signatures and 131,000 francs for the widow of Colonel Henry. Cahm, The Dreyfus Affair, 132. 
Henry had created the forgeries that implicated Dreyfus and exonerated Esterhazy and had committed suicide 
upon their revelation.  
 
90 Cahm, The Dreyfus Affair, 110. 
 
91 The crack down on right-wing organizations had been prompted by the attempt by Deroulede and 
the Ligue des Patriotes to spark a military coup during the funeral of President Faure. Maurice Barrès would 
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retrial and pardon of Dreyfus, and the increasingly perceptible association of intellectuals with 
Dreyfusism, led the anti-Dreyfusard Right to see itself as suppressed, marginalized, and dominated by 
the Left.92 
The creation of the Ligue de la Patrie and the effort by the Right to be recognized as 
intellectuals instigated a struggle between the Dreyfusard Left and the anti-Dreyfusard Right to 
control the concept, title, and empowering identity of the intellectual. The Dreyfusards’ success in 
gaining revision of the trial, repression of their opponents, and dominance over the intellectual field 
did not end this struggle. Instead, the resentful Right would continue its campaign for recognition, 
legitimacy, and influence over public opinion through its increasingly segregated intellectual 
communities. The divisions and antagonisms revealed in the intellectual milieu by the Affair would 
result in the creation of two distinct concepts of what it meant to be an intellectual as early as 1899. 
And these two different concepts would continue to inspire conflict between Left and Right over the 
right to represent French intelligence well into the twentieth-century. 
 
play a prominent role in both the attempted coup itself and in the right-wing journalistic narrative of the coup, 
the trial of Deroulede, and the subsequent repression of the Right. 
 
92 September 11, 1899 Dreyfus was found guilty with “extenuating circumstances.” Eight days later he 
was pardoned. By 1900 all Dreyfusards indicted for crimes in the Affair received amnesty and in 1906 the 
original verdict was overruled. The military, however, would not officially declare Dreyfus innocent until 1995. 
CHAPTER 1 
 
LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: DREYFUSARD 
INTELLECTUAL VALUES 
 
For intellectuals, the Dreyfus Affair was not solely about defending Dreyfus. It was about 
creating a certain image of France and, more particularly, of themselves as its intellectual 
representatives and guides. It was “a clash between two world views, two conceptions of society, two 
scales of moral values.”93 What had previously been seen as a single strata of French society united 
by its education and profession, was revealed to be two fundamentally opposed camps. The division 
was not a simple political disagreement, but what Dreyfusard intellectual Françis de Pressensé would 
describe as “an unbreachable abyss” between the most essential aspects of intellectual identity on the 
Right and Left.94 As early as 1898, the Dreyfusards had developed a distinctly republican and left-
wing model of what it meant to be an intellectual that would become the dominant concept well into 
the twentieth century. This Dreyfusard model stipulated the mentality of engagement, values and 
worldviews, socio-professional communities, and relationships to government and intellectual 
institutions that the Left equated with true intellectual identity. All of these components of the left-
wing model would intentionally exclude the opposing views of the extreme Right. 
 Because they enjoyed an unrivaled monopoly over the title and role of the intellectual for a 
full year, the Dreyfusard Left developed a mentality of engagement that would distinguish them from 
the Right. While the anti-Dreyfusards had to justify a reversal of their earlier position on engagement 
and struggle to make up for lost ground in the battle for intellectual authority and legitimacy, the 
Dreyfusard Left had no such past to overcome. While the anti-Dreyfusards quickly earned 
 
93 Drake, French Intellectuals and Politics, 23.  
 
94 Françis de Pressensé, “La Nouvelle Ligue des Patriotes,” L’Aurore, January 2, 1899. 
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disapprobation and repression from the regime, the Dreyfusard Left received the Third Republic’s 
support after 1899. The benefits of anteriority and a connection to the existing regime meant that the 
Dreyfusards engaged in public debates confident that the public would see them as legitimate 
authorities. As the first to control the title and role of intellectual, they simply defended their 
hegemony over the concept while the Right had to launch a campaign to seize and redefine it. 
Dreyfusard Jaures could declare, “the intellectuals of the Right have no right to the title of 
intellectuals” without first needing to justify his own right to it.95 The intellectuals of the Left, 
therefore, would not display the resentment, insecurity, or compulsion to legitimize themselves as 
intellectuals that would characterize the mentality of engagement on the Right.  
Because they enjoyed this hegemony, the Dreyfusards were able to indelibly fuse their 
worldview, concept of society, and moral values to the concept of the intellectual. The supporters of 
revision wanted French society to consider itself the product of its Enlightenment and Revolutionary 
heritage rather than its military conquests or national borders. They promoted a belief in universal 
abstractions like Truth, Justice, and the Rights of Man and the use of Reason and rationalism to 
comprehend and apply these abstractions to society. They advocated individualism and individual 
rights, and believed in the equality and fraternity of a universal mankind regardless of nationality or 
religion. These values would provide an underlying thematic unity to the Dreyfusard intellectuals’ 
more specific arguments in favor of revision, against the military leadership, and in opposition to 
right-wing anti-Semitism. They would also provide the foundation for the Dreyfusard intellectual 
model.  
 Francis de Pressensé would write in summation of the Dreyfusard intellectuals, “for us, the 
tradition or rather the soul of France is the cult of Justice and Truth, it is the strong sense of solidarity 
that means an innocent does not suffer without all citizens sensing themselves deprived in their 
 
95 Charle, Naissance des “intellectuals,” 162.  
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rights.”96 The belief in such universals and in their importance in defining not only the soul of France 
but the role and responsibility of her intellectual guides was a theme emphasized by all the 
Dreyfusard engagés. Gaston Paris described the Dreyfusard intellectuals as “those who demand Truth 
and Justice” and who “consider these two things one of our most precious heritages.”97 Emile Zola 
implored France to turn to Dreyfusism in order to “become again the nation of honor, the nation of 
Humanity, of Truth and Justice.”98 And the appeal to create the Ligue pour la Defense des droits de 
l’homme declared its purpose was to “spread anew, in the entire nation, the ideals of Justice, of Truth, 
and of Liberty from which it appears for a moment that public opinion has been detached.”99
For the Dreysuard intellectual, true intelligence and morality lay not in the particular laws, 
traditions, or determinations of a particular nation, society, or time but in the abstract ideals that 
existed outside time and place. Émile Duclaux lamented, in an article for the Revue du Palais, the 
folly of the anti-Dreyfusards who “have approached the Affair as a question of the honor of the 
French military” and the stability of the French nation rather than a question of Truth, Justice, and the 
Rights of Man.100 He was appalled by the anti-Dreyfusard writers like Barrès who suggested that 
there were “relative” or “national” truths which only applied to certain nations and that questions of 
justice and equality should be considered in the light of these national circumstances. The true 
intellectual, according to the Dreyfusards, was responsible for translating the universal, absolute 
Truths into accessible national policies rather than making particular national experience into the 
general ideal.  
 Equally essential to the Dreyfusard concept of intellectual identity was the use of logic and 
reason to grasp the universal truths and translate their abstract laws into social policy. “In the domain 
 
96 Pressensé, “La Nouvelle Ligue.”  
 
97 Gaston Paris, “La Ligue de la Patrie française” Le Siècle January 4, 1899. 
 
98 Jennings, “1898-1998,” 831.  
 
99 AN F7 12487 “Ligue Française pour la defense des droits de l’homme et du citoyen.” 
 
100 “L’Elite Intellectuelle et la democratie,” Revue politique et litteraire; revue bleue, May 21, 1904, 34. 
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of truth,” Alphonse Darlu wrote, “it is not possible to have an authority other than Reason.”101 
Dreyfusard Rationalism was linked to the Enlightenment promise that reason and logic, when applied 
to the questions of society, would yield “the Truth,” and a moral direction and social guidance backed 
by scientific and mathematical certainty. As the representatives of intelligence and the spokesmen for 
morality and truth, the intellectual was obligated to suppress any national, religious, or individual 
passions in favor of impartial Reason. Emile Duclaux wrote that in contrast with the Anti-Dreyfusards 
who betrayed logical thought to accept the statements of the military high command, the Dreyfusard 
intellectuals “are incapable of inclining their logic before the order of a general and ask instead about 
the state of mind of those who would dare demand it of them.”102 This identification of intelligence 
with Rationalism and the belief that reason could provide social guidance brought the intellectual Left 
into conflict with an extreme Right that equated intelligence with Realism and social guidance with 
particular, national experiences. For the extreme Right, rational thought produced only inapplicable, 
utopian theories; realism produced practical results. 
Rationalism also implied an impartiality and tolerance that the Dreyfusards linked to the 
Enlightenment and Revolutionary goal of intellectual secularization. The Defense des droits de 
l’homme manifest stated that reliance on reason, rather than religious morality, gave the Dreyfusards 
“clear minds” unclouded by “clerical reaction” with which to judge the Dreyfus case. It was their 
rationalism and their secularism that gave them the ability, and the authority, to speak for impartial 
intelligence. Rejection of religious intolerance, “clerical reaction,” and anti-Semitism would become 
one of the most visible hallmarks of the Dreyfusard concept of intellectual identity. According to 
Alphonse Darlu, the Dreyfusard “pro ratione” concept of intelligence and truth, which proposed to 
return the moral direction of minds to philosophy rather than religious authorities, was in direct 
opposition to the anti-Dreyfusard concept of intelligence and truth which he saw to be tied to the 
 
101 Alphonse Darlu, M. Brunetiere et l’individualisme; a propos de l’article Après le process (Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1898), 41. 
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irrational worldview of the Catholic church.103 Brunetière and the anti-Dreyfusards, he wrote, 
returned to the anti-Semitic orthodoxy of the Middle Ages and, in doing so, betrayed their 
responsibility to uphold free, individual, and unorthodox thought. Rationalism, reason, logic, and 
science were all impartial, unaligned, and secular in nature. To be an intellectual, according to the 
Dreyfusards, required not only devotion to rationalism, but to the secular thought and education 
necessary to sustain it. Although not all Dreyfusards denounced the influence of the Church, they 
would all reject anti-Semitism. Even the socialists, who had previously equated anti-Semitism with 
anti-capitalism, would renounce it in favor of the universal rights and equality under the law of all 
“humanity.” As a result, anti-Semitism and the associated themes of anti-cosmopolitanism, 
enracinement, and integral nationalism would become the domain of the extreme Right alone and a 
mark of “anti-intellectualism.” 
Secularism and rejection of anti-Semitism would be linked to a final Dreyfusard concept of 
intellectual responsibility: the defense of individual rights and the equality of man under the law. The 
Ligue des droits de l’homme made protection of “the rights of an accused, whatever his religious or 
political opinions may be,”104 a central tenet of their program. In particular, the appeal specified, 
individual rights were not to be sacrificed to the “raison d’Etat.” For Dreyfusard intellectuals, the 
freedom of the individual was the foundation for a secure society, rather than, as the anti-Dreyfusard 
intellectuals argued, the security of society the foundation for free individuals.105 Clemenceau would 
write, “the guarantees offered by justice cannot be withdrawn from a single person without 
 
103 Darlu, M. Brunetiere.
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105 Against Brunetière’s rejection of individualism as anarchism and the loss of all social authority, 
Dreyfusard Henri Bérenger would write “To progressively free the individual from all exterior authority, to put 
in his internal life the rule of all moral and intellectual obligation, to respect among others this same personal 
liberty of which one has made his own law, this is the individualism of the French revolution and of modern 
philosophy” that the anti-Dreyfusards ignore. Henry Berenger, La France intellectuelle (Paris: Armand Colin et 
Cie, 1899), 43.  
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threatening the whole fabric of society.”106 Rather than viewing the nation as an organic collective as 
the anti-Dreyfusards would, the Dreyfusards saw it as a civic agreement by a collection of individuals 
each bound to the collective only to the extent that their individual rights were assured. This concept 
of society and the individual led the Dreyfusard intellectual to locate his responsibility and role in the 
defense of the disenfranchised individual Alfred Dreyfus. In contrast, the intellectual of the Right 
would find his responsibility in the defense of the beleaguered nation and its military.  
The “military dictatorship” and “clerical reaction” that Zola saw in the Dreyfus Affair made 
him fear that what made the people of France “French,” the values outlined by the Enlightenment and 
protected by the Dreyfusards, was being threatened by the anti-French and anti-intellectual values of 
the anti-Dreyfusard extreme Right.107 By continuing to present themselves as the defenders of Truth 
and Justice, the protectors of individual rights, the proponents of Reason, and, therefore, the only 
legitimate guides of French intelligence, the Dreyfusards would indelibly associate the identity of the 
intellectual with the republican value system. From this point on, the intellectual was accepted by 
most as one who, as Lucien Herr wrote, “puts the law and an ideal of Justice before themselves, their 
natural instincts, and the egoisms of their group”108 and who, as Péguy wrote, displayed a “passion for 
Truth, and a passion for Justice.”109 It was against the standards of universalism, abstract values, 
individualism, Rationalism, and secularism that right-wing anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals were later 
measured and found wanting. By claiming that it was their values that defined the essential nature of 
France, the Dreyfusards legitimized themselves as the only intellectual guides for the nation. All 
those who opposed them were, by default, both anti-French and anti-intellectual. 
 
106 Cahm, The Dreyfus Affair, 70. 
 
107 “How,” Zola worried, “can you [France] want Truth and Justice when all your legendary virtues, 
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Dreyfusard Intellectual Communities and Networks 
 The “unbreachable abyss” between the Dreyfusard intellectuals and the anti-Dreyfusard 
intellectuals, and the two distinctive concepts of intellectual identity that resulted, was therefore a 
product of two very different sets of socio-political values. It would also be a product of two different, 
and increasingly segregated, socio-professional communities and networks. It was in these intellectual 
communities that the abyss between right and left-wing value systems evolved from a theoretical 
disagreement into an actual physical separation of the intellectual milieu. The Dreyfus affair divided 
families, friends, even university departments, but in dividing the old, it created new groups whose 
shared intellectual values brought a new sense of collective identity. Certain schools, revues, ligues, 
and salons relinquished their bipartisan natures to be identified as Dreyfusard centers where 
individual Dreyfusard efforts were amplified and radicalized in a collective crusade. The physical 
division of these communities would contribute to the growing perception among intellectuals that 
there was a division of the educated elite between two fundamentally opposed camps. The 
Dreyfusards made certain that the public understood that the “true intellectuals” were those who 
involved themselves in the communities, networks, and trajectories of their camp, not those of their 
opponents. 
 Zola’s initial letter prompted the engagement of several prominent figures beginning on 
January 14th with the signatures of Anatole France, Émile Duclaux, Daniel Halévy, Felix Fénéon, 
Marcel Proust, Lucien Herr, Charles Andler and Gabriel Monod. To these prominent names would be 
added, among thousands of others, the support of emergent Dreyfusard leaders Jean Jaurès, Yves 
Guyot, Émile Durkheim, Julien Benda, André de Séipse, Henri Bérenger, Françis de Pressensé and 
Alphonse Darlu. The intellectual communities, networks, and professional paths that these individuals 
participated in would be transformed from apolitical intellectual spaces into centers of political 
engagement and defining characteristics of intellectual practice.  
The university, particularly certain schools and faculties, came to be seen as a Dreyfusard 
stronghold even though, in truth, the majority of universitaires remained outside of the debate. 
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Dreyfusards were prominent in the scientific faculties at the Sorbonne, at the College des Chartes, and 
the École Pratique des Hautes Études while, in contrast, no member of the Faculty of Law signed a 
Dreyfusard petition.110 The École Normale Superieur was also considered a center of Dreyfusard, and 
particularly socialist, engagement. Lucien Herr was a dominant force in shaping young minds as the 
librarian of the ENS.111 His anticlerical, socialist, and Dreyfusard political discussions in the 
afternoons in the library began as early as 1894 and influenced untold numbers of students who 
recounted his impact on their intellectual formation in their memoirs. It would be a left-wing space so 
devoted to the mentoring of future left-wing intellectuals that right-wing Robert Brasillach would 
recall he felt out of place. Several students noted the general perception among their classmates that 
the ENS and its professors were “Dreyfusard with very few exceptions.”112 The equation of the 
universitaire and Normalien with the collective identity of the Dreyfusard intellectual would have 
important consequences for the concept of left-wing intellectual practice.  
Although the Dreyfusard Left would not enjoy the dominance of the press that the anti-
Dreyfusards did, they did form their own, distinctly Dreyfusard network of revues. The revues that 
were Dreyfusard centers of intellectual community included the militant and university revues like 
Revue philosophique, Revue historique where Monod was editor, Revue de metaphysique et de 
morale where Darlu wrote against Brunetière, and Revue Bleue where Durkheim wrote 
“L’individualisme et les intellectuels.” To these were added the socialist revues that became 
Dreyfusard following Jaurès and Millerand: Le Mouvement socialiste, Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine of 
Péguy, and Pages libres. There were also several literary revues like Revue Blanche and journals of 
daily information like L’Aurore and Le Siècle.
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These revue teams provided socio-professional camaraderie that also contributed to the 
Dreyfusard intellectual collective identity. The offices of Revue Blanche, for example, would become 
“one of the great rallying centers of the writers, artists, and intellectuals who were convinced of the 
innocence of Dreyfus.”113 Felix Fénéon was the editor and attracted contributors like Octave Mirbeau, 
Pierre Quillard, Jean Psichari, Julien Benda, André Gide, Lucien Herr, Gustave Kahn, Léon Blum, 
and Bernard-Lazare.114 The Affair would make the revue team, which had once welcomed diverse 
political adherents and had considered Maurice Barrès one of its masters, into a politically segregated 
Dreyfusard community where even Barrès was excluded and attacked.115
In the pages and offices of Revue Blanche, men of different literary persuasions and talents 
found in their Dreyfusism a strong link between themselves and others in the revue.116 This 
camaraderie was based on shared intellectual values and sense of duty which separated them from 
their anti-dreyfusard peers into an intellectual community. Benda would write of it “here is a 
phalange of men who not only conceive of general ideas but in whom these ideas determine 
corresponding emotions that in their turn determine actions.” They shared, he concluded, “not 
intellectualism but intellectual sensibility.”117 The revue was not only a place for camaraderie with 
fellow Dreyfusard writers and an outlet favorable to their intellectual sensibilities, it was a center of 
militantism. The offices became “true councils of war” where collaborators met and discussed late 
into the night. Blum would write of these evenings, “we met at the revue, toward the end of each day, 
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nearly every evening at the same hour. We could hear the passionate ideas of Octave Mirbeau, 
comment on the last news from Le Temps, share that which each had learned during the day.”118 At 
the end of the evening, the discussions could sometimes spill over into nearby Café Calisaya, which 
itself became a Dreyfusard center. 
Dreyfusard intellectual communities and social identities were, therefore, also reinforced in 
separated salons, bookstores, and cafes where anti-Dreyfusard thinkers and opinions were excluded. 
Salons had initially been spaces where diversity and contrast in ideas was believed to be intellectually 
beneficial. During the Dreyfus affair, however, several of these spaces became devoted centers of one 
or another side of the polemic. Dreyfusards found particularly willing listeners in the salon of Mme 
de Caillavet where the visitors and the political discussion naturally drove away many previous 
attendees like Charles Maurras and Jules Lemaître while attracting new visitors like Clemenceau and 
Jean Jaurès. The salon of Mme Strauss had also been frequented by Lemaître and Arthur Meyer, 
director of the monarchist Le Gaulois, until the Dreyfus Affair. Meyer would later write in his 
memoirs that his frequenting of he salon of Mme Strauss stopped “the day when the Dreyfus Affair, 
which has separated all from being able to agree, broke relations which were very precious to me.”119 
Other politicized salons of the Dreyfusards included that of Mme Menard-Dorian who favored 
socialist and anti-clerical ideas and hosted Blum, Clemenceau and Zola,120 of Mme de Saint-Victor 
who was surnamed “Notre Dame de la Revision,” and of the marquise Arconati-Visconti who would 
later be labeled by the right-wing Action Française as “the protector and benefactor of all that which 
decomposes and dissolves society and French intelligence.”121 
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Like salons, cafes have long been recognized as spaces of intellectual sociability yet these 
places were also divided in many cases. During the Affair, for example, La Closerie des Lilas was 
strongly Dreyfusard and was “diametrically opposed both geographically and politically to the Café 
de Flore, the cradle and fief of the Action Française.” Here young dreyfusards like Gide would gather 
and feel themselves surrounded by others who shared their “international spirit.”122 A Dreyfusard 
bookstore, Librairie Bellais, opened by Charles Péguy in the Latin Quarter was also a gathering place 
for dreyfusard thinkers, particularly students interested in socialism. Blum, who frequented the site, 
described it as the “general center of Dreyfusism in the Latin Quarter.” Bellais was not only a space 
for discussing shared ideas, it was also a center for Dreyfusard youth militantism. Here, Daniel 
Halévy wrote, “clashes [with the anti-Dreyfusard students] were frequent in the corridors of the 
Sorbonne, the entrance of which was only 100 meters away from Bellais. Péguy kept himself in 
constant readiness to send his friends into the fight…if he was in the school when the call came he 
would immediately go from study to study opening the doors. Assemble! He cried at each door. They 
would all seize their sticks and rush to the Sorbonne.”123 Intellectual communities were therefore not 
only effective in organizing and amplifying individual engagements, they also converted thought into 
collective action. 
These centers of physical, tangible communion were expanded to include Dreyfusards who 
might never actually share the same space through the imagined communities of manifests and 
petitions. These collections of names, perhaps better than any other form of intellectual community, 
drew a line of division between Left and Right. Signers of Dreyfusard manifests like that famously 
dubbed the “Manifeste des intellectuels,” felt that they shared a common purpose and engagement 
with the intellectuals whose names were listed alongside theirs. In contrast, they considered those 
names on the anti-Dreyfusard petition for the Ligue de la Patrie to be suspect and outside their 
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community. Yves Guyot of Le Siècle would write of this petition, “It is useful. It classes men. We 
will preciously guard their names. They disqualify themselves. We know now who are the professors 
in the university who represent the Jesuit spirit.”124 Petitions literally provided a list of all those who 
shared the same worldview, values, and engagements while also clearly listing those who were 
outsiders and adversaries.  
The very practice of petition construction also reveals a distinctly Dreyfusard concept of 
intellectual community. While the anti-Dreyfusard listing of names revealed the organization, 
hierarchy, and elitism prized by the extreme Right, the Dreyfusard petitions revealed a certain desire 
for egalitarianism between intellectuals and non-intellectual activists. The petition in favor of Picquart 
was ordered alphabetically, the Manifeste des intellectuels had no clear organization by social or 
intellectual cadre, and later petitions mixed the professions completely.125 The very construction of 
the petitions indicates that the Dreyfusard intellectuals felt their network of engagement connected 
beyond the intellectual milieu to the general public and was not based on any internal hierarchy of 
academic titles or honors. 
The community that would have the most influence on the construction of Dreyfusard 
collective identity, however, was the Ligue Française pour la defense des droits de l’homme et du 
citoyen which was a veritable “organ for disseminating Dreyfusard] ideas and a cartel of its 
forces.”126 At the initial meeting on February 20, 1898, immediately after Zola’s trial, it was said and 
recorded that here, “one was happy to be among Dreyfusards.”127 Because the Ligue “was an 
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important place of co-habitation for the otherwise isolated intellectual” it was an effective means of 
amplifying and interconnecting individual efforts of engagement that might otherwise have been 
easily silenced.  
In its appeal to new members in 1900, the Ligue clearly separated itself from the anti-
Dreyfusard intellectuals. Although it did not, as the right-wing Ligue de la Patrie Française would, 
prohibit any of its opponents from becoming members, it clearly distinguished its values and 
intentions from those on the anti-Dreyfusard Right. In particular its first statute declared that the 
association was designed “to defend the principles of liberty, equality, justice announced in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789” and declared all forms of “arbitrariness and intolerance are 
a menace of civil division, a menace to Civilization and Progress.”128 The appeal declared a rejection 
of the “old religious hatreds,” the “obscure superstitions of the middle ages,” and the “odious 
excitations” of the people expressed by the Right. The Ligue, it continued, was created to combat this 
and to make “prevail the just and liberal ideas which are the imperishable honor of the Revolution.” 
Thanks to the Ligue, it claimed, “public meetings have been organized to spread anew in the entire 
nation the ideas of Justice, of Truth, and of Liberty” and to carry out the “work of Republican 
defense.”129 The plea closed by outlining the role and responsibility of the Dreyfusard intellectual: 
“We have a great mission to fulfill. We have to spread and make known and loved the ideas of 
Justice, Truth, and Liberty.” 
The Ligue was an important source of ideological organization as well as social interaction 
and networking for its members. It not only held lectures and meetings but also published an official 
Bulletin, created an intellectual revue called Droits de l’homme and held annual congresses for 
members. It also hosted banquets where its intellectual leaders and political members could fraternize 
 
ten meetings in Paris and several outside and had over 8,000 members. By 1904 it had grown to 47,000 
members. See, Histoire de la Ligue, 37. 
 




and share ideas. One banquet, described in L’Aurore in 1902 was host to more than 600 people. A 
table of honor was reported to seat not only the new committee members Buisson, Guieysse and de 
Pressensé but also Anatole France, Brissaud, Psichari, and Gustave Hervé among other prominent 
Dreyfusards. One final arm of the Ligue that was intended define Dreyfusard intellectual values was 
that of popular education. In addition to public lectures and the creation of popular bookstores, the 
Ligue set for itself the task of operating the “universities populaires.” Their aim was to educate the 
broad masses in “republican” ideas: the universal abstractions, individualism, rationalism, and 
secularism that they believed made France not only Republican but truly French.130
Whether it was in revues, university departments, ligues, petitions, or even previously 
unaffiliated spaces like cafés and salons, the Dreyfusard intellectuals created communities where their 
values and engagements could be amplified from individual efforts into a more effective collective 
action. The communities became centers of sociability, professional networking, and mentorship, but 
most importantly, they became centers of collective identity. Being a Dreyfusard intellectual meant 
not only sharing certain values and political ideals, it also meant engaging in certain organizations 
and expressing oneself through certain organs. An important element in the left-wing monopoly over 
intellectual identity would be the Dreyfusards’ ability to link membership in these communities and 
networks to public perception of the role and responsibility of the true intellectuals. Engagés of the 
extreme Right were either refused participation in these communities or simply deterred from them 
by an intellectual environment that was hostile to right-wing values. Either way, they were excluded 
from these legitimizing communities and identified as anti-intellectual by their absence. 
 
The Dreyfusard Intellectual Experience 
The great power behind the Dreyfusard monopoly of intellectual collective identity also came 
from the dominance that the Dreyfusard intellectuals exerted over the public’s perception of 
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legitimate intellectual behavior and experience. The different relationships that the intellectuals of the 
Left had to places of power gave them a certain experience of intellectual life that would dramatically 
separate them from the intellectuals of the Right. For the Dreyfusards, being an intellectual required a 
certain relationship to the Third Republic, the university, and the Church that the intellectual Right 
did not share.  
 Being an intellectual, according to the Dreyfusards, implied first a certain relationship to the 
republican government and its institutions. Although the Dreyfusards accused both the military high 
command and the government of perpetuating a known injustice, they did so in the name of the better, 
truer nature of the French Republic. In striking contrast, the anti-Dreyfusards defended the military 
and the interests of the collective patrie, yet they did so by announcing the inadequacy of the 
Republic and the collapse of Enlightenment values. For the Dreyfusards, France was the 
parliamentary Republic and the Republic was the socio-political, intellectual, and moral values of the 
Enlightenment and the revolutionaries of 1789. By defending the implementation and practice of the 
latter, they saw themselves as the defenders of the Republic. The identification of the Dreyfusard 
intellectual with the Third Republic would apply not only to republican intellectuals like Anatole 
France and Emile Zola, but to the socialist leaders as well.131 By 1899, socialists would be an integral 
part of the “government of Republican defense” and socialist intellectuals would increasingly identify 
their role as defenders of the Third Republic. 
For both the republicans and socialists, therefore, being an engaged Dreyfusard, and therefore 
being an “intellectual,” meant identification with the fundamental values of republicanism and 
defense of the existing Republican regime. In return, they and their intellectual agendas would be 
promoted, protected, and nurtured by the Republican ministries as early as the 1899 ministry of 
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Waldeck-Rousseau. In contrast, the anti-parliamentarianism and anti-Republicanism of the extreme 
Right would earn the tangible repression of anti-Dreyfusard intellectual engagement and its 
organizations.132 The Dreyfusard, therefore, experienced intellectual life from the vantage point of the 
protected Republican intelligentsia while the anti-Dreyfusards’s experience became that of the 
repressed and persecuted intellectual opposition.  
 The Dreyfusard’s relationship to republicanism would be linked to their relationship to the 
secular university system. The French educational institutions would be important places of 
engagement and intellectual activity during the Affair for both Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. The 
Left-Right polarization of both the students and professors along school, faculty, and even course 
lines created important intellectual sub-communities and networks for both Left and Right.133
However, the overwhelming percentage of universitaires in the Dreyfusard intellectual ranks, and the 
relatively fewer number in the anti-Dreyfusard camp, would be an important factor in the 
identification of Dreyfusism, and therefore of intellectual identity, with the experience of the 
universitaire. Within the ranks of the Dreyfusards, the university professors “had a directing and 
leading role” and their prominence and influence helped to identify the intellectual with the university 
professor. It was in the Sorbonne and the ENS, in particular, that the “innovatory concept of the 
Dreyfusard ‘intellectual’ and the revisionst cause” found its “best supporters.”134 In contrast, the 
universitaires of the anti-Dreyfusard camp were merely “one element of support within a much larger 
coalition” that was directed by and recognized for its journalists and writers rather than its 
professors.135 Because of this, the Dreyfusard concept of the behavior and experience of the 
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intellectual would be modeled on that of the university professor rather than the journalist and writer 
who would serve as the model for the Right. 
 Finally, the relationship of the Dreyfusard intellectual to the Catholic Church would be 
important in differentiating the experience of the Dreyfusard intellectual from that of the anti-
Dreyfusard. The debates surrounding the Dreyfus Affair would be linked, sometimes overtly, to the 
discussion of the place of the Church in French society and the issue of secularization. Catholicism 
was not a defining characteristic of either the Dreyfusard Left or the anti-Dreyfusard Right since 
Catholics remained prominent on both sides. However, many anti-Dreyfusards would intentionally 
link themselves to the institution and tradition of the Church in their discussions of anti-Semitism and 
the integral French nation while most of the Dreyfusards pointedly linked their engagement to the 
secular and even anti-clerical tradition of the Enlightenment and civic nationalism.136 They 
juxtaposed their value of Rationalism, scientific reason, and free thought with what they saw as the 
Church’s irrationalism, superstition, and limits to free thought. Also, although there were many 
Catholics who favored revision, they were joined by Protestants, like André Gide, and Jews, like 
Daniel Halévy, who were rarely found in the anti-Dreyfusard camp.137 For the Dreyfusards, therefore, 
part of the intellectual experience that divided them from the Right was the separation of their 
religion and their engaged thought. Being a Dreyfusard intellectual meant identification with secular 
values that could be supported by all religious faiths rather than the traditions and institutions of the 
Catholic Church.  
 The Dreyfusard, therefore, experienced intellectual life in a distinctive way that would not be 
shared by their peers on the Right. Their relationships to the regime, the university, and the Church 
dictated certain practices and experiences, from participation in a government of republican defense 
to the professional trajectory of universitaire, that excluded the intellectual of the Right. When 
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combined with the increasing segregation of the intellectual community, these distinctive experiences 
and relationships fostered a collective identity of the Left that would entirely separate it from the 
collective identity of the Right. 
 
The Dreyfusard Intellectual Model 
 The Left gained a unique advantage in the struggle to guide public opinion by taking on the 
title and role of the engaged intellectual well before the Right. They were able to monopolize the 
public’s first understanding of the intellectual and of the values, organizations, and experiences that 
defined him. This hegemony provided a certain mentality of engagement that would be characteristic 
of the Left and contributed to the emergent model of left-wing intellectual identity. The model 
dictated first a certain set of values that all those who took the title and role of the intellectual were 
expected to support. Intellectuals were universalists, rationalists, individualists, and secularists. The 
model of the Left also identified certain collective communities and organizations with which 
intellectuals were expected to identify. Dreyfusard intellectuals were defined in part by their 
participation in the university, Dreyfusard revues, the Ligue des droits de l’homme, certain petitions, 
and social spaces that had become Dreyfusard centers. Finally, the Dreyfusard intellectual came to be 
identified collectively with the institutions of the Third Republic and the university and with 
opposition to the authority of the Church. The Dreyfusard intellectual’s mentality of engagement, 
values and worldviews, socio-professional communities, and even the very experience of intellectual 
life and engagement would be completely at odds with those of the intellectual of the Right. The 
Right felt excluded from this newly constructed model of intellectual identity and responded, in 
resentment, by creating its own, alternative version. Recognized men of letters Maurice Barrès and 
Ferdinand Brunetière would play a central part in this struggle to create a new concept of the 
intellectual for French society.
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE ANTI-DREYFUSARD RIGHT: THE CASE OF MAURICE 
BARRÈS 
 
As early as October 1898, when the initial plans were laid for a ligue of anti-Dreyfusard 
intellectuals, it is necessary to recognize the presence of a new model of the engaged intellectual, one 
that was equally qualified in terms of professional success and influence, equally engaged in public 
affairs, and yet, was indisputably on the political “Right.” This new species of intellectual resented 
the dominance that the Republican and leftist intellectuals held over the concepts of the intellectual 
and engagement and sought not only to attack and delegitimize this dominance but also to legitimize 
their own, alternative model. Maurice Barrès was one of the originators of this alternative model and 
his work and experience provide valuable insight into right-wing intellectual identity.  
Barrès was one of the intellectual leaders of his time and influenced both the reading public 
and his fellow writers and thinkers.138 He was not only, as his peers in the Latin Quarter would 
immortalize him, the “prince of youth” and the leader of intellectual trends among those of his 
generation, but also a mentor for the next generation of thinkers like Henri Massis,139 a political 
influence in the Chamber, and an accomplished author and Academy member. Barrès was born in 
1862 to a mother with a long family heritage in Lorraine. His childhood memory of France’s defeat 
and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany would be a driving force for much of his later 
nationalism and political writings. His desire to return Alsace-Lorraine to France would come out 
explicitly in many of his speeches for the Ligue de la Patrie as well as his writings on the military, the 
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weakness of the parliamentary Republic, and the need to be rooted in one’s region. Barrès’, 
unhappiness at the lycée de Nancy and his detestation of the Kantism of his professor there, M. 
Burdeau, are believed to be the inspiration for insipid character Bouteiller in Déracinés,140 who 
became a symbolic character in the campaign against Dreyfusard universitaires.
By 1883, Barrès had left Nancy for Paris and begun to make his way as a journalist. He was 
still an unknown in the world of literature, however, until his 1888 Sous les yeux des barbares 
received a favorable review from Paul Bourget who would introduce Barrès, as he had Brunetière, 
into the world of the literary elite.141 The following year, during the Boulangist crisis Barrès ran and 
was elected as a Boulangist deputy. These sympathies would later unite him with other ex-Boulangist, 
anti-Dreyfusards like Déroulède and would form the basis for his novel Appel au Soldat: a
galvanizing text for the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual community after 1900. It is during these years 
that Barrès is credited by several historians and some later fascists142 with developing a sort of 
“nationalist socialism.” This new approach to socialist reform from a nationalist rather than 
internationalist perspective was one of the themes of Barrès’ next journalistic endeavor from 1894-
1895 as editor of La Cocarde. Here Barrès combined the efforts of royalist, federalist, republican and 
socialist collaborators to provide a provocative approach to nationalist critique of the Republic. 
Several eventual anti-Dreyfusards would collaborate with Barrès in this journal, including Charles 
Maurras.  
During the years leading up to the Dreyfus Affair, Barrès’ work began to show the 
interconnected themes of anti-Semitism and enracinement which would contribute to his concept of 
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nationalism based on rooted regional identities. It is this theme of “rootedness” that dominates the 
Roman de l’energie nationale series of novels, Deracines, Appel au Soldat, and Leurs figures, written 
at the height of the Dreyfus Affair between 1897 and 1902. In order to lend his notoriety to the cause 
against the Dreyfusards, Barrès also involved himself in the anti-Dreyfusard journalistic campaigns in 
the mainstream  Figaro and Le Journal, but also in the monarchist Gaulois and anti-Semitic Le 
Drapeau of Déroulède’s Patriotes.143 His February 1 article in Le Journal was the first article by a 
recognized writer to condemn the Dreyfusard intellectuals’ engagement, thus initiating the debate 
over intellectual responsibility and values. He was also a founder of the Ligue de la Patrie Française 
and served on its directing committee for several years. Barrès engaged his name, his pen, and his 
voice in a struggle to preserve what he considered essential cultural and intellectual values that were 
in crisis and to formulate a right-wing vision of True France. He would pioneer and popularize not 
only the term “intellectuel,” but a different conceptualization of the values, responsibilities, and 
communities that provided the identity of this intellectual.  
The creation of this right-wing intellectual model would evolve according to what would 
become a century long pattern of the intellectual Right. It began with Barrès’ recognition and 
resentment of the Dreyfusard hegemony over intellectual engagement. His desire to redefine 
intellectual authority according to his own worldviews and values would initiate a crusade to 
delegitimize the intellectual Left while legitimizing the Right. The most effective means to this end 
was the differentiation and popularization his own intellectual values and visions for society. His 
individual effort to differentiate, separate, and yet legitimize his intellectual identity was reinforced 
by the creation of right-wing, anti-Dreyfusard intellectual communities and social networks. Here, 
among like-minded peers, Barrès was able to solidify and popularize his own concept of intellectual 
identity and more effectively present his version to the public. His perception of exclusion and 
repression, his resentful struggle to legitimize himself as a different, yet viable intellectual guide, and 
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the resulting segregation of his intellectual life would all contribute to his alternative concept of 
intellectual identity.  
 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
 From the first acceptance of the title “intellectual” by Clemenceau in January 1898 until the 
public announcement of the anti-Dreyfusard Ligue de la Patrie in January 1899, the hegemony of the 
intellectual Left over the concept and role of the engagé was not only perceptible, it was 
unchallenged. During this year, the men of thought and letters on the Right studiously avoided both 
the term and the role of the intellectual and focused their efforts on delegitimizing the concept of 
engagement rather than redefining it for their own purpose. It would not be until October of 1898 that 
the first indications of resentment and a desire to end the left-wing monopoly on the role would 
appear. And it would not be until January 1899 that the effort to legitimize a right-wing intellectual 
model would ignite the struggle to control intellectual identity. It is after January 1899 that the Left’s 
casual hegemony became an intentional effort to exclude and repress the Right. Only then would the 
Right feel the need to create its own legitimate alternative. 
As early as his February 1, 1898 article, Barrès had begun to delegitimize Dreyfusard 
engagement and legitimize the anti-Dreyfusard position. Barrès wrote that Clemenceau had solicited 
the signatures of men of intelligence and published their names in Aurore saying, “this is the protest 
of the intellectuals.” By calling them intellectuals, Barrès claimed that Clemenceau was advertising 
the petition as a “catalogue of the elite—who would not want to be in it!” and saying to undecided 
writers, “give me your name and I will give you the title of intellectuel.” By trivializing the 
motivations of these signers, Barrès hoped to delegitimize their claims to moral and intellectual 
superiority. The intellectual, Barrès continued, “defines himself as a cultivated individual, though one 
without mandate, who claims to apply his intelligence to efficiently solve the diverse circumstances 
of the Dreyfus Affair.” But, he wrote, there is nothing in the Affair that has been clarified, no 
elements of real knowledge to attach one’s intelligence or on which to base an opinion of guilt or 
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innocence. All positions, whether for or against Dreyfus, were based not on truth, justice, reason or 
science, but on hypothesis. “How do you intend,” Barrès taunted the “intellectuels,” “you cultivated 
men, you men of method, to undertake to solve the problem when you do not have all the data?” He 
closed the article with his own newly developed definition of the intellectual: “an individual who 
persuades himself that society ought to be founded on logic and who does not recognize that it rests in 
fact on anterior necessities and is able to be foreign to individual reason.”144 
The article was specifically intended to weaken the Dreyfusard intellectuals’ cause by 
scorning their claim to be recovering truth and justice based on their superior reasoning skills. The 
truth of the case, Barrès argued, could not be determined by science or reason and therefore the 
writers and savants of the petitions held no special authority or legitimacy. Rather than claiming to be 
“intellectuels” who made false claims to a superior knowledge, Barrès wrote of himself and the anti-
Dreyfusards who had not signed the petitions “it pleases us to be intelligent rather than intellectuals” 
and to keep to their profession rather than attempting to meddle in judicial affairs where they had no 
special knowledge. He did not intend, Barrès continued, “that we muzzle, as we have been accused of 
wanting to do, the men of the laboratory and the library. But we do not approve of them saying 
everything, in every manner, in all circumstances, and to all sorts of people. They do not act in the 
abstract.” In contrast to this irresponsible behavior of speaking in abstractions without considering the 
dangers for concrete society, Barrès presented the anti-Dreyfusard thinker whose realism, recognition 
of the needs of society, and refusal to interfere in judicial affairs beyond his skill “forbids him from 
being an ‘intellectuel.”145 It was this mantra that would be taken up for the next ten months by the 
anti-Dreyfusard writers and thinkers in their attempt to undermine and delegitimize the Dreyfusard 
intellectual position.  
However, by October 1898, the influence of the Dreyfusard intellectual had become a source 
of resentment on the Right. To gain equal social authority, the thinkers of the Right realized that they 
 




needed to take the title and role of the intellectual while redefining it according to their idea of the 
role of “men of intelligence.” Three anti-Dreyfusard agrégés, Louis Dausset, Gabriel Syveton, and 
Henri Vaugeois developed a petition hostile to the Dreyfusards which called for the creation of a 
“society of intellectuals” to maintain the traditions of the patrie against the agitations created by the 
Affair. From this initial petition would be born the committee and petition of the Ligue de la Patrie 
Française, which included Barrès at its head, and more importantly, the first claims by the anti-
Dreyfusards to the title of intellectual. In an article in Le Journal on January 2, 1899, Barrès wrote 
what is perhaps the clearest expression of these efforts to claim the authority and title of the 
“intellectuel,” for the Right. The aim of the Ligue, he wrote, was to “protest against the pretension 
expressed by the defenders of Dreyfus that all the intellectuals are in their ranks.”146 Barrès’ position 
was reiterated in the first conference of the Patrie Française where Lemaître said, “WE, that is all of 
France minus a few hundred thousand individuals- we were punished…we remained silent…but one 
day we wanted to reassure the brave men and comfort the army by showing that all the intellectuals 
were not on one side.”147 
Yet, as soon as Barrès began the campaign to claim the title of intellectual, the Dreyfusard 
papers had begun their own campaign to prevent it. The title, role, and influence of the intellectual 
was a valuable tool for the Dreyfusards that they did not intend to relinquish to Barrès and the Right. 
The thinker of the Right had to be excluded, marginalized, delegitimized, and ostracized from 
intellectual life. The day after the publication of the Ligue de la Patrie manifest, Françis de Pressensé 
wrote in L’Aurore “The Academicians [of the Right] are indignant to hear it said that the intellectuals 
are on the side of Justice and Truth. They have wanted to re-establish the equilibrium. But, he 
sneered, “It would be a naïve illusion to persuade oneself that because one has been part of the 
Academy, one has the right to the title of intellectual. He continued by declaring to the anti-
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Dreyfusard thinkers, “it is well evident that between you and us there is an unbreachable abyss” that 
necessarily prevented them from sharing the same title. On one side the “so-called intellectuals” of 
the Ligue, and on the other, the real intellectuals, “those among us who have opened our eyes to the 
light and will no longer close them.” Here he claims, is the division between the “Two Frances: one 
which tries an offensive return under the name of nationalism, in the interest of clericalism, and in the 
hope of a Caesar, and one that orients itself definitively toward the future and which proclaims itself 
proudly of the Revolution.” The new Ligue, Pressensé wrote, taking care to emphasize his point with 
the use of italics, “is on the side of the first. The Intellectuals who have taken in hand the cause of the 
revision are and remain on the side of the second.”148
Other leaders of the intellectual Left quickly rallied to exclude the Right from the public’s 
image of the intellectual and to solidify the Dreyfusard hegemony over the concept. Clemenceau 
would write in L’Aurore that though he had at first been overjoyed by the idea of a ligue for the 
patrie, reading the list of the members of the Ligue had quickly revealed that it would not be what he 
had envisioned. Clemenceau wrote of the Ligue founders, “when one poses oneself as ‘intellectuals 
against intellectuals,’ it is necessary at least to give oneself the appearance of Reason.” This is why, 
he claimed, he had no fear that this new Ligue of “pretended intellectuals” would impact the 
Dreyfusard vision of a patrie of justice and truth. In fact he wrote that he was overjoyed to hear that 
they would be attempting to counter the Dreyfusard intellectuals in debates and lectures. “As soon as 
you cease to howl, as soon as you return to the articulated language which distinguishes men from 
beast, as soon as you foolishly accept the meeting of thoughts,” Clemenceau triumphantly claimed, 
“you are able to say nothing which does not turn to our advantage.”149 Although the anti-Dreyfusards 
might be able to supply a list of illustrious Academicians, Pressensé and Clemenceau were 
suggesting, they had no real “intellectual merit” because their values were those of irrational authority 
rather than Enlightened rationalism. It was this rationale that would prompt Jaures’ summary 
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dismissal in “La classe intellectuelle,” that “the intellectuals of the Right have no right to the title of 
intellectuals.”150 
Resentment of this new, intentional exclusion from the intellectual field would become one of 
the main themes in the work of the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals. “I was enthusiastic,” one Ligue de la 
Patrie member wrote, “by the response which had opposed the new ligue to the exorbitant pretensions 
of the pseudo-intellectuals who imposed on their fellow citizens their convictions of the innocence of 
Dreyfus and their hatred of the military institution.”151 Charles Maurras praised the progress of the 
Ligue in a letter to Barrès that concluded, “Do not forget that the Anti-Dreyfusard people has been 
governed for three years by more or less avowed Dreyfusards.”152 And, in one of the initial speeches 
of the Ligue, Lemaître summarized this “theme” by saying, “We are oppressed by a minority and by 
an evil-doing minority.”153 These republican thinkers, he continued, “who make us feel the yoke,” 
claimed to be “free-thinkers.” “What error! Hatred of men because they themselves… explain 
differently than we do the mystery of the universe, this is miserable. But this is the case with these 
feeble philosophers. They have the mania of evoking the State…against those who do not think as 
they do.” He concluded of the Dreyfusard hegemons, “they are marvelously organized for 
domination.”154 
In particular, resentment was voiced against the large number of Dreyfusards believed to be 
dominating the Sorbonne and university system. Here it was claimed that Herr, Durkheim, Seignobos, 
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and other prominent Dreyfusard professors were molding young minds to believe that the only true 
intellectuals were those who supported the Dreyfusard values. Barrès expressed this frustration with 
this Dreyfusard influence in an attack on the values taught by the Republican institutions. “The 
philosophy which the State teaches is primarily responsible if the people believe the intellectual 
despises the national unconscious and makes intelligence function in the pure abstract outside the 
field of realities…this is what we have reproached the University, this is what creates, as its product, 
the ‘intellectuel,’ the enemy of society.” If they have any doubt that this philosophy is a powerful 
force of aberration in the university, Barrès continued, they need only consider the attitude shown by 
the majority of universitaires during the Dreyfus Affair, “an attitude favorable to Dreyfusism.”155 The 
great fear among the anti-Dreyfusards, was that the hegemony of Dreyfusism in the university would 
not only taint the concept of intellectual values in the present but would be engrained in successive 
generations as well. “If Dreyfus and his friends write the history and scholarly texts, Barrès warned, 
“you patriots who read me, we will be scoundrels before the centuries.”156 It was vital that the anti-
Dreyfusards present a new intellectual model and a new vision of France before such an alternative 
became inconceivable to these future generations. 
But before presenting this right-wing alternative, it was necessary first to delegitimize the 
Dreyfusard model. Barrès wrote of the Ligue de la Patrie that it would provide “national resistance, 
on the interior, against the anarchic forces and particularly against the “intellectuels pervertis.”157 
From January 1899 on, Barrès and the intellectual Right would work to delegitimize not the concept 
of the intellectual or engagement per se, but only the version constructed by the Left. Those in 
support of Dreyfus were labeled pseudo-intellectuals, perverted intellectuals, anarchic intellectuals, 
demi-intellectuals, mandarins, or simply referred to as intellectuals in quotes or italics to suggest 
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doubt of legitimacy. This was mirrored by a corresponding attempt to legitimize the alternative right-
wing intellectual concept. Even before the official announcement of the Ligue, Barrès would write in 
his Cahiers of his own concept of himself and his anti-Dreyfusard peers as intellectuals “I say to the 
good intellectuals: you decorate French thought; you are able to serve it.” Were there any doubt of the 
identity of the “good intellectuals,” Barrès emphasized, “the good intellectuals have received the 
young universitaires who came to propose to them a nationalist ligue.”158 The good intellectuals, as 
opposed to the perverted, demi, false intellectuals were those of the Ligue de la Patrie.159 
With the creation of the Ligue, these good intellectuals had a forum to combat the Dreyfusard 
hegemony and to legitimize their alternative. “The important thing,” Barrès wrote of the ligue, “is that 
one is no longer able to say that intelligence, and the intellectuals- to use the questionable French 
term- are only on one side….There is no longer anyone who is able to believe that all the intellectuals 
are partisans of Dreyfus or Picquart.”160 It was, Barrès wrote, their distress at seeing the Dreyfusard 
“mandarins” applaud the destruction of the patrie that had roused them to engage as a collective.161 
With the creation of a ligue, the intellectual Right would “no longer be a troop of sheep who bow to a 
squad of shepherds” on the Left.162 They would be an equally legitimate, equally authoritative 
intellectual alternative. 
Although these strategies were useful in attacking the Left and promoting the Right, the most 
effective means of legitimizing their distinctive alternative would be the public differentiation of 
right-wing intellectual values. “There are now among us,” Barrès wrote of the Dreyfusards, 
“individuals born French who detest or think they detest all that which we believe. With them it 
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seems that we no longer have in common words or sentiments. Here are the enemies, or rather the 
dangerous misleaders.”163 This sense of separation from the enemy “other,” of an unbreachable abyss 
in worldviews, of a total lack of shared sentiments and values was essential to the formation of 
separate intellectual identities. Highlighting these differences and the implications for right-wing 
intellectual identity would become a major theme in the work of Barrès. To the value of universalism 
he opposed relativism, to abstractions and Rationalism he opposed Realism, to individualism, he 
opposed collectivism, and to internationalism he opposed national socialism. 
 
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: National Relativism and Enracinement 
One central Dreyfusard intellectual value that Barrès opposed was that of Universals. For the 
Dreyfusard Left, there was a set of universal truths, like Truth, Justice, and the Rights of Man that 
were to be recognized in all places and times. Barrès rejected the very foundation of universalism in 
favor of national relativism. There were no absolute truths but only truths relative to circumstances 
and nations. Man was therefore not a universal being but a national man whose consciousness and 
identity was, at its core, “rooted” in the particular nation. This different worldview had important 
ramifications for the distinctive right-wing concept of intellectual role and responsibility. Rather than 
professing universals, true intellectuals spoke of the French truth, of the identity of the rooted 
Frenchman, and considered all questions of truth and justice in relation to the French nation. “It is 
necessary,” he would write in summation of intellectual responsibility, “to judge things in the 
relative.”164 
As early as October 1898, Barrès confided to his Cahiers an exploration of his ideas of national 
relativism and their incompatibility with the Dreyfusard intellectual ideal. “One more time I examine 
an aspect of my thought: What is Justice? There are just relationships in a given time between given 
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objects. This is the same story as that of the Rights of Man. Which man? Where does he live? When 
did he live? This error is so strongly accredited in France because we have no national consciousness. 
This is the incalculable wrong that Paris does to France.”165 Barrès blamed Paris because he blamed 
the Dreyfusard, universalist universitaires, centered in Paris, for inculcating these values in the youth. 
He would emphasize this concern later writing, “there are miserable ones who want to teach the 
children the absolute Truth. Naturally these professors are not able to discern it and they serve instead 
sentimental drivel. It is necessary to teach the French truth, that is to say what is the most useful to the 
nation.”166 Only in teaching the truth as it related to the circumstances of both time and place did 
intellectuals fulfill their responsibility to educate the nation. “In the order of facts, that which we call 
Justice and Right do not exist,” Barrès wrote. “It is this,” he continued, “that they will never 
understand, these theoreticians of the university drunk with an unhealthy Kantism. They repeat like 
Bouteiller ‘I ought always to act in a way that my action serve the universal rule.’ No sirs- leave these 
great words ‘always’ and ‘universal’ and since you are French, preoccupy yourselves with acting 
according to the French interest at the time.”167 The responsibility of the intellectual, as conceived by 
the anti-Dreyfusard Right, was to determine the practical needs of France, not of an abstract vision of 
a universal humanity. 
 National relativism also dictated the right-wing concept of the proper role of the intellectual in 
the Dreyfus Affair. Barrès determined, “It is possible that Dreyfus is not guilty, but it is absolutely 
certain that France is innocent.”168 According to the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, it was better to 
sacrifice an individual’s “human rights” than to sacrifice the well-being of the collective nation which 
secured these rights for all. The incompatibility between these Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard 
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approaches was clearly summarized by Barrès. “Never,” he wrote, “has one sensed the necessity of 
the relative better than in the course of this Dreyfus Affair which is a profound orgy of 
metaphysicians. They judge all by the abstract. We judge each thing by relation to France.”169 
Dreyfusards defended the individual Dreyfus despite the instability it caused the military and the 
nation. Anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals looked beyond the abstract “droits de l’homme” to France’s 
particular need for collective stability at the time. The role of the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual was 
clear to Barrès and it was directly opposed to the universal truths of the Left. “We have sensed that 
there are French Truths,” he wrote, “Let us prove them… We will be the men in whom France 
persists.”170
Barrès’ conception of national relativism was therefore closely linked to his idea of the French 
essence as a product of rootedness. An individual and a nation, he believed, gained their full identity 
and consciousness from their own earth and dead, or in other words, their national territory and 
history. Those outside of the nation or the déracinés who were uprooted from it were not able to fully 
understand it. Although rootedness was central to several of his works including Déracinés, it is best 
summarized in Barrès’ speech for the Ligue entitled “La Terre et les Morts.” Here he declared, “the 
German truth and the English truth are not the same as the French truth and are able to poison us. It is 
in vain that the foreigner tries to naturalize himself, in vain that he links his interests to ours, in vain 
tries to think and live in French, the blood refuses to follow the order.”171 For Barrès, being rooted in 
ones land and one’s history provided structure for the sentiments and the intelligence. It was a sort of 
determinism that encouraged some thoughts, actions, and sentiments while discouraging others. The 
essence of French intelligence and culture depended on a continuing connection to the patrie. This 
was why Barrès felt education, one of the responsibilities of the intellectual, was best served by the 
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national relativism of the anti-Dreyfusards, not the universalism, internationalism, or 
cosmopolitanism favored by the Dreyfusard Left.172 
Barrès summarized the separation in worldviews by saying, “The Opportunists have favored, 
for twenty years, the Jew, the foreigner, the cosmopolitan. Those who commit this criminal error say 
these exotic elements bring energetic elements to France. Here is the truth, the energetic elements that 
France has need of, it finds them in itself.”173 Dreyfusard André Gide specifically opposed this idea of 
rootedness in his novel Les Nouvelles nourritures. Here Gide proposed, instead of national self-
sufficiency and the rejection of “foreign” intellectual elements, the transplantation and infusion of 
foreign ideas. He claimed that over history this influx of different ideas had strengthened France, 
aided her progress, and enriched her culture. Barrès argued that universalist intellectuals could not 
even properly communicate their cosmopolitan ideas to the average Frenchman because they were so 
disconnected from French thought and sentiment. The role of the intellectual was not to seek 
universal ideals from “foreign” sources and force them on France, but rather to discern first the needs 
of France and draw inspiration from traditional sources that resonated with the people. 
 Barrès also used this idea of “foreign intellectual elements” to justify his increasing anti-
Semitism. Dreyfus was identified as a member of a “foreign race” who “did not harmonize with the 
soil he was transplanted too.”174 Jews, Barrès, claimed, as opposed to other nationalities were 
particularly uprooted because they had no actual homeland in which to have their own roots. They 
were therefore transplanted in France and attempted to assimilate but had no concept of nationalism, 
patrie, or national loyalty. Barrès wrote during the second Dreyfus trial, “I have no need of telling 
myself why Dreyfus betrayed France…That Dreyfus is capable of treason I conclude from his 
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race.”175 Barrès’ concept of rootedness, and with it his cultural anti-Semitism and anti-
cosmopolitanism, further intensified the intellectual barrier between him and the Dreyfusard 
intellectual. 
 The concept of rootedness was in turn linked to Barrès’ distinctive concept of national identity 
and of “True France.” Extreme nationalism and its corresponding view of France came to be a 
distinctive trait of the intellectual Right that separated it from the Left. For the intellectual Left, the 
nation was understood as a collection of laws and rights conferred by the Declaration of the Rights of 
man. Civic nationalism was a legal determination that conferred citizenship and national identity on 
all those who desired to live under the laws of France. The intellectual Right, however, and 
particularly Barrès, understood nationalism differently. For Barrès, nationalism was an integral, 
organic concept, a birthright conferred through the blood and culture of their families and ancestors. 
Nationalism was not the result of any legal determination but the result of a lifetime of shared 
experiences and sentiments. “The nation” for Barrès and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, was not a 
contract but rather “a group of men united by common legends, a tradition, habits, in the same milieu 
and sharing a series of ancestors.”176 Guiding French intelligence required an appreciation of this 
heritage, not of representative democracy. 
 Barrès also rejected the Dreyfusard concept of the nation as “a republican idea.” His most 
scorned character, Bouteiller, taught that, “France is the ensemble of notions that all the Republican 
thinkers have elaborated and which compose the tradition of this Party. One is French if one 
possesses these in his soul…without the philosophy of the State, there is no real national unity.”177 
Dreyfusards identified ‘True France’ with the Revolutionary principles, Rights of man, and 
Republican institutions that had not existed until 1789. Barrès and the Anti-Dreyfusards, in contrast, 
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prided themselves on a concept of France that extended back to the Gauls, to the first connection 
between man and the soil, the first development of national traditions and language. This respect for 
all of France, according to Barrès, was what made the anti-Dreyfusards patriots and nationalists and 
the Dreyfusards cosmopolitans and republicans. This in turn differentiated their sense of 
responsibility and duty, as intellectual guides, to the republican regime and the individual rights of its 
citizens.  
 Barrès and intellectuals of the Right rejected the model of the intellectual as a defender of 
universal mankind, individual rights, cosmopolitanism, and republican-based nationalism. Instead, 
they presented the concept of a right-wing intellectual who saw his role and responsibility to be the 
defense of particular national needs, elaboration of a national consciousness, protection of the 
uniquely French intelligence, and identification with the long history of the pre-revolutionary nation. 
These different concepts produced a divide between the Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard 
understanding of intellectual identity. 
 
Realism and Anti-Rationalism 
Almost inseparable from the Dreyfusard value of universals was that of abstractions. The idea 
of a universal implied a concept or determination that could be applied equally to all men and nations 
regardless of time or place, a sort of absolute value not altered by circumstances. The idea of 
abstraction implied a value that did not need foundation in any reality, a determination based on 
rational thought alone, an ideal that functioned outside the confines of real society. For Dreyfusards 
there was a pure form, attainable through rational thought, on which all social values: justice, 
equality, fraternity, were to be based. For the Anti-Dreyfusards, there was no pure form attainable by 
the simple logic and rationality of man. If there were higher forms of Truth and Justice, these were 
knowable only to God and not to man. Intellectuals instead were responsible for making the 
abstraction practical by molding the value to best meet the needs of real society. Rather than be high 
priests of the rational abstract, Anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals would be the communicators of the real.  
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 Barrès expressed his hatred of abstractions and his preference for an intelligence tied to reality 
in many ways but perhaps the clearest statement of it was in Le Journal in October 1898. Here he 
accused the Dreyfusards of dwelling so completely in the world of the abstract ideal that they could 
not see that blind application of such ideals would ruin rather than preserve France. “In abstraction, 
one is able to support this thesis or that thesis, one is able according to the mind that one has to 
depreciate or appreciate the army, the military jurisdiction, and the struggles of the race...but these 
questions ought to be treated in relation to the interest of France. It is necessary to not suppress the 
army because a militia would not suffice…It is necessary not to complain about anti-Semitism at the 
moment where one sees the enormous power of the Jewish nationality which menaces the French 
State.”178 When later he considered the ruling that would be handed down from the cour de cassation,
he wrote, “it will furnish us with a truth finally. It will not be the absolute truth, for this no institution 
is able to furnish and no one is able to possess since it is not of this world. To promise such to us, one 
must have the extreme religious optimism of certain ignorant ones….We await not the absolute truth 
but the judicial truth.”179 The Dreyfusards, Barrès wrote, wanted the Revelation of the great truth of 
Dreyfus’ innocence, the anti-Dreyfusards wanted simply a judicial decision that could be 
implemented to repair the social divisions and disruptions created by the Affair.  
 Barrès was certain that the application of abstract theories of social justice to real society by the 
Dreyfusard intellectuals was actually destroying, rather than guiding, France. Those who remained 
mentally trapped in their ivory tower of abstractions and ideals, he warned, will only destroy 
themselves and society by engaging in public affairs. “I do not mean that all theoreticians of the 
absolute necessarily are concussed, but it is the constant observation verified once again in the 
Dreyfus Affair that any theoretician of the absolute destroys himself in public affairs…I have several 
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times seen societies without Justice, but I have never seen Justice without a society.”180 Societies 
could function without the pure abstractions of the Dreyfusard intellectuals, he was saying, but pure 
abstractions had no function outside of real society. Those who attempted to live in the ideal, outside 
the confines of reality, were not only deluded and dangerous, they were incapable of serving as 
intellectuals. According to Barrès, the very role and definition of the “intellectual” as a social guide 
was incompatible with the Dreyfusard ideal. An intellectual, he explained, is not the same as the 
philosopher who devises grand theories that need not apply to real life. The intellectual was 
responsible for using theories to guide a real society. Those who were divorced from the real, Barrès 
wrote, ought not attempt to guide it.  
 The right-wing concept of the intellectual’s relationship to reality required an equally 
distinctive understanding of the source of wisdom and intelligence. According to Barrès, wisdom was 
never the result of abstract logic or rationalization by individuals. Instead, wisdom was a result of 
exposure to the collective wisdom of the patrie through appreciation of its history and traditions. The 
intellectual’s responsibility to educate was therefore ill served by the Dreyfusard university’s 
instruction in logic, rationalism, and theoretical abstractions. Instead, Barrès and the anti-Dreyfusard 
intellectuals promoted education in what the Dreyfusards considered “irrational” and “anti-
intellectual” sources of inspiration: sensibility, experience, emotion, the subconscious, and intuition 
gained by excursions with families to see the battlegrounds, churches, and forests of the pays. The 
responsibility of the right-wing intellectual was to provide students with “a sense of the real and of 
the relative, to convince the professors…to judge things as historians rather than metaphysicians… 
and to create for us…a national consciousness.”181 The latter could only be achieved by drawing on 
sources of collective wisdom that existed beyond the capability of the mind alone and were foreign to 






 According to the Dreyfusards, the Right’s focus on the practical realities of a particular time 
and place, rejection of rationalism and abstract truths, and irrational approach to intelligence 
identified them as anti-intellectuals. Barrès and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, however, believed 
that it was their sense of the Real that best qualified them to represent French intelligence. 
Appreciation of the social realities, they argued, was essential to the very concept of intellectual 
engagement. It was the dominant Dreyfusards, Barrès complained, who were “responsible for leading 
the people to believe that the intellectual despised the national unconscious and made intelligence 
function in the pure abstract, outside the field of realities.”182 In truth, the true intellectual was a 
student of the Real, not of abstract reason. 
 
Collectivism and National Socialism 
 For Dreyfusards the individual was the foundation upon which society was built. For Barrès and 
the Anti-Dreyfusards, society was the foundation for the creation of individuals. Because of his 
prioritization of a stable collective before individual rights, Barrès was drawn to the ideas of 
socialism, which, as he understood it, emphasized the importance of the collective over the 
individual. However his nationalism led him to oppose the international socialism and concept of 
class conflict on the socialist Left in favor of his own concept of “national socialism.” Barrès 
developed a concept of intellectual responsibility and values for the anti-Dreyfusard, nationalist Right 
that promoted collectivism and socialism without advocating internationalism.  
 Despite his early Culte de Moi novels, by 1898 Barrès had come to identify individual rights 
and liberties as subordinated in the hierarchy of values to the collective security of the nation that 
granted and secured these liberties. Collective society was the structure within which the individual 
could reflect and free himself: society created the individual, individuals did not create society. “Do 





discipline?”183 Without the stability of the national collective, the individual would lose all liberty. 
Barrès also saw the collapse of the collective in favor of the individual to be a threat to intelligence 
and culture. For Barrès, knowledge and wisdom were not the result of isolated, logic based study by 
individual thinkers but rather the result of exposure to real life, to the ideas of the past, to the 
traditions and faiths of the patrie. The individual was simply a vessel for this accumulation of thought 
and sentiment. Therefore, it was the protection of the collective which was essential to French 
intelligence, not the protection of the individual.184 With this in mind, Barrès confided to his cahiers 
that it was his goal as an intellectual guide to “protect with a durable effectiveness the most intimate 
and most noble element of the social organization, the living sentiment of the general interest, against 
the growing flood of individualism.”185
It was also in submitting one’s individual interest to the needs of the collective that Barrès 
believed individuals most fully realized their potential identity. As Lemaître summarized in a ligue 
speech, “This sentiment is not a duping of the individual since from it the individual’s life and being 
are aggrandized…a strong patrie maintains order and makes good finances, a prosperous commerce 
and a dignified foreign politics. And the sentiment that one is the member of a robust community 
engenders a generous pride, a confidence in oneself, a taste for action, a hardiness, and a 
disinterest.”186 According to Barrès, it also did not take away an individual’s sense of distinctive 
identity or moi, it simply expanded this moi to include the larger national family, the collective 
identity of one’s patrie or ethnie.187 It was this larger association of the individual that the intellectual 
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of the Left, according to Barrès, was unable to comprehend. 188 The true intellectual could encourage 
individualism, but never at the expense of the collective will or the security of the nation. It was the 
anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, Barrès insisted, who understood this task of true intelligence. 
 Right-wing understandings of collectivism, however, were quite different from that of the 
international socialists. The anti-Dreyfusards opposed vehemently “those among us who are ruled 
by…the gross German utopia of Marxism, which we reject because we believe that the solution to 
social questions was in free association and mutuality and because we fear in the socialism of the 
state pan-bureaucracy, pan-functionarism, uniformity, general mediocrity, the death of individual 
initiative, and the laziness and sluggishness of the citizenry.”189 Barrès intentionally portrayed the 
Dreyfusard support for Marxist socialism as a playful decadence or a misguided opportunism while 
legitimizing the anti-Dreyfusard opposition to it as well reasoned and in keeping with the needs of 
France. 
 Although the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals and Barrès in particular opposed international 
socialism, they did not exclude “nationalist socialism.” The first expression of this is believed to have 
been in Barrès’ La Cocarde where socialism was understood as “a relentless struggle against 
economic liberalism…in favor of the organization of labor and…the suppression of the proletariat by 
integrating it into society.”190 According to Barrès, the liberalism of Jules Simon and the Marxist 
hatred of the classes were both entirely foreign to the true nature of collectivism. This made the 
economic doctrines “of Jaurès, to which the Dreyfusards refer themselves,” intellectually unsuitable 
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for France.191 He proposed rather a collectivism based on nationalist socialism: protectionism for 
workers, class cooperation, and the idea of all stages in production serving the nation equally.192 Such 
a program was called socialism only by the anti-Dreyfusards and was in clear opposition to the left-
wing intellectual ideal of international socialism and of collectivism.  
 
Barrès and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model 
Barrès was one of the first on the anti-Dreyfusard Right to oppose the influence of the 
Dreyfusard intellectuals and one of the leaders in the struggle to legitimize an alternative. His 
experience of engagement and effort to construct a right-wing intellectual identity involved a cycle of 
behavior and a set of values that would become essential to right-wing intellectual identity 
construction over the century. Barrès rightly perceived himself excluded from the title and role of the 
intellectual, both before and after 1899, by a left-wing hegemony over the concept. Before 1899, he 
resented only the audacity of the Left’s engagement. After 1899, he would resent his own exclusion 
from this authority. The repetition of the themes of dominance, exclusion, repression, and struggle in 
his work indicates an important difference between his mentality of engagement and that of the 
Dreyfusard intellectual. While the Dreyfusards confidently defended their title and did not concern 
themselves with proving their right to it, Barrès and the anti-Dreyfusards had to overcome both their 
past condemnation of engagement and the concept of the intellectual that had been engrained in the 
public imagination. Barrès, as an anti-Dreyfusard intellectual, had a double burden. He had to first 
prove himself a legitimate intellectual before ever attempting to sway public opinion on the Affair. 
Barrès not only claimed the right to speak as an intellectual, he intentionally highlighted the “abyss” 
between his concepts of true intellectual values and those of the Dreyfusards. Instead of universalism 
he valued relativism and nationalism and saw the role of the intellectual to be defense of the 
collective nation rather than the rights of an individual. Instead of abstraction and rationalism he 
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promoted realism and “irrational” sources of wisdom and saw intellectual duty to lie in the 
elaboration of practical, French based social guidance. And, to the ideals of individualism and 
international socialism, he suggested that the true intellectual would advocate the prioritization of the 
collective and national economic cooperation. This differentiation and separation of his value system 
would eventually become a physical separation of his intellectual experience with the increasing 
segregation of the intellectual community. All together, the “unbreachable abyss” between left and 
right-wing intellectual mentalities of engagement, cultural values, socio-professional communities, 
daily experiences, relationships, and behaviors would produce a completely different right-wing 
intellectual identity. Barrès would not be the only contributor to this intellectual model, however. He 
would be joined in the effort by Ferdinand Brunetière.  
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE ANTI-DREYFUSARD RIGHT: THE CASE OF FERDINAND 
BRUNETIÈRE 
 
Ferdinand Brunetière brought to the conceptualization of the intellectual his own resentment 
of the dominant intellectual Left, his own intellectual values, and his own social and intellectual 
network. Although Brunetière is less recognized among scholars today, his influence on the 
intellectual milieu during the Affair was considerable. He was one of the first intellectuals after 
Barrès to publicly oppose “J’accuse” and to deliberately call into question the responsibility of the 
intellectual through his landmark article “Après le Procès.” Brunetière was an original Ligue de la 
Patrie committee member, and one of its touted Academicians. Because his anti-republicanism was 
more reformist than that of Barrès and since he has been recognized by contemporaries and historians 
to be opposed to anti-Semitism, Brunetière also offers a different insight into the right-wing 
intellectual model. His concept of intellectual identity showed some deviations from that of Barrès, 
yet he remained firmly right-wing, was adamantly opposed to the idea of the intellectual on the 
Dreyfusard Left, and was vehemently resentful of their dominance of the concept.  
Brunetière was born in Toulon in July 1849. Although his father urged him to attend the 
École Polytechnique, Brunetière’s interests were in literature and he moved to Paris to prepare for the 
ENS at lycée Louis le Grand. Here he met Paul Bourget who would prove instrumental in his later 
literary career. Brunetière failed the entrance exam and so would never earn a degree higher than his 
bachelor in letters and bachelor in science. He enrolled in the army in 1870 to defend Paris and was 
horrified by the disorder and anarchy that he saw in the Commune. This experience would influence 
his later anti-Dreyfusard writings on individualism, anarchy, and the necessity of the military. With 
the end of the war, Brunetière found a position with Bourget preparing students for the bac at Lelarge 
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during the days and began writing articles for small journals in the evenings. By 1874 he had received 
an introduction to Revue Bleue and soon after was introduced by Bourget to the highly prestigious 
Revue des Deux Mondes where he would stay until his death in 1906. 
During these early years of his literary and journalistic career, Brunetière was seen as a 
republican, a positivist, an anti-clericist, and a modernist but by the 1890s, he had become recognized 
by his contemporaries as a “reactionary, traditionalist, religious conservative.”193 It is in the pages of 
the Revue des Deux Mondes that Brunetière would make this transformation in intellectual values and 
begin to make a name for himself in the world of letters. From the intellectual stronghold of the RDM,
Brunetière began launching his attacks on the Naturalist school and in particular against its leading 
author Émile Zola. He built a strong reputation there as a literary critic of exceptional talent and taste 
and soon began to move up the ranks in the reuve. By 1877 he was the secretary of the RDM and by 
1893, he had taken over the direction from Charles Buloz. During these years, Brunetière was also 
working on his multi-volume critical study Etudes critiques sur l’histoire de la literature Française,
his Histoire et literature series, and his two works on French theater and lyric poetry. In recognition 
of his extraordinary literary accomplishments and his pervasive knowledge of 17th and 18th century 
French literature, he was granted a professorship in French language and literature at the ENS in 1886 
despite his lack of a university degree. He would retain his position at the ENS and add a position as 
lecturer at the Sorbonne until his ostracism from the university system in 1905. 
By 1895, Brunetière’s résumé was imposing enough that his shift to conservatism and 
particularly to Catholicism aroused great speculation and debate in the literary milieu. His essay, 
“Après un visite au Vatican,” was widely denounced by those who would later be found in the ranks 
of the Dreyfusard intellectuals as a declaration of the bankruptcy of science and progress in favor of 
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Catholicism.194 Brunetière was intrigued more by Catholicism’s capacity for moral guidance and 
social structure than its religious promises and would not fully convert until after the Dreyfus Affair. 
By 1897, Brunetière had become an internationally recognized public figure whose lectures at the 
Sorbonne became sites of militant student confrontation, some yelling “vive Zola” and others 
demonstrating in favor of their beloved professor. He had become, “as early as 1894, a public man, an 
‘intellectual’ before the word was created, whose smallest declaration was published in the press” in 
both Paris and the US.195 It is not surprising, therefore that after returning to Paris from the US, 
Brunetière became embroiled in the Affair. 
Brunetière’s primary podium during the Affair was the RDM and his opinions permeated 
every article and chronicle during these years, particularly in the weeks when he chose to write the 
political chronicle.196 The chronicles and the revue as a whole initially pled for respect for the court 
judgment, the priority of national defense, and the return to social unity. Eventually they would 
follow Brunetière into a demand for equal recognition of the anti-Dreyfusards as engaged intellectuals 
and a more passionate defense of their right-wing values. The most contentious piece to emerge from 
the journal was Brunetière’s own “Après le Procès” from March 15, 1898 which sparked a whole 
series of Dreyfusard responses from figures like Duclaux, Darlu, Yves Guyot, and Henri Bérenger. 
As the Affair continued on, Brunetière joined with the self-proclaimed anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals 
who formed the Ligue de la Patrie and became one of their primary spokesmen in the journals and a 
lecturer on their behalf. Although he would resign from the directing committee of the Ligue due to 
differences in opinion over the electoral politics of Lemaître and the anti-Semitism of Barrès, 
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Brunetière would publicly declare that he was still a member of the Ligue and would continue to give 
lectures under its name.  
As the Affair and its aftermath came to a close in the early 1900s, Brunetière increased his 
opposition to the secularization of the new Dreyfusard dominated Republic and his attachment to 
Catholicism. Because of his anti-Dreyfusard views and his new Catholic faith, Brunetière’s tenure at 
both the ENS and Sorbonne was ended. His ejection from the university was seen by Brunetière and 
his contemporaries as an ostracism from a new university elite that was dominated by the 
Dreyfusards. Brunetière’s resentment of the Dreyfusard intellectual hegemony did not begin with this 
insult however, it had been smoldering since the first claims to the term intellectuel in L’Aurore. Like 
Barrès, Brunetière immediately attempted to delegitimize the intellectual Left and to reject its 
dominance in shaping public opinion. By 1899, he joined Barrès in developing a new, alternative 
concept of intellectual identity based on anti-Dreyfusard intellectual values.  
 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
 Brunetière was one of the first prominent thinkers to protest against the interference of the so-
called “intellectuals” in the Dreyfus Affair and did so from the Revue des Deux Mondes with the 
explosive article “Après le Procès.” Like Barrès, before January 1899, Brunetière refused the 
“intellectuals” any special ability to intervene in public debates. “The ‘intellectuals,’ he wrote, “seem 
to me to have interfered with no discretion in a question which does not involve them at all.”197 This 
strategy of delegitimization was continued throughout the article as Brunetière both sneered at the 
‘intellectuals’ claim to have special insight into judicial truth and rejected their monopoly over this 
moral superiority. “What is an intellectual?” he asked, “and from which conception of life does he 
draw the superiority which he claims over all those whom he does not honor with this name?”198 He 
 





continued that these self-proclaimed intellectuals, because of their authority in their specific fields, 
seemed to assume that “this superiority communicated itself to all that which they thought and their 
authentic reputation to all that which they said.”199 But, Brunetière continued, this is in fact a great 
mistake by them and a great danger for us since they are taken at their word and one is inclined to 
believe them on things of which they are incompetent. They behave, he concluded, like Nietzsche’s 
“enemy of the laws” who place their ideas above the laws of social institutions and beyond the 
understanding of those they did not include under the title “intellectuel.” “We have,” he said with 
resentment, “we other mediocre ones, only to admire and thank them for it.”200
These attempts by Brunetière to discredit the Dreyfusards as intellectual guides in all matters 
of moral truth and justice would spark weeks of polemic between Brunetière and the Dreyfusard 
organ Le Siècle in August 1898. The “portrait of Basile” article in Siècle claimed that Brunetière had 
a “moral defect,” that he was “working for the great power of darkness,” and that the section in 
“Après le Procès” on intellectuals was “truly dishonoring for a man of thought.”201 The author, 
Michel Colline, compared the Dreyfusard crusade to the work of Voltaire in the Calas case. 
Brunetière responded that Voltaire’s engagement was an opportunistic attempt to crush the Church, 
not an effort to correct an injustice. This critique of Voltaire’s motives was a clear insinuation that 
Zola had been attempting to discredit and overturn the military authority rather than protect the rights 
of Dreyfus.202 In the Chronicle of RDM Brunetière would expand on this theme saying Zola had been 
“looking for something to do,”203 and the affair had been only a “pretext” for the Dreyfusards who 
had a predetermined hatred of the military and Catholicism. “Without Dreyfus,” he wrote, “you 
would have found some other ‘victim’ to defend since it was only done for “political reasons.” These 
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reasons, he continued, were “to reverse the ministry, to satisfy old rancors, to recapture a morsel of 
power” to receive praise and compensation for their work. He wrote that they had engaged in the 
Affair because they were disgruntled that “they were not yet the masters or idols of public 
opinion…because one disputed their sentiments and did not tremble when they spoke.”204 It was for 
personal and professional gain, according to Brunetière, that a writer or thinker engaged as a 
Dreyfusard, not for Truth or Justice of which they knew no more in the case than he did. 
 The accusations made by Siècle and its ability to monopolize the discussion would eventually 
cause Brunetière to shift his resentment from the concept of engagement itself to the Left’s control 
over it. Hostility, rather than mockery began to permeate the tone of his articles and the dominance, 
control, and censorship by the Left became his central theme. In his last letters to Siècle, he wrote, 
“We differ in opinion on an essential point and instead of responding to my reasons with your 
reasons…you try to persuade the readers of Siècle that if I do not share your opinion it is because I 
have secret motives. One is not able to be of good faith if one does not think as you do! One is not 
able then to desire truth or justice but only politics! By what right do you say this? What is this 
method of erecting yourself, you and yours, as the sole representatives of Truth, Justice, Probity, you 
who have always lived by politics?”205 
In particular, Brunetière fumed against the Dreyfusard attempt to claim that all those who 
rejected the French Revolution and the principles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man were anti-
Republican and anti-intellectual and therefore could not represent France or intelligence. It was in 
Siècle, well before 1899 when the Anti-Dreyfusards officially claimed the title and role of the 
intellectual, that Brunetière unleashed his most virulent statement of resentment against this 
Dreyfusard hegemony over the “intellectual truth” and guidance of public affairs. “By what right do 
you confound the “religion of the Revolution” with France?” he wrote, “Ah yes, I know it well! You 
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alone are France and you alone represent it! Whoever is not with Le Siècle or the Republic of which 
you compose the ministry is not French, would not know how to be French…for you treat him like an 
‘émigré à l’interieur”… Suffer, monsieur, that we feel and think in a different way! We are French 
like you and we have been so for a long time.”206 He continued with a claim to equal intellectual 
legitimacy despite his anti-Republicanism and opposition to the Revolution: “we are able to judge the 
Revolution and if several of its consequences appear harmful to us, we believe to do the work of good 
Frenchmen in combating it or correcting it or in ameliorating it. We do not imagine it to hold the 
monopoly on Truth and Justice but we do not prevent you from believing it. And on the Revolution, 
as on those who make it the means of their declarations, we have the right, we maintain it, to think 
that which we want, we have the right to say it, and we will use it. And you, you have the right to 
contradict us, but not to denature us, to travesty or demean our intentions.”207 Brunetière was intent 
on distinguishing his own thought and values from those of the intellectual Dreyfusards. “I maintain 
our right to think otherwise than you,” he wrote to Siècle, “on the Revolution, on science, on justice, 
on Free thought, and on the Church.”208 
Brunetière was furious that his claim to be able to speak as a Frenchman and a man of letters 
before the public was being questioned and denied to him because he did not express the same 
intellectual and social values as the Dreyfusards. He was even more outraged that by claiming the title 
and role of intellectuals, the Dreyfusards now dominated the role of public guide for society. “That 
which the free thinkers do not pardon the Church for having done in the past,” he wrote in the 
Chronicle of RDM, “is precisely what they have done. They have made all government action serve 
the propaganda of a philosophical doctrine. Whoever does not think as they do is excommunicated; 
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they chase him from the Republic, they denounce him as loathsome to all ‘republicans.”209 The 
Dreyfusards, by proclaiming themselves the only intellectuals, had convinced the public that they 
alone spoke for French intelligence and that all ideas and opinions contrary to theirs were backward, 
opportunistic, or unjust. Brunetière resented this. It had become clear to him that if he wanted to 
enjoy the right to think differently, to hold different intellectual and social values despite the 
Dreyfusard hegemony, he had to also claim the right to engage, to speak for France, and to be an 
intellectual. 
Brunetière had perhaps recognized this need for the status, responsibility, and authority 
inherent in the title of intellectual earlier than any other anti-Dreyfusard. In a March 15, 1898 letter to 
Vogue, he had protested the hegemony of the Dreyfusard intellectuals by introducing himself and the 
anti-Dreyfusard elite as “we other intellectuals.” It was an explicit attempt to show that the title, and 
therefore the prestige and responsibilities being associated with it, “had not yet taken on exclusive 
meaning” by being irrevocably fused to Dreyfusard values.210 Yet Brunetière did not push his claim to 
the title more forcefully at the time and the Dreyfusard intellectual press quickly moved to discredit 
Brunetière and prevent him from effectively claiming the role of intellectual as long as he opposed 
their views. L’Aurore printed an article that claimed sections of the RDM were plagiarized and 
questioned Brunetière’s qualification for its leadership by referring to him maliciously as “this 
eminent anti-intellectual.”211 It was not until the formation of the Ligue de la Patrie in 1899 that 
Brunetière would again lay claim to the title and role of the intellectual. In an interview about the 
formation of the Ligue, Brunetière would explain, “Several of my friends and I have been wearied 
and irritated by hearing it said that all the men of study and thought, the intellectuals, were on the 
same side. This was not true and we prove it. It was necessary to show that intelligence, which has its 
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part, a very large part in the direction of the affairs of this nation, has not taken part in the abominable 
campaign conducted against the army.”212 
For Brunetière, however, it did not just concern taking the title of intellectual; it was 
necessary also to take on the responsibility of guiding public opinion toward true intellectual values 
and denouncing false and dangerous ones. Because he was attempting to legitimize the values and 
worldviews of the extreme Right as those of a viable intellectual alternative, Brunetière knew the 
Dreyfusard intellectuals would attempt to discredit him. “In conforming to the Jacobin logic,” he 
wrote, “our adversaries will accuse us of backward political thinking and reactionary intentions. In 
effect we are reactionaries against the radicals. We try to react against the ideas that we believe are 
dangerous.”213 In some instances, he argued, like this one, reaction ought to be considered 
synonymous with progress and liberty.214 In particular, he warned that the hegemonic Dreyfusards 
would attempt to maintain their monopoly over public understanding by preventing the anti-
Dreyfusards from perpetuating their value system. “Today we hear,” he continued in his speech, “that 
we are not prevented the liberty of thinking as we please, but that this right to have ideas contrary to 
theirs can only be exercised behind closed doors.” Teaching, as the most effective way to propagate 
intellectual values, was expressly forbidden to the Anti-Dreyfusards. In truth, he wrote in 1900, they 
were not prevented from teaching, “we are only forbidden to have students.”215 
Had Brunetière not already been convinced that the Dreyfusard intellectual exercised a 
hegemony over the role of the intellectual, his own exclusion from the teaching field would convince 
him of this truth. After having been invited to present himself for the chair of French language and 
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against him in the Dreyfusard press. L’Aurore claimed that those who wanted to block Brunetière 
from this post would form an alliance. The campaign proved effective and Brunetière was forced to 
withdraw his candidacy.216 During the reorganization of the Sorbonne, Brunetière would also be the 
only professor not incorporated into the Sorbonne from the ENS. Even the protégés of Brunetière 
were prevented from holding professorships. When René Doumic applied at the ENS, he was told, 
“since it is a chair at the ENS, yes, your political opinions will put you aside. Wrong or right you have 
been classified and you are not classified as a republican….never would the current ministers 
welcome a candidate to the École presented by Brunetière.”217 Doumic admitted that as a prominent 
anti-Dreyfusard he had foreseen this hegemony over the university, but continued, “I do not see 
without regret all the doors to higher education close before me.”  
 Brunetière, like the other anti-Dreyfusard writers and thinkers who were now claiming to be 
intellectuals, was excluded from the university system and other republican, Dreyfusard controlled 
spaces because of his intellectual values. His ideas were deemed hostile to the Dreyfusard intellectual 
values of individualism, universal abstraction, rationalism and social republicanism and so he was 
rejected as anti-intellectual. When Brunetière proclaimed himself an intellectual of the anti-
Dreyfusard Right, he faced an uphill struggle to overturn the existing left-wing hegemony and 
legitimize himself as a viable intellectual representative for France. Like Barrès, he found the most 
effective means to legitimize his own intellectual identity was to differentiate his intellectual values, 
to separate his worldview from that of the Left, and prove the intellectual and social superiority of his 
alternative. To the Dreyfusard ideal of individualism and individual rights, Brunetiere opposed the 
collective good, to left-wing rationalism he opposed realism, and to internationalism he opposed 
nationalism. 
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Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Collectivism and Anti-Individualism 
Opposition to individualism was central to all of Brunetière’s work and was the stance most 
often cited by the Dreyfusards as proof that he was unqualified for the position of the intellectual. 
Brunetière’s opposition to individualism and individual rights was part of an anti-Dreyfusard 
worldview that understood the foundation of society and the relationship of citizens to the nation in a 
fundamentally different way than the Dreyfusards. According to the Dreyfusards, intelligence, 
thought, reflection, and creativity were all individual attributes that required the absence of 
restrictions and authority to blossom. Intelligence had to remain independent and the representatives 
of intelligence, the intellectuals, also had to remain free from the influence of government, institutions 
like the military, and in general all circumstances and situations that might require them to submit 
their independent thought to the will of a collective authority. Those like Brunetière who defended the 
greater good of a strong military against the individual rights of a single defendant were, according to 
the Dreyfusards, truly opposed to individualism and the independence of thought essential to the 
identity of the intellectual.  
 Alphonse Darlu’s response to “Après le Procès” was specifically entitled, “M. Brunetière et 
l’individualisme” and declared that his main concern would be addressing the question of 
individualism raised by Brunetière. Since Brunetière had begun to “neglect his books to concern 
himself with public life,” it was necessary, Darlu wrote, to consider his ideas, particularly on 
individualism, to determine if they were the best possible for society.218 In other words, to determine 
if Brunetière merited the title and authority of the intellectual. It is quickly clear that Darlu did not 
find him worthy of the role. He attributed Brunetière’s “blindness” in his “chosen side” of the anti-
Dreyfusard camp to be a result of his rejection of the essential intellectual value of individualism. 
Other Dreyfusard writers soon joined Darlu in attacking Brunetière’s qualification for engagement 
specifically because of his anti-individualism. Yves Guyot clarified the Dreyfusard concept of the 
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intellectual and its link to individualism saying, “it is not authority and social institutions which 
should be the concern of the men of intelligence but rather “freedom of examination, which is simply 
the highest expression of individualism.”219 Brunetière’s attack on individualism and individual rights 
in favor of the collective was therefore, according to Guyot, incompatible with the responsibility of 
the intellectual.220 The Dreyfusard intellectual position was made clear for the public. Those who 
opposed individualism were the servants of blind, governmental authority, and the enemies of free 
examination, personal liberty, and, most importantly, the intellectual. 
 In response to this campaign against him, Brunetière gave an explicit statement of his anti-
individualism and clearly delineated his intellectual values from those of the Dreyfusards. While 
boldly continuing to stand against individualism, he nevertheless claimed the right to the status of the 
intellectual. He declared that in fact, far from destroying the essence of French intellectual values, his 
anti-individualism was the best choice for the preservation of true French society. “When I attack this 
‘individualism’ of which you are the apostles,” he fumed, “what right do you have, I do not say to 
combat in your turn my reasons, but to put them aside in order to substitute others for them? You 
think that this country lacks individualism and I believe, on the contrary, that if it suffers a great evil, 
it is precisely the excess of this individualism.”221 This great evil arising from individualism that 
Brunetière believed it was his duty as an intellectual to combat was the progressive spread of egoism. 
His alternative vision for France was the submission of the individual ego to the collective good. “We 
no longer know how to submit ourselves, nor to subordinate ourselves, nor even to associate 
ourselves” he said. “Each of us, all by himself, wants to be the government, the justice, the truth.”222 
This, Brunetière urged, was nothing short of egoism, and once it had spread through society, 
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purportedly as a freedom but in reality a harmful germ, it would mutate into an even greater danger 
for society, anarchism. Brunetière argued that in promoting collectivism and rejecting revision of the 
Dreyfus case, he was not attacking the foundation of French intelligence or representing “anti-
intellectual” militarism but rather acting as a responsible intellectual guide for collective society. “If I 
find these ideas [of individual rights] false, if I find it dangerous, it is an opinion and it is mine,” he 
concluded, the Dreyfusard intellectuals could reject and oppose it but they could not deny him the 
right to think in this way nor to deem it anti-intellectual.223
The Dreyfus Affair was for Brunetière simply the clarification of a great division in forces, 
those of social order against those of individual license. His own eventual engagement was, therefore, 
never about the guilt or innocence of Dreyfus but always an opposition to the Dreyfusard intellectuals 
whom he saw fomenting “rebellion against the two pillars of society: the army and the courts.”224 In a 
question of individualism or social authority, for Brunetière, social authority, and the stability it 
offered for the collective, always had priority.225 It was his conviction that the individual was only 
able to arise from the liberty that a stable, ordered society provided. In areas and times of social 
instability, he believed that individualism and individual thought were prevented from their fullest 
expression. Individuals did not create their societies, as Darlu and the Dreyfusards claimed. Instead, 
strong societies created the necessary environment for the development of individuals. “We do not 
exist for ourselves alone,” he wrote, “but for other men as well, and, what is more, we can only reach 
our full development as the result of commerce with our fellows…Let us renounce our egoism in the 
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pamper the individual in his egoism but rather to strengthen the individual and guide him toward 
fulfillment by urging him to submit himself to the higher good of the collective society. 227 
Brunetière’s most extensive statements against individualism in general are found in his two 
public speeches “L’Idée de patrie” and “Les Ennemis de l’âme Française.” In explaining his concept 
of “True France,” Brunetière clearly identified individualism as its principle antithesis. “The most 
dangerous of all are the individualists, I mean all those who do not recognize other law for their 
activity than of working to the development of all their powers….those who recognize no obligation 
and no duty than in the cult and idolatry of themselves.” Rather than seeing the essence of France as a 
collection of separate individuals, Brunetière and the intellectuals of the Right saw it as an extension 
of the idea of family. The idea of family and therefore of the patrie arises from “the realization that 
the individual cannot provide for his own personal security nor his own development alone.” The 
individualist intellectuals, who valued the single man before the needs of the patrie, had no concept of 
the patrie, no respect for the societal bonds that held France together. They were, Brunetière wrote, 
more interested in their own individual well-being than that of the France they claimed to be guiding. 
In his speech on the enemies of the French soul given in March 1899, Brunetière continued this line 
of attack on individualism. When considering what it was that “destroyed this hereditary communion 
of sentiments and ideas which is the French soul,” Brunetière determined that it was the division or 
atomization of society that had caused it to denature, disassociate and destroy itself.228 To “the 
individualists who say ubi bene ibi patria,” Brunetière and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals replied 
“ubi patria ibi bene.”229 
227 “Individualism,” he said in a speech for the Ligue, “is the cult of the self, it is egoism, it is the 
resources and means of civilization turned from the usage of the community in order to be only servants of our 
instincts and appetites, of our caprices and fantasies. But to give the individual another object or another end 
than himself, to want to place him back in society in order to make him the worker of a work which passes 
beyond him,” this, Brunetière claimed, was the role of men of intelligence at the turn of the century. Ferdinand 
Brunetière, Discours de combat (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1900), 51.  
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 Brunetière’s anti-individualism was the foundation for his support for the military, a position 
that placed him in direct confrontation with the Dreyfusard intellectuals on a tangible political matter. 
In a speech for the Ligue on “La nation et l’armée,” he said, “in the years after 1870, we had 
associated in an indissoluble manner the interests of the nation and the army.”230 What, he asked, had 
changed since then in the mentality of the people? And he answered, “all that which there was of 
defiance, of hatred even of the military institution in the heart of several ‘intellectuals’…had been 
emancipated by the Dreyfus Affair.”231 These intellectuals, he sneered, when they claim to protect 
French intelligence and culture by demanding prioritization of the individual over the honor of the 
military, “do not think for one second that without the military, without the gift that it provides even 
to its internal enemies, there would be no leisure to martyr oneself in the laboratories nor the ease of 
holding a Congress of Peace nor the freedom to insult good sense and justice.”232 The defense of 
intelligence, of French culture, lay in the stability of the collective French nation and it was the 
intellectuals of the Right who promoted this cause. 
Brunetière’s prioritization of collective society and the stability of the nation before the 
individual rights promised in the Declaration of the Rights of Man placed him in direct conflict with 
the Dreyfusard intellectuals. Because of this incompatibility in their views of the foundation of 
society and the relationship of citizens to the nation, the dominant Dreyfusard intellectuals would 
accuse Brunetière of anti-intellectualism and block his efforts to engage as a legitimate “intellectual.” 
This would become a major source of resentment for Brunetière who wrote of his struggle, “I do not 
want them [Dreyfusard intellectuals] to have ideas contrary to mine, but I demand the right to have 
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ideas contrary to theirs.”233 He demanded to be recognized as an intellectual with alternative, even 
oppositional ideas on individualism and the French nation.  
 
Realism and Anti-Rationalism 
 Brunetière’s rejection of individualism in favor of the broader collective was closely tied to 
another intellectual value that would set him apart from the Dreyfusard intellectuals: his concept of 
realism and his opposition to rationalism. Brunetière’s understanding of intellectual realism was a 
rejection of the ability of “pure thought” and theoretical abstraction to represent reality. Individualist 
thought could only be abstract since it had no real foundation in the society. Any application of this 
individual idea to the broader society was possibly dangerous and certainly irresponsible. For a 
Dreyfusard, an idea, if it was logical and rational, was true no matter how it affected society once it 
was implemented. If society suffered, it did not diminish the intrinsic value of the idea or make the 
thinker who had proposed the idea culpable. Brunetière flatly rejected this approach to thought. For 
him, thought was only good and true if it positively affected the reality to which it was applied. Ideas 
had no intrinsic value, they were not real entities on their own nor did they lead to a more perfect 
reality if they were themselves logically perfect. Ideas only had value according to the practical 
implementation they provided. In this thinking, Brunetière shared his friend Paul Bourget’s concerns 
with Dreyfusard abstraction: “A philosophe, is he able to disperse among men the explanation he has 
conceived of the universe without considering whether this metaphysical explanation will translate in 
practice as a dangerous morality? Is he responsible for the harmful realities that his doctrine is able to 
give birth to?”234 For Brunetière, the effect of an abstract idea on the real world was the intellectual’s 
greatest concern and responsibility. 
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 It is on this division in values that Brunetière and Anatole France engaged in a lively polemic 
during the Affair. According to France, freedom of thought, essential to the intellectual, required the 
absence of not only authority but of all burden of responsibility as well. “Any savant who has an idea 
of the world ought to express it,” he wrote, “the rights of thought are superior to all.”235 For France 
and the Dreyfusards, pure thought and philosophy were “above morality, and to subordinate 
philosophy to morality was to desire the death of thought, the ruin of all intellectual speculation, the 
eternal silence of the mind.”236 In terms of the Affair, France argued that the goodness of the 
Dreyfusard ideas of truth and justice justified and in fact made acceptable the division and instability 
that the protest had caused society. Yet, for Brunetière and the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, the 
beauty of the ideas did not justify the destructiveness of their implementation. He asked, “since they 
[abstract ideas] are able to be translated into acts, since they are able to leave the invisible world and 
enter the visible world, do we not have the right to envision them in their consequences and judge 
them accordingly?” Rather than judging the truth and quality of an idea by its purity, its logic, and its 
beautiful composition, Brunetière argued, “all doctrine ought to be judged according to the social 
principles that it fortifies or menaces.” The abstractions of Truth and Justice had no value if they were 
applied to society in a way that disrupted and divided it as the Affair had. 
 Brunetière’s insistence that the value of thought was measured by its impact on reality 
brought him in conflict with other Dreyfusards besides France. Guyot and Darlu would both accuse 
Brunetière of “considering the practical consequences rather than the truth of opinions” which was, 
for them, a scandalous stance for a self-proclaimed intellectual. Brunetière accepted the accusation 
with pleasure writing, “Darlu would have done well to tell us what the truth is, by what signs he 
recognizes it, and how he has been able to have so much confidence in being the only possessor of it. 
As for what he has said of me, I continue to think that in the matter of social morality, the practical 
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that of not regarding the practical consequences of the truths or of the so-called truths which they 
announce.”237 Here then were two completely opposed concepts of intellectual responsibility and 
intellectual defect. For the Dreyfusards, intellectuals were to work in the realm of the abstract and to 
concern themselves with the purity of the idea rather than its practical effect. For Brunetière and the 
Anti-Dreyfuards, intellectuals were only responsible thinkers if they considered first how their ideas 
would impact the real people and institutions of their particular society.  
 Brunetière, like Barrès, was also willing to draw intellectual inspiration from sources outside 
rational thought that the Dreyfusards considered anti-intellectual. For the Dreyfusards, thought and 
intelligence were a function of logic and rationalism alone. For Brunetière, thought had to encompass 
all the methods of judgment and determination, even those deemed irrational. The Anti-Dreyfusards 
argued that intelligence, the mind, and rational thought were not the only means to approach reality 
and determine the truth. Brunetière believed that the will, faith, emotion, and character could augment 
rational thought and lead more effectively to the truth. This division in worldviews and values would 
find expression in the debate between Brunetière and the Dreyfusards over the “bankruptcy of 
science.”238 Science and the scientific method, Brunetière argued, were incapable of being the source 
of truth and justice or of furnishing men with a “rule of life.”239 The rationalism of science could not 
provide insight into morality nor into questions of truth. Therefore, he argued, the intellectuals who 
claimed this insight into the Affair because they were scientifically trained minds had misled the 
people. While science was a noble application of intelligence, neither science nor intelligence were 
“the entire man, nor that which there is of the best in him, it is therefore not the only force which 
ought to govern the world.”240 To pure intelligence functioning in the abstract, Brunetière contrasted 
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experience, character, and will which he claimed were qualities of the mind and soul that were more 
connected to the real. He believed the anti-Dreyfusards’ recognition of these qualities made them the 
more qualified intellectual guides. 
 
Nationalism and National Socialism 
Well before the ENS ostracized Brunetière and his devotees from the university system and 
classified them as ‘anti-Republican,’ Brunetière had felt himself distanced, separated, and even 
rejected from the Republican regime that was in office during the Affair. This was in part due to his 
increasing opposition to individualism and rationalism. It was also a result of his hostility toward 
what he saw as an increasing tendency toward international socialism in the regime. The Dreyfusards 
considered internationalism to be an identifying trait of the intellectual since it was the manifestation 
of the left-wing ideal of universal humanity. Dreyfusard internationalism was directly tied to their 
concept of the model intellectual as a “citizen of the world” who was linked to men through ideas 
rather than national boundaries. For Dreyfusards, the intellectual shared more with men of thought 
throughout the world than they did with the “anti-intellectuals” of France. In contrast, for Brunetière 
and the intellectuals of the Right, the quality of “Frenchness” was inseparable from French 
intelligence since it provided the intellectual with a unique cultural inspiration. Those who sought to 
expunge this nationalism from their approach to culture and intelligence, Brunetière determined, were 
not fit to be intellectual guides. As he had with individualism, abstraction, and rationalism, Brunetière 
attempted to separate his own intellectual worldview from that of the internationalists and to elaborate 
his own approach to socialism that was clearly distinct from that of the Dreyfusard intellectuals.  
 Brunetière’s stance against internationalism is perhaps best summarized in his lecture on “Les 
Ennemies de l’âme Française” in March 1899. Here he lists internationalism, second only to 
individualism, as one of the most threatening internal enemies of the French society. The 
internationalists, he complained, in their search to extend their hand to all humanity and to erase 
divisions, were weakening France in a time when other nations were building up these separations. 
104 
“While everywhere around us we see nationalities concentrate on themselves, assemble and unite 
themselves as of old,” he wrote, “I entreat you to see that our worst enemies are the most internal. 
They are those you [Ligue members] have believed it necessary to combat: the Internationalists who 
repeat the imprudent verse “Nation is simply a pompous word to mean barbarism.”241 Although 
Brunetière scoffed at the idea that the Dreyfusards’ intellectualized internationalism could ever 
replace the instinctual love of the patrie in the people, he still warned against complacency. “These 
latter,” he wrote of the international humanists, “are the inheritors of the social philosophy of Mme 
Sand and M Lamartine. ‘I am the fellow citizen of any man who thinks; liberty is my country’ they 
say.” Of these intellectuals whose abstract internationalism would have the English, French, German 
and Chinese live and love one another as brothers, Brunetière says “I believe they fool 
themselves.”242
He was therefore quick to differentiate his concept of the relationship that the true, right-wing 
intellectual was to have with the patrie. While, he wrote, “certain philosophes find the idea of the 
patrie limiting…and are ‘fellow-citizens of any man who thinks’ with a strange tendency to find that 
one thinks better everywhere else than in their own patrie,” he himself chose to “reason in a different 
manner.”243 Far from being convinced by the rationalizations of the Dreyfusard internationalists, 
Brunetière wrote “I say hardily that if the idea of the patrie finds itself one day to be contradictory to 
the reasonings of ‘Reason’ or to the suggestions of nature, considering what we owe it in the present 
as in the past, the need that we have of it, and the superior life that it lets us live, so much the worse 
for nature and it is Reason which I will consider wrong.”244 In practice, this meant that the role of the 
intellectual was not to seek the suppression of national differences in favor of a universal, 
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international intelligence but rather to defend national difference and national relativism. Defending 
the patrie entailed defending its traditions which were, according to Brunetière, “the military 
tradition, the literary tradition, the intellectual tradition, and…a religious tradition.” This meant 
defending the courts’ decision on Dreyfus, the Church’s views on Jews and education, and the 
heritage of pre-Enlightenment intellectual values including militarism, authority, hierarchy, and 
French patriotism. 
 Like Barrès, although Brunetière rejected internationalism in favor of traditional patriotism, 
he did not completely oppose socialism as long as he was able to define the term according to his 
own, alternative worldview. “I declare to you first,” he began, “that in the current sense, in the 
political meaning of the word, I am not socialist.” He explained that he regretted that he was not 
because in the true sense of the word, which had been denatured by the internationalists, socialism 
was simply a word for solidarity or collectivism, the “idea that the rights of society are anterior to 
those of the individual since they found them,” and the rejection of individualism.245 “I regret that the 
abuse that one has given the word prevents me from serving myself of it; I regret that a word invented 
only to be the antithesis of egoism and the synonym of solidarity has come to signify only hatred and 
miserable envy,” he wrote, “in other times less troubled and less confused where I would not risk 
being misunderstood, I would have liked to call myself socialist but I am not it. And of all the reforms 
with which socialism menaces us from the ‘nationalization of the soil’ to the ‘disintegration of the 
idea of the patrie,’ I admit none of them.”246 International socialism had denatured the idea of 
socialism into “dreams of sick minds and idealists who lack the sense of reality.”247 To oppose this 
distorted concept of the Dreyfusard Left, Brunetière outlined his own conception of a nationalist 
 
245 Ibid., 47. 
 
246 Ibid., 44.  
 
247 Ibid., 49. 
 
106 
socialism in keeping with his anti-Dreyfusard intellectual values of realism, collectivism, nationalism, 
and class cooperation. 
 First Brunetière explained that the negation of the patrie was not necessary to the socialist 
concept. The patrie, had been portrayed as the enemy by international socialists, but the social 
solidarity these groups represented was actually at the heart of the idea of socialism. Perhaps the 
problem, Brunetière wrote, was that the international socialists understood solidarity differently than 
he did. In the contemporary application of the concept, it had come to mean dependency rather than 
cooperation. It is necessary, he wrote “to clarify a necessary distinction. I do not reject absolutely 
either the idea or the word solidarity. I demand only that one explain it and if possible that one define 
it. Since we do not understand the same thing by the same word, I ask that they say so and that though 
one might not elaborate on all the bases, that one at least not feign that all are of the same accord 
regarding it.”248 Brunetière understood solidarity as a national or professional unity which, far from 
requiring class conflict and struggle as the international socialists proposed, instead encouraged and 
fostered class cooperation and mutual assistance. When, Brunetière wrote, we “have disengaged 
socialism from collectivism and anarchism and thus retained what it contains of the practical and 
legitimate and separated it from what it contains of the dangerous and utopian,” then the anti-
Dreyfusard intellectuals would have constructed their own concept of socialism.249 It would be this 
nationalist concept of socialism that Brunetière believed it was the intellectual’s responsibility to 
advocate. Those who promoted an internationalist socialism were betraying their responsibility to 
French intelligence and French society. 
 
Brunetière and the Right-wing Intellectual Model 
 Brunetière was one of the first prominent writers on the Anti-Dreyfusard Right to engage in 
the debate over the role and responsibility of the intellectual. His initial condemnation of the concept 
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of intellectual engagement in Après le Procès quickly turned into resentment of the left-wing 
monopoly over it. Brunetière expressed, perhaps better than any of his right-wing peers, his 
resentment of the Dreyfusards’ ability to dominate the discussion of moral and intellectual values and 
to silence and delegitimize their opponents by excluding them from the new authoritative role of the 
intellectual. As the Affair continued, he would feel himself increasingly excluded from places of 
intellectual authority like the university and marginalized because of his religious, political, and 
intellectual values. He therefore claimed equal rights to speak as an intellectual and began, with 
Barrès and others of the Ligue de la Patrie, the process of constructing an alternative intellectual 
model for the engagé of the Right. Convincing the public of the legitimacy of this alternative would 
become an additional but necessary component of his engagement and would result in a certain 
defensive mentality that the Dreyfusards did not share. This process of self-legitimization also 
involved an intentional differentiation of intellectual values and responsibilities. According to 
Brunetière, the true intellectual believed the individual only reached his potential in an ordered and 
stable society and therefore saw his role to be the stabilization of collective society rather than 
defense of individual rights. The true intellectual had a responsibility to advocate particular ideas that 
were relevant and practical for real society rather than creating abstract theories that were destructive 
in practice. And, the true intellectual saw himself to be linked to his compatriots by French culture 
and intelligence rather than to an international of intellectuals linked by rational, universal thought. 
Brunetière’s perception that he was excluded from the new authority of the intellectual guide, his 
resentment of this hegemony, his belief that his engagement required a secondary aim of self-
legitimization, and his desire to differentiate his cultural values and concept of intellectual role and 
responsibility from those of the Dreyfusard Left were shared by others on the Anti-Dreyfusard Right. 
These like-minded individuals would come together in intellectual communities, separate from those 
dominated by the Dreyfusards, in order to transform their individual protest into a more effective 
counter-engagement. These collective communities of the excluded and ostracized intellectuals of the 
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Right, and the different relationships, practices, and experiences that developed there, contribute the 
final component of the right-wing model of true intellectual identity.  
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE WORLD OF THE ANTI-DREYFUSARD RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND 
THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE 
 
As the Dreyfusards had, the Anti-Dreyfusards congregated in revues, ligues, salons and cafés 
and other areas of Parisian intellectual sociability. As the debates intensified, these spaces, which had 
before been home to men of both political persuasions, became exclusive centers of Dreyfusard or 
Anti-Dreyfusard opinion, resulting in a radical polarization of the intellectual community. In these 
places of professional and personal sociability, right-wing resentments, worldviews, values, and 
understanding of role were nurtured and reinforced by constant exposure to like-minded peers. Men 
of letters who had seen their work as an individual expression, now collaborated with others in a 
shared effort as intellectuals. Whether it was in a ligue, a revue equipe, a salon, or a gathering of 
engaged friends at a café or banquet, belonging to the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual camp and 
participating in its networks of professional support and personal friendships provided the anti-
Dreyfusard intellectual with a new sense of belonging and a new collective identity that was separate 
from that of the Dreyfusard intellectuals. And, although they shared general intellectual behaviors 
with the Dreyfusards, from teaching to journalism to petition signing, the segregation of the two 
groups during the Affair revealed underlying differences in the experience of these basic professional 
practices that would contribute to a sense of fundamental incompatibility. As time passed, the 
segregation and sense of exclusion from the mainstream milieu would come to differentiate the 
behaviors and practices themselves. The new collective identity that was created in the separate, 
alternative intellectual communities of the Right both perpetuated and substantiated the perception by 
the Anti-Dreyfusards that they had a different intellectual identity from the Dreyfusards. 
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The first step toward collective engagement on the Anti-Dreyfusard Right would be the 
announcement of the new Ligue de la Patrie on January 1, 1899. The ligue had originally been 
conceived by three agrégés, Louis Dausset, Gabriel Syveton, and Henri Vaugeois in October of 1898. 
The petition they created would be circulated quietly among the prestigious men of letters who had 
refused to participate in the Dreyfusard petitions and ligues. This initial statement of anti-Dreyfusard 
engagement, which read in closing, “ the undersigned, persuaded that they express the opinion of 
France, are resolved to work, within the limits of their professional duty, to maintain…the traditions 
of the French patrie,” was signed by Charles Maurras, Barrès, Brunetière, François Copée, Jules 
Lemaître, René Doumic, the Comtesse de Martel,250 and numerous other men of letters, artists, and 
professors.251 On January 1, 1899 Le Soleil, a monarchist paper, broke the story that there was a new 
ligue forming and volunteered its revue team’s signatures for the petition. Although the founders 
expressed irritation that their ligue had been announced before a suitable number of prestigious names 
had been gathered, they took the opportunity of increased publicity to launch their ligue. An initial 
comite de direction was formed in 1899 including Barrès, Brunetière, Coppée, Lemaître, Syvetton, 
Vaugeois, and Dausset.252 
The Ligue de la Patrie would become the central network of the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual 
and formed a clear division between those who were Dreyfusard and those who were not. Although 
the Dreyfusard Ligue des Droits de l’homme had not literally excluded any particular men of letters 
from signing, the anti-Dreyfusard ligue would pointedly include the proscription that no individual 
who had signed the Dreyfusard petitions in favor of revision would be accepted as a member of the 
new ligue. Lists of new adherents were published in blatantly anti-Dreyfusard journals like L’Éclair,
L’Écho de Paris, and Gil Blas. And, the first meetings of the Ligue in the salle des Horticulteurs were 
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for invited guests only.253 With this stipulation, the ligue became an arm of specifically anti-
Dreyfusard collective engagement. The most effective expression of this collective engagement, and 
the most significant contribution to collective intellectual identity, would be the ligue lecture tours.  
These tours began in Paris, where speakers gave lectures before large crowds of university 
students and the general public, before traveling to the larger provincial cities. They were referred to 
as “conférences patriotiques” and were not only reproduced partially in the larger papers the 
following morning but also were printed and sold as pamphlets by the Ligue’s own press.254 Certain 
speeches, like one given by Lemaître in 1900, were not even sold, but rather distributed in envelopes 
to every home in all the quarters of Paris.255 The dissemination of these lectures created an imagined 
community of like-minded readers that extended well beyond the small number of actual attendees. 
The published speeches were also an effective means of promoting the larger anti-Dreyfusard 
intellectual network. After 1900, the inside-cover of several of these printed lectures included 
advertisements for the ligue bulletin Annales and a summary of the contents of the next issue. Back 
covers often listed other essays and lectures given by Ligue members that were available to 
purchase.256 The lectures were also the aspect of Ligue engagement that continued to connect member 
intellectuals in the ligue’s socio-professional network. Although Brunetière would leave the directing 
committee as early as February of 1899 and Barrès would leave it in October of 1901, they both 
remained committed members of the Ligue’s lecture efforts throughout the Affair.257 
These lecture tours were essential in promoting and consolidating the alternative intellectual 
model developed on the Right and reinforcing the sense of common purpose and sentiment among 
right-wing intellectuals. They magnified the common themes on the Right about the existence of a 
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Dreyfusard intellectual hegemony, the resentment felt by its opponents, the struggle being waged to 
combat this monopoly over public opinion, and the alternative set of values and intellectual positions 
on the anti-Dreyfusard Right. Lectures by Coppée and Lemaître noted the “oppression by an evil 
doing minority” who claimed to have a “monopoly” on engagement.258 They called for the Ligue to 
continue to organize, discipline, and publicize itself in order to legitimize its alternative position.259 In 
the Ligue’s fifth conference entitled “Où Sont Les Intellectuels?,” Doumic complained that the 
Dreyfusards had “entitled themselves ‘les intellectuels” and excluded from this role all who disagreed 
with them.260 These men had been friends and peers of ours, he continued, but “suddenly they 
appeared to us transformed… We held them for men of open and tolerant minds, but they now 
consider that all those who were not of their opinion were men without heart, that they alone had the 
monopoly on humanity, piety, and generally all of the beautiful sentiments, while we were, we others, 
the partisans of injustice and barbarism.” He concluded by declaring of this unwarranted Dreyfusard 
hegemony, “In entitling themselves with pomp ‘Les Intellectuels’ instead of calling themselves as 
they ought to have ‘plusieurs intellectuels,’ they have wanted to make it be believed that the immense 
majority of France who thinks, reflects, and lives by intelligence was on their side. And it is the 
contrary that is true.”261 
After collectively denouncing the Dreyfusard hegemony, lecturers continued by declaring 
themselves the originators of a legitimate, authoritative, French alternative and differentiating the 
worldviews and values of this alternative model. They collectively expressed the relativism, 
collectivism, realism, and national socialism that Barrès and Brunetière had expressed individually. 
The first lecture entitled “La Patrie Française” was given by Lemaître to “explain the spirit and design 
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of the Ligue.” Here he argued that while the Dreyfusards had accused them of not loving “truth and 
justice as much, of not being as attached as them to the rights of man and the citizen,” they were here 
to clarify that though they loved truth and justice, as intellectuals they also “had a duty to respect the 
fundamental pacts of human society” and the stability of the nation.262 Barrès began his lectures by 
reminding listeners that the Ligue was led by “an elite of historians, savants, artists and grands 
lettrés” who had taken the responsibility of “advising on the necessities of the Patrie.” He continued, 
“we share a common will….and we have among us the men of France most capable of expressing in a 
clear and moving fashion, with disinterested hearts, the national sentiment.”263 The Ligue, he wrote, 
held as its highest purpose the replacement of abstract internationalism and universalism with a 
patriotism grounded in the national reality.264 
The Ligue de la Patrie also created a network of intellectuals and devotees that served to link 
various members to one another in a larger right-wing community. Beginning in 1900, there were 
monthly Ligue sponsored banquets that brought together the leading names of the Ligue and 
celebrated the members newly elected to office. It organized its own section for women called the 
“Dames de la Patrie Française” which continued to hold permanent meetings well past the Dreyfus 
Affair and printed its own Bulletin by 1910. Belonging to the Ligue de la Patrie also linked members 
to other anti-Dreyfusard ligues. Despite the clear dominance of intellectuals in the Ligue de la Patrie 
and the working class majority of the other leading anti-Dreyfusard ligues, the memberships, and 
especially the audience, of the ligues could not help but overlap during the Affair.265 The Ligue de la 
Patrie cooperated with Déroulède’s Ligue des Patriots in several electoral campaigns and they and the 
Ligue antisémitique would support one another’s writers and public demonstrations. Barrès not only 
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belonged to the Ligue des Patriotes, he joined in Déroulède’s February 1899 attempted coup and 
eventually became the editor of Le Drapeau and the leader of the Patriotes.266 Brunetière was giving 
lectures and articles on the enemies of France and the values of anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals to the 
Union de la paix sociale and the Catholic University during the time that he was speaking for the 
Ligue de la Patrie. And Lemaître, Dausset, Syveton, and Vaugeois would all join Maurras and 
Maurice Pujo in the Action Française. The latter was born almost simultaneously with the Ligue de la 
Patrie and saw itself as a son of this original collective community. 
 The creation of the Ligue would also initiate yet another form of intellectual community: the 
imaginary community created by manifests and petitions. Those who signed the ligue manifest 
believed they were in the company of like-minded peers and felt a certain affinity for their fellow 
signers even though they might never come in contact with them. These imagined communities were 
able to create a sense of collective identity on a massive scale. When the ligue petition was first 
published, it had 22 academician signatures, by the first official assembly of the Ligue there were 
10,000 adherents, by the end of 1899 there were 20,000, and by the end of 1900 over 500,000 
compared to the 8,000 of the Ligue des Droits de l’homme.267 The ligue petition was followed by 
other anti-Dreyfusard petitions, like the “Henry Monument.” Begun in La Libre Parole,268 it garnered 
fewer signatures but became a means, used by both camps, to identify intellectuals as anti-
Dreyfusards. Signing one’s name and title to these petitions implied a certain willingness to be 
identified with the values and programs of the collective extreme Right and a disassociation with the 
Dreyfusard Left. The very practice of petition signing also indicated a certain concept of intellectual 
community on the Right that was distinctive from that of the Left. While the Left listed names 
alphabetically or in no particular order, the petitions of the Right classed their signatures by 
 
266 Rutkoff, Revanche et Revision, 159. 
 
267 Sirinelli and Ory, Les Intellectuels en France, 23.  
 
268 The petition was to raise funds and express support for Colonel Henry’s widow. 14,000 signatures 
and 131,000 francs were collected within a month.  
 
114 
professional cadre, academic standing, or social position.269 While the Dreyfusard Left liked to 
envision its intellectual community as an egalitarian society, the anti-Dreyfusard Right saw their 
community as ordered and hierarchical.  
The Ligue de la Patrie was the largest of the right-wing intellectual collectives, but it was not 
the only source of sociability, mentorship, or collective identity for anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals. The 
division created by the Affair revealed a previously existing division in professional trajectories 
between the Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. The anti-Dreyfusard dominance in letters and the 
press meant that revue teams and offices would become important communities and networks for the 
intellectual Right. The revue provided not only a laboratory and an outlet for ideas that were 
oppositional to the regime and university, it also served as a space of interaction and fellowship for 
the writers. Here students who eschewed the professional path of the university professor found 
professional mentors and opportunities to develop their skills as contributors before becoming regular 
columnists. Collaborators on revue teams usually worked in the same offices and shared opinions and 
stories, met to discuss the upcoming issue or consider literary contributions for publication in serial, 
or simply used the offices as points of rendezvous for other social gatherings with fellow 
collaborators. Their shared values and likeminded approach to the political and social situation, in 
addition to their shared professional pursuits in journalism and literature, more often than not, 
engendered friendships and a strong sense of social community and collective identity. This sense of 
community and collective identity was also experienced on a broader scale, among the network of 
journals that shared collaborators and socio-political perspectives throughout France. The revues 
provided, therefore, not only real interpersonal community but also a source for an imagined 
intellectual community shared with all the other writers who contributed to like-minded papers.  
Right-wing intellectuals dominated the teams of several of the larger revues and daily 
presses, including Gaulois, La Presse, Gil Blas, Libre Parole, L’Intransigeant, La Patrie, L’Écho de 
Paris, Le Journal, Figaro, Petit Journal and L’Éclair. The anti-Dreyfusard collective identity of these 
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papers was seldom in question since the revues continued the same right-wing themes as the 
individual intellectuals. One article in Gil Blas, for example, denounced Dreyfusard hegemony and 
advocated the legitimacy of the Ligue saying, “The men attached to the cause of Dreyfus have 
affirmed that the elite of France is with them…they have concluded that they dispose of all the 
intellectual forces of the nation….The foundation of the Ligue de la Patrie Française shows that the 
Dreyfusards have only created an illusion for us. The intellectual elite of France is not with them, it is 
divided.”270 A small bi-monthly revue called Les Annales de la Patrie Française was also created 
expressly as the organ of the Ligue in May of 1900. Each number included political essays or articles 
in addition to literary pieces, poetry, theater, and a section called “Le Mouvement Nationaliste” 
advertising the meetings, lectures, and committees being held around France.271 In a clear attempt to 
forge a sense of collective intellectual identity in the initial issue, Lemaître listed five values believed 
to unite all the readers and collaborators of the revue in a single mindset.272 Although each of these 
revues would provide a segregated community that reinforced and amplified anti-Dreyfusard 
engagement, it was Brunetière’s Revue des Deux Mondes which was the most prestigious and least 
ephemeral of these communities. 
The RDM was one of the more actively engaged literary revues in the anti-Dreyfusard arsenal 
and employed such leading anti-Dreyfusards as Lemaître, Doumic, Brunetière, Françis Charmes, and 
Charles Benoist on its permanent staff of chroniclers as well as inviting regular articles and literary 
contributions from other anti-Dreyfusard notables like Paul Bourget, André Bellesort, and Barrès. The 
revue was a socio-professional space for all of its contributors, but particularly for Brunetière who 
worked in his office alongside his contributors every day, read each of their pieces, and collaborated 
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with them on revisions and alterations. Twice a week he gathered all the permanent writers to his 
offices for a discussion of the issue,273 and in the evenings, there were salon meetings hosted by Louis 
Buloz in the offices of the revue.274(95,97)  The revue team was therefore a significant part of 
Brunetière’s life and was central to his conceptualization of himself as an engaged intellectual. 
Brunetière knew that the revue was a flagship for anti-Dreyfusism and preferred his post as 
director to any political position he could have earned since he saw it to be “a podium more 
resounding than any other in France or even in Europe.”(95,92) This platform provided an 
opportunity for other contributors to amplify their own views as well and to protest the monopoly of 
the Left and the repression of the Right with more effect.275 The RDM team was, therefore, both a 
place of sociability and professional collegiality for Brunetière and his contributors and a means to 
amplify their individual engagement. It linked its writers in a network of like-minded peers who 
shared a purpose and a system of values. Most importantly, identification with RDM implied a sense 
of alienation from Dreyfusard communities. Writers for the RDM during the Affair were often found 
in other anti-Dreyfusard journals and revues but rarely, if ever, had essays or even literary works 
published in the network of Dreyfusard journals. Brunetière even removed his work from Calmann 
Lévy’s publishing catalogue when Lévy published the Revue de Paris, led by Dreyfusards Ernest 
Lavisse and Lucien Herr, and gave it instead to publishers Perrin, Delagrave, and Hachette until his 
death in 1906. Writing for RDM implied a decision to support the anti-Dreyfusard camp and a 
rejection of the Dreyfusard community. 
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The Ligue and the Revue were not the only spaces in the intellectual world that served as 
politically segregated centers of sociability and community for anti-Dreyfusards. Salons were 
particularly popular places for intellectuals to meet and be introduced to fellow anti-Dreyfusard 
thinkers, discuss and share ideas, and forge valuable professional networks. Brunetière’s salons of 
choice were those of Mme Buloz which often met at the offices of the RDM and that of Mme 
Aubernon where “the Dreyfusard artists no longer showed themselves” after the Affair sparked the 
division into camps.276 The Anti-Dreyfusards found themselves most at home in the salons of Mme 
Leland, Mme de Loynes, and Comtesse de Martel, known in the literary world as Gyp, who were all 
three ardent anti-Dreyfusards. They were also such strong supporters of the work of the Ligue de la 
Patrie that they became its “bailleuses de fonds.”277 Mme de Loynes’ salon had once welcomed as 
diverse a clientele as Renan, Flaubert, Anatole France and Barrès in the same salon, yet, with the 
advent of the Dreyfus Affair, her salon became a “fortress of nationalism” where Dreyfusard thinkers 
were no longer welcomed while Lemaître, Barrès, and Brunetière were frequent visitors.278 Salons 
were also important centers of mentorship and professional networking for right-wing intellectuals. 
De Loynes’ salon helped right-wing editors find financial assistance and introduced Ernest Judet of 
Le Petit Journal to financier Antoine Vlasto, enabling Judet to start the more nationalist and anti-
Semitic paper L’Éclair. Other editors including Gaston Calmette of  Figaro,279 Henry Simond of 
L’Écho de Paris, and Léon Bailby of La Presse and L’Intransigeant were frequent guests of de 
Loynes and used the salons as opportunities to meet potential contributors. It was even at one of de 
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Loynes’ dinners, among friends who shared the same intellectual frustrations during the Affair, that 
the original plan to create the Ligue de la Patrie was supposedly devised.280 
Cafés and small dinners offered more casual opportunities for anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals to 
form personal links to like-minded peers, to discuss and debate their ideas, and even to hold small 
organizational meetings with fellow engaged writers. Several café spaces, particularly during the 
divisiveness of the affair, separated what had before been a clientele of mixed ideologies into very 
polarized communities whose political persuasion dominated the atmosphere and patronage of the 
café. Café des Vosges, for example, would literally change its name to Café François Coppée to 
recognize the dominance at that café of Coppée and his followers around the time of the Affair.281 
Café Procope and Café Voltaire were also widely recognized as anti-Dreyfusard spaces during the 
Affair where one could find Barrès, Bourget, Jean Moreas and Maurras holding small gatherings or 
simply relaxing and discussing affairs with a few friends.282 Café Voltaire, in particular, became the 
home of the Association nationalistes de la Jeunesse whose aim was said to be creating a space for 
student sociability “where one does not admit Dreyfusards.”283 These now divided social spaces 
reflected the corresponding division in personal and professional friendships that had often been 
formed around socializing in a café. Anti-Dreyfusard activist Léon Daudet recounted how on the eve 
of the Affair, his father Alphonse, Zola, Anatole France, Coppée, Lemaître, Bourget, and Barrès had 
enjoyed meeting together at Restaurant Durand. When Daudet declared that it was necessary for all 
who thought and wrote to take the side of France and the army, Zola responded to the contrary and 
the atmosphere of the group, according to Daudet, “became glacial.” When the party broke up for the 
evening, Lemaître suggested to the group that, “the Balzac dinners had a place at one time, but it is 
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likely they will not take place again.” It is thus, Daudet concluded, “that the Dreyfus Affair divided 
the world.”284 
Perhaps the largest gatherings of anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals for politically charged dinner 
discussions were those in honor of Barrès’ Appel au Soldat held most often in the Café de l’Univers. 
In recollecting these dinners, Barrès expressed clearly the sense of intellectual community and 
collective identity that formed here. “Two years ago,” he wrote, “the majority of those who are today 
united around this table did not know one another. They were made sensible to one another by the 
intensity, the cruelty of the drama of which France was almost the victim. This first of all brought us 
together.”285 Barrès did not consider the grouping to have been only voluntary however. There were 
pre-existing sentiments in the men present in that hall, he continued, and certain words like Patrie and 
France awakened in them ideas that “were not able to be understood by those in whom these 
associations of ideas had not previously existed. It is not a matter of intelligence: whatever their 
[Dreyfusard intellectuals] rapidity of mind, whatever their alertness, they are not able to sense things 
as we do. A shared instinct, a shared physiology has grouped us.”286 And, he was clearly suggesting, 
this psychology and sense of things that had brought the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals together in this 
community also separated them as intellectuals from the Dreyfusards.  
Whether meeting and forming bonds in ligues, petitions, revues, salons or cafés, the anti-
Dreyfusards, as the Dreyfusards had, sought to unite and bond with like-minded peers who could be 
part of a specific intellectual network and community favorable to their own values, worldviews, and 
socio-political positions. But, it was not the segregation of spaces, groups, and networks alone that 
created a distinctive right-wing collective identity for intellectuals. Integral to the formation of this 
collective identity was the perception, voiced so well by Barrès, that there was a more fundamental 
division between the two camps of intellectuals. The opposition in values and the division in 
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communities was paired with the perception of an essential abyss, between Dreyfusards and anti-
Dreyfusards, in the very experience of being an intellectual.  
 
The Anti-Dreyfusard Intellectual Experience 
 During the Dreyfus Affair, intellectuals of the Right came to have a very different 
understanding of what it meant to “be an intellectual” than the intellectuals of the Left. The distinctive 
experience of daily intellectual life on the anti-Dreyfusard Right was partly a result of their 
segregated communities, but it was also a product of the very different relationship that the 
intellectual of the Right had to the republican regime and French cultural institutions. Many of these 
differences between Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard relationships and experiences originated before 
1898, but they would not carry much significance until the struggle to control intellectual identity 
during the Affair. After 1898, the distinctive relationships and experiences of the anti-Dreyfusard 
Right were used by the dominant Left as a tool for identifying them as anti-intellectuals. However, 
while the Left used its own relationships to the Republic, the university, and the Church to define the 
intellectual experience and exclude anti-Dreyfusards, the intellectual Right began to outline its own 
concept of these relationships and use them to define its own model of true intellectual experience.  
 The Dreyfusards identified themselves collectively as the intellectual defenders of the 
Republic and of the France created by the Enlightenment and Revolution. The Dreyfusards, therefore, 
experienced intellectual life as the protected intelligentsia. Among the anti-Dreyfusards, in contrast, 
anti-Republicanism, entailing both a rejection of parliamentarism and of liberalism, became an 
expectation of the intellectual. Barrès, despite his past position as deputy from Nancy, symbolized 
this anti-republican cause. He said of his anti-Dreyfusard peers, “we are united by the most complete 
disgust, we are clearly and resolutely in revolt and in disgust against the parliamentary regime.”287 
Brunetière, who had considered himself a republican before the Affair, was distraught by the infusion 
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of internationalist socialism into republicanism and came to identify himself as a “nationalist” rather 
than a “republican” intellectual. As early as 1898, the chronicle in the RDM expressed the role and 
responsibility of the anti-Dreyfusard intellectual when it said, “we have struggled against the inherent 
faults of our republican and parliamentary regime.”288 Beginning with the Affair, intellectuals of the 
Right would not engage to support of the Republic or defend its values. Instead, being an intellectual 
of the Right would come to mean being the anti-republican, anti-liberal, and anti-parlimentarian 
opposition.  
 This oppositional relationship to the Third Republic and its political values meant that the 
right-wing experience of intellectual life was one of perceived repression and persecution. The 
Dreyfusards would exclude them from the category of the intellectual by denouncing them as anti-
republican and therefore anti-French.289 René Doumic would react to this perceived exclusion writing, 
“The spirit of the sect [political Left] is the spirit of exclusion. To exclude, this is their favorite 
pastime. No one will be Republican outside of us and our friends!”290 Behind the “word screens” of 
Justice, Liberty, and Civil Equality, he concluded, “is practiced a politics of oppression.” While the 
intellectuals of the Left used anti-republicanism to exclude the Right from the intellectual milieu, the 
ministries of Brisson, Waldeck-Rousseau, and Combes would use it as a rationale for political 
persecution of right-wing organizations and leaders. The Right was forced to apply for governmental 
authorization of its organizations and revues, reorganize its disbanded ligues, and replace its 
imprisoned leaders.291 While the intellectual Left increasingly enjoyed a daily intellectual life of 
political support, organizational stability, and the resulting public prominence, the intellectual Right’s 
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experience of intellectual life was one of perceived suppression, vulnerability, and organizational 
instability. 
 As Brunetière would discover when he was dismissed from his positions at the ENS and the 
Sorbonne for anti-republicanism and clericalism, the anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals’ relationship to the 
Republic would also affect their relationship to the university system. The pre-1898 tendency of the 
right-wing to follow the professional trajectory of journalism rather than university teaching would be 
exacerbated by the perceived Dreyfusard dominance of the ENS and the university system. Although 
anti-Dreyfusards continued to predominate certain areas like the Faculty of Law and College de 
France, they were increasingly outnumbered by their left-wing opponents in the faculties of Arts and 
Sciences at the Sorbonne.292 And, as the experience of the universitaire became identified with the 
Dreyfusard intellectual, being a right-wing universitaire was increasingly seen as aberrant. As 
generations of right-wing students perceived this imbalance in the university system, they would seek 
mentors outside the university and find new professional alternatives in journalism.  
This tendency toward journalism and literature rather than the university would yield a 
significant difference in the experience of daily intellectual life on the Left and Right. While the 
Dreyfusards were able to form smaller revues like Siècle, Aurore, and Petit Republic, the Anti-
Dreyfusards dominated the larger, more prestigious literary revues, particularly the Revue des Deux 
Mondes.293 The large daily presses were also usually anti-Dreyfusard, especially L’Écho de Paris,
which became the flagship journal for the Ligue de la Patrie Française, as well as Le Journal, Figaro,
and Petit Journal.294 The anti-Dreyfusard intellectual enjoyed an array of possible forums for his 
literary engagement and was assured of a much larger audience for his articles than his Dreyfusard 
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opponents.295 By the end of the Affair, although there were anti-Dreyfusard universitaires, it was the 
journalists and men of letters who had become the prominent leaders of the right-wing camp and the 
model of the right-wing intellectual experience.  
The anti-Dreyfusard intellectual experience would also be influenced by the relationship of 
the extreme Right to the Catholic church. As previously mentioned, Catholicism did not predispose 
intellectuals to be anti-Dreyfusards since many prominent Dreyfusards were practicing Catholics. 
However, the intellectual Right invoked faith, religion, and catholic tradition more often than the Left 
in its intellectual discourse and did not see secularism as a necessary quality of intelligence. Also, in 
contrast with the Dreyfusard camp, the presence of Protestant or Jewish names on anti-Dreyfusard 
petitions was rare, while those of church officials was commonplace. The Dreyfusards eagerly 
highlighted the religious thought of their right-wing opponents in an effort to dismiss them as anti-
intellectual, irrational, and intolerant. They claimed Brunetière’s writings on the importance of the 
Church for social order, the Catholic tradition of anti-Semitism, and the value of religious primary 
education indicated he was unsuited for intellectual responsibilities. However, Brunetière and the 
intellectuals of the Right saw faith, religion, and church tradition as essential to the French national 
identity and therefore as important influences on the formation of French intelligence. Being a 
responsible intellectual of the Right required the translation of these faith-based, traditional sources 
into cultural and intellectual inspiration.296 For Dreyfusards, being an intellectual required a 
separation of religious and intellectual life. For the anti-Dreyfusards, the two were intertwined and 
symbiotic.  
 Anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals, therefore, had a very different understanding of their 
relationship to political and cultural power than their Dreyfusard peers. Their antagonism toward the 
republican regime, marginalization in the university, and close association with the press and the 
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Church would give them a particular experience of intellectual life that distinguished their concept of 
what it meant to be an intellectual from that of their opponents. This fundamental difference in 
intellectual experience was intensified, actualized, and perpetuated by the segregation of the 
intellectual community. Spaces of intellectual sociability and professional networks from ligues and 
revues to petitions, cafés, and salons became politically polarized. This segregation led over time to 
an increasing sense of separation and incompatibility between the two camps. The communities and 
spaces of the intellectual milieu became centers of engagement and politicization that radicalized 
individual intellectuals and gave them a new sense of their collective identity as anti-Dreyfusard 
engagés.  
 
The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Dreyfus Affair 
 Barrès and Brunetière were two of the first anti-Dreyfusard men of letters to engage 
in the Dreyfus Affair and, therefore, were instrumental in the construction of an alternative, 
right-wing intellectual identity. First and foremost, both men showed a strong resentment of 
the dominance exercised by the Left over the authority of the “intellectual” and their 
exclusion from this role. This resentment, which would continue to mark all of the 
intellectuals of the Right over the century, would inspire a desire to legitimize themselves as 
equal, if not superior, intellectual guides for France. This struggle for legitimacy would 
become an essential aspect of Barrès’ and Brunetière’s mentality of engagement that 
distinguished them from the left-wing intellectuals who engaged without any such obligation. 
Both Barrès and Brunetière would consider the differentiation and defense of their right-wing 
socio-cultural values to be an important part of this legitimization process. They advocated 
nationalism, realism, and collectivism as the true ideals of French intelligence rather than the 
Dreyfusard values of universalism, rationalism, and individualism. These different value 
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systems would correspond to equally distinctive attitudes toward intellectual role, 
responsibility, and behavior. The abyss that became apparent between the values and 
attitudes of the individual right-wing intellectuals would be reinforced and radicalized by the 
physical segregation of their collective intellectual communities and socio-professional 
networks. The organizations, spaces, and camaraderie that Barrès and Brunetière shared with 
their like-minded peers would give them a sense of collective identification with the right-
wing camp and would enhance the effectiveness of their individual engagements. This 
physical separation of the intellectual field would both reflect and inspire distinctive 
relationships to the places of political and cultural power in France. This resulted in a 
different right-wing experience of intellectual life. All together, these factors contributed to a 
very different concept of intellectual identity on the anti-Dreyfusard Right and Dreyfusard 
Left. This pattern of alternative identity construction on the extreme Right would not end 
with the resolution of the Affair, however. It would continue into the next decades when the 




THE NOUVELLE SORBONNE AND THE INTERNATIONAL THREAT: 1910-1920 
 
The large scale political engagement by intellectuals in Dreyfus Affair had revealed 
underlying differences within the intellectual milieu between the Dreyfusard Center and Left and anti-
Dreyfusard Right. These differences were not mere political disagreements; they were the result of a 
veritable abyss between these intellectuals’ understanding of the essence of the nation, the 
conceptualization of culture and intelligence, and the responsibilities and values of the intellectual. 
The separate concepts of intellectual identity did not disappear with the end of the Affair. Instead, the 
resentments, struggle for legitimacy, and process of differentiation and segregation on the extreme 
Right would continue into the decades surrounding World War I. The Right’s efforts to construct an 
alternative model of intellectual identity can be seen once more, almost immediately after the Dreyfus 
Affair, in the debates over the Nouvelle Sorbonne and the international threat of Germany. In these 
debates, a new group of intellectuals on both the Left and Right took the reigns from their Dreyfus 
Affair predecessors. Engagement in the years surrounding World War I was driven by the modernists 
and internationalists of the Left and the traditionalists and integral nationalists of the Right. The 
polemic began to take form as early as 1908, and continued until the declaration of War in 1914, 
when the majority of the intellectuals temporarily put aside their differences in the Union sacrée. 
Even this union, however, was based on two different rationales, on the Left and Right, for engaging 
in the war. The separations of the pre-war debate would reappear after the Versailles treaty, 
reinvigorated by the new ideological oppositions of the post-war era.  
 The movement of the intellectual Right against the reforms made to secondary and higher 
education, dubbed the “Nouvelle Sorbonne” by writers Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde, had its 
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origins in the divisions created during the Dreyfus Affair. In 1871, with the loss of the Franco-
Prussian war, many French universitaires demanded reforms to the French system which would 
model it after Germany’s university system. These German inspired reforms included a new focus on 
practical sciences, an emphasis on modern languages, scientifically-based methodologies in the 
humanities, and a new attempt to guide students toward a specialization. However, the reforms were 
not actually implemented until 1902, and were quickly associated with the dominant Dreyfusard 
position, since the young universitaires who supported and implemented the new reforms were ardent 
Dreyfusards.297 By 1908, the formerly anti-Dreyfusard Right had rallied its forces to combat this new 
left-wing assault on traditional French culture, intelligence, and civilization by promoting the 
humanities and arts, classical languages, traditional teaching methods, and the benefits of a general 
education. As one historian of the debate has noted, the old battle lines between Dreyfusard Left and 
Anti-Dreyfusard Right seem to have simply been redrawn in the decade before World War I around 
the new issue of French education.298 
The 1902 reforms to secondary education introduced four options for the baccalaureate, 
including one which required only sciences and modern language. Although the traditional option of 
humanities and classical languages remained an alternative, right-wing men of letters were outraged 
by the assault on traditional culture. Insult was added to injury in 1903 when the Dreyfusard 
universitaires arranged for the integration of the elite ENS into the Sorbonne. The conflation was 
intended to democratize higher education by making coursework and degrees more accessible to the 
average student, and also to erode the intellectual elitism of the ENS. The shift was widely 
reproached on the Right as an effort to destroy the natural hierarchy of intelligences and to create an 
unnatural egalitarianism which would only result in widespread mediocrity. The Combes ministry 
also succeeded, by 1905, in the separation of Church and State. This resulted in the forced resignation 
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of many Catholic professors like Brunetière and the elimination of the catholic schools that the Right 
saw as a mainstay of traditional, conservative education. The final blow came in 1907, when 
reformers suppressed the Latin and French composition requirements for the license in letters. Right-
wing traditionalists responded by declaring a “crisis of French” and calling for widespread intellectual 
engagement against the crippling of French education by the Third Republic. 
These Republican and left-wing inspired reforms to the education system seemed, to the 
former anti-Dreyfusards, to be yet another attempt by the Left to dominate society’s concept of 
culture and the nation by monopolizing the formation of the French youth. The resentment of left-
wing hegemony that had festered since the Affair found a new outlet in the Nouvelle Sorbonne 
debates. Pierre Lasserre and Charles Maurras led the campaign against the reforms for the newly 
emergent Action Française. The Action Française had been created in 1898 as an anti-republican and 
anti-Dreyfusard, though not yet monarchist, organization. With Charles Maurras as its theoretician, its 
core membership slowly shifted toward monarchism while retaining a strong base of nationalist and 
anti-republican supporters. Due to its large student clientele, the AF necessarily concerned itself with 
university affairs and in particular the reforms to secondary and superior education. It would play a 
prominent role in the collective engagement of the Right. 
Although the AF gained rapid popularity, it was the work of “Agathon” in articles for 
L’Opinion that first declared educational reform the new divisive issue for intellectuals. The series of 
articles by right-wing intellectuals Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde brought the moderate, 
conservative, and extreme-right wing presses as well as the majority of the men of letters to the 
support of the humanities and classical languages and forced the socialist and republican press and the 
left-wing universitaires to defend the reforms. The articles were a condemnation of the university’s 
failure to achieve its goals of a French national education. The cause of this failure, they claimed, was 
the heavy influence of German philosophy, pantheism, and the utilitarian and scientific methods so 
revered by the Republican and left-wing intellectuals. The success of these articles spawned a 1913 
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enquête published as Les jeunes gens d’aujourd’hui in which Agathon outlined the new right-wing 
model of the intellectual.  
The years of the educational debate were also those of increased fears among the public of a 
second war with Germany. In 1906, the Kaiser, who had watched the defeat of France’s ally Russia at 
the hands of the emergent Japanese power, took the opportunity to travel to French Morocco to 
express his support for Moroccan independence. This undeniable threat increased the latent fears of 
Germany that had lingered since 1870 and increased public support for nationalist groups, including 
the anti-German AF.299 In response to this increased nationalism and militarism on the French Right, 
the French Left, and particularly the recently united SFIO, emphasized its message of 
internationalism and anti-militarism. The clash between nationalist right-wing and socialist left-wing 
intellectuals during this time of international tension was made public in the debates over the “law of 
three years” which required three years of mandatory military service. The socialist Left considered 
this excessive militarism while the nationalist Right considered it essential for the preservation of the 
nation in view of Germany’s increased military strength.300 However, with the declaration of war on 
August 3, 1914 and the call by Raymond Poincare for a Union Sacrée, the intellectual gap, even on 
this issue, seemed to close temporarily in a united effort to defend France.  
This union of the intellectuals can be considered something of a victory for the intellectual 
Right, since it was their values and worldviews that were affirmed. There were several instances in 
which the entire intellectual community seemed united in these values such as the response to the 
German intellectuals’ “Appeal to the Civilized World.” Only marginalized intellectuals like Romain 
Rolland refused to enter the “fray” and withheld their support. However, the Union sacrée did not 
remove the underlying causes of intellectual incompatibility, and when the crisis of war passed, the 
two camps returned to their separate sides. The nationalist Right, and particularly the AF, emerged 
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from the war stronger than ever, reinforced by their apparent victory in the Union sacrée. Right-wing 
intellectuals like Massis saw the war as proof of the need for a continued right-wing intellectual 
engagement in a defense of “civilization” against the forces of barbarism represented now not only by 
German philosophy but also by Bolshevism. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the increasing 
popularity in Europe of the communist movement had simply broadened the scope of the intellectual 
Right’s concerns about foreign threats to French cultural identity. 
In contrast, the intellectual Left would revert, with even greater fervor, to its pre-war anti-
militarist, internationalist, and philo-German ideas and programs. Intellectuals of the Left had quickly 
been made ashamed of their excessive nationalism by writers, like Rolland, who had remained “above 
the fray.” This contributed to an increasingly strong movement on the intellectual Left in favor of 
pacifism.301 By 1920, the PCF had emerged from the Socialist party as a new alternative on the Left 
and had taken with it the valuable organ L’Humanité. The two distinct trajectories after the war, one 
on the extreme Right in favor of continued intellectual vigilance against the international threat, and 
the other on the Center and Left in favor of a return to internationalist values, renewed the old 
divisions over foreign influence that had first divided intellectuals in the debates over the Nouvelle 
Sorbonne.  
The decade 1910 to 1920 was therefore a period of great transition for intellectuals. They saw 
their debates shift from internal quarrels over French education to externally influenced divisions over 
international ideologies. The intellectual Right believed it was more excluded and marginalized in the 
intellectual world than it had been during the Affair, since now they were denied not only the right to 
engage as intellectuals, they were also increasingly marginalized in the education of the youth. They 
would respond by taking a new interest in guiding the student population and developing new socio-
professional alternatives to the university for the next generation of intellectuals. Yet, despite these 
evolutions, the pattern of right-wing intellectual identity construction would remain. The intellectual 
of the Right continued to be distinguished by a resentment of left-wing hegemony, a distinctive 
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mentality of engagement created by their struggle for legitimacy, and a desire to differentiate their 
intellectual values and segregate their communities from those of the dominant Left. This would 
result in a distinctive experience of intellectual life that prevents the right-wing intellectual of the 




LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE NOUVELLE SORBONNE AND 
WORLD WAR I ERA 
 
Questions of education have always been grounds for passionate debate in France, yet in the 
period between the Dreyfus Affair and World War I, the discussions of education carried implications 
beyond the specific institutional reforms. The reaction by the intellectual Right to the Nouvelle 
Sorbonne reformers revealed two fundamentally opposed concepts of French culture and society and 
two corresponding visions of the responsibility of the university, the educator, and the intellectual. 
These underlying divisions could not be mended by the Union sacrée, and reappeared after the war in 
a new debate over intellectual responsibilities in the post-war world. The distinctly left-wing 
approach to engagement and the values and worldviews that united the otherwise disparate 
Republican, socialist, and communist intellectuals against the intellectuals of the Right would 
contribute to a dominant model of intellectual identity that intentionally excluded the engagés of the 
Right.   
 The authority and prestige that the Dreyfusard intellectuals had garnered for their camp 
during the Affair would give them an added advantage in the new debates over French cultural 
identity and provide them with a distinctly left-wing mentality of engagement. They were proposing 
drastic and even initially unpopular changes to the traditional university that were characterized by 
the Right as an imitation of German structures foreign to the French mind. But the intellectuals of the 
Left presented them as a continuation of the Dreyfusard, Republican, and Enlightenment spirit and of 
the universal, abstract truths that had gained great intellectual authority.302 In contrast, the extreme 
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Right would quickly be identified with some of its more prominent, if not entirely representative, 
catholic and monarchist elements and their “anti-intellectual” stigma. The reformers would also 
benefit from the post-Affair association of intellectual authority with the person and role of the 
universitaire. Although the traditionalists of the Right enjoyed numerical advantage in the debates, 
the left-wing reformers would enjoy positions of dominance in the university and, therefore, in the 
battle for intellectual authority. Republican and socialist reformers from Lavisse to Croisset to 
Durkheim held prominent and powerful positions in the university system, and they effectively 
implied that the new reforms were backed by the university as a whole. This portrayal was reinforced 
by the young universitaires who dominated the scientific and modern disciplines that received the 
most public attention in the debate. Most importantly, however, the reforms of the Nouvelle Sorbonne 
had been in place for several years before the protest of Agathon ignited right-wing engagement. 303 
As it had with the Dreyfus Affair, the delayed reaction of the intellectual Right would damage the 
effectiveness of its engagement. The reformist Left engaged in the debates as the confident defenders 
of a functioning program rather than its external challengers.  
Because the left-wing reformers enjoyed pre-existing public authority, positions of power in 
the institution, a numerical majority in the modern disciplines, the support of the Republican regime, 
and the absence of any initial opposition, their engagement in defense of the Nouvelle Sorbonne was 
done with confidence and the expectation of success. After a momentary lapse during the Union 
sacrée, the Left’s return to its values of universalism and internationalism would allow it to regain 
quickly its lost intellectual authority and its confident claim to represent French intelligence. 
Intellectuals of the Left displayed no compulsion to legitimize themselves as authorities and displayed 
no concern that the intellectual Right dominated public opinion.  
 
individuals freed from clerical traditionalism. And, institutional changes to the Sorbonne and ENS were 
presented as steps toward true democratization, egalitarianism, and the foundation for an education in 
republican citizenship. 
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 Paired with these distinctive approaches to engagement was an equally distinctive set of 
socio-cultural values and worldviews that held important implications for the intellectuals’ concept of 
role, responsibility, and identity. The Nouvelle Sorbonne that was under attack in Agathon’s articles, 
and in the right-wing press campaign which followed, was not so much the institution itself or even a 
series of reforms, but rather a collection of intellectual values that Agathon referred to as a “spirit.” 
The reaction certainly targeted the tangible reforms of 1902 and 1907, but these specific attacks 
developed from the Right’s rejection of the general principles of education and culture that were 
shared by the republican and extreme left-wing reformers. Although the reformist Left included a 
diverse range of political ideologies from liberal republicanism to socialism to, after 1917, a small 
contingent of Communists, they all identified with certain general values, worldviews, and concepts 
of the intellectual that would separate them, as a bloc, from the intellectual Right. Their tendency 
toward the university led them to envision the role of the intellectual as that of the university 
professor and the erudite, and identified intellectual responsibility and practice with objective science, 
specialization, and international cultural exchange. They specified the essential values of the true 
intellectual as those of rationalism, democratic egalitarianism, progressive modernism, and 
internationalism. This concept of the role, responsibilities, and values of the intellectual that emerged 
from the debates would be essential to the model of intellectual identity created on the Left; one that 
by its very nature, excluded the Right. 
 Perhaps most essential to the reformist concept of the intellectual was the devotion to 
Rationalism and the scientific methodologies it engendered. This value and the roles and 
responsibilities it implied for the intellectual as educator would become one of the main sources of 
division between the Left and Right during the debates. In a speech before the Ligue de 
l’Enseignement, Alfred Croiset, doyen of the Sorbonne, specifically attacked Agathon and drew a 
clear line of division between the intellectual values of the two camps. The opponents of the 
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Sorbonne, he summarized, were “the enemies of Rationalism.”304 According to the republican and 
left-wing intellectual reformers, to be a true intellectual and educator required that one be a 
Rationalist who valued logical deduction, fact driven research, and the consistency of the scientific 
method. Facts, procedures, and steps of analysis were all able to be taught uniformly across the 
particular discipline and did not vary according to the taste, preferences, or particularities of the 
instructor. This uniform consistency and verifiable results, according to the reformers, meant that 
scientific rationalism brought one closer to “the Truth” than irrational methods based on traditional 
interpretations, personal taste, or irrational analyses. Rationalism and science therefore became 
synonymous with intelligence and the intellectual while taste and sentiment were rejected as anti-
intellectual and of little value in educating the nation. 
 Croiset and Ernest Lavisse, director of the ENS, both linked the reformist value of scientific 
rationalism to the new professional practices that were to mark the model intellectual of the Left. In 
contrast to the hierarchical concept of the classroom, favored by the traditionalists, where professors 
lectured without defending their reasoning to students, the reformers envisioned a new role for the 
educator. Lavisse wrote articles in Le Temps suggesting that a strong education in the steps of the 
scientific method would encourage students to question their professors and professors to guide their 
students through the steps of their analysis. It would ensure that professors taught according to the 
verifiable facts of their disciplines, even in literature and the arts, rather than their intuition, 
sentiments, or personal tastes. Croiset echoed this new vision of the responsibility and practice of the 
reformed universitaire saying, “our role is not to form men of taste, amiable dilettantes…taste is too 
individual an affair to be made a part of university instruction.”305 Erudition based on factual 
knowledge and scientific methods, not unquantifiable refinement and taste, was the responsibility of 
the educator.  
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This newly defined responsibility required not only an evolution in teaching practices; it also 
demanded a transformation of the disciplines themselves. Charles Seignobos, a reformist professor of 
history whose work was often utilized in the Sorbonne as official textbooks,306 argued for the 
transformation of history from a vague philosophy to a scientific and rational pursuit of factual truths. 
Only scientific methods applied in a thoroughly rationalist approach, he wrote, would “lead to the 
scientific truth” which was the aim of all historical investigation. The application of the scientific 
method to history would make it less subjective and provide a clear methodology for students to 
follow that would consistently lead them to the same truths.307 Rules and procedures for study would 
prevent history from being what it had been in the past, simply an instinctual imitation of the ideas of 
previous masters. Instinct and talent, he wrote, “were not rational procedures” and resulted in 
contradictory claims and ill-founded theories. The positivist dimension that Gabriel Monod added to 
the study of history was referred to scathingly by Agathon and the intellectual Right as the German 
“fetish of ‘méthode historique.”308 Perhaps most irksome to the intellectual Right however was the 
method of bibliography which would become a central component of historical and literary studies 
and a more vital component of the examinations than essays or compositions. The tendency to have 
advanced students in history compile bibliographies and historiographies on a given subject rather 
than produce a new interpretation was an overt effort to support a rational approach to history through 
the scientific collection of data. Yet it was also seen by the intellectual Right as a covert attempt to 
reform the university system into a more egalitarian, democratic, and therefore utilitarian institution.  
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Equally important to the left-wing concept of the intellectual was the devotion to democratic 
egalitarianism first identified with intellectual identity by the Dreyfusards. The egalitarianism that 
united the reformers and opposed them to the traditionalists on the Right was perhaps best revealed 
by the reform that integrated the elite ENS into the democratic Sorbonne. This reform leveled the 
graduation requirements of the ENS to those of the Sorbonne, merged both the students and the 
professors of the two schools, and equated the degrees conferred by each institution. Yet the passion 
for democratic equality in education was also essential to less dramatic reforms including the new 
preference for bibliography, the reorganization of the bac, the attack on Latin and classics, and the 
rejection of the traditional literary canon. In their defense of each of these reforms, the intellectuals of 
the Left linked their egalitarianism and democratic ideals to their concept of the role of the university 
and the professor in modern society. While the intellectual of the Right saw the university as an 
education in humanities for the nation’s elite, the intellectual of the Left saw it as a training ground 
for the entire citizenry in necessary skills for daily life. In contrast with the intellectuals of the Right 
who saw the role of the educator to be identifying and refining the talented few, the intellectuals of 
the Left promoted a concept of the educator as the instructor of the masses in utilitarian skills. 
One of the leaders of the Reform, Gustave Lanson, was instrumental in propagating the new 
intellectual practices that corresponded to this Left wing concept of the educator. He considered 
bibilographies to be an introduction to history and literature that was accessible to all students and 
required no theorization or analysis that might reveal differences in the abilities of the students. The 
intellectual Right declared this new methodology a glorification of mediocrity and the forced equality 
of naturally unequal abilities. Yet, Lanson believed that since secondary education was now to be 
extended to all the French citizenry, this mass influx of students into a previously elite system 
required a new conceptualization of the methods of education. Rather than the “useless” exercises in 
theory, composition, and analysis, the reformers proposed utilitarian methods of study which would 
better serve the needs of the mass of students who were destined for jobs in science, industry, or 
business rather than life as savants or philosophers. The traditional methods of lecture and 
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composition were not tailored to the needs of these students, but only to the elite. Therefore new 
utilitarian methods like laboratory learning, bibliography, and sociological study would be essential if 
the university were to fulfill its function of equally educating all of society.309 “I am not able to 
conceive of a teaching which is not clearly utilitarian,” Lanson wrote, “education ought to prepare us 
to solve, in the measure which is given to each of us, the great social and moral questions which are 
posed today.”310 These questions of the day, according to Lanson, were modern issues of Republican 
citizenship. 
 The progressive modernism of the reformist intellectuals divided them from the intellectuals 
of the Right and was linked to both the reformers’ emphasis on scientific rationalism and their vision 
of the university as a democratic institution. While the intellectual of the Right believed the essence 
of French culture, intelligence, and power lay in its intellectual and cultural heritage and its role as the 
representative of Western civilization, the intellectual of the Left saw the essence of France, her 
responsibility, and her future security lay in scientific progress and technological modernization. 
They labeled as backward, “oriented toward the past,” and anti-intellectual those disciplines, 
methodologies, and educators that valued classicism and traditionalism over modernism. According 
to the reformists, the true intellectual guides of France provided an education designed to meet the 
needs of the modern republican citizen, not instruction in dead languages or collapsed civilizations. 
Lanson and the reformers were adamant that Latin language and ancient history was not only 
unnecessary for French studies, it was in fact an elitist pursuit that had no practical application. 
French was a republican language, Lanson wrote, while Latin was aristocratic and elitist and did not 
correspond to the needs of a modern democracy. An article by fellow reformist professor Jules 
 
309 It should be noted here that the combination of democratism and scientific methodology on the Left 
led them to embrace the “practical” aspects of intellectual life that they had dismissed as anti-intellectual in the 
work of Brunetiere. During these years, the Right would also distinguish its concept of the Real by linking it 
more to the irrational realities of national enracinement, emotion, sentiment, and experience than practical 
application. 
 
310 Gustave Lanson, “L’etude des auteurs francais” Revue universiatire (1894), 262. 
 
139 
Delvaille emphasized this point saying, “what good is it to have the young men continually live in 
Rome…when one allows them to ignore the things of their own pays.”311 The Left’s understanding of 
its role as educators of the republican citizenry also led it to reject the traditional literary canon. 
Lanson identified the works of the 17th century which had been the mainstay of a literary education 
as “monarchial and Christian” and therefore completely unacceptable in a democratic Republic which 
admitted no state religion. Literary instruction for the republican reformers was not a means to impart 
taste and style to students but rather to instruct them in civic values. Lanson saw no patriotic value in 
the works of the pre-Revolutionary era and utilized only the works of the 19th century. Those 
professors of pre-Revolutionary French literature, who tended, like the classicists, to be anti-reformist 
educators in an increasingly left-wing university system, were labeled backward, reactionary, 
monarchist, and anti-intellectual. 312 
The values of scientific rationalism, egalitarianism, and progressive modernism that came to 
define the university intellectual of the reformist Left led these dominant intellectuals to a cultural 
internationalism that promoted active imitation of the German university. In keeping with its integral 
and Barrèssian nationalism, the intellectual Right attacked this imitation as the perversion of French 
culture and intelligence with methodologies and ideas “foreign” to it. But the adaptation of the French 
university to the German design was understood by the reformers on the Left as an expression of 
international intellectual exchange. The very act of imitating the German model became essential to 
the left-wing intellectual’s understanding of his role since it indicated a belief in universally 
applicable abstract ideas and the intellectual benefits of internationalism. Even the declaration of war 
in 1914 and the resulting rush to defend France both militarily and intellectually from invasion did 
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not diminish the left-wing value of internationalism. It would emerge in a new discourse about “two 
Germanies” and a call for the demobilization of intelligence that was unique to the intellectual Left.  
During the years of the war and the Union sacrée, intellectual differences between the 
international pacifists and the national militarists seemed to be put aside as even Gustave Hervé 
became an ardent patriot and the majority of socialist party members enlisted.313 Yet, the left-wing 
intellectual’s firm belief in international fraternity remained, and it continued to differentiate their 
discourse from that of the extreme Right. Intellectuals of the Left felt driven to patriotic militarism for 
reasons that would distinguish them from the extreme Right. For the Left, the atrocities committed by 
Germany, and their rationalization by German intellectuals, was an affront to universal human rights. 
They rejected German imperialism as contrary to the revolutionary and Enlightenment spirit, and they 
accepted French engagement and militarism as a necessary evil to combat the more sinister militarism 
of Germany. For the intellectual Right, the enemy was Germany and the German people who it was 
believed had an innate aggression for France. The intellectual Left, however, retained its belief in the 
universal fraternity of all “peoples” and identified the Junker class as the enemy. Unlike the 
intellectual Right, which waged war in the name of nationalism, the French intellectual Left promoted 
the war under the banners of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Truth, Justice, and Reason.314 The 
intellectuals of the Left also salvaged their philogermanism and internationalism by making the “two 
Germanies theory” a central theme of their wartime engagement. This theory argued that the 
traditional Germany of Kant and scientific methodolgy was a valuable source of culture while the 
 
313 In the years leading up to the war, the socialists, except Peguy who would be claimed by the 
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other, militaristic and nationalist Germany was a threat to both France and true German culture.315 In 
this way the Republican and Left intellectuals hoped the focus the hostility of the war on militarism 
and imperialism while retaining their internationalism. Such differences in intellectual values despite 
the war-time union foreshadowed the quick collapse of Union sacrée intellectual compatibility. 
As soon as the war ended, so too did the union of intellectuals under the banner of 
nationalism. The work of Romain Rolland chastised the intellectuals of the Left for engaging their 
work in irrational patriotism and for betraying their responsibility to open cultural exchange. His 
September 1914 article in Journal de Geneve, “Au-dessus de la melée,” called for a return to the 
internationalist principles so essential to the left-wing intellectual. “Young men of all nations,” he 
wrote of the war, were “brought into conflict by a common ideal, making enemies of all those who 
should be brothers.”316 The responsibility of the intellectual was to resist the passions of nationalism 
in order to promote cultural understanding among all Europeans. Although his work was 
marginalized by both camps during the war, Rolland would become the new spokesman for the 
repentant intellectual Left during the immediate post-war years. His “Appel” in L’Humanité on June 
26, 1919 entitled “Fière declaration d’intellectuels” garnered the hasty support of numerous 
republican and left-wing intellectuals eager to return to their pre-war values of pacifism and 
internationalism. The new responsibility of the intellectual to help “demilitarize” intelligence was 
outlined in this appeal and echoed in other left-wing organs like André Gide’s Nouvelle Revue 
Française. Intellectual mobilization, led by the nationalists of the extreme Right, the Appeal claimed, 
had been a “near total abdication of the intelligence of the world.” Intellectuals had “worked to 
destroy the comprehension and love between men. And in doing this they had degraded and abased 
thought, of which they were the representatives.”317 But intellectual responsibility could be regained 
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by a return to disinterested thought, international cooperation, and intellectual pacifism. Rolland’s 
“declaration of the intellectuals” made the position of the true intellectuals quite clear. The 
nationalists, royalists, and those who continued to call for mobilization of intelligence like Massis and 
Maurras degraded thought and rejected the fundamental principles of intellectual responsibility. Only 
internationalism provided the dispassionate foundation essential for “free thought.” Thought tied to 
national interest was, by contrast, enslaved and anti-intellectual.  
The return of the republican and Left wing intellectual to the values of internationalism and 
pacifism would also lead a few avant-garde left-wing intellectuals toward a new avenue of intellectual 
engagement: communism. Communist intellectuals in these early years, like Henri Barbusse and the 
members of Clarté, saw bolshevism as an extension of the internationalism and anti-militarism they 
had long supported. These thinkers identified the role of the intellectual with the critique of capitalism 
and privilege, the conspiracy of the governments and the capitalists, and the militarism bred by 
nationalism.318 The growing fascination with bolshevism by this segment of the intellectual Left was 
mirrored by an increasing antipathy for it on the intellectual Right, adding new intensity to the old 
quarrels over internationalism, socialism, pacifism, and foreign influence on French culture. 
For Republicans and the extreme Left, being an intellectual and an educator implied the 
identification with certain fundamental intellectual values and worldviews. True intellectuals 
advocated firm rationalism and scientific methodology as the source of all valuable knowledge and 
cultural truths. They promoted the ideals of democratic egalitarianism and saw their responsibility to 
be the education of the masses in utilitarian skills for the market and civic life. This vision of their 
role necessitated utilitarian, modern, scientific, and practical applications in specialized fields that 
would prepare students for their future occupations rather than providing them with a vague sense of 
style and culture. And, in their intellectual guidance, the true intellectual and educator was open-
minded, disinterested, and a “free thinker” and therefore a proponent of internationalism. 
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Internationalism required the speedy demobilization of intelligence by those who had betrayed their 
responsibilities during the war. Those thinkers, particularly on the royalist and nationalist Right, who 
rejected these stipulations of intellectual identity were zealously denied the legitimizing status of the 
intellectual and duty to engage.  
 
Reformist Intellectual Communities and Networks 
As they did during the Dreyfus Affair, the conflict in intellectual values during the Nouvelle 
Sorbonne debates and post-war years led to the creation of separate intellectual communities. These 
communities provided a common space and socio-professional network for like-minded intellectuals, 
reinforced their distinctive intellectual values, and emphasized certain professional practices. In 
particular, these polarized communities and networks fostered a new sense of collective identity 
among the participating intellectuals and a sense of separation from the excluded “other.”319 The 
“intellectual,” as defined by the dominant Left, came to be recognized not only by his particular 
cultural and social values like rationalism, but also by his affiliation with specific associations, ligues, 
petitions, and revues, choice of certain professional trajectories, method of mentorship, and general 
experience of daily intellectual life. Those on the Right who rejected these associations, or were 
excluded from them, were correspondingly defined as anti-intellectual and denied the authority and 
role of the engagé.  
One of the important communities for republican and left-wing reformers was that of the 
Musée pedagogique. The organization had been founded by Jules Ferry in 1879 with the aim of 
furthering popular education and serving as an example of the pedagogic renovations being made in 
education. By 1902, the Musée was directed by reformist historian Charles-Victor Langlois and 
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served as an outlet for reformist ideas and a network for republican and left-wing intellectuals. The 
Musée provided lectures and seminar discussions such as those by reformers Ferdinand Brunot in 
1906, Charles Seignobos in 1907, and Lanson in 1909. These lectures were particularly followed by 
lycée and college professors who hoped to keep up to date with the latest pedagogical reforms created 
by the Sorbonne intellectuals, and implement them in their own teaching. Lectures like Lanson’s on 
“L’Education de la Democratie” and Seignobos’ on “L’enseignement de l’histoire comme instrument 
d’education politique” were intended to convince these professors that the mission of secondary 
education was the formation of youth for their roles in democracy and the modern world.320 In the 
Musée pedagogique community, the educational values and practices considered by the Left to define 
the true intellectual were developed, clarified, and then mentored to the secondary instructors.  
A similar and closely linked community was created in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales, 
directed by Alfred Croiset in 1910. The mission of the Ecole was in keeping with the spirit of the 
declining “universities populaires,” which had been an important arm of the Left during the Dreyfus 
Affair. The program of the Ecole for the year 1910-1911 included the public lectures by leading 
reformers like Seignobos, Croiset, Levy-Bruhl, Basch, Andler, Delacroix, Lanson, Langlois, and 
Rolland. The Ecole not only brought together the leading minds of the Reform and spread their ideas 
to the broader populace; it also formed a network of intellectuals who exerted great collective 
influence over the nomination and selection of Sorbonne professors and chairs. Although the extent of 
this influence cannot be gauged, the professional networks and political connections created there 
among various reformers, university leaders, and political figures is undeniable.321 Both the 
influential network of the Ecole and the forum for mentorship of the Musée were closed to 
intellectuals of the Right. 
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 The intellectual Ligue, which had been such a powerful foundation for intellectual 
community during the Dreyfus Affair, was quickly adapted to the new needs of the reformers. The 
Amis du Français et de la culture moderne was created as a left-wing reformist center to combat the 
right-wing Ligue pour la culture Française and the moderate but traditionalist Amis du Latin. While 
the Ligue pour la culture Française and the Amis du Latin welcomed conservatives, numerous former 
members of the Anti-Dreyfusard Ligue de la Patrie, and a large majority of the world of the men of 
letters, it only had two Sorbonne professors. The Amis du Française, on the other hand, mainly 
“received the support of the universitaires generally situated on the Left, from Charles Andler to Paul 
Langevin.”322 In fact, “few of the writers supported the Amis du Française et de la culture moderne, 
and the majority of those who did belonged exclusively to the intellectual families of the Left.”323 The 
activities of the Ligue were not as coordinated as those of the Ligue des Droits de l’homme, yet it 
provided a clearly segregated space for reformers to commune and share ideas as well as a platform 
for expression of their collective intellectual views.  
Yet another space of clearly segregated intellectual community was that of the petition. 
Reformist petitions created an imaginary community of left-wing intellectuals that extended beyond 
their daily interactions to create an international community of like-minded thinkers. They literally 
provided a list of those who identified themselves as both engaged and “of the Left.” And, perhaps 
better than any other community, the petition was able to collectively express the values, worldviews, 
and programs that united the disparate intellectual Left, from liberal republicans to communists, in a 
single concept of intellectual identity. One petition against the “law of three years” read, “moved by 
the risk of voting in a measure as grave as a transformation in military law, considering that the 
project profoundly affects the intellectual and economic life of the nation and is able to cause a step 
backward in French civilization…the undersigned vow that it will be submitted to a profound 
discussion.” Over time the petition was signed by over 200 left-wing intellectuals including a strong 
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number of professors active in the reform like Alain, Lucien Herr, Durkheim, and Paul Langevin.324 
Many of these same intellectuals joined together later in the post-war “Fière declaration 
d’intellectuels.” Here forty intellectuals collectively declared their “independence de l’esprit” by 
renouncing their engagement in favor of the nation during the war, recalling their prior commitments 
to an abstract, universal “People,” and reclaiming their responsibility to universal, internationalist, 
and unconstrained thought.325 When determining who merited the title and authority of the 
intellectual, the reformers of the Left would cite the Right’s absence from these left-wing manifests as 
proof of its incompatibility with legitimate intellectual positions.  
To reach a broad audience and garner substantial support, a petition or manifest needed to be 
placed in a sympathetic journal or revue where like-minded readers could appreciate its appeal. 
Although the majority of the reformers were universitaires whose dominance was in the university 
and education system rather than the world of letters and journalism, there were several republican 
and left-wing papers. These revues formed a sort of web or network which was connected by shared 
writers, gerants, readership, or even publishing houses. Revues, therefore, were not only a source of 
intellectual community for those who fraternized in the revue’s offices. They were an interconnected 
literary and journalistic world which provided support for each others’ ideas, movements, petitions, 
books and articles. While the larger journals like Figaro, Temps, and Journal des Debats remained 
supporters of classical culture and traditional education, the reformers found journalistic havens in the 
left-wing militant presses like those of La Dépêche de Toulouse, L’Humanité, and the previously 
Dreyfusard Le Siècle. Leading reformer Alphonse Aulard published his defense of the Nouvelle 
Sorbonne in Siecle, Dépêche, and L’Action, while Célestin Bouglé printed his dissection of the 
psychology of the opposition in Dépêche. Numerous reformers including Anatole France, Andler and 
Lanson wrote articles for Humanité and made personal and professional connections there with 
socialists Herr, Blum, Halevy, and Pressensé. Other left-wing revues which had blossomed under the 
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Dreyfusards like Le Radical helped the Reformers to paint the opposition as politically motivated and 
declared all opposition to all modern, scientific, utilitarian, and rationalist education “anti-
Republican” as well as “anti-intellectual.”326 
Other revues that became communities for reformists were those devoted to educational 
affairs and university issues and directed by university leaders. In these educational journals, leaders 
of the reform were constant contributors while those opposing the Nouvelle Sorbonne were never 
featured. Revue critique d’histoire et de literature was led by a Sorbonne reformer and Croiset 
directed the Revue internationale de l’enseignement. Revue universitaire had a committee of 
patronage and edition of almost exclusively Sorbonne professors, including Victor Berard, Ferdinand 
Brunot, Croiset, former Dreyfusard leader Alphonse Darlu, Lanson, Lavisse, Seignobos, and Gustave 
Reynier. As one of the flagship revues for pedagogy, whose cover promised articles on the latest in 
“pedagogy, educational and teaching issues, administration, literary issues, bibliography, exams and 
courses,” its reformist tone was intended to influence its primary subscribers: lycée, college, and 
provincial professors awed by the Sorbonne. Writing for these revues, therefore, also became an 
important form of mentorship for the intellectual Left who, if they were a minority in the larger world 
of journalism, dominated the important segment of the field marketed to educators.  
During the war, most left-wing revues joined in the Union sacrée,327 but, after the war, pre-
war divisiveness in intellectual revue communities would reappear. L’Humanité and Mercure begin 
the post-war era by supporting Rolland’s petition with articles attacking Massis. By 1923 the revue 
Europe would be created to counter Massis and Bainville’s Revue universelle and “give to the 
pacifist, humanitarian, and communisant current an organ of propaganda destined for the intellectual 
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milieu.”328 And, in addition to L’Humanité, the communist element would create Clarté to serve as a 
community particularly hostile to the intellectual Right.329 The movement, and subsequent revue 
Clarté, was launched in May 1919 and would become a “center of revolutionary education”330 and a 
source of socio-professional community and collective identity for the communist element of the 
extreme Left.  
The constant appearance of several key reformers in all of these revues was not the only link 
that existed between this network of reformist revues. Several of the revues and the authors also 
shared common publishing firms which were extremely sympathetic to their goals. Publishers 
Hachette, Alcan, and Armand Colin were particularly supportive of the reformist position and many 
of the reformers revues and independent works and textbooks could be found in their catalogues.331
Armand Colin published both Revue de Paris and Revue universitaire, Alcan published Gabriel 
Monod’s Revue historique, and Hachette published the history textbook Introduction aux études 
historique of Seignobos and Langlois. Those who wrote for Humanité were also supported by the 
socialist Société nouvelle de librairie et d’édition which was led by Herr.332 The Nouvelle Revue 
Française of André Gide and its powerful press under Gallimard was just coming of age during the 
Nouvelle Sorbonne debates. However, despite its assurances of an apolitical focus, it would slowly 
attract a left-wing clientle including Roger Martin du Gard and perceptibly arouse the hostility of the 
Right. 
Belonging to and identifying with the organizations, petitions, revues, and publishing firms 
that welcomed and supported the Left had important ramifications for reformist and internationalist 
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intellectuals. These physical centers of engagement amplified the individual contributions of their 
members into a powerful arm of collective engagement. They served as spaces of personal and 
professional connection and provided important forums for mentorship of fellow educators and the 
general public. Most importantly, they provided a foundation for a left-wing collective intellectual 
identity. To be recognized as an intellectual by peers and the public, it was necessary to participate in 
one of these communities of the Left. Those who shunned these communities, or were excluded from 
them, were marked as anti-intellectual by default.  
 
The Leftist Intellectual Experience 
 It was not only the values and socio-professional communities that would separate the 
intellectual of the Left from that of the Right. The different relationships that the reformist, and later 
internationalist, intellectuals of the Left had to the Republic, the Church, and the university would 
give them a certain experience of daily intellectual life not shared by their opponents on the Right. 
The practices, behaviors, professional trajectories, and methods of mentorship that resulted from these 
relationships on the Left would all contribute to a distinctly left-wing understanding of what it meant 
to “be an intellectual.” 
 Being a Nouvelle Sorbonne intellectual automatically entailed supporting the fundamental 
values of republicanism and their incarnation in the institutions of the Third Republic. And, as the 
ruling of minister of public education Theodore Steeg made clear, opposing the Nouvelle Sorbonne 
was “anti-Republican.”333 The intellectual of the Left, whether liberal or socialist, engaged to make 
the education of French youth more “republican” by making it more egalitarian, rational, scientific, 
modern, and cosmopolitan. The reforms they defended were those legislated by the Third Republic 
and supported by its ministries. Unlike their opponents on the Right, the intellectual of the Left 
continued to experience the practice of daily intellectual life as his predecessors the Dreyfusards had: 
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as the protected intelligentsia. Under the state-sponsored reforms, right-wing professors were replaced 
with more progressive, left-wing universitaires, positions of power and influence within the 
university system went to left-wing reformers like Croiset, Lavisse, and Durkheim, and disciplines 
where right-wing traditionalists predominated were slowly eliminated or deemphasized in favor of 
left-wing dominated scientific disciplines. Because their reforms were made in the name of 
republican values, the reformers easily earned the authorization of the regime for any institutional 
changes they deemed necessary, from a required course in pedagogy taught by Durkheim to an 
emphasis on bibliography. Being an intellectual of the reformist Left meant enjoying privilege, 
promotion, and power within the university and having the ear of the government.  
 As a correlate, being a reformist intellectual also demanded a certain disassociation with the 
Catholic Church. Once again, Catholicism was not an automatic mark of anti-intellectualism since 
practicing Catholics were found in both camps. However, overtly Catholic lycées, professors, texts, 
and interpretations were intentionally removed from the new university and replaced with secular, 
republican, rational alternatives. Jesuit schools in particular were deemed dangerous to the education 
of the youth and disbanded. Most catholic educators would turn, out of necessity, to the educational 
alternatives established by the Action Française in order to continue teaching. Reformers argued that 
the intellectual values of science, progress, rationalism, and even democracy were contradicted by the 
irrational, superstitious, and past-oriented nature of religious instruction. They also claimed that 
Catholicism was too closely linked to the Ancien Regime and monarchism to provide an effective 
education in republican citizenship. The intellectual’s role as educator of the republican citizenry and 
responsibility to free, unrestricted thought necessarily precluded him, according to the reformers, 
from religious instruction. Reflecting the official separation of Church and State, being an 
intellectual, according to the Left, meant separating public intellectual life and practice from private 
religious belief.  
 However, it was their relationship to the University that most distinguished the professional 
identity and intellectual practices of the intellectual of the Left from those of the Right. In the decade 
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following the Affair, the number of professors on the Right diminished while the number of 
professors considered on the Left, particularly the socialist Left, had increased.334 While the Right 
increasingly felt its values and goals for intelligence excluded from the university and turned toward 
careers in journalism and literature, the Left continued to command the university trajectory. This 
divisive tendency was perhaps best exemplified by the composition of the left-wing Amis du 
Française and the right-wing Ligue pour la culture. The Amis included over fifteen Sorbonne 
professors and enjoyed wide support within the university while the Ligue had only two Sorbonnards, 
the Latin professor Frédéric Plessis and conservative Emile Faguet, and was dominated instead by 
journalists and men of letters.335 This division in professional trajectories led left-wing intellectuals to 
have not only a different intellectual community and network within the University space than the 
minority Right did, but also different intellectual experiences and expectations. The intellectual of the 
Left who followed the common trajectory of university teaching began not only on a different 
professional path from his right-wing peers, he also began in a different region. Very few agrégés 
earned teaching positions in Paris and most found themselves teaching at one of the provincial 
universities for several years before returning to a position in Paris. While the intellectuals of the 
Right were able to begin building a name, a professional network, and a publishing career in Paris at 
an early age, their university bound peers on the Left were exiled to the provinces and had to regain 
public influence when they returned.  
One of the most significant differences in the left-wing universitaire and right-wing 
litterateur intellectual experience was the ease with which the Left was able to mentor the youth. By 
physically and ideologically dominating the ENS and the Sorbonne and influencing primary and 
secondary educators through pedagogical lectures and journals, the reformers of the Left exercised a 
veritable hegemony over the mentorship of emerging intellectuals. Lucien Herr had a strong influence 
on students at the ENS through afternoon discussions in the library and guidance of the students’ 
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reading selections. Alain had a long-standing forum at lycée Condorcet and Emile Durkheim 
personally mentored each aspiring universitaire in his required pedagogy course at the Sorbonne. 
Even if the professor was not a reformist, the students still received reformist guidance through the 
official textbooks. Seignobos’ book Introduction was routinely assigned as a history text, as was that 
of Lavisse, whose history textbooks were disseminated for free in the schools courtesy of the 
publisher Ville de Paris. In literature, Lanson’s Histoire de la literature française became the 
foundational text for literature. His concept of literary history was even a required component of the 
exit exams.336
This different relationship to the university and, therefore, to the mentorship of the student 
population would yield distinctly different intellectual practices on the Left and Right. Those on the 
Right like Massis and Maurras most often had to create their own mentoring environments, hand pick 
literary or journalistic protégés, and go to great effort to attract a youth following. The reformers 
enjoyed the benefits of an established, and often required, forum for their mentorship in the lycée and 
university classroom. They dispersed their values through their everyday lectures and their textbooks. 
Rather than seeking alternative opportunities to connect with the youth, the Left simply worked to 
increase the reach and authority of their influence as university professors.  
The Reformist universitaire of the intellectual Left therefore could be said to have 
experienced intellectual life differently than his right-wing peers and therefore to have conceived of 
his role, responsibility, and intellectual activity differently. Distinctly left-wing relationships to the 
Church, the Republican government, the University, and most importantly, the next generation of 
intellectuals, led to a distinctly left-wing experience of daily intellectual life and practice. These 
different experiences and intellectual activities simply reinforced the separation in physical spaces 
and networks of Left wing intellectual communities.  
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The Reformist Intellectual Model 
The intellectual of the Left developed a distinctly left-wing model of intellectual identity 
during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and the years immediately following World War I. Although 
they were not a statistical majority of the educated elite, they did dominate the university and 
effectively utilized this hegemony to control public perception of  intellectual identity. This monopoly 
in the university, the public’s predisposition to equate republican values with intellectual legitimacy, 
and the failure of the Right to oppose the reforms before they were implemented gave the reformers a 
certain confidence in their engagement that was not shared by the Right. The intellectual Left was 
able to effectively equate intellectual identity with the values of rationalism, progressive modernism, 
egalitarianism, and internationalism and also with the role and practices of the university professor, 
the erudite, and the objective scientist. According to the reformist model, the intellectual was also 
identified by participation in certain left-wing and reform-oriented organizations, petitions, revues, 
and publishing houses. Finally, the intellectual, as defined by the Left, enjoyed certain relationships to 
the government and the university that gave him a particular experience of intellectual life not shared 
by those on the Right. The exclusion of the intellectual Right from this dominant, left-wing model of 
the intellectual would revive old resentments and frustrations and result in the creation of an 
alternative version of intellectual identity on the traditionalist Right. Henri Massis and Charles 
Maurras would be at the forefront of this movement. 
CHAPTER 6 
 
THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE TRADITIONALIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF HENRI MASSIS 
 
Henri Massis has been recognized by his biographer as a “witness of the intellectual 
Right,”337 yet, in truth, he was more a provocateur of intellectual issues and a linchpin to the complex 
networks of right-wing intellectual life than mere witness. Massis provoked the explosion of the 
Nouvelle Sorbonne debates in 1910, outlined his vision of the intellectual of the Right in 1912, led 
the crusade for the continued mobilization of intelligence in 1919, introduced the discourse of a 
“defense of western civilization” to the arsenal of the Right in 1927, provoked the engagement of 
right-wing intellectuals on the side of fascist Italy in 1935, wrote the speech that would create the 
Petainist myth of the sword and shield in 1944, and added his weight to the petitions in favor of 
French Algeria in 1961. His lifetime was spent raising new issues and clarifying the values of the 
intellectual Right while creating spaces, networks, and personal connections that mentored the next 
generation of right-wing intellectuals. 
Massis studied first at lycée Condorcet where he took his philosophy classes with reformist 
and socialist Alain. While greatly admiring the man, Massis did not share the same attraction to his 
ideas that other students did and sought alternative mentors.338 After study at the ENS des arts 
decoratifs and later the Sorbonne, Massis turned to a life of literature and journalism rather than 
teaching. His first literary study on Zola was the only work that he had to present when he was 
introduced to Maurice Barrès, but Barrès found promise in the young writer, despite his topic, and 
aided him in his entry into the world of letters. His next study in 1908 on Barrès himself allowed 
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Massis to remain in constant contact with Barrès and to receive his regular suggestions, critique and 
editing. During the years between this introduction to the literary world and his explosion on the 
scene as “Agathon,” Massis received introductions and began writing for various journals in the right-
wing network including L’Echo de Paris, Figaro, Gil Blas and Paris-Journal. By 1909 he had taken 
political direction of Petit Journal, by 1912 the secretariat de redaction of L’Opinion, and, by 1914, 
he was the literary critic for L’éclair.339 It was, however, his work as “Agathon” in 1911 and 1913 
that secured his reputation and leadership in the world of right-wing engaged journalism.  
Alfred de Tarde arranged an introduction to Massis after reading his articles in Paris-Journal 
and the two agreed to collaborate as Agathon on an article against the Sorbonne reforms for 
L’Opinion in 1910. Had it not received the immediate condemnation of Ernest Lavisse and, therefore, 
great public interest, this article might have been the only one written. However, the raging debate 
sparked more articles and the mystery of Agathon remained until the Spring when the authors 
revealed themselves to great outrage among the reformist milieu.340 The two were made immediate 
stars of the intellectual Right and were invited to join the comité d’action of the Ligue pour la culture 
française being formed by several Academy members. Agathon would reunite for one last large work 
before parting ways: Les jeunes gens d’aujourd’hui which was published in L’Opinion in 1912 before 
being released as a book in 1913. This enquete claimed to see a new spirit among the rising 
generation of intellectuals which was disgusted with the current state of affairs. Although Agathon’s 
enquete claimed to be reporting a measured change among the youth, it is today widely recognized 
that he was instead attempting to create this change and promote his own concept of right-wing 
intellectual identity among the next generation. During these years, Massis’ work carried the clear 
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By 1914, Massis had already engaged in polemics with both André Gide and Romain Rolland 
whom he accused of decadence and dilettantism. The most intense of these attacks, written while 
Massis was convalescing, in January 1915, would be collected and published as Romain Rolland 
contre la France. After his demobilization in 1919, Massis was outraged to find Rolland’s manifest in 
Humanité and created his own petition for the intellectual Right entitled “Le Manifest du parti de 
l’intelligence” which was published in Figaro the following month. Here he outlined the post-war 
Right’s demand for a continued mobilization of national intelligence against internationalism and the 
new threat of bolshevism. He connected the new struggle to the old one by declaring that an 
education in traditional and classical culture was the best counter to these anti-French influences. This 
petition became the foundation for the creation of a new Action Française allied revue, Revue 
Universelle which Massis would co-directed with Jacques Bainville. This new connection to the AF 
network indicated the subtle shift during the war that had led Massis away from his old mentor Barrès 
and closer to Maurras. Although he would never officially join the AF, Massis became a new 
advocate for their ideology and an important figure in their intellectual network during the succeeding 
decades.  
Massis would continue to play a vital role in the intellectual expression and engagement of 
the Right in the decades after the war, but his most significant contribution to the construction of 
right-wing intellectual identity came from his engagement in the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and 
postwar debates over demobilization. During this period, Massis exemplified both the continuity and 
transformation that right-wing values and concepts of intellectual role underwent from the close of 
the Dreyfus Affair to the advent of the inter-war years. His engagement also touched a number of 
important right-wing intellectual communities and networks where he was first the student and then 
the mentor of right-wing cultural values and intellectual identity. Finally, Massis provided a powerful 
expression of the continued right-wing resentment of the perceived left-wing hegemony over the 
concept of the intellectual.  
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Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
 By waiting to engage in the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates until after the reforms had been 
legislated and implemented, the intellectuals of the Right once again allowed the Left to define the 
parameters of the concept of the intellectual and to forcibly exclude the values and visions of the 
Right. The anteriority of the reforms, the dominance of the Left in the university disciplines under 
discussion, and the support of the Third Republic would all contribute to a left-wing intellectual 
hegemony. The intellectual, in his role as educator and public guide, became indelibly linked to the 
image of the reformist universitaire and to the idea of educational modernization and cultural 
exchange. By 1910, the intellectual Right recognized that to combat this trend in the education of the 
nation, they needed to legitimize their own views and redefine the role, responsibility, and identity of 
the intellectual guide according to their own model. 
 Massis’s engagement was driven by his resentment of the hegemony that the intellectual Left 
held over the education of the university students. He resolved, in the summer of 1910, that it was 
“his duty to react against the Germanization of higher education at the Nouvelle Sorbonne, against 
this sterile erudition which demoralized the souls and enslaved the intelligences.”341 He felt sure that 
his mentor Barrès would appreciate his new crusade and was crushed when Barrès dismissed his 
frustrations as those of every student. Massis recalled his shock that the great opponent of Dreyfusard 
domination did not recognize the new hegemony they exerted now in the university as reformers. 
“How could he not comprehend that the Sorbonne of Aulard, Seignobos, Lanson and Durkheim 
constituted a party which was going to give its direction to politics, to the mind, to the temporal, to 
the spirit of France, and that the party tended toward nothing less than the subversion of all that which 
he, Barrès, defended?”342 It could only be, Massis decided, that Barrès did not know the Nouvelle 
Sorbonne well enough to recognize the power that its monopoly assured the Left. “This attempt 
 





against culture, against intelligence,” Massis mourned, Barrès “did not see it or, if he saw it, he saw it 
too late.” To save true culture and intelligence, he determined, a coordinated campaign was necessary 
to reveal the nature of the Nouvelle Sorbonne and the threat it posed to true, right-wing intellectual 
values. 
It was this campaign that the articles by Agathon in L’Opinion, was intended to spark. They 
are perhaps his most significant statement of resentment against the hegemony of the intellectual Left 
in the university. The articles were a public statement of “repugnance for the suffering of constraint 
that our masters of superior education, dazzled by Germanic science, have imposed on young 
minds.”343 Yet, more than this, they were a warning about the wider “intellectual despotism” of the 
Left through the means of the university. Massis particularly rejected the influence on the next 
generation of Durkheim. His required course in pedagogy was the perfect opportunity to instill the 
value system of the reformers in all the students who would become professors. “Students today,” 
Massis later wrote, “are not able to imagine the domination of Durkheim at that time, the extent of his 
power and the authority that his sociology exercised over certain students.”344 Clearly, Massis 
continued, Durkheim was an “omnipotent personage” who exerted a “despotic” monopoly over the 
image of the educator and the formation of the intellectual elite.  
Massis was particularly incensed that Durkheim was part of the committee that surveyed all 
the nominations to superior education positions and that students had to reproduce his sociological 
interpretations of pedagogy in order to be admitted to exams. “Through Pedagogy,” Massis fumed, 
“even more by the prerogatives of administrative authority which have been attributed to him, M. 
Durkheim has strongly established his intellectual despotism. He has made of his teaching an 
instrument of rule.”345 Massis warned that Durkheim used his monopoly over the university to insert 
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the new discipline of sociology favored by the scientifically minded reformers. Sociology, Massis 
concluded, was the “scorn for ideas and individuals, the vehicle of despotism.” Sociology and 
Durkheim had both been rejected by the leaders of the Sorbonne, Massis claimed, until the Dreyfus 
Affair when it was decided that anyone who was as ardent a Dreyfusard as Durkheim must have 
reason on their side and “follow a common ideal” with the other Sorbonnards.346 After this, sociology 
had been welcomed as the official philosophy of the Sorbonne and made a tool of moral re-education 
and control. “An appetite for domination, the ideal of moral enslavement, a narrow dogmatism” 
Massis wrote, “this is the philosophy of the Sorbonne” as represented by sociology.347 It was this sort 
of “dogmatic authoritarianism,” “intellectual despotism,” and “moral enslavement” by the Left that 
Massis demanded the intellectuals of the Right engage against. If they failed to collectively oppose 
the Left, he warned, future generations might not even recognize the invisible system of intellectual 
oppression. “In truth,” he concluded, “Erudition as exclusive master of the intelligences would reign 
over the people as slaves…it would be intellectual servitude.”348 The values of the Left would be 
engrained from the earliest age and become the unquestioned model of intelligence and culture. 
Durkheim was not the only harmful influence dominating the university system however. “It 
is impossible to misconstrue the hold of Lucien Herr on souls nor the dominating leadership that the 
famous librarian of the ENS exercised over the minds and wills of his generation,” Massis wrote. 
Herr, Massis claimed, was “intimately linked to the ‘parti intellectual” even though he “worked in the 
shadow” of the library since he had had a decisive influence on the formation of French socialism 
among universitaires. “He made of the Ecole Normale, Massis warned, “the cradle of university 
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socialism on which Jaures supported himself and where he recruited his cadres.”349 Massis concluded 
“it was the action of this group of intellectuals, of whom Herr was the leader, that made the Sorbonne 
and the ENS the foyer of the parti pro-allemand.”350 
After showing the dominance of these leading left-wing intellectuals, Massis expanded his 
compliant against left-wing hegemony to the university as a whole. “We imagined an independent 
and free university,” he lamented, “we found it enslaved, degraded by politicians and the grossest 
demagoguery, by that which has a hatred of intelligence.”351 As the ideological arm of the Republic, 
the Nouvelle Sorbonne proclaimed itself the center of true French intelligence and culture. All 
thought that opposed the ideals of republicanism were, by default, anti-intellectual and anti-French. 
Massis resented the left-wing bloc that he perceived to unite the university and the government. He 
complained that the university under the reformers had become the “ideological fortress of the 
regime” which protected and disseminated a set of ideals derived from Dreyfusism.352 They dispensed 
with all ideas, particularly those from pre-Revolutionary history and literature, that did not meet their 
ideal of republican culture, replaced them with modern science, and proclaimed these the true 
foundation of French thought. Massis wrote angrily, “they have decided to make a blank slate of all 
the inherited ideas- why? Because they have not been obtained scientifically. They say ‘we are the 
representatives of Science, we alone are able to speak as it is necessary of Justice, of Peace, of the 
Passions. We are the masters of Thought.”353 
Most importantly, Massis warned, the intellectuals of the Left intended to actually become 
the masters of Thought by rejecting all ideas and knowledge that had come before them. The 
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intellectual Left’s fascination for scientific learning was, Massis claimed, simply the most effective 
way to destroy the system of education that had been maintained by the traditionalist Right over the 
centuries. Only by destroying public faith in the traditional values and methods could they insert 
themselves as the new guides of French education. In imposing these values and seeking only their 
own aggrandizement, Massis wrote, these universitaires had betrayed their role and responsibility as 
intellectuals. It was they, not the Right, who were the “anti- intellectuals” or false intellectuals. He 
wrote of the new scientific methods, “in the eyes of these false intellectuals, it [science] was only a 
pretext to exercise an imperious privilege, to claim a temporal dominion, and to impose it with much 
more fanaticism…That which the ‘parti intellectuel’ pursued was the enslavement of intelligences.”354
It was the responsibility and role of the intellectual of the Right to prevent this destruction and 
enslavement. 
The Left, according to Massis, controlled not only the programs and direction of the 
university and the title and image of the intellectual, they also controlled the public’s perception of 
the role and practice of the intellectual. The role of the intellectual, and the authority to guide public 
opinion, educate the nation, and influence affairs that this role entailed, was now closely associated 
with the university professor. “Society,” Massis fumed, “has been led to think that a university savant 
knows all and thus leave their sons with no defenses in the university. We cannot conceive that a man 
who puts the title of agrégé on his calling cards could be tricked in his political party and does not 
have all the instruction that one is able to receive.”355 The Left had garnered the truest form of 
intellectual dominance according to Massis, it had seduced the public into believing that the true 
intellectual and representative of intelligence was the university man of science. Against this 
inculcation, it was practically impossible for the intellectual of the Right to convince anyone that their 
values and positions outside the university were better suited for French intelligence. “The educator,” 
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Massis complained, “is, for the worker, the depository of all science and if we come into a provincial 
salon to oppose a professor of philosophy, you will see quickly appear on all the faces the signs of 
severe disapprobation.”356 This, he continued, was both a ridiculous and dangerous illusion that it was 
the responsibility of all right-wing intellectuals to combat.  
To do this, it was necessary to publicly legitimize the right-wing intellectual. Agathon wrote 
the articles in 1912 that would become Jeunes gens d’aujourd’hui with this purpose in mind. 
Although written as a testimony to events of the time, these articles were in fact an effort of 
propaganda by Agathon; a conscious effort to legitimize his own concept of intelligence and his own 
model of intellectual identity. Rather than revealing an actual generational shift, the work was a 
vision for the future, a vision built around the ideals of the intellectual Right. Massis claimed that he 
was portraying the sentiments of the “new type of the young intellectual elite” whose ideal was 
synonymous with the will of a New France.357 By proclaiming this vision to be the new sentiment 
among the youth, Agathon was countering the legitimizing power of the university with the 
legitimizing power of the elite youth. In speaking with his young friend Ernest Psichari about his 
plans for this work, Massis said “I will speak of the Sorbonne, the university tyranny, the false 
erudition, and I will defend culture despite our professors. Yes, it will be…a long analysis of our 
sentiments, of our ideas, all this animated by an active love of intelligence, despite the intellectuals! 
And we will speak of the young men of today in search of an order, a discipline, a faith”358 The key 
was that the young men would be shown to be searching outside the confines of the university and its 
left-wing ideology and to be finding their alternative on the Right. 
As the war drew nearer, Massis intensified his struggle to legitimize the intellectual 
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culture” by defending internationalism and pacifism as invasion threatened. While the “legitimate role 
of the university would have been to put the masses on guard” it instead “betrayed its role” by 
appealing to their egoism and urging them against the law of three years.359 In contrast, as one right-
wing engage wrote, the intellectuals of the Right had “perceived our task, our proper role, our 
duty.”360 The defense of the patrie required the mobilization of intelligence and the Right would prove 
its legitimacy as guardian of French culture by leading this effort.  
In his 1919 manifest in Figaro, “Pour un parti de l’intelligence,” Massis made quite clear his 
intention of legitimizing the intellectual Right and redefining the concept of the intellectual according 
to right-wing standards. The undersigned, it read, believed that “public opinion…had need of being 
guided and protected, and they believe this is the role of the writers who are truly conscious of the 
peril and intend to offer their service. Against the bolshevism of thought, against the party of 
ignorance, they intend to organize an intellectual defense.”361 The manifest was a clear demand for 
the Right to be recognized as intellectuals and to be able to redefine intellectual responsibility. 
“Finally,” Massis wrote of the men of letters on the Right, “the intellectual elite has rediscovered the 
sense of its social responsibility” and “restored the sense of our duty toward this people whom we are 
charged with enlightening.”362 The party of intelligence was to begin “an immense work of 
reconstruction” not only for France but for all of civilization. The Manifest not only claimed the 
identity of the intellectual for the Right, it sought to differentiate true, right-wing, intellectual identity 
from the false version on the Left. While those writers who had signed the manifest of Rolland 
displayed “an action susceptible of acting as an evil ferment and menacing intelligence and society,” 
those who signed this manifest of Massis would put first the need of France and national 
reconstitution, they would “serve and accept our civic obligations” by “organizing the defense of 
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French intelligence.” In striking contrast with the intellectual of the Left, the intellectual of the Right, 
as defined by Massis, would defend classicism, elitism, realism, and nationalism. 
 
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Classicism and Elitism 
Massis and the intellectuals of the Right had a very different understanding of the essence of 
French intelligence and culture and of the aim of education than the intellectuals of the Left. While 
the Left favored reforms that introduced German inspired modernity, positivism, and scientific 
research, the Right defended the traditional, classical humanities as the foundation for French 
intelligence and culture. To the Left’s belief in specialization and utilitarian education as the key to 
intellectual progress the Right opposed a trust in the benefits of a general, liberal education in French 
and classical thought and literature which would enable the student to meet new problems with time-
tested ideas. And, while the Left saw the aim of education to be the preparation of the masses for 
democratic citizenship, the Right believed education, particularly superior education, was intended to 
form an intellectual elite who would guide this democratic mass. These different visions of the 
purpose and method of education were at the core of the Right’s defense of Classical thought against 
German influences.  
Perhaps the most powerful statement by Massis against the Left’s concept of culture and 
intelligence was found in L’Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne where he wrote, “If there is a culture 
opposed to ours and that we are not able to imitate without forcing and falsifying our natural qualities 
it is without doubt the Germanic culture…This spirit that the Nouvelle Sorbonne has imported from 
the Germanic universities…is incompatible with French culture and perhaps with all true culture.”363 
True culture, he explained was not the Germanic categorization of concepts but rather the French 
approach, modeled on that of the ancients, of attempting to understand the ideas behind a concept and 
to appreciate their beauty. The latter required a higher form of intelligence, a more intimate 
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knowledge of the material, and a devotion to thoughtful analysis. While the German scientific 
methods might benefit the physical sciences, the true French intellectual understood that there was 
more to intelligence and to culture than these sciences. True French culture was intimately connected 
to classicism and the humanities, not science and erudition. “There exists a profound accord between 
our French genius and that which we call “classical culture,”364 he wrote, therefore “in combating for 
taste and style we [the intellectuals of the Right] are fighting for the prestige of French thought.” 
Not surprisingly, it was this respect for Classical thought against the infiltration of Germanic 
science that the new intellectual elite of Jeunes gens d’aujourd’hui displayed. Massis wrote that these 
new intellectuals, these intellectuals of the Right, recognized that the battle between classicism and 
modernism was over a moral conception, over the spiritual notions out of which the youth would 
make their lives. They found in the scientific approaches to intelligence and culture proposed by the 
Sorbonne only “a pedantic materialism…a dehumanization of the soul…where there is only the most 
mediocre, the most despaired moral ideal.”365 Instead, they turned to the classics, where they found 
“as much a moral benefit as an intellectual benefit.” By immersing themselves in classical thought, 
Massis proclaimed, the right-wing intellectual youth were separated from their utilitarian peers by 
more than just forms of intelligence, they were affected in their daily and moral lives. Youth formed 
by classical, French culture had “a taste for the definitive, for stability, for order…a horror of 
unruliness, of anarchy as the worst obstruction to the development of themselves and true liberty.”366 
Because of these different formations of intellectual and moral values, Massis believed this new 
classically educated youth, the intellectuals of the Right, would separate entirely from those youth 
who remained mired in the scientific teachings of the university and form their own “communities of 
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moral life.”367 Classical history, ancient literature, and languages provided a model of man, of culture, 
and of moral life which was essential to the continuation of French culture and society. In destroying 
the classical ideal of culture and “replacing it with a new intellectual model” the reformers were not 
only abasing classical humanities, they were endangering the intellectual and moral preparation of the 
nation.368 
This distinctly right-wing, traditionalist vision of a true education had important implications 
for the right-wing intellectual’s approach to educational practices. The intellectual of the Left 
promoted “the new ideal of specialization”369 and the preparation for professions and the utilization of 
knowledge for industry as quickly as possible. For this reason, Massis wrote, they kept the students 
ignorant of the “liberal and disinterested intellectual culture” on which artists and litterateurs 
thrived.370 While, according to Massis, the Left saw education as the mass production of specialized 
parts, the Right wanted an intelligence which would “form judgment, discover the capacities of 
intelligence, and develop the innate gifts” of taste, style, and talent. Massis claimed this separation in 
the aims of education between Right and Left was proven true by Durkheim’s work La Division du 
travail social where instead of proposing the creation of a complete, total man he suggested the need 
for specialized man. Durkheim and the reformers, Massis wrote, wanted to shrink the horizons of the 
minds of the youth, to force the “spiritual activity of individuals to adapt itself to a more and more 
narrow task.” This, he continued, supported the “defeat of all culture and of all moral ideals.”371 In 
contrast, the intellectual, as defined by the Right, advocated a broad education in the classical 
humanities. Here history and science would not be ignored or subordinated but would be grouped 
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die without ever having had to use algebra,” Massis supporter René Doumic wrote, but all their life 
they will have had to use the observation, wisdom, and dreams which are enclosed in 
literature…before becoming a doctor or a savant it is necessary first to become a man.”372 Massis 
believed, as did those on the intellectual Right who opposed the Reformers, that a broad classical 
education created complete men capable of moral and intellectual growth while specialized education 
was only intended to create cogs in the republic’s economic wheel. 
Massis’ support for a broad, classical education indicated yet another distinction in his 
concept of the role of education from that on the intellectual Left. The reformers wanted to 
democratize secondary and superior education, to make it accessible to all, and to use this new 
common education as a tool for social egalitarianism in all aspects of life. In contrast, the intellectual 
of the Right engaged to protect superior education as the domain of the elite. The difficulty of a 
classical education was intended to separate the intellectual wheat from the mediocre chaff. 
According to Massis, those who opposed classicism were promoting the republican vision of 
egalitarianism at the expense of the well being of French culture and intelligence; a clear betrayal of 
their duty as intellectuals. The “apostles of our so called intellectual democratization,” Massis wrote, 
desired the “abasement of education” in order to “give it a broader hold” on the populace.373 It no 
longer mattered the quality of the instruction provided as long as it was given out in equal quantities 
to all the students. This Massis fumed, made secondary and superior education the glorification of 
mediocrity. While intellectuals of the Left like Lanson praised the reformers for their “democratic 
tendencies” and ability to “utilize the mediocre who were neglected by the former literary education,” 
Massis and the intellectuals of the Right decried the sacrifice of the elite, the unnatural praise for 
those without aptitude, and the obsession with number to the detriment of talent.  
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To the mediocrity of a higher education leveled to the abilities of all, Massis and the 
opposition demanded that superior and even secondary education retain their focus on philosophy, 
critique, composition, language, and analysis attainable only by an intellectual elite. The purpose and 
aim of education, and therefore the responsibility of the intellectual as educator, was not the 
democratic formation of average citizens but rather the formation of an intellectual elite who would 
serve as guides for the mass of society. Instead of erasing this intellectual divide, the right-wing 
intellectual nurtured it as the natural result of the human hierarchy.374
Realism 
 The Right also had an appreciation and understanding of the Real Massis believed the Left 
was incapable of sharing. As it had been for Barrès and Brunetière, Realism was a primary organizing 
principle of intelligence for Massis. Although the new emphasis on practical, utilitarian knowledge by 
the reformers was presented as intellectual Realism, the intellectuals of the Right intentionally 
differentiated their concept of intellectual realism from that on the Left. Realism for Massis entailed 
an appreciation for the contributions made by sentiment, experience, action, and will, as well as pure 
intelligence and logic, to man’s understanding of the world. It was this appreciation that separated the 
Realism of the Right from the “pure” intellectuals of the Left who found value only in what could be 
deduced by logic and scientific theory; by the mechanics of the intellect alone. In keeping with the 
anti-Dreyfusard concept of realism, Massis also defined real knowledge as a product of the time and 
place of the thinker, applicable only to the needs of the nation and the era. Left-wing utilitarian 
science was based on an abstract knowledge that could be universally applied to any circumstance 
with the certainty of a scientific procedure. Such a fundamental division in the concept of 
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intelligence, the resources on which the intellectual could draw, and the scope of intellectual 
responsibility led to an essential abyss between the two concepts of intellectual identity. 
 Massis wrote that the reformers of the intellectual Left “disdained the study of concrete 
reality” in favor of a fetish for doctrines and thus “distanced themselves from any truly living 
study.”375 In contrast, the intellectual Right proposed an education for complete men in full contact 
with the realities of human existence. This education was not, as reformer Paul Souday would accuse 
Massis, “an intellectual abasement” that favored action and energy to the detriment of ideas and the 
mind. Instead it was conceived as an appreciation for all the resources available to intellectual 
analysis. Massis defended his vision of intellectual realism in Jeunes gens saying, “In giving to the 
realities of the sentiment and of action a place which the pure ‘intellectuels’ refused to them, the 
enquete did not believe to violate the supremacy of intelligence: such dispositions seemed on the 
contrary to enrich it in dissuading it from remaining sterile.”376 Only an intelligence which tapped into 
the other wellsprings of human understanding could provide real guidance for real men in real 
situations. Pure intelligence was too abstract, too sterile. For the Left whose intellectual endeavors 
were reduced to speculation with no bearing on real things, enlightenment became simply a “pride in 
knowing elevated things.” In contrast, Massis wrote we intellectuals of the Right “are practical men; 
we do not content ourselves with playing with ideas, with taking pleasure from them, we demand 
from them the knowledge of the real, the joy of the truth,” a usefulness for France.377 
It is no surprise therefore that the theme of Realism played a central role in the description of 
the new intellectual elite in Jeunes gens. “The spirit that guides the youth of today is that of 
affirmation, of creation” he wrote, “their sensibility is realist; it is submitted to fact.”378 These youth 
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had been united by their realism, their acceptance of the conditions of the real for the formation of 
thought. Massis would later write that it was around the central theme of Realism that the tendencies 
which defined the new intellectual elite, like dreams of national renewal, patriotism, and religious 
faith, were grouped.379 It was in being Realist in fact that Massis most distinguished his ideal of the 
intellectual Right from the concept of “intellectualism” that had been dominated by the Left. “Yes, 
thought is able to launch itself outside of reality, but in this it is falsified…our youth, consciously or 
by instinct is anti-intellectualist; it does not consider life an intellectual debate: a debate where only 
rational elements enter into play.”380 While the Left lost itself in universalisms and abstractions, the 
new intellectual elite of the Right were conscious “that they live in France, in a certain period of its 
history, and that all ought to be envisioned from this current and French point of view.” This was the 
“realist spirit” of the youth who formed Massis’ model of the right-wing intellectual.381
Intellectual realism also distinguished the role and practice of the intellectual of the Right 
who would be a man of letters rather than a scientist. The intellectual of the university, Massis wrote, 
had “faith in the autonomous value of ideas independent of all contact with the real.” This lack of 
contact with the real and devotion to pure abstraction was ironically what had led the Left to a 
fascination with science. Science and mathematics, though seemingly based on physical reality, were 
in fact efforts to make an intellectual abstraction, a formula, or a theorem out of reality, to “reduce the 
abundant diversity of beings to a system of abstractions.”382 Intellectual Realism as Massis 
understood it was not a rejection of intelligence or intellect nor a wild abandonment to instinct, 
mysticism, or imagination. It was simply a “metaphysics which envisioned all things from the point 
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of view of human life.”383 It was this connection between intelligence and life that Massis claimed 
had for too long been deemed a contradiction by the dominant Left. The intellectual of the Right 
realized that life and action were the purpose of intelligence and that the intellectualism of the Left, 
which separated thought from real life, was the real incompatibility. Literature, not science, was in 
contact with human emotions, life, will, and action. The identity of the responsible intellectual, 
according to Massis and the Right, was therefore associated with the role and practices of the 
litterateur and journalist rather than the savant or universitaire as the Left suggested.  
 
Nationalism and Defense of Western Civilization 
 Both before and after World War I, Massis would forcibly differentiate his concept of 
intellectual role and responsibility from that of the Left by promoting the intellectual as a spokesman 
of the French nation and of Western civilization rather than a representative of the “International of 
thought.” The Left universitaires, Massis wrote, were “detached from all contingency, plunged in the 
pure abstractions of the mind, assembled together in an international place, in the hall of the 
Sorbonne.”384 Here professors like Ruyssen taught the utopia of internationalism and the federation of 
patries into a fraternal society while other professors dismissed patriotic fervor in the youth as 
ignorant superstition and unscientific sentiment.385 Lucien Herr “taught successive generations that 
the ‘politics of national sentiment were dead’ and that ‘no one raises the people in the name of France 
any more’ and spread internationalism under the cover of science.”386 In contrast, it would be the 
responsibility of the intellectuals of the Right to provide an education in French ideas and intellectual 
patriotism.  
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 Again, it was in Jeunes gens that Massis would outline his model of the right-wing 
intellectual. To the “humanitarian internationalism of the ‘intellectuals,’387 the new intellectual elite 
opposed patriotic faith and a focus on the needs of France as a collective. According to Massis, 
Sorbonne pacifism and international humanitarianism had no effect on the intellectual of the Right 
who rejected the university tendency to “sacrifice the patrie to the Idea, to put patriotism in the 
service of internationalism.”388 For this new intellectual youth, ideas and patriotism were not 
contradictory, they were inseparable. Intellectual thought was laced now with ideas of force, action, 
energy, sacrifice, heroism, and faith rather than cosmopolitanism, decadence, anti-patriotism, and 
idealism. The “intellectual youth formed by universitaire idealism and cosmopolitan culture was 
entirely won to international socialism” during the Dreyfus Affair, Massis wrote. But today it 
concerned itself instead with the nation and it approached political questions from the French point of 
view.389 
It was the internationalism of the intellectual of the Left, Massis wrote during the war, that 
most distinguished him from the intellectual of the Right. The intellectual of the Left said, “I only 
recognize intelligence, it does not suffer borders and I would sacrifice one hundred French imbeciles 
for a single intelligent citizen of any nation…one is able to conquer the territory around me, never 
will one attain my thought.”390 The intellectual of the Right, in contrast, believed there was no 
abstract “intelligence,” no “detachment of the intelligence from the place and its borders.” Real 
intelligence, culture, and thought only existed in relation to the peoples, territory, and history that it 
drew from. Intellectual internationalism was not true intelligence but only a dangerous myth that led 
to sterile thought and an absence of culture. And, Massis continued, any foreign invasion during war 
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would mean the imposition of foreign culture on French life. The intellectual of the Left would not be 
able to retain the freedom of his thought if his territory were no longer free. French genius, different 
from other nations’ genius, had been made over time from order, clarity, and taste.391 Whether from 
physical invasion during war or insidious infiltration of the educational system, any dilution of this 
genius by foreign thought risked the corruption of centuries of French culture and intelligence.  
Massis carried over this assessment of intelligence into his rejection of the International of 
Thought after the war. Rolland had called for a demobilization and reunification of all the 
intellectuals of Europe after the war in an attempt to reprioritize intellectual fraternity and cooperation 
after the degrading experience of nationalist partisanship. Massis was firmly opposed to Rolland’s 
efforts to demobilize all the intellectuals of Europe and involve them in this new International 
devoted to shared enlightenment and the concerns of an abstract humanity. Rolland, he wrote, was not 
able to love only France, he was too “generous a soul” and wanted instead to love all humanity. 
Massis determined that this abstraction and anti-patriotism was a result of Rolland’s inability to 
organize his thoughts, to prioritize, and to make decisions. His internationalism was a very clear 
indication of his intellectual dilettantism and confusion. Intellectual nationalism, on the other hand, 
was based on reality, on firm roots, and on an ordered and organized process of prioritization and 
decisiveness.392 This cultural nationalism clearly divided the Left and Right intellectuals. “Here,” he 
wrote, “is that which separated the intellectuals of the Left from the ensemble of their colleagues: 
they have no confidence in their patrie!”393 This cultural nationalism would be the priority of the 
right-wing “Parti de l’intelligence.”  
 The concept of the intellectual as a “defender of Western Civilization” outlined by Massis in 
this manifest revealed an “abyss” between left-wing and right-wing concepts of Civilization and the 
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intellectual’s responsibility to it. French civilization was a product of the classical spirit, “elaborated 
over the ages, brought to us by good tradition, for a long time rejected or misunderstood in the 
shadows by the ways of the Revolution and Romanticism.”394 It was the result of French national 
intelligence, not a homogenous, universal culture as envisioned by the Left. The different vision of 
the foundations of Western, and particularly French, civilization and intelligence had important 
ramifications for the concept of intellectual role and responsibility on the Right. While the Rolland 
manifest envisioned intellectuals aiding in the homogenization and interspersion of national cultures 
throughout Europe in a sort of melting pot of thought, Massis and the Right envisioned instead the 
role of the intellectual as strengthening and purifying each national culture in order to create a mosaic 
of separate but brilliant components. Promoting cultural nationalism, not internationalism, was the 
means to protect civilization and therefore the responsibility of the true intellectual. Massis explained 
“if we put first the preoccupation of the needs of France and national reconstitution, if we want before 
all to serve and accept our civic obligations, if we claim to organize the defense of French 
intelligence, it is because we have in view the spiritual future of all civilization.”395 The explanation 
was later shortened to the pithy mantra “national intelligence in the service of national interests is our 
primary principle.”  
It was their different understandings of civilization and intelligence that renewed the pre-war 
divisions in the concept of intellectual responsibility between the Right and Left. The Left promoted 
the International of Thought based on its own idea of the benefit to civilization of the continued 
progress of intelligence through cultural cross-pollination. The Right opposed this with it own 
nationalist Party of Intelligence based on its alternative view of Civilization as the product of 
unadulterated French national tradition and classical heritage.  
 




Massis and the Right-wing Intellectual Model 
 The debates over the Nouvelle Sorbonne were never simply about policy for Massis and the 
intellectuals of the Right. They believed the reformers were transmitting to the next generation a 
certain understanding of culture, intelligence, and the purpose of education which dramatically 
differed from their own. Faced with the legitimization of these values by the authority of the 
University, the Right feared the Republican and Left intellectuals would gain an even stronger hold 
on the public’s perception of the role and identity of the true intellectual. Massis expressed the 
resentment and frustration of his peers on the traditionalist Right when he raged against the 
“intellectual despotism” of the left-wing “masters of Thought.” While the reformist intellectuals of 
the Republic and extreme Left defended the already legislated reforms confident in the submission of 
the public and the support of the regime, Massis and the intellectuals of the Right would develop a 
distinctly right-wing mentality of engagement. Massis believed the hegemony of the Left in the 
university and over the concept of the intellectual required him to first legitimize his position as 
intellectually viable, through propaganda efforts like Jeunes gens d’aujourd’hui and the 1919 
Manifest, before he could hope to sway public opinion. Like the anti-Dreyfusards who preceded him, 
Massis took on the mentality of the oppressed, anti-establishment outsider. To distinguish his 
alternative, right-wing concept of the intellectual, Massis would clearly differentiate his own 
intellectual values from those of the Left. The model intellectual of the Right valued the classicism, 
taste, and style attainable only by the elite students over utilitarian science available to all and so 
advocated a general education over specialization. He promoted a vision of intellectual realism that 
incorporated the knowledge gained by sentiment, experience, and action into concepts of intelligence 
rather than one based on practical but sterile scientific logic alone. And, the intellectual of the Right 
saw Civilization to be a mosaic of independent national cultures rather than a homogenized, 
international intelligence and so engaged to defend cultural nationalism rather than international 
cultural exchange both before and after the war. Massis made these different concepts of intellectual 
values and responsibility central to his struggle to differentiate and legitimize his own concept of 
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intellectual identity from that being promulgated on the Left. The abyss that became apparent 
between the Right and Left versions of the intellectual as educator would be reinforced during the 
decade by the increasing segregation of the intellectual community and by the distinctive experiences 
of intellectual life that these separate communities revealed and engendered. Massis was not the only 
right-wing intellectual who resented the Left’s dominance over intellectual identity and developed his 
own concept. He was joined in this effort by the imposing figure of Charles Maurras. 
CHAPTER 7 
 
THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE TRADITIONALIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF CHARLES 
MAURRAS 
 
Charles Maurras is one of the best known writers of the intellectual Right. His remarkable 
intellectual career began in the Dreyfus Affair and would not end until after his collaboration with 
Vichy France. Throughout this period of engagement, he was a leader in the movement to expand, 
popularize, and clarify the right-wing intellectual presence in French culture and politics. The Action 
Française movement which came to be synonymous with his name can be considered the most 
extensive and most enduring of the right-wing intellectual organizations. And the avowed influence 
of both Maurras and the AF on successive generations of young writers from the Left and Right 
speaks to the intellectual and political significance of both the man and his movement.  
 In 1895, Maurras had come to Paris as a youth of seventeen to begin his career as a writer. 
Rather than opting for the professional trajectory of the universitaire, Maurras entered the literary 
world by writing for the catholic journal L’Observateur Française at the age of nineteen and later 
Barrès’ nationalist and socialist revue La Cocarde. By 1898, Maurras was writing for the main 
royalist and soon to be anti-Dreyfusard organs Gazette de France and Le Soleil. During these pre-
Dreyfus Affair years, Maurras had also confirmed his classical and traditionalist values by creating 
the Ecole Romane with Jean Moréas. The aim of this movement was to replace German romanticism 
with traditional French styles in the intellectual field. This renewal of literature would be augmented 
by a returned respect for the healthy traditional institutions of the Church, the monarchy, and classical 
language. Maurras claimed the source of this monarchism was the trip he made in 1896 to Greece. 
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Seeing France from an external vantage point, he recognized the faults that plagued it under the 
republican regime.396 
As an ardent anti-Dreyfusard intellectual, Maurras had been an active member of the Ligue 
de la Patrie Française, but had been disillusioned by its electioneering. He believed he had found a 
better alternative in the small Comité d’Action Française created by Maurice Pujo and Henri 
Vaugeois as a daughter movement of the Ligue de la Patrie. By 1899, the movement had become 
more royalist than republican under the influence of Maurras and had declared a division between the 
pays legale of the Republic and the pays réel of “True France.”397 This royalism was popularized by 
the first edition of Maurras’ Enquête sur la monarchie in 1900. By this time, Maurras had already 
surpassed the founders of the movement in terms of ideological influence and began to be recognized 
as the mentor and leader of the organization. His distinctively right-wing conceptions of royalist 
nationalism and French intelligence would be the foundation of all the organs of the Action Française 
developed over the next decade. 
Although Agathon would receive the glory for popularizing the Nouvelle Sorbonne debate, 
the Action Française had actually taken the lead in attacking the German-inspired scientific reforms 
of the university as early as 1907. These attacks were led by Pierre Lasserre and provoked a continual 
polemic by AF members against the reformists from 1907 to 1914 as well as street and classroom 
protests by AF youth. All of these attacks on the Sorbonne found firm footing in the ideas and 
writings of Maurras during these years which praised classical and traditional education, rejected 
Germanism in all its forms, and strongly opposed the University. Maurras saw the university system 
to have been corrupted by Dreyfusards during the Affair and to have increasingly become a citadel 
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for Republican and socialist values and views, to the exclusion of traditional, classical, nationalist, 
and particularly royalist intellectual values.398 
During these pre-war years, although Maurras took pains to place himself in clear opposition 
to the intellectual values and movements of the Republic and Left like international socialism, class 
conflict, and egalitarianism, he did not exclude from the royalist movement those left-wing thinkers 
who had come to sympathize with his ideas. This attempt to unite the French under monarchism 
regardless of past affiliations is perhaps most apparent in the Cercle Proudhon created in 1911 and 
chaired by Maurras with the aid of syndicalists Georges Sorrel and Edouard Berth. Although the 
movement spawned a few attempts at collaboration between syndicalists and monarchists, the 
compromise between the two parties was short lived and their efforts eventually abandoned due to 
irreconcilable differences in values. Despite this brief collaboration and statements of inclusion, being 
royalist and Maurrassian came to be understood by contemporaries as being irrefutably on the 
Intellectual Right.  
During the war, Maurras would be one of the most vocal supporters of the Union sacrée. 
Unlike the intellectual Left, he and others on the Right viewed the union and engagement in the war 
as validation of their intellectual values of nationalism, militarism, and anti-internationalism. The 
union did not, however, prevent Maurras from critiquing the inefficiency of the Republican regime or 
from attacking the socialist press like Bonnet Rouge for what he considered defeatism. During these 
years he continued daily publications in the Action Française which would be collected as the four 
volume Les Conditions de la victoire. In the post-war years, Maurras pushed for harsher penalties on 
Germany, including the re-division of the unified German state. His anti-Germanism and anti-
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internationalism would continue unabated into the 1920s and 1930s making Action Française 
royalism a beacon of right-wing thought against the increasing turn to internationalism and 
communism by the intellectual Left. It would be here in the Action Française intellectual milieu, 
which by the post-war years included Henri Massis, that the young non-conformists of the 1930s 
found their first intellectual mentors and professional community.  
Like Massis, Maurras adamantly separated himself from the intellectuals of the Left by 
promoting the right-wing intellectual values of classicism in education, realism in politics, and 
nationalism in international affairs. But the royalism which transcended these values for Maurras 
would distinguish his approach to these values from the one previously seen in the work of Barrès and 
Massis. His contribution to the elaboration of right-wing intellectual values and construction of 
intellectual communities during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and the pre and post-war years 
provides both insight into one of the most influential right-wing movements of the time and an 
equally significant model of right-wing intellectual identity.  
 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
 Maurras began working through the AF to redefine intellectual identity according to a right-
wing model when the Republicans and Left rejected his own values as anti-intellectual and anti-
French. He and other right-wing men of intelligence who sought to guide public affairs resented their 
forced marginalization and devoted much of their energies to legitimizing themselves and their ideas 
as intellectually viable. Like Barrès and Brunetière, Maurras and the other founders of the Action 
Française had been drawn to the Ligue de la Patrie because of their frustration with the way that 
intellectual values and responsible engagement were being defined by the Left. But, when these anti-
Dreyfusard ligues seemed to lose their focus, Maurras felt the need to make the AF into a new 
legitimizing force for the Right. During the years 1910-1920, Maurras and the AF would be one of 
the most powerful voices on the Right calling for an end to the republican and left-wing hegemony 
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over the role of the intellectual and its replacement with an alternative, right-wing model of 
intellectual engagement based on the ideals of royalism, classicism, realism, and nationalism.  
 One of the clearest statements of resentment about the hegemony of the Left over the concept 
of the intellectual was written by AF devotee Pierre Lasserre. “Before critiquing the attitude of the 
‘Intellectuals,’ he wrote, “we must first state that the orators of the Action Française are also 
intellectuals and that they have equal rights to participate in this debate.”399 Only by claiming the 
status of the intellectual and the responsibility to engage would the AF be able to participate as 
equals, in the eyes of the public, in the debates over the Nouvelle Sorbonne and French education. 
Lasserre’s demand for equal recognition of the Action Française “intellectuals” encapsulated the 
resentment and demand for intellectual status shared by all AF thinkers and by Maurras in particular. 
Maurras’ own demand for intellectual authority was, like the enquête on youth by Agathon, both an 
attempt to reveal the existing hegemony of the Left and an effort to claim legitimacy by suggesting 
that a shift to the Right was underway. He claimed that beginning in the years 1906-1909, the Action 
Française had accomplished a massive shift in Western history. “Intellectual prestige,” the statement 
read, “the honors of the mind, the ability to hypothesize on the future, had ceased to be reserved to the 
doctrines and tendencies of the Left; the ideas of the Right had taken their place.”400 He wanted to 
emphasize that the Left had held hegemony over the authority of the intellectual but that the Right, 
through the AF, was now the new intellectual model. Maurras was attempting to win authority and 
legitimacy for the AF by claiming that these goals had already been achieved. From now on, Maurras 
continued, no one would ask “if it was true that to be intelligent it was necessary to be Dreyfusard.”401 
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Instead, the public would have a superior alternative to the left-wing intellectual model that had been 
so dominant, it would have the model of the royalist intellectual of the nationalist Right.402 
During the Nouvelle Sorbonne era, Maurras believed the hegemony in the intellectual world 
that the AF had been called to combat was most visible and most pernicious in the Left dominated 
and Republican controlled university system. It was the intellectuals of the university, and the concept 
of intelligence, culture, France, and engagement that they instilled in the youth, that Maurras found to 
be the most threatening to the future of right-wing intellectual identity. One of Maurras’ more 
forceful statements against the university dominance was made in his L’Avenir de l’Intelligence. This 
work was his summation of the history of French intelligence, his condemnation of the decadence 
into which it had fallen under the Republic, and his proposed model for the royalist, right-wing 
intellectual engagement that would save it for the future. Here he popularized his resentment of the 
monopoly that the Left and the Republic held over education of the youth in particular and 
intellectual production and expression in general.  
The University, Maurras wrote, was a product “of the State” and “with the methods that the 
State could dispose of, created an immense obstruction in the scientific, philosophical, and literary 
domain.” The goal of the University to monopolize intellectual life, he continued, “to take literature, 
philosophy, and science captive” led it to “stifle” all opposition from the Right. It exercised in this 
way, he concluded resentfully, “an indirect monopoly” over intellectual life and “determined speech 
or silence” of intellectuals.403 The ties between the left-wing leaders of the university and the Third 
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Republic made the hegemony of the left-wing reformers and universitaires even more ominous. The 
Republic’s bureaucracy reached into every village primary school and thus prevented the 
development in the next generation of any serious adversary to its “muzzling and sedating of 
intelligence” through the university. By controlling the education of the youth, access to publication, 
and the dispensation of intellectual honors, the Republic exercised an invisible hegemony over the 
intellectual field that made thinking outside the parameters of the intellectual Left virtually 
“unthinkable.” Maurras would summarize this saying, the Republican university system “prevented 
the opposition from knowing a political truth, and if it saw this truth from telling others of it, and if it 
told others of it from being heard and understood by them.”404 In short, by monopolizing the 
University system that mentored all future intellectuals, the Republican regime silenced any possible 
intellectual opposition or deviation from its value system. It was this hegemony that Maurras intended 
to break with the communities and educational institutions constructed around the AF network.  
 In particular, Maurras and the AF intellectuals resented the dominance that certain reformist 
intellectuals held over the university and their ability to exclude as “anti-intellectual” the ideas and 
educators of the extreme Right. An article by Lasserre identified Durkheim, Lavisse, Lanson, and 
Seignobos as “belonging to a little group of professors of the Sorbonne whose…omnipotence in all 
things of public instruction has been the most characteristic fact of university life for the past twelve 
years.”405 Durkheim was recognized as both a political and administrative power within the university 
and his pedagogy course as “cover for a maneuver to tighten around him the new generations of 
universitaires, to make of sociology according to Durkheim’ their new religion.”406 Yet, the control 
supposedly exerted over public instruction by these reformers was nothing, according to Maurras, 
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compared to that exerted by Gabriel Monod. Monod, Maurras wrote, had annulled the positive, 
nationalist influence of the historian Fustel de Coulanges by denigrating his work in the University 
and glorifying instead the German histories and methods. Monod had the State, the administration, 
and the “subsidized bookstores and the enslaved press” supporting his interpretation of history. It 
was, he fumed, a veritable intellectual and governmental “bloc.” Against this hegemonic power the 
intellectuals of the Right had only the AF Institut and their independent press to draw back the minds 
of the youth. For the past thirty years, Maurras continued, Monod had influenced every branch of the 
moral sciences, presided over their development, and jealously surveyed their progress. He had 
integrated his own left-wing concepts of intelligence and history into the university courses while 
excluding those ideas, professors, and historical interpretations which did not correspond to his views. 
In truth, he had been “the tyrant of professors of French history.”407 
And should any readers suspect that Maurras’s resentment was unfounded or the dominance 
of the university by the Republican regime and the left-wing intellectual reformers was exaggerated, 
the example was given to them of Dimier and Lasserre. These two Action Française advocates had 
doctorates in letters and yet had been ejected from the Sorbonne. They had turned to the AF Institut in 
order to continue teaching their intellectual and cultural values. Here they taught courses that were 
not “authorized to a professor in the Sorbonne” since the University feared such courses would 
reverse the official republican and socialist curricula.408 
Maurras took great pains to show the hegemony and dominance of the Left over the concept 
of the intellectual and particularly over the formation of these intellectuals in the university. His 
expressions of resentment and anger at this exclusion were seconded only by his statements claiming 
legitimacy for the repressed Right. This struggle to convince the public of the legitimacy of the 
intellectual of the Right took several forms. One of the main strategies of legitimization, as it had 
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been for the Anti-Dreyfusard petitionnaires, was to display publicly the recognized men of letters who 
had joined the camp of the Right. Respected names in literature and journalism were advertised as 
lecturers for the Institut d’Action Française, which was intended to provide an alternate education in 
right-wing values for both the general public and the university student. To these masters associated 
with the AF, Lasserre compared the influential men of letters of the Left. Anatole France, he smirked, 
was the only one of “great intellectual and literary value who had not taken in regard to the regime an 
attitude of hostility and distaste.” In a great stroke of bravado, Lasserre continued “What therefore 
can we put on the intellectual bilan of the Republic? I see nothing.”409 In his enquête on the 
monarchy, Maurras concluded that monarchist, right-wing intellectuals deserved public recognition 
and authority since “so many collaborators of infinite price” had shown themselves on the side of the 
Right.410 By publicizing the famous names of men of letters affiliated with the Right and the AF, 
Maurras intended to impress the public with the talent that supported their camp and therefore 
legitimize themselves as authoritative intellectual guides.411 
A second strategy of legitimization was to claim, as Agathon had done with such marked 
success, that the youth of France, the symbol of fresh thought and progress, were on the side of the 
AF intellectuals. “The new generation,” Maurras wrote in defense of his ideas on monarchism and his 
hostility toward the Republic, “is above all in revolt against the resignation to death.”412 The youth, he 
continued, were no longer seduced by theories claiming to be “free-thinking or revolutionary” and 
instead recognized them as utopias which could not offer the substance of traditional French 
instruction.413 By popularizing the image of the “youthful reactionaries of the AF,” the “generation of 
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national royalists who did not believe themselves any more anachronistic than their adversaries,”414 
Maurras was able to claim intellectual prestige and victory had “changed camps” from Left to Right. 
The youth of the intellectual elite, Maurras wrote, were no longer “convinced that the future horizons 
were only able to open themselves to the ideas of the Left” and had made a break from the dominant 
majority in favor of the new intellectual alternative of the AF.415 Claiming a youthful and elite avant 
garde gave the intellectual Right a powerful tool in the struggle for public perception of true 
intellectual identity.  
 Maurras and the intellectuals of the Action Francaise believed that they had been excluded 
from the role and responsibility of the engaged intellectual, particularly in the university. Maurras had 
embraced both the title of intellectual and the role of the politically engaged thinker as early as the 
Dreyfus Affair and rejected, as his right-wing peers had, only the values, behaviors, and programs 
attached to it by the intellectuals of the Left. During the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, Maurras would 
continue to distance himself from the intellectual model of the Left. He saw serious and fundamental 
differences between the two worldviews that made their intellectual outlooks incompatible. “One 
does not see any ground of entente between the Jacobins and us,” he wrote of the Left in the years 
before the Union sacrée, “their spirit is opposed to ours. The two spirits had been manifested in the 
Dreyfus Affair and they have survived it. Any reconciliation is only a sham.”416 Maurras saw with 
increasing resentment the growing power of republican and left-wing reformist intellectuals like 
Monod and Durkheim and the decreasing influence or outright exclusion of the anti-republican, right-
wing universitaires like Lasserre. The dominance of these individuals of the Left mirrored the 
increasing hegemony of the reformist, modernist, and left-wing value system in French education. As 
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successive generations of intellectuals were mentored by this left-wing system, Maurras warned, 
engaging outside of or in opposition to the engrained left-wing ideals would literally become 
inconceivable. Against this hegemony, AF intellectuals demanded equal right to the title and role of 
the intellectual and equal responsibility to engage in the debate over French education. They 
developed strategies to legitimize their alternative right-wing model, but the most effective would be 
to highlight the differences that existed between the Left and Right the ramifications these different 
visions had for intellectual life.  
 
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Realism and Royalism 
 The intellectual platform that most separated Maurras and the intellectual Right of the Action 
Française from the dominant intellectual model of the Republican Left was the complex set of 
intellectual issues that surrounded their royalism.417 For Maurras and the AF, although the mantra 
would become “Politics First,” the original incentive to engage, as they often had to explain, had been 
intellectual and aesthetic. From the beginning, therefore, Maurras closely identified his political 
royalism with his intellectual responsibility and the needs of French intelligence. The third Congress 
of the AF in 1910 emphasized this connection between political platform and intellectual values in a 
speech which read, “These past five years have made proof of the identical cause of the French 
monarchy and that of French intelligence.418 Lasserre clarified this connection even further saying, 
“The doctrine called Action Française concerns the national politics, but it implies the usage of an 
intellectual discipline which has a general value, a general application.”419 These general values 
which were expressed politically as royalism were expressed more generally as the intellectual value 
of Realism.  
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 Realism was a fundamental intellectual value for Maurras and the AF that distinguished their 
worldview and concept of responsibility from that of the Left. The “intellectual discipline” that 
Maurras believed to guide the AF consisted of “simply taking for foundations and for guides the 
theory and practice of the natural and necessary relationships of things, the laws of reality.”420 These 
laws of Reality were drawn from historical experience and the observance of constants in natural 
relationships. Maurras’ concept of realism as a tool for intellectual engagement was known as 
“organizing empiricism.” It was the reorganization of ideas drawn from experience into new patterns 
that could address the needs of the future.421 Rather than rely solely on theory, abstract logic, or even 
mathematical laws applied to society and economics, Maurras and the AF looked to historical 
experience to guide society toward the future. Like Barrès and Brunetière, Maurras would emphasize 
that the “Real” was not a universal or international concept but rather one tied to a particular time, 
space, and people. This meant that, unlike the intellectuals of the Left who borrowed methodologies, 
educational formats, and social theories from Germany, Russia, and other nations with the belief that 
logical ideas were universally applicable, the right-wing intellectuals of the AF looked only to the 
history of France for inspiration; specifically the history of pre-Revolutionary France.  
 According to Maurras, the intellectual’s duty to the Real obligated them to engage against the 
Third Republic and the ideals of democracy. Since Maurras believed that the monarchy had brought 
France territory, cultural glory, and international influence while the Republics had only brought 
social unrest, declining influence, and economic failure, he determined that monarchism alone offered 
a successful example for emulation. All of the components of Left Republican thought were 
incongruous with historical experience and therefore divorced from the reality which ruled all 
responsible intellectual positions. Unlike many right-wing nationalists who retained some hope for 
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principle in general. Organizing empiricism, Maurras wrote, determined the political “necessity of the 
monarchy and the malevolence of democracy.”422 The supreme rationale for this opposition to 
democratism was its inability to function in the real world, beyond the realm of abstract political 
theory. “The defenders of democracy,” he wrote, “are the pure mystics, their opinion is only 
supported by a mix of dreams and subjective impulses.”423 The intellectuals of the Republic and the 
Left who attempted to use abstract Rationalism to defend the principles of democratic regimes were 
not only deceiving the public, Maurras claimed, they were abusing intelligence and betraying the 
responsibility of the intellectual. “They have believed to be able to make nature, history, and the facts 
speak in favor of the dogmas of 1789, Democracy, and the Republic,” he wrote, “Have they 
succeeded? No.”424 The right-wing intellectual, according to the model of identity developed by 
Maurras and the AF, engaged in opposition to the Republic and to all democratic forms. This made 
them, necessarily, anti-establishment, external, and oppositional intellectual critics clearly separate 
from the institutional intellectuals of the Left.  
 Maurrassian realism would also dictate a certain conception of France for the right-wing 
intellectual of the AF that would determine their engagement in the discussion of reforms to the 
history curricula. France, Maurras wrote, was not a geographic, racial, or linguistic entity like the 
other European nations. It was a historical product of the Kings who had created France between 987 
and 1789 by establishing its traditions, borders, and historical identity.425 French national identity and 
therefore knowledge of its interests was bound to the political form of monarchism. While 
Republicanism was based on the fantasy of utopian equality, self governance, and anarchic individual 
liberties, monarchism was based on the reality, proven viable over the years, of hierarchy, authority, 
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and liberty through order. Maurras and the royalists were particularly disturbed that this fantasy of 
democratism was the official doctrine of the monopolized university and that the youth were being 
deliberately divorced from the stable reality of their royal past in favor of an emphasis on the post-
Revolutionary era. Maurras was incensed by Lanson’s attempt to minimize all history and literature 
that hadn’t been written in the 19th century. He was outraged by the attitude of Nouvelle Sorbonne 
reformer Aulard who said “it does not concern teaching the child the historical truth but teaching him 
to abhor all that which is not of the Revolution in our past.”426 For the AF intellectual, France was the 
sum of her historical experience, specifically the experience of the monarchy. It was, therefore, the 
responsibility of the intellectual as educator to instruct the nation in its glorious royal past so that 
society would have effective examples to profit from. This would be the mission of the intellectuals 
who lectured for the AF Institut. Teaching history from the perspective of the failed Republic, as the 
reformers did, was, by contrast, a betrayal of intellectual duty.427 
Realism would also have important implications for Maurras’ approach to nationalism. The 
Left’s entire political conception was based on what Maurras considered an unrealistic abstraction: 
the idea of humanity as a real political entity. Instead, in a statement reminiscent of Barrès, Maurras 
wrote of his intellectual peers on the nationalist and royalist Right, “We say ‘real political 
community’ because it concerns pre-existing conditions, we do not speak of humanity for example 
because humanity has never existed in itself and we do not know if it is able to…In the measure of 
the real, humanity is the nation.”428 The Left had accused Maurras and the nationalists of betraying 
intelligence by submitting their work to a sentimental, emotional nationalism. In truth, Maurras wrote, 
the Right recognized political realities while the Left betrayed intelligence by founding their political 
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ideas on abstraction. According to Maurras, humanity was too vague and broad a category for real 
political relationships. “International relations, whether they are political, moral, or scientific,” he 
wrote, “depend on the maintenance of nationalities.” Without the nation, founded in political and 
historical reality, serving as a vessel for the expression and preservation of humanity, humanism itself 
was lost. Therefore the nation needed to be the primary concern of intellectuals.429 This meant that the 
work of a responsible intellectual of the Right included defining French national identity, making 
cultural nationalism a priority, and protecting the university from foreign, particularly German, 
infiltration. In contrast with the intellectual reformers and post-war internationalists of the Left, the 
intellectual of the Right would see his role to be the preservation of a pure French intelligence 
nurtured in French and classical sources rather than the cross-pollination of intelligence though 
international cultural exchange. 
 Because Maurras saw the nation as the only real political unit, he was equally dismissive of 
the intellectual Left’s glorification of the individual. Individualism, according to Maurras, was a 
metaphysical abstraction that had no foundation in natural relationships just as humanity did not. In 
nature, the smallest grouping was not the individual but the family, the association. Under the 
unnatural Republican laws of individual autonomy and freedom, the individual was left isolated, 
society atomized, and the nation weakened.430 “The Realistic mind,” Mauras wrote, is instead 
“warned by history, not deformed by a false history of laws. The true guarantee of individual rights is 
first society and then association. In a well made society, the individual accepts the law of the species, 
the species does not perish by the will of the individual.”431 While the intellectual Left might prefer 
what Maurras called the illusion of freedom and autonomy that came from individualism, the AF and 
the intellectual Right instead recognized the need for a foundation in stable reality to achieve true 
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liberty. “It is necessary to choose between devotion to the patrie or devotion to the individual,” an 
article in the AF read. “Intellectual France has for 120 years chosen the second and we are dying from 
it. It is a choice to be remade. We [the intellectuals of the AF] fulfill our duty to French 
intelligence.”432 
Finally, Maurras claimed intellectual Realism as the justification for the Action Française’s 
anti-egalitarianism. “Inequality,” he wrote, “is a fact. We want it to be recognized as a vital fact 
outside of which no life is possible.”433 This fact, this human reality of inequality was proved by the 
experience of history and the observation of relationships among living things in nature. “Equality is 
not able to reign anywhere,” Maurras wrote, because it is an unnatural relationship between men 
foisted upon them by an idealistic republican regime. A powerful state like the Third Republic could 
provide many rights to the people, but “it is not up to it to make these rights equal when they 
correspond to naturally unequal situations. When the law claims such an equality, the citizens receive 
permanent council of anarchy.”434 Equality was unnatural and led to chaos, disorder, a false sense of 
liberty, and eventual disintegration of society. Superior life for men was always to be found in 
inequality, in the acceptance of one’s place in the social hierarchy and submission to the best interests 
of the collective instead of the will of each individual. According to Maurras, the role of the 
intellectual of the Right was not to democratize education or bring about a more equal society, it was 
to equip men with the knowledge necessary to take their place willingly in the national hierarchy and 
to work for the stabilization of an orderly society.  
 Whether it was expressed as anti-egalitarianism, anti-individualism, royalist integral 
nationalism, anti-republicanism, or a general application of organizing empiricism, Realism was a 
fundamental intellectual value for Maurras and the AF. It dramatically distinguished their intellectual 
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value system and worldview from that of the Left. And, as Maurras showed, it was essential to the 
distinctive model of intellectual role, responsibility, and identity on the Right.  
 
Classicism and Traditionalism 
 The intellectual Right did not always agree on the foundations for French tradition or 
classical culture. Barrès and Maurras for example disputed the inclusion of contributions from the 
revolutionary era while others debated the primacy of Latin over medieval influences. Yet despite 
these internal disagreements, the appreciation of classicism and traditionalism was believed by 
intellectuals on the Right to be a defining characteristic of their thought. It was viewed as an 
intellectual value which separated them from the intellectuals of the Left, whom they believed to 
prefer German romanticism, scientific rationalism, and utilitarianism. Maurras was one of the 
predominant intellectual forces behind the movement to return to a classical, traditional aesthetic 
during the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates and the post-war 1920s.435 While the Left accused the Right of 
backward thinking, unscientific sentimentality for the past, and a desire to revert society to the 
Medieval Age, the Right saw its appreciation for tradition and the classics as a preservation of French 
cultural identity and the fundamentals of civilization necessary for any stable progress.436 In this way, 
the AF intellectuals believed they were acting as realist, responsible, and practical intellectual guides 
for modern society by supporting classical and traditional forms in education against the scientific 
modernism of the Left. 
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For Maurras and the AF, France was “the legitimate heir of the Greek and Roman world” not 
the Frankish “barbarians” who had settled in the land.437 Germanic ideas, particularly the scientific 
approaches, were therefore foreign and even corrosive to the French mind. Classicism and the 
traditional French literary canon, which drew inspiration from the literature and law of the Greeks and 
Romans, were, on the other hand, a means to preserve French national identity, intelligence, and 
culture. The reformist intellectuals’ determination to “reform” the university by replacing the French 
and classical elements with German ones implied a distaste for French intelligence incompatible with 
being its intellectual leaders. It was when, Maurras wrote, “the French were taught to despise 
themselves, when they no longer love themselves, when they can no longer suffer that which is made 
by their own hand or their ancestors’” that they delivered themselves to their enemies.438 The 
campaign by Pierre Lasserre in Action Française during the years 1908-1912439 best represents this 
Maurrassian defense of classicism and critique of the intellectual Left who, they believed, wanted to 
eradicate it. Lasserre claimed the Republic, the “government of Dreyfus…had need for its own 
conservation of violating the tradition of the intellectual culture in our nation, of making a generation 
of minds without ideas, without method, without taste, minds without patrie, without civilization, and 
without defense.”440 It was for this anti-French reason that the humanities and classics had been 
chased from the university and secondary schools, Lasserre wrote, and substituted with the foreign 
and sterile products of erudition.441 This failure by the Republic and the Left to preserve the nation’s 
cultural and intellectual heritage was recognized in not only the importation of German scientific 
methods, erudition, and utilitarian courses by the Nouvelle Sorbonne reformers but also in the general 
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fascination among the intellectual Left with the Germanic philosophies of Kantism, socialism, 
pantheism, and Romanticism.442 
The AF intellectual’s defense of Classicism against the scientific modernism of the Left was 
not simply a debate over pedagogical method or German influence. It was the cornerstone of a vital 
debate over “the definition and object of public education” and, by correlation, over the definition and 
role of the intellectual and educator. The reformers and the AF traditionalists conceived of the goal of 
French education and the responsibility of the university completely differently and, therefore, 
“contradicted one another at their very foundation on the sort of intellectual formation suitable for 
new French generations.”443 An education in classical languages and history was extremely 
impractical for the French masses and served only to identify those students who would become men 
of letters or savants. It provided excellent material for advanced instruction in style, taste, and 
individual interpretation but not in the basic skills of computation, compilation, and repetition. 
Articles in the Action Française were particularly adamant that scientific and utilitarian education 
were only for vulgar minds who appreciated quantity over quality and the accumulation of erudition 
over a true education in civilization, culture, and morality. The intellectual of the Left saw his role to 
be the democratization and leveling of the educational system so that all students received an equal 
education that would prove utilitarian in the modern market society. The intellectual Right sought to 
provide an education in classics and traditional French humanities so that they could carry out their 
role of identifying and nurturing the elite who would be the intellectual leaders of a hierarchically 
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Patriotism and Nationalism 
 Maurras and the Action Française also considered the intellectuals of the extreme Right to be 
the representatives of all that was nationalist and patriotic, claiming at one point “all that is national is 
ours.” They perceived their nationalism to be a characteristic of their intellectual identity that 
distinguished them from the anti-patriotic, internationalist Left and that clearly designated them as the 
more appropriate intellectual guides for France. The idea of “intellectual patriotism” that rejected not 
only German intellectual annexation but also “foreign” Protestant and Jewish contributions was a 
distinctive component of Maurrassian right-wing intellectual identity that would separate it clearly 
from the model of the Left. 
 Maurras identified patriotism as a value of the intellectual Right, and particularly the Action 
Française, while denying its appreciation among the intellectual Left. He wrote that the Left 
sacrificed the “primordial interests…of life in this nation” to the German inspired value of 
universalism. The Left was, he continued, well guarded at its very intellectual foundation from the 
only Germanic value worth emulating, “the passion of intellectual patriotism.”444 In an article on anti-
patriotism and the Republic, AF writer Montesquiou clarified this denial. The AF, he wrote, followed 
the principle of the Ligue de la Patrie in conceiving of all questions in their relation to the national 
interest. There was, in contrast, a “group of citizens to which this point of view seems forbidden- 
those who call themselves true “republicans.” What distinguished the thinkers of the AF from those 
of the Republic, he concluded, was that the AF wanted the health of the patrie while the republican 
only wanted the health of the republican form and the socialist only the health of international 
socialism. “With these others,” he wrote of the socialist Left and Republican intellectuals, “we are not 
able to be understood since we do not want the same things.”445 Clearly the intellectuals of the AF 
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Right saw an abyss between their own values and visions as intellectuals and those of the Republican 
and Left intellectuals. 
Maurras found intellectual patriotism particularly lacking “in the university milieu” where he 
claimed pacifists, Jews, and socialists taught about nations in the abstract and as a family of equals. 
For example, Durkheim claimed to teach patriotism but his patriotism was celebrating a “new type of 
patrie in a formation which envelops our patrie: the European or human patrie.”446 Such “conception 
of patriotism was objectively and practically the equivalent of anti-patriotism itself” one AF article 
declared. And the willingness to teach the youth internationalism disguised as patriotism was, 
according to the intellectual Right, a betrayal of intellectual duty that merited that “one rap his 
knuckles in order to teach him his responsibilities.”447 Equally untenable in the university was the 
teaching by reformist and socialist historians that the French nation had been born in 1789 with the 
Revolution and the Rights of Man. This, Maurras wrote, was a misconception of the nation as a civic 
idea, a contract made by individuals of their own will. This, he continued, was not the AF 
understanding of the patrie. Right-wing intellectuals understood the patrie as a natural, historical 
society constructed by the kings and based on the hereditary tradition transmitted over generations. It 
was “the earth and the dead,” as Barrès had written, plus a body of tradition and political 
experience.448 The Left’s incompatible conception of the nation and patriotism, according to Maurras, 
separated its intellectual vision for France from that of the Right and clearly disqualified it. 
 Maurras also believed that the Left, in its desire to turn the theory of internationalism into a 
reality, had permitted the “intellectual annexation” of France by Germany. Protestant ideas of 
individualism, Marxist theories of social economics, and scientific reforms to education were all 
German imports that made France more sympathetic and open to her dangerous neighbor. Maurras 
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saw a division in concepts of intellectual responsibility between the Right and Left in the opposing 
attitudes that the two camps took toward this annexation. While the Left glorified this annexation and 
perpetuated it through the reforms to the Sorbonne,449 the intellectual Right combated it with the 
traditional French arsenal of classicism and traditionalism.450 The republican university and the 
socialist professors continued to teach, until the outbreak of war in 1914, that “Germany is the second 
patrie of all thinking men.”451 Even the war would not cure these reformers like Croiset, Maurras 
wrote, “insane with the Germanic esprit” who would continue their internationalism after 1919.452 In 
contrast, the intellectual of the Right saw himself as a spokesman for France, not a citizen of the 
world or an intellectual citizen of Germany. They would reject the “Two Germanies theory” and 
would wholeheartedly support intellectual mobilization against German influence both before and 
after the war. It was the duty of the maurrassian intellectuals to prevent further annexation of 
France.453 
Finally, Maurras and the Action Française incorporated the idea of the “internationalism of 
the interior” into their conception of intellectual values and responsibility. This rejection of Jews, 
Protestants, masons, and “metics,” as well as socialists as elements foreign to the French national 
identity clearly divided the Maurrassian Right from the intellectuals of the Republic and the Left who 
instead tended to embrace thinkers from these groups and their ideas. Maurras’ anti-Semitism was 
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similar in many ways to Barrès’ concept of enracinement but intentionally opposed to the Germanic 
idea of racial or biological anti-Semitism. There were, Maurras claimed, no French races but rather a 
French national history, tradition, and culture which was imbibed through family life and attachment 
to the land. Jews, having no homeland, were identified as always uprooted and never connected in 
this way to the French essence. Because they had no strong affiliation with the French patrie over any 
other country despite years of attempted assimilation, they were always a hidden threat to French 
unity. Maurras therefore blamed all those areas of intellectual or political life which he deemed 
foreign or corrupt on the influence of the Jews. He particularly embraced the stereotype of the 
wealthy capitalist Jew who controlled the French media and was supportive of the socialist presses.454 
The Protestant community was equally targeted as a dominant force in the intellectual world 
and the university. “The Protestant community,” he wrote, “who makes the laws for us in the 
university, the administration, and the bookstore ought to be warned that it is without rights on us” 
since it is outside the national body.455 Maurras was not as concerned about the religious doctrine of 
Protestantism as the fact that Protestantism was a Germanic product, the inspiration for 
egalitarianism, individualism, and revolutionary thought, and a source of social schism within the 
French nation. French identity, as a historical construct, was linked to both monarchism and 
Catholicism since it was from these traditional institutions that France had achieved its cultural 
tradition, its international force and prestige, and its national cohesiveness. Protestantism and the 
many Protestant thinkers of the intellectual Left were therefore deemed anti-French and an 
international enemy on the interior. 
This concept of international enemies on the interior who were unable or unwilling to work 
for the best interests of the patrie and instead promoted ideals which destroyed French unity clearly 
divided Maurras and the AF intellectuals from those on the Left. While the Left could list an 
overwhelming number of socialist, Jewish, and Protestant intellectuals in its ranks, the AF Right was 
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hard pressed to counter with even one who had not converted or become a syndicalist. To this 
separation was added Maurras’ preoccupation with the dangers of intellectual annexation by 
Germany, which the Left had embraced in the Nouvelle Sorbonne, and the need for intellectual 
patriotism, from which he excluded the internationalist Left. Integral Nationalism was therefore an 
intellectual value that Maurras found to clearly divide the intellectual Left and Right and to create two 
different concepts of the responsible engaged intellectual. Like the values of Realism and Classicism, 
its distinctive qualities would be reinforced by the intellectual communities, networks, and behaviors 
created around the AF. 
 
Maurras and the Right-wing Intellectual Model 
Maurras and the intellectuals of the Action Francaise Right fiercely resented the monopoly 
that the reformers and the government exercised over the influence of the university and over the 
intellectual authority it granted. Maurras’ desire to legitimize himself and his royalist program as a 
viable intellectual alternative led him to adopt a distinctly right-wing mentality of engagement. 
Before engaging against the reforms or later against the internationalism of the inter-war years, 
Maurras and the monarchists believed it was first necessary to develop strategies and discourses of 
legitimization and construct an impressive structure of supporting intellectual communities like the 
Institut and the revue Action Française. Although he would claim to be speaking from the position of 
the new majority, Maurras would continue to portray himself and his engagement as excluded, 
marginalized, and repressed by the official power of the regime and its left-wing intelligentsia. 
Although they resented the intellectuals of the Left, the AF did not reject the title, role or 
responsibility to engage and simply sought to redefine the identity of the intellectual and the concept 
of engagement according to their own right-wing value system, communities, and experiences. 
Maurras would begin this process of differentiation and redefinition by intentionally separating his 
own intellectual values and worldviews from those of the Left. According to Maurras, the true 
intellectual advocated a Realism that was incompatible with democratic republicanism, international 
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humanism, individualism, and egalitarianism. It dictated that the intellectual adopt political 
monarchism, teach cultural nationalism, and serve as the external, anti-establishment opposition of 
the regime. The intellectual of the Right valued a classical and traditional education over a modern, 
scientifically based one and sought to educate the elite of society in matters of taste and style rather 
than the masses in utilitarian basics. Right-wing intellectuals, according to the model dictated by 
Maurras, were defenders of the national heritage against the infusion of foreign ideas from both 
external and internal sources. Maurras and the AF intellectuals felt excluded from the places of 
influence and power in the university and resented the resulting marginalization of their intellectual 
influence. They attempted to redefine intellectual identity according to their own distinctly right-wing 
values and views since they truly felt that they were “not able to be understood” by their intellectual 
opponents on the Left. In this effort to segregate and redefine intellectual identity, they would be 
aided by the creation of distinctly right-wing intellectual communities and networks that fostered a 
sense of collective identity. 
CHAPTER 8 
 
THE WORLD OF THE TRADITIONALIST RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND THE 
INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE 
 
During the decade 1910-1920, the traditionalists and nationalists of the extreme Right would 
build upon and expand the communities, networks, and social spaces created for right-wing 
intellectuals during the Dreyfus Affair. The Nouvelle Sorbonne reforms caused the intellectuals of the 
Right to feel themselves intentionally excluded and marginalized by the Left in the university system. 
Because they no longer found community, professional networks, or even opportunities to mentor the 
youth in the university space, the Right focused much of its attention on creating new spaces, through 
ligues, manifests, revues, and the outlets of the AF that could replace this lost community. The 
increasingly segregated and isolated nature of these right-wing alternative communities provided the 
intellectuals of the Right with a sense of collective identity and shared purpose. They reinforced and 
radicalized individual efforts to engage and emphasized certain daily experiences of intellectual life 
that would further separate the right-wing intellectual’s understanding of what it meant to be an 
intellectual from that of the Left.   
 As they had been during the Dreyfus Affair, Ligues remained a popular method of grouping 
like-minded supporters and focusing engagement for both the Left and Right. The Nouvelle Sorbonne 
debates saw the creation of oppositional ligues whose members either agreed on the need to protect 
classics and the humanities from German inspired reforms, like the Amis du Latin, or on the necessity 
of defending university reforms designed to bring scientific progress. On the side of the right-wing 
Ligue pour la Culture Française were found over thirty-six conservative academicians in addition to 
the right-wing engages Massis, de Tarde, Maurras, and right-wing activists Daudet, Drumont, and 
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Rochefort, but few universitaires.456 The Ligue released two manifests of its collective goals for 
education and its resentment of the Sorbonne reforms, yet it was rather vague in its plan for 
addressing these concerns and would be short lived. Although Massis recalled his invitation to join 
this Ligue as a turning point in his career, since it indicated recognition of his influence by the 
intellectuals of his camp, this Ligue could not claim the impact on intellectual collective identity that 
its partner in the Nouvelle Sorbonne crusade, the Ligue de l’Action Française, did.  
The AF was an extensive and multifaceted organization, even in the early years of the 
century, including two powerful journals, associated presses, a publishing house, and an influential 
network of cercles, youth groups, writers, political candidates, and activists. Yet, in 1905, its first 
method of grouping large numbers of adherents outside the collaborators of its small monthly revue 
was to form a Ligue. The Ligue was described by Maurras as the creation of a handful of men who 
wanted to create, in the larger body of followers and supporters, “a national sense, a national 
espirt…in this veritable intellectual desert.”457 The Ligue was therefore recognized as a powerful 
means of creating an intellectual environment, a community of like-minded peers, which would be 
favorable to the ideas and visions of the emergent Action Française. The ligue had its own siege, it 
own leadership including Vaugeois as president and Maurras as Vice President, and its own mission 
statement and pledge of support. These Ligue statements and written pledges publicized the values of 
royalism, nationalism, anti-republicanism, traditionalism, Catholicism, and anti-Semitism that would 
become identifying traits of the collective AF intellectual milieu.458 
The Action Française ligue would become the center of an extensive network on the 
intellectual Right spreading its influence beyond the limited royalist circle to the larger nationalist and 
traditionalist community. It would remain, however, closed and unwelcoming to the reformist and 
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internationalist intellectuals of the Left making it a segregated and polarized socio-professional 
network. Under its auspices, a collection of smaller ligues were created that were designed to help 
group and support the different types of adherents, both intellectual and non-intellectual, in the 
growing AF. These included the female organizations Dames de l’Action Française and the Jeunes 
Filles Royalistes, and the student organizations the militant Camelots du Roi and the Étudiants d’AF. 
There were also regional sections of the AF that formed their own local leadership, created their own 
regional journals, and nominated local leaders for the AF political campaigns. Other organizations 
were designed specifically as communities for right-wing intellectuals. The Cercle Fustel de 
Coulanges grouped those who advocated the teaching of nationalist history and united them through a 
journal and demonstrations on the anniversary of Fustel’s birth.459 The Cercle Proudhon, created in 
1911, attempted a short lived collaboration with Sorel’s syndicalists and united intellectuals interested 
in economic reform.460 Each of these smaller groups retained an affiliation with the AF while working 
to create smaller, AF friendly communities around its particular membership demographic. The 
network of support created by all of these interconnected sub-ligues provided a veritable intellectual 
and social world on the royalist Right where any concern from youth affairs to economic questions 
could be considered outside the confines of Left and Republican thought. 
The imagined communities created by manifests, and particularly on the Right, the enquête, 
were valuable for creating collective identity and shared purpose on the Right among intellectuals 
who might never share the same physical spaces. They were also a means to identify by name those 
intellectuals who identified with the collective community of the intellectual Right rather than the 
intellectual Left. The Enquête sur le monarchie was first published in the royalist Gazette de France 
in 1900.461 This series of questions on the viability of the monarchy and the decadence of the republic 
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was addressed to “philosophers and savants” who had “considered the French nationalist problem.”462 
Contributors to the enquete included intellectuals who were both supporters and opponents of 
monarchism but all of whom were “of the Right.” Letters by Barrès, Vaugeois, Lucien Moreau, 
Henry Bordeaux, Bainville, Montesquiou, Louis Dimier, and Sully Proudhomme provided the 
perception of an imagined intellectual community of shared values and aims which crossed 
generational and geographic barriers in support for a revival of nationalism. An important aspect of 
this enquête by Maurras was also the legitimacy that such powerful names in the world of letters 
provided for the right-wing venture. Even the reservations about monarchism that Barrès expressed 
could not outweigh the support that his contribution to the work provided the AF and the intellectual 
Right.  
The 1912 enquête by Agathon on the Jeunes gens d’aujourd’hui did not include the names of 
the young men who had supposedly contributed these reflections on their intellectual generation but 
its very ambiguity provided a certain sense of imagined community as well. By not including a list of 
names, Agathon was able to imply that the opinions he included in the work were those of all the 
French youth rather than simply his own vision. Such implied universality granted the right-wing 
intellectual model that Agathon was developing in these pages enormous legitimacy among the 
readers. In the post-war manifest that Massis created for Figaro, “Pour un parti de l’intelligence,” the 
same efforts at legitimization reappeared, although the fifty-four supporters this time included their 
signatures. Here the intellectuals of the right who sent in their signatures gave the appearance of an 
intellectual community brought together by their outrage. The manifest was not only a statement of 
shared values but a call for collective engagement and a tangible work of reconstruction. Although 
Massis clarified this was not a party in the normal political sense, it was a community of like-minded 
intellectuals who were “taking the part of intelligence” by defending their shared values and 
worldviews. And once again, the community was exclusively right-wing in nature. These enquêtes 
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and manifests therefore brought together a group of intellectuals of the Right, who were often 
separated geographically, creating a legitimate community of thought. 
Perhaps the most important intellectual communities on the Right, and the most segregated, 
were those that were built around the revue. The intellectuals of the Right increasingly tended toward 
journalistic and literary professions rather than university professorships or state functions. Often, 
when they did take this academic path, they felt excluded by the republican and socialist hegemony 
there. Independent revues, therefore, became one of their most powerful tools for the collective 
expression of their oppositional values.463 The revue was also a place to make professional 
connections with other writers and even with publishers since the revue either utilized a publisher 
who was sympathetic to its values or created a press of its own. For example, Action Française 
writers were often published by its own press the Nouvelle Librarie Nationale or by sympathetic 
presses like Fayard and Flammarion.464 The importance of the revue to the intellectual Right was 
perhaps best seen in the Action Française. The movement began with the little semi-monthly, gray-
covered revue that was published from 1899-1908. However, Maurras and the team recognized that in 
order to expand the influence and legitimacy of their movement they would need access to a daily 
journal. After a brief attempt to buy La Libre Parole, the team began its daily Action Française in 
Spring 1908 while retaining the monthly revue. These revues were the nucleus of its operation, the 
means of propaganda for its activities and its ideas, and the center of the intellectual and social 
community that it was beginning to build.  
 
463 There were a large number of right-wing intellectual revues during the period 1910-1920 but those 
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of these larger revues because of their competition for similar readers, but the general sense of a shared mission 
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Journal and revue teams and offices provided a space for fraternization among contributors 
and often daily exposure to like-minded writers. These teams often developed into, or out of, strong 
personal friendships whose ties extended beyond the workplace. It was not uncommon for teams to 
gather at nearby cafes or restaurants to continue discussion of an issue or even an intellectual debate 
that had begun in the offices. AF journalists like Leon Daudet recalled meetings after hours in the 
home of Maurras where writers would sit around a table “writing a tract or poster while the secretary 
Louis Gonnet took notes and led the debate on useful documents.”465 It was here, he wrote, that he 
had the chance to meet and share ideas with Montesquiou, Bainville, Moreau, Dimier, Pujo, Lasserre 
and others who were on the directing committee of the Action Française. “All these men,” Daudet 
marveled, “came from different places including the university, the military, and the literary worlds, 
but all agreed and came together around the thought of Maurras.”466 A shared sense of intellectual 
purpose and values combined with the sociability provided by such revue team interactions yielded, 
as Daudet testified, a new sense of intellectual unity, community, and collective identity as 
Maurrassian intellectuals.  
Maurras himself spoke of the personal connection that had initiated the revue and which 
continued to extend to the friends who were brought into write for it as it expanded. He wrote in his 
Au Signe de Flore of the early meeting of friends Vaugeois, Pujo, Bainville, and Moreau and the 
determination that each shared to construct an intellectual movement to counter Republican and Left 
dominance. He had met Moreau at the Revue encyclopedique where the two of them had felt isolated 
by the Dreyfusards and frustrated that their opinions were ignored. He had then met Syveton through 
a school friend and had from there been introduced to others like Dausset and Vaugeois.467 This 
network of friends would continue, from that point on, to bring in writers and thinkers from an ever 
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expanding web of personal and professional connections. Early meetings were held in committee 
members’ homes, in Café Flore, or in café Voltaire where official journal business was seconded only 
by intellectual and political discussions akin to a salon which drew crowds of students and aspiring 
writers. It was in this way, Maurras wrote, that the AF had “composed in our nation a veritable circle 
of ardent intellectual friendships.”468 The network created by these socio-professional relationships 
remained a right-wing, if not always monarchist, community that left-wing intellectuals had no 
interest in joining.  
The post-war revue team of Revue Universelle, directed by Bainville and Massis, would 
experience the same sort of professional networking, team camaraderie, and collective identity. 
Massis recalled fondly, for example, starting the Revue Universelle in 1920 with Jacques Bainville. 
They “shared a common office…where they met each Monday” and where Massis wrote he had the 
“marvelous privilege of working in the presence of Bainville for sixteen years.”469 Here at the RU,
was created “a haven for conservative-nationalist, traditionalist, and reactionary writers” where ideas 
could be expressed freely without repression, friendships formed, and mentoring offered.470 In 
particular, the RU opened itself to the emerging names of the Jeune droite and the non-conformist 
circles of the inter-war years as a sort of training ground. Here writers like Maulnier, Benjamin, and 
Massis’ particular protégée, Robert Brasillach were introduced to nationalist, anti-international, anti-
communist, and occasionally anti-Semitic journalism.471 
Massis and Bainville did not fail to recognize the influence that their revue would have on the 
effort of intellectual community building and mentoring on the Right. In their first issue where they 
outlined their program, they extolled these benefits writing “The moment is come to realize the idea 
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which rallied the signers of the manifesto [Pour un parti de l’intelligence] by giving to writers of the 
intellectual and national renaissance the means to put these principles to work. This method is 
furnished by a general revue...this organ will federate all the intellectual elements which on all the 
points of the globe are devoted to safeguarding civilization.”472 The “destiny” of the Revue, they 
continued, was to spread relationships between groups devoted to the cause of the mind which too 
often ignored one another. Here, “French patriots,” could enter into contact with one another, unite, 
and realize their alliance. In coming together they would “know themselves and each other better” 
and “take consciousness of their force” in order to increase the “effectiveness of their action.”473
Only, they concluded, when “all those who think the same way come together and collaborate” would 
the “just ideas” they shared triumph. It was this aim of intellectual community and fraternity, of 
shared purpose, of effective engagement, and of a united front against the “forces of intellectual 
dissolution” on the Left that helped build these right-wing intellectual communities and contributed to 
a distinctive collective identity on the Right. 
Whether they were uniting in ligues, organizations and cercles, manifests and enquetes, or 
revue teams, the intellectuals of the extreme Right sought to form communities and socio-
professional networks, separate from those of the dominant Left, where their own, right-wing values 
and engagements could be nurtured. Association with these larger communities led the intellectuals of 
the Right to identify themselves as part of a greater collectivity separate from the Left and marked 
them as “other” in the eyes of the Left. But segregated spaces and networks were not the only 
influence on right-wing collective identity. Exclusion from the communities of the Center and Left 
and segregation in exclusively right-wing communities tended to both highlight existing differences 
in the daily experience of intellectual life and create new ones.  
 




The Right-Wing Intellectual Experience 
The reformist universitaire and the traditionalist litterateur and journalist not only formed 
communities in different spaces and networks with different ties, they also experienced the daily 
practice of being an intellectual differently. This different experience of daily intellectual life and 
practice was in part a result of their different relationships to the important French institutions of the 
Government, the Church, and the University.  
The pre-war Sorbonne debates and even, to some extent the post-war debates over intellectual 
internationalism, displayed the abyss in the Right and Left wing intellectuals relationship with the 
State. In contrast to the Republican and left-wing intellectuals’ symbiotic relationship to the Third 
Regime and the ideals of democratic republicanism, the intellectual of the Right would experience 
intellectual life as an outsider and opponent of this regime. Maurras would explain his very different 
conception of the only true relationship between the intellectual and the State in the first line of one of 
his chronicle of right-wing intellectual experience. “This book,” the line read, “is a simple chronicle 
of our moral and mental resistance [to the State] before the war of 1914.”474 The intellectual of the 
Right had already felt excluded, repressed, and even persecuted by the dominant intellectual powers 
of the Republic and their socialist allies during the Affair. The changing nature of the university 
would make them feel their values were excluded and marginalized in one of the most important 
institutions of the Republic. A speech for the youth of the Latin Quarter in 1913 lamented this 
obstacle to AF universitaires saying, “our [AF] universitaires do not occupy the official posts but on 
the contrary have been hunted down and excluded from it by the republican government.”475 The 
engagement of the intellectual of the Right would therefore be a force of opposition and resistance to 
what Maurras called the “official world” of the Center and Left. For years, Maurras wrote, he and the 
AF had carried out this “reaction, always private, always exterior and hostile to the official world, 
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treated by this official world as an enemy.” Being an intellectual of the Right, according to the 
Maurrassian model, meant being a “reactionary” whose experience of engagement was one of 
opposition, repression, and external critique.476 
The Right’s oppositional relationship to the Republic would be related to its more 
sympathetic relationship to the Catholic Church. Traditionalists of the Right tended to appreciate the 
order, stability, social morality, and historical tradition of the Church. It was the Right that opposed 
the regime’s separation of Church and State and defended the right of parents to send their children to 
religious schools instead of the secular public schools of the State. The Catholic Church, however, 
found its staunchest allies in the intellectual milieu in the Action Française and Charles Maurras.477
The royalists believed the Church was an important source of French national identity, social 
tradition, public order, and education. The AF would take the lead in defending both catholic 
universitaires and instruction in religious topics. The Thalamas affair was their most emblematic 
engagement in favor of religious instruction. In 1908, AF intellectuals and students protested the 
presence at the Sorbonne of lycée professor Thalamas who had suggested in his course that Joan of 
Arc’s mission was not divinely inspired.478 In contrast with the intellectuals of the Left who believed 
being an intellectual meant separating one’s irrational faith from intellectual life, the intellectuals of 
the Right found inspiration for their intellectual life and engagement in the tradition, order, history, 
and faith of the Church and its educators.  
The most important distinction in intellectual experience during the Nouvelle Sorbonne 
debates and immediate postwar years would be based on the very different relationships that the 
intellectuals of the Right and Left had to the university system. The university was dominated by the 
Republican and left-wing reformers during the years 1910-1920 and was believed to be a hostile 
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environment by the few intellectuals of the Right who took this professional path. Right-wing 
intellectuals increasingly found their ideas, their courses, their texts, and even their positions excluded 
from the new Sorbonne and the mentoring possibilities of the classroom. Those intellectuals of the 
Right who engaged most effectively in the debates were those like Massis and Maurras who were not 
confined by the university setting but rather had taken the path of independent men of letters. Even 
former professors like Lasserre broke from the confines of the Republican university in order to 
publish their ideas in journals like the Action Française and later in books published by the AF firm. 
This professional tendency toward the life of the journalist and litterateur dramatically altered the 
intellectual practices of the Right from those of the universitaire Left. It provided a different 
professional focus, and most importantly for this time period and series of debates, a different strategy 
of mentorship. 
Men of letters like Maurras and Massis had a different daily experience of intellectual 
engagement because their professional focus was on the contribution to and often the direction of a 
revue instead of classroom lecturing and research. Like Brunetiere, Maurras had begun his 
journalistic and literary career without attending the university and had built a reputation and network 
of journal columns for himself at an early age. He was therefore well prepared by the turn of the 
century to launch his own revue and eventually to write daily articles for the journal while continuing 
to juggle the responsibilities of the AF movement. Massis had begun contributing to influential 
journals like Figaro and L’Echo de Paris while still in school and by age twenty-six had already 
taken over direction or editorship of three respected literary revues.479 Their professional focus was 
on journalism and literary activity and so their primary experience of political engagement and 
influence was, at least initially, through this medium. Although the Republicans and the Left made 
use of journalism for their defense of reform and later for their defense of internationalism, even these 
outlets were often linked to their primary life and focus as universitaires. The journals that they 
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dominated were most often pedagogical journals,480 and their larger works were often written for use 
as university texts. The majority of the reformists’ engagement was related in some way to the 
university, therefore, while that of the Right was influenced more by the world of journalism and 
literature.  
These different professional trajectories also led to different practices of mentorship between 
the Left and Right. While the Left enjoyed the benefit of the automatic prestige attached to the 
University and the easy access to the minds of the youth, the Right had to be more strategic and more 
focused on gaining student followers. Massis has been recognized by many of the non-conformist and 
fascist sympathizing intellectuals of the inter-war years as one of their most valuable mentors. His 
mentorship was not offered through the classroom but rather through personal relationships made 
with individual students one at a time. Brasillach recalled walking with Massis in the avenues around 
the ENS and speaking of political matters in their student turnes or at the Deux Magots café instead 
of attending the popular socialist circle of Lucien Herr. Both he and Maulnier recalled recognizing 
Massis as a voice of the disaffected youth of their own generation, but who could offer guidance. 
“Massis found himself among us, or us around him,” Maulnier wrote, “we considered him naturally 
as a guide since he knew that which we had to do.”481 Brasillach and Maulnier would join other right-
wing youth in collaborated in the small revues that Massis had created, such as 1933, as training 
revues for emerging right-wing talent. Massis would introduce those who were successful in these 
preparatory journals to the larger organs like the AF and RU or help critique their literary works and 
introduce them to publishers. Massis was therefore as dedicated as any professor to the students he 
had taken under his wing. He simply found different ways to ingratiate himself with the youth and to 
offer them guidance and professional support.  
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The influence of Massis was remarkable considering he did not have a classroom of students 
at his disposal. Yet it cannot compare with the machinery of youth mentorship and propaganda which 
was the Action Française. The AF had connected with the youth of the Latin Quarter at the start of the 
century and worked constantly to retain and expand its influence over their thought and activity. 
Various strategies were implemented ranging from the smaller, intellectually focused student journals 
like L’étudiant francais to the massive youth movements like the Camelots du roi and the Étudiants 
d’AF. These youth organizations were not small affairs of individual mentoring but rather massive 
bodies of students with their own leadership, meetings, and forms of engagement. The youth were not 
always interested in the finer points of right-wing doctrine but the AF goal was to exert influence over 
the political mobilization of the mass body of the youth. This was accomplished by organizing events 
for hundreds of AF students like Banquets de la Classe for all the AF youth before the start of the 
school year where speakers reminded the youth of the left-wing corruption of their schools,482 annual 
processions to the statue of Joan of Arc,483 Camelots fetes with speeches, music, and political rallies, 
and excursions to property in Neuilly for sporting events.484 In return, the youth were called upon to 
engage themselves in the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates by provoking street demonstrations against 
Thalamas and disrupting reformists’ lectures.485 
Perhaps the most significant testimony to the efforts of the AF to mentor the next generation 
of intellectuals in right-wing identity was the creation in 1906 of the Institut d’Action Française. This 
Institut had been devised by AF leaders at one of their fortnightly dinners at the Boeuf à la Mode 
where discussion had focused on efforts to mentor the student population in the ideas of the AF 
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outside the confines of the republican and socialist University.486 The general purpose of the Institut 
was described at its tenth anniversary as “the intellectual reform of our nation misled fifty years ago 
by the false principles of the Revolution.” The mission of its professors was “to carry to the French 
nation all the general light, all the clarification of principles of which these men dispose who have for 
the past fifteen years oriented all their reflections, consecrated all their studies, each in his own 
sphere, to the restoration of the intelligence of the patrie.”487 The Institut was originally organized 
around four chairs named for figures admired by the AF like Comte and Barrès with professors such 
as Maurras, Montesquieu, Dimier, and Moreau providing a series of seven to ten lectures. 488 It 
welcomed the general public as well as students and so countered the influence of the already 
faltering left-wing universities populaires as well as the Sorbonne. It also admitted left-wing students 
whom Vaugeois claimed were not inherently incapable of coming to integral nationalism, just less 
prepared than their right-wing peers who had already been “initiated to the royalist political truth 
which we explain.”489 The Institut was therefore a strategically designed, broad scale counter-
influence to the mentoring provided by the University. Even though they shared the basic practice of 
lecturing, the intellectuals of the Right who participated in the Institut had a very different mentoring 
experience from the universitaires of the Left. 
The intellectual of the Right therefore could be said to have experienced intellectual life 
differently than his right-wing peers and therefore to have conceived of his role, responsibility, and 
intellectual activity differently. His alternative values and views led to different relationships to the 
Republican government and the Church, to the University and world of journalism, and most 
importantly to the youth he struggled to mentor. His practices and strategies for engagement, though 
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sharing the same goals of political persuasion and social guidance as the engaged intellectual of the 
Left, were, as a result, distinctive and separate from those of his opponents. These different 
experiences and intellectual practices both necessitated and reinforced the separation in physical 
spaces and networks between Left and Right wing intellectual communities.  
 
The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Nouvelle Sorbonne Debates  
 Massis and Maurras were instrumental in elaborating the right-wing model of intellectual 
identity during the decade 1910-1920. During these years, thinkers of the Right perceived their 
values, leaders, and intellectual authority to be excluded increasingly not only from a specific debate 
like that of the Dreyfus Affair, but also from the republican university system and the transmission of 
intellectual values to the French youth. Massis, Maurras, and the intellectual leaders of the debates 
responded to this increased hegemony over intellectual identity and authority by helping to legitimize 
an alternative to the university and a distinctly right-wing model of engagement. Although they would 
introduce new programs and political positions like monarchism to the intellectual world of the Right, 
they would also build on the foundation of the very separate intellectual communities and experiences 
created by their predecessors during the Dreyfus Affair. Most importantly, they continued the 
attitudes, relationships, and essential values of engagement that increasingly served to identify the 
intellectuals of the Right. Massis and Maurras both believed that they and their peers on the Right 
were marginalized and excluded from the mentorship of French youth in the university system by the 
Nouvelle Sorbonne reforms. They resented this ostracism of their right-wing values in one of the 
most significant forums for the formation of both intellectuals and the public understanding of 
intellectual identity. Both men felt obligated to legitimize their own concept of intellectual identity 
before ever entering into the specific debates on education. They devoted much energy to strategies to 
delegitimize the ideas, programs, and reforms of the Republic and the Left and present their own 
model as the choice of the progressive youth. This added element of their engagement in the debates 
gave them a different mentality of engagement than their peers on the Left. Both Massis and Maurras 
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were also spokesmen for a distinctly right-wing set of intellectual values including classicism, elitism, 
realism, and nationalism both before and after World War I. These values would isolate them from 
the programs of engagement on the Left that valued scientific modernism, egalitarianism, universal 
rationalism, and internationalism. The distinctive values of the Right had important implications for 
right-wing concepts of intellectual responsibility and role that would mark them, according to the 
Left, as anti-intellectual. The Left identified the intellectual as the erudite, the savant, and the 
universitaire whose duty was to promote international cultural exchange, scientific progress, and the 
democratization of education. In contrast, the Right identified the intellectual as the man of letters, 
journalist, or independent educator whose duty was to preserve the classical tradition of Western 
civilization, promote cultural nationalism, and train the intellectual elite of France. The abyss that was 
revealed between Right and Left concepts of engagement, intellectual values, and the role and 
responsibility of the educator during the Sorbonne debates and the postwar discussion of mobilization 
necessitated separate, segregated intellectual communities. In the network of intellectual communities 
created by the extreme Right, intellectuals like Massis and Maurras clarified their ideas and amplified 
the effectiveness of their individual engagement. The professional, personal, and mentoring 
relationships formed among like-minded peers in these separate communities gave them a sense of 
collective identification with the intellectual Right. The distinctive relationship of this collective 
community of the intellectual Right with the government, the church, and the university would reveal 
underlying differences, and create new ones, in the daily experience of intellectual life on the Right. 
All together, these factors led to the formation of a very different concept of intellectual identity on 
the Right than that on the Left. The model of identity initiated during the Dreyfus Affair and 
continued during the decade 1910-1920 would reappear during the interwar years of the 1930s when 




THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL FASCISM AND COMMUNISM: 1930-1939 
 
The debates over the Nouvelle Sorbonne and the threat of international influence revealed, 
once more, the divisions in values and worldviews that separated politically engaged thinkers into two 
opposed camps. Those thinkers who came to be recognized as “of the Right” in these years shared 
certain fundamental intellectual values like realism, nationalism, and classicism, as well as common 
intellectual communities and practices. Most importantly, they identified themselves as a collective 
community of engaged thinkers who were ostracized from the university and the image of the 
intellectual by those who were “of the Republic” and “of the Left.” This division in intellectual values 
and identities would intensify during the inter-war years as international pressures raised the stakes of 
intellectual engagement. The new international alternatives of fascism and communism would lead 
more thinkers to engage than ever before and would produce unrivaled “cleavages within French 
intellectual society.”490 The new generation’s increasing frustration with the failures of the Republic, 
and of the existing political alternatives to it, would cause a significant evolution in many of the 
values and communities of both the intellectual Right and Left. However, it would not change the 
perceived hegemony of the Left, the resentment felt by the intellectuals of the Right, nor the Right’s 
desire to legitimize and differentiate their intellectual identities from the model of intellectual 
engagement on the Left. With the rise of the Popular Front and the new anti-fascist blocs, the 
intellectual Right perceived the hegemony of the Left to be even more widespread and believed itself 
to be excluded not only from the university, but from French public affairs in general. In response, 
they would expand their crusade to include not only the reeducation of the youth but also the 
development of a new socio-political vision for France.  
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 In the decade between the debates over demobilization of intelligence in 1919 and the new 
wave of engagement in the 1930s, the intellectual Right and Left continued to struggle for control of 
the title and role of the intellectual. Occasional calls to engage, like the intellectual debate over the 
1925 Rif war in Morocco, revealed the continuing resentment on the Right of the perceived 
hegemony of the Left. In 1925, the intellectuals of Humanité, Clarté, and Europe supported the Rif 
insurgency through a petition that claimed to speak for all intellectuals. Resentful of this portrayal, the 
Right responded with its own petition supporting the French military presence in North Africa. “As 
with the responses to the Dreyfusard peititons and the reply to Rolland’s 1919 text, the signatories of 
this open letter denied the right to the signatories of Barbusse’s text to speak on behalf of all French 
intellectuals.”491 
This conflict over intellectual authority and the right to speak for France would reemerge in 
the 1930s. Although the Wall Street crash would cause increasing frustration with the liberal Republic 
as early as 1931, the crisis that intellectuals of both the Left and Right identified as the incentive for 
their respective engagement was the Stavisky scandal of 1934 and the resulting February 6 riots. 
Because the majority of those killed in the riots were right-wing activists from the Action Française 
and Croix de Feu, the riots were quickly associated with the movements of the extreme Right.  They 
were countered by the first combined protest of the socialist and communist Left on February 12. The 
association of the riots of February 6 with the influence of fascism would collapse the earlier tripartite 
division between fascism, communism, and republicanism and create instead the dual camps of 
fascism and anti-fascism.492 The Stavisky scandal and February 6 riot was the “turning point in 
political polarization” for many intellectuals since the Right found justification for its anti-
Republicanism, and the Republic and Left believed it had uncovered a new fascist force in right-wing 
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France that necessitated a united opposition from the “anti-fascist” Left.493 Fascism was much more 
threatening to the intellectual Left than either the classicism and nationalism of the Nouvelle 
Sorbonne era or the anti-Dreyfusism of the turn of the century. It would therefore inspire a more 
vocal and virulent engagement by the Left and a more passionate ostracism of the “fascist” Right 
from the intellectual milieu. 
 The engagement prompted by the Stavisky scandal reflected the intellectuals’ larger 
international concerns. On the Right, intellectuals were uneasy about the increasing attraction of the 
PCF for internationalist intellectuals and the infusion of communism into French affairs under the 
cover of anti-fascism. In 1932, the Comintern had altered its policy on proletarian culture in order to 
woo the intellectual milieu to its side and away from the fascist temptation. By 1933, movements 
created by intellectuals and approved by the communist party like the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement, 
the AEAR, and the CVIA capitalized on the broad appeal of “anti-fascism” for intellectuals of both 
the Republic and the various parties of the Left. By joining in the anti-fascist cause, even moderates 
like Gide were drawn into increasingly polarized active engagement. On the Left, intellectuals were 
disturbed by the successes of Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, and Franco in Spain. They feared 
that the new generation of non-conformist intellectuals, who had begun to distance themselves from 
the inactivity of the Action Française, would see foreign fascism as a political alternative for France. 
New militant groups like the Croix de Feu and revues like Je Suis Partout and Gringoire radicalized 
the intellectual Right and provided a threatening forum for opposition to the republic and extreme 
Left. 
These tensions and fears in the intellectual community would turn into mass active 
engagement when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935. Competing claims over the role of the intellectual 
were quick to appear as intellectuals of the Right signed a manifest written by Massis and entitled 
“Un mainfeste d’intellectuels français pour la défense de l’Occident” and intellectuals of the Left 
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responded with a manifest claiming to be the “true representatives of the French intelligentsia.”494 
Intellectual divisions between the fascist sympathizing Right and the anti-fascist Left would continue 
with debates over French involvement in the Spanish Civil war and appeasement of Germany at 
Munich.    
The confrontation of the intellectuals over the affairs of Europe was mirrored on the national 
level by their battles over the French Popular Front. A 1935 shift in Comintern policy encouraged the 
anti-fascist coalition of communists and socialists and even their alliance with the Radicals. This 
policy of cooperation tilted the balance of power in the French government to the favor of the new 
Left coalition and put the government of Leon Blum in power in 1936. The Popular Front made itself 
the government of the anti-fascist intellectuals by giving them significant roles as government 
advisors and emphasizing cultural as well as social and economic change. All of this was intended to 
increase its legitimacy by garnering the support of anti-fascist intellectuals from all parties of the 
Left.495 While the Popular Front rallied the intellectuals of the Republic and the Left, its existence 
also gave new unity, strength, and purpose to the excluded intellectuals of the Right. They saw the 
Front as proof of a long-standing alliance between the republican Center and socialist or communist 
extreme Left that intentionally excluded the Right from public affairs.496 Due to the leadership of 
Leon Blum, the Popular Front also sparked a renewal of right-wing anti-Semitism, the intensity of 
which had not been seen since the Dreyfus Affair. When Blum was attacked in 1936 by the Camelots, 
all extreme-right wing groups were banned by the government. This repression was interpreted as 
validation of the Right’s perception of left-wing dominance not only in the university, but in 
governmental and public affairs as a whole. The victory of the Popular Front, ironically, became the 
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incentive for many thinkers of the Right to become active, engaged intellectuals and for the creation 
of a new network of right-wing communities, such as the Parti Populaire Français, that could provide 
a socio-political alternative for the increasingly ostracized intellectual of the Right.  
During the Dreyfus Affair and Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, only a vocal minority had chosen 
to engage in public affairs as intellectuals. In the interwar decade of the 1930s, engagement became 
the new way of life for the majority of French academics, savants, and men of letters. Abstention 
from engagement, in the name of disinterested art or ivory tower academicism, was no longer a 
respected choice for the educated elite. Responsible use of one’s talent and intelligence now 
demanded active engagement either against communism or against fascism. In time, even 
engagement in favor of the Third Republic and status quo politics, instead of the extreme alternatives, 
came to be seen as abstention and “intellectuals of the center” became increasingly rare.497 The anti-
fascism and anti-communism of the intellectual extremists, therefore, became the mutually exclusive, 
identifying traits of the two camps and created, once more, an “unbreachable abyss” between the 
intellectuals of the Right and Left.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE 1930S: ANTI-FASCIST 
INTELLECTUAL VALUES 
 
The emergent forces of communism and fascism were met with different reactions by the 
intellectuals formerly identified as “of the Republic” or “of the Left.” Some chose to retain their 
liberal values while expressing distant sympathy for the communist cause while others believed their 
values had been realized in the USSR and engaged fully as committed party intellectuals. Naturally 
the intellectual Right perceived the entire spectrum of these responses as a threat to their own values 
and grouped them all under the category of “intellectual bolshevism.” Although this was a strategic 
and emotional reaction by the intellectual Right, there was some truth to the right-wing perception of 
a bloc of intellectuals united by their anti-fascism against the Right. The model of intellectual identity 
created by the Center and Left during the 1930s acknowledged both the diversity that existed in 
approaches to the international situation as well as the mentality of engagement and intellectual 
values that united them against the alternative model on the Right.  
The intellectuals of the anti-Fascist Left maintained the confident mentality of engagement 
that had separated their camp from the resentful Right since the Affair. Despite the popularity of the 
Action Française in the 1920s, the intellectual Left would continue to benefit from the intellectual 
authority and legitimacy of their internationalist and reformist predecessors.498 They wisely presented 
their new crusade against fascism and, for some, in favor of the USSR, as a continuation of the 
universalist, Enlightenment ideals associated with the intellectual since the Dreyfus Affair. While 
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maintaining their dominance in the university, they added a new monopoly over political affairs when 
the Popular Front government solicited their involvement. The State’s identification of Popular Front 
supporters as the intellectual representatives of France gave them significant cultural capital in their 
effort to dominate the role of the intellectual. Most importantly, the principle of anti-fascism that 
united the diverse elements of the Popular Front became synonymous with intellectual responsibility 
and moral authority. The Left effectively characterized both Italian Fascism and German Nazism as a 
menace to the stability of republican France and to French cultural and intellectual values.499 By 
labeling the programs and values of their opponents on the monarchist, nationalist, or non-conformist 
Right as “fascist,” and identifying themselves and their various programs and values as “anti-fascist,” 
the Left created a division between the legitimate intellectuals of the Left and the “anti-intellectual 
fascists” of the Right.  
The moral superiority, governmental approbation, and inherited authority of the anti-fascist 
Left gave it a certain stability and confidence in its engagement that would not be shared by the Right. 
They would confidently identify themselves as “the true representatives of the French intelligentsia” 
with little concern that the public would question this assertion.500 Although the intellectual Left was 
concerned about the influence of foreign fascism, it did not express any feelings of powerlessness, 
exclusion, repression, or marginalization. They did not devote their engagement to denouncing their 
opponents’ monopoly on intelligence as the intellectuals of the Right would. They displayed no 
compulsion to first legitimize themselves or their positions as intellectually viable before engaging in 
public debate.501 They were not preoccupied with the possibility of State suppression of their 
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intellectual communities or with the existence of a hegemonic alliance between the regime and their 
intellectual opponents. And, although the communist element might call for a proletarian revolution 
against the bourgeois republic, even the communists did not identify themselves as isolated or 
excluded from intellectual influence, especially during the Popular Front. Rather than viewing their 
engagement as that of the oppressed, minority, isolated, opposition, as the Right did, the Left saw 
itself as the political avant garde of a regime that agreed with it on the fundamental goal of anti-
fascism.  
The values and worldviews identified during the 1930s as “anti-fascist” would unite what was 
otherwise a diverse collection of thinkers and parties ranging from liberal republican Radicals to 
SFIO socialists to PCF communists. Although they may have been divided internally on many 
matters,502 their common rejection of the “fascist” thinkers, positions, and cultural values of the 
extreme Right would lead them to work together as a collective to exclude the intellectual Right from 
public influence. Their shared values of universal abstraction, internationalism, and egalitarianism 
would continue the left-wing and republican intellectual tradition of the previous decades while 
evolving in scope to counter the new right-wing values associated with fascism.503 
Although the intellectual Left continued to see belief in universal abstractions as essential to 
intellectual identity, the new focus in the 1930s would not be the Dreyfusards’ “Truth and Justice,” 
but the abstract ideas of Revolution and the People. Themes of revolution and the People would 
distinguish the discourse of the intellectual Left from the Right. The Left was especially eager to 
monopolize plans for the 150th anniversary of the Revolution so that the Right could not effectively 
use the term “Revolution” for their own camp.504 Liberal intellectual Alain’s “Message au Peuple” 
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was an effort to associate his calls for democratic reform with the abstract concept of the French 
People.505 The abstract concept of revolution also attracted those of the Left like André Gide to the 
communist dominated anti-fascist communities. In order to appeal to a broad spectrum of left-wing 
intellectuals, the communist experiment was portrayed by the Soviets and the PCF as a continuation 
of the general, universal, enlightenment aims of social revolution, scientific progress, individualism, 
and egalitarianism. “Revolution” in its most generic and universal sense was used as a theme to unite 
intellectuals who identified with the traditionally left-wing ideals of the French revolution with the 
intellectuals who identified with the new aims of the communist revolution. The communist inspired 
Association des Ecrivains et Artistes révolutionaires (AEAR) would attract large numbers of non-
communist intellectuals of the Left based on this shared association of intellectual responsibility with 
the universal values associated with revolution and the people.  
On the more extreme end of the left wing, PCF intellectuals like Paul Nizan, André Malraux, 
Vaillant-Couturier, and Aragon would advocate the application of the soviet model of Revolution and 
concept of the People to the French political field.506 These PCF intellectuals were a minority on the 
engaged Left, but they spearheaded the anti-fascist engagement and so dominated the image of the 
intellectual more than their numbers might suggest. Unlike those on the Left like Gide who admired 
the Soviet system but did not recommend its imitation in France, the party intellectuals saw 
communist revolution and proletarian dictatorship as abstract truths that were universally applicable. 
In this way, although Aragon and Nizan both claimed to be replacing ivory tower intellectualism with 
a new activism, they continued to advocate the universalist conception of an international humanity 
and abstract political truths that were independent of time and place. The extreme Right saw the 
PCF’s fascination with a foreign, generic concept of revolution, their image of the People as divorced 
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from any national or ethnic ties, and their belief that these abstractions could be applied to the French 
circumstance as proof of a continued left-wing disconnection from French reality.  
This continuing devotion to abstract universals on the Left would impact the Left’s concept 
of role and responsibility and separate it from the image conceived by the Right. The intellectual of 
the Left increasingly saw his duty as an intellectual to be the awakening of “the People”507 and the 
advocacy of revolutionary social change. The duty of the intellectual, Nizan wrote, was to “serve the 
revolution with their pens by waking the minds of the masses.”508 A few PCF intellectuals like 
Aragon would extend the idea of popular education in revolution to include socialist realism. This 
approach to literature emphasized proletarian-friendly themes and use of language and style that 
could be understood by the masses. The PCF intellectuals in particular tended to identify the new role 
of the intellectual as that of the “active revolutionary” and “party member” rather than the university 
educator or social commentator. Intellectuals were to follow the revolutionary path dictated by Marx 
by putting an end to social injustices, destroying the old bourgeois social and intellectual apparatus, 
and working alongside the workers in response to their needs. Those like Gide and Alain, who were 
sympathetic to the PCF but eschewed party membership as detrimental to the independence of the 
intellectual, still saw participation in anti-fascist and communist inspired intellectual endeavors like 
the CVIA and AEAR congresses as essential to responsible intellectual behavior.  
The Left also believed the legitimate intellectual was a proponent of social egalitarianism. 
This shared value, and its association with anti-fascism, would envelop positions ranging from liberal 
visions of republican fraternity among the classes to communist visions of class conflict and social 
reorganization. Alain warned that the essence of France was found in the guarantee of the “precious 
equality of persons” that was threatened by attacks on individual liberties in Germany and Italy. He 
chastised those who “even among our friends” were now discarding liberty and equality as “old idols” 
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in favor of new, and, he insinuated, un-French, alternatives.509 Those of the Left who were more 
sympathetic to communism, like Gide, closely identified intellectual identity with the value of 
egalitarianism. As a member of the intellectual and economic elite, Gide was plagued by intense guilt 
and sought to assuage his conscience by rescuing the working class.510 He believed the communist 
promise of cultural and moral enlightenment for the working class would achieve the left-wing goal 
of an end to working class privation and material inequalities. It was, in part, his devotion to social 
egalitarianism that would attract him to the USSR where, he was convinced, all inequalities had been 
erased. PCF intellectuals Nizan, Malraux, Paul Vaillant-Couturier and Aragon shared Gide’s sense of 
guilt and “class treason” that came with escaping the working class by means of their higher 
education. The intellectual, according to the PCF, could never be part of the honored proletariat since 
he was relegated by birth and education to the shameful institution of the bourgeoisie. He could, 
however, redeem himself by actively promoting social homogenization: working in conjunction with 
the masses, writing for and about the working class, and supporting the idea of class conflict and 
struggle.511 Alain, Gide, and PCF intellectuals like Aragon would all extend their engagement against 
social inequality beyond the hexagon to a “condemnation of all colonialism without reservation,” 
particularly the colonialism of the fascist powers.512 This anti-imperialism, particularly during the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia, would be cited by both the intellectual Left and Right as a clear 
indication of the abyss between the two camps. 
This value of egalitarianism also influenced the Left’s expectation of intellectual behavior. 
Despite internal differences on the place of the proles, all intellectuals of the Left identified the role of 
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the intellectual as the “herald of progress for the masses.”513 Alain’s most prominent engagement was 
the construction of the manifest that would begin the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascists 
(CVIA); a manifest entitled “Aux Travailleurs.” This document envisioned the left-wing intellectual 
as the “comrade” and “partner” of the worker in the struggle against fascism.514 The intellectual’s 
responsibility was to form this “intimate liaison” with his working class brothers in order to actively 
promote the social egalitarianism essential to a reformed Republic and the battle against fascism. 
Among the PCF intellectuals, egalitarianism took on anti-republican tones in addition to anti-fascist 
ones. Vaillant-Couturier made it clear in his program for the AEAR that the role of these intellectuals 
was to become “the little group among the ruling class that detaches itself from this class in order to 
join itself to the revolutionary class to whom the future belongs.”515 They were to be “social 
revolutionaries” who aided in the inevitable collapse of the bourgeois class and the ascendancy of the 
proles.516 Although some fascist sympathizers of the extreme Right, especially in the PPF, would 
promote an image of the intellectual as the guide and partner of the people, they would be quick to 
differentiate their vision of the role of the intellectual from that outlined by the Left.  
The left-wing value of social egalitarianism was also linked to the continued intellectual 
value of internationalism. Republicans, socialists, and communists could agree on a vision of man as 
a universal abstraction, unfettered by national or racial particularities. Republicans continued to 
defend the idea of the international rights of man while communist intellectuals promoted the related 
idea of the fraternity of the international working class. In sharp contrast with the extreme Right, the 
Left increasingly devalued the idea of national culture, enracinement, and biological racism in favor 
of internationalist, cosmopolitan worldviews and concepts of culture and intelligence. Gide 
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summarized the aims of the anti-fascist International Writers Congress for the Defense of Culture by 
saying, “we must begin with the idea that this culture which we seek to defend is the sum of the 
particular cultures of each nation… that it is international.”517 This internationalist view of “culture” 
would be emphasized, by both the Left and Right, as a distinguishing characteristic that separated the 
intellectuals of the Left and their program of engagement from those of the Right. According to the 
intellectual of the Left, one “can be deeply internationalist while remaining deeply French.”518 In 
contrast, the intellectual of the Right found the two identities mutually exclusive. Even when 
borrowing elements from Nazism, Rexism, or Italian Fascism, the intellectual of the Right 
emphasized the French foundations of the ideas or the alterations necessary to adapt it to French 
circumstances.  
Internationalism would also distinguish the practice of engagement on the Left. Although the 
extreme Right would invite fascist representatives and speakers from Germany and Italy to its rallies 
and lecture tours, it would not identify its intellectuals as members of an international community of 
thought in the way that the Left did. The intellectual Left, inspired by both the internationalist 
tradition of republicanism and socialism and by the new influence of the communist International, 
made the infusion of non-French thought and intellectual representatives a central component of its 
engagement. Creations such as the International Writers Association for the Defense of Culture and 
the AEAR identified their collective communities as international spaces and displayed their 
international members like Ilya Ehrenburg, Maxim Gorky, and Dimitrov prominently. 
Internationalism would also lead to several left-wing intellectuals’ engagement in favor of pacifism, 
during the early 1930s, when war between nations was seen as undermining either the Enlightenment 
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legacy of fraternity or the international alliance of the working class.519 In the later 1930s, particularly 
after the Munich concessions, the Left switched trajectories and engaged to define internationalism as 
the “grand ideal of the SDN” against the “false pacifism” now promoted by the extreme Right to 
avoid war with Germany and Italy.520 For the internationalists of the Left, the struggle against fascism 
abroad was the same struggle as that faced by French anti-fascists at home.  
The political unity of intellectuals in the Popular Front, where the mantra was “no enemies to 
the Left,” was emblematic of the sense among left-wing intellectuals that they shared a common set 
of intellectual values and worldviews. This set of values was categorized under the legitimizing title 
of anti-fascism and served as a foundation for the new left-wing model of intellectual identity. The 
continued respect for universalism, egalitarianism, and internationalism on the Left and the resulting 
vision of intellectual role and responsibility would once again dominate the public and historical 
image of the intellectual. As a result, the opposing values of the Right were identified as “fascist” 
and, by correlation, anti-intellectual. 
 
Anti-Fascist Intellectual Communities and Networks 
 As they had during the Dreyfus Affair and the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, the intellectuals of 
the Left dominated certain spaces and networks where their distinctly left-wing values were 
appreciated and where their individual engagement could take on a collective force. These intellectual 
communities gathered like-minded peers in a common effort and excluded those on the intellectual 
Right either by directly rejecting them or indirectly creating an environment hostile to their positions. 
By segregating and separating their intellectuals in this way and “othering” the intellectual 
opposition, these communities of the Left reinforced among their members a certain segregated 
conception of intellectual identity. Being an intellectual, according to the Left, required the thinker 
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not only to advocate certain values, but also to belong to certain intellectual communities and to 
experience intellectual life in a certain way. 
 Perhaps the community of Left intellectuals that was most influential in the formation of left-
wing intellectual identity was the Association des Ecrivains et Artistes Révolutionaires (AEAR) 
created in March 1932 under the direction of communist intellectual Vaillant-Couturier. The AEAR 
was an association intimately tied to intellectual communism since it was conceived as a French 
section of the Moscow based Union internationale des écrivains revolutionaires. Yet, it, and its 
subsequent organs of propaganda, would welcome, even before the Comintern shift toward frontism, 
intellectuals of all affiliation on the Left who were opposed to fascism. By 1933, the movement was 
announced to have attracted over 550 writers and artists who wished to “struggle alongside the 
proletariat.”521 The AEAR fostered community and collective identity in two ways, one more tangible 
and based on the interaction of French intellectuals within the association, and the other more 
imaginary, based on a sense of shared mission with intellectuals across Europe. Both senses of 
community were emphasized in the smaller intellectual communities created under the AEAR: the 
revue Commune, the International Writers Congress, and the Maisons de Culture.  
 The revue Commune’s directing committee was a diverse collection of left-wing intellectuals 
sympathetic to communism including Barbusse, Gide, Rolland, Vaillant-Couturier, Aragon, and 
Nizan. These directors were also constant contributors to the revue alongside international names like 
Maxim Gorky and Ilya Ehrenbourg.522 Commune served as an important network linking the various 
AEAR groups and supporting its affiliated writers and ideals. Here readers and adherents could find 
articles on the AEAR, notes on the upcoming programs of the Maisons de Culture, as well as poetry, 
essays, political chronicles, and critiques of other journals by AEAR writers.523 The contributors 
 
521 Lottman, The Left Bank, 59. 
 
522 Commune, July 1933. 
 
523 One critique of Esprit chastised Maritain for believing that the church could remedy the profound 
causes of the current social malaise. Another issue included political poems calling for proletarian revolution. 
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found their common ground in the mission statement included in every issue. “Commune,” it read, “is 
a revue of combat, it makes public the struggle that the AEAR leads.” Anti-fascism was a particularly 
important component of unity: “in the face of the confusion through which modern culture marches 
toward fascism, Commune proclaims that the only revolution is the proletarian revolution. It engages 
in combat against the first evidence of French fascism on the Left and Right, against the ideological 
preparations for imperial war and the armed struggle against the USSR.”524 This statement provided 
not only intellectual and political unity but a sense of collective purpose and mission to the 
contributors and the readers of the revue. Those who were part of the Commune community 
recognized their own identity as individual intellectuals in the engagement of the larger collective.  
 To reinforce the sense of unity, engagement, and collective purpose that Commune provided 
on the written page, AEAR also sponsored grand writers congresses where audiences could hear 
speeches by French and international intellectuals. The first of these was held in March 1933 with the 
proclaimed purpose of combating the rise of Hitler. It featured Gide as its principle speaker in an 
effort to show that AEAR welcomed all “non-conformist representatives of literature and art” on the 
anti-fascist Left. But, this open invitation did not include representatives from the Right nor were the 
topics of anti-fascism designed to make right-wing thinkers feel welcomed. The topics of Gide’s 
speech, anti-fascism and anti-imperialism, reinforced the intellectual values shared by both 
communist and non-communist intellectuals alike. The AEAR’s crusade: to give “writers ‘of the Left’ 
an orientation by mixing them in the struggles of the proletariat” was specifically directed to “writers 
of the Left” and was not open to the intellectual Right.525 The success of this first endeavor led to a 
much greater undertaking in June 1935 before an audience of over three thousand.  
 
An enquete in 1933 and 1934 asked “pour qui ecrivez-vous” and suggested the proper answer was for the 
proletariat. And an article by Vaillant-Couturier considered “avec qui etes-vous artistes et ecrivains?” 
Commune, July 1933. 
 
524 Commune, July 1933.  
 
525 Vaillant-Couturier, “Un an d’activité.”  
 
234 
This 1935 International Writers Congress for the Defense of Culture included an extensive 
list of French and foreign writers and political activists including Benda, Jean Cassou, Dimitrov, and 
Gorki.526 Of course, in a left-wing atmosphere such as this, “conservative writers were unwelcome,” 
and although all the great names of the literary Left were invited, those on the Right, including 
Montherlant, Mauriac, Morand, Henri Beraud, and Maurras, were intentionally excluded.527 At the 
close of the Congress, the sense of community and shared purpose was so inspiring that the members 
refused to disband without first arranging for a permanent International Writers Association for the 
Defense of Culture. The association would continue the values and vision of the AEAR, namely “to 
struggle on its own terrain, which is culture, against war, fascism, and in a general manner against all 
threats to civilization.”528 Again, right-wing intellectuals, identified as the anti-intellectual fascists, 
would be excluded from this defense of culture and civilization.  
Congresses were excellent means of bringing together the left-wing intellectual community 
under the principles of the AEAR, but they were rare occurrences. The AEAR needed a more 
consistent means to reach the public and bring together its intellectuals for engaged activity. The 
Maisons de culture were opened in Paris in 1934 and offered music, poetry, and lectures on literature, 
film, and political affairs by AEAR affiliated intellectuals. Within two years they were serving over 
96,000 members and had sections throughout France and Algeria.529 These centers of left-wing 
intellectual community and collective engagement would become one of the most vilified targets of 
the intellectual Right who saw them as organs of propaganda.  
 
526 Topics of speeches ranged from “the Role of the Writer in Society” to “The Individual” to speeches 
against nationalism and in favor of socialist realism 
 
527 This exclusion of the right-wing writers was met with feigned outrage by the extreme right journals 
who claimed, “a congress of writers which deprives itself of the great majority of writers is only a clan of 
partisans.” Lottman, The Left Bank, 83. In truth, they would not have had any interest in speaking in this left-
wing environment. 
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Akin to the AEAR in many ways yet without the connection to international communism and 
the USSR was the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascists. The CVIA was founded in 1934 
with the manifest “Aux travailleurs,” written by the socialist Paul Rivet, radical republican Alain, and 
communist sympathizer Paul Langevin. The alliance of the three authors in the stated purpose of 
confronting and defying internal and external fascism was emblematic of the larger unity and 
frontism provided by the movement for the left-wing intellectual community. The express purpose of 
the movement was to form collective groups of intellectuals and workers who maintained a 
“vigilance” against the rise of fascism in France and the concept of “national revolution.”530 This 
collective would therefore not include intellectuals of the Right who sympathized with both of these 
ideas. By the end of the year they had gained over 6000 signatures from writers, journalists, and 
professors who sympathized with their goals of fighting fascism in all its forms.531 Anti-fascism was 
the message and the mission of the numerous brochures of the CVIA and the short-lived bulletin 
Vigilance. With the arrival in power of the Popular Front, the CVIA rallied the intellectuals of the 
Left to become a sort of laboratory of ideas for the new regime. Although it provided fewer physical 
gatherings for intellectuals of the Left than the AEAR, the CVIA was more likely to draw in 
republican, pacifist, and non-communist intellectuals of the Left and to involve them in the 
engagement against fascism that would divide them from the intellectual Right.  
Frontist organizations like the AEAR and CIVA provided a strong sense of intellectual 
community, shared purpose, and political alliance. This tangible intellectual fraternity and collective 
identity was echoed by the imaginary communities created by the numerous petitions and manifests 
of the 1930s. These petitions and manifests, by their very nature, tended to group intellectuals into 
oppositional camps, particularly along Left-Right lines. Thus divided into like-minded groups, they 
served, as they had during the Dreyfus Affair and Nouvelle Sorbonne, as forums for the expression of 
 
530 Racine, Le manifeste du comité de vigilance.
531 “We are ready to sacrifice all,” they wrote, “to prevent France from being submitted to a regime of 
repression and bellicose misery under the cover of a national revolution.” Ibid. 
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collective identity. As early as 1931, the pacifist left issued the Manifeste contre les excès du 
nationalisme that claimed to speak on behalf of all intellectuals. Signed by 186 intellectuals drawn in 
large numbers from the contributors to the NRF, the manifest implored France to break with the 
strategy of war in favor of one of reconciliation. The intellectual youth of the extreme Right would be 
so indignant by this attempt to monopolize the title of intellectual that they launched their own 
manifeste des jeunes intellectuels ‘mobilisables’ which prominently utilized the name “intellectuel” 
and demanded an equal authority to speak for the intellectual community. By 1936, the associations 
of the Right and Left had shifted noticeably to their new pro-fascist and pro-communist positions so 
that the right now favored pacifism while the left demanded the right to intervene in international 
affairs. Yet the separation and opposition between the two camps remained fixed. 
The final great war of petitions was waged in 1936 over involvement in the Spanish civil war. 
The Left petition entitled “Declaration des intellectuels républicains” was placed in Commune in 
December 1936. The signers claimed a “duty” to speak for France and to help guide public opinion in 
the path of the universal conscience. Any policy of non-intervention, they wrote, was simply 
intervention in favor of the rebels against the Popular Front. The signers were united by their anti-
fascism and their desire to help the Popular Front, Communist-friendly Spanish government. In 
response, the intellectuals of the Right would band together in the Manifeste aux intellectuels 
espagnols where they expressed their support for the rebels of Franco. In these imagined spaces of 
collective identity, even the structuring of the petitions revealed a difference between the 
communities of the Right and Left. Signers of the left-wing petitions like the Declaration des 
intellectuels républicains were grouped separately under the headings of Professors and Writers. 
Because the number of universitaires, over 200, outnumbered those of the men of letters, the latter 
was augmented by artists, architects, and others of the liberal professions. Even so, it still totaled only 
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half of the universitaire number.532 On the Right, such divisions were less common. Writers and 
journalists, who dominated the list of signers, held prominent places in its display.  
These manifests were most effective in amplifying individual engagements when they were 
well publicized in a journal or revue that had built a community of sympathetic readers. The most 
prominent revues and the most widely circulated papers during the 1930s remained the property of 
the intellectual Right. Even during the years of the Popular Front, the mass journals of the Right like 
Gringoire, Candide, and Action Française drastically outsold left-wing papers and even republican 
journals like Figaro.533 But there were several important left-wing revues that provided a sense of 
intellectual community, a fraternity of writers, and a shared journalistic mission to their collaborators. 
The French press sympathetic to the left-wing effort included papers like Humanité, Commune, 
Monde, Clarté, Nouvel Age, Europe, and later Ce Soir. Even revues like the NRF that tried to 
maintain their moderate republican or even apolitical appearance still visibly favored anti-fascist 
works and authors. Each of these journals was part of the larger network of the intellectual Left and 
provided support and propaganda for the rest of the community. Humanité published many of the 
first announcements of the AEAR congresses as well as reproductions of the speeches that were given 
there. In addition, they announced meetings of the Maisons de Culture and promoted books written by 
AEAR and communist friendly authors. Later, Ce Soir, directed by Aragon and J.R. Bloch, would 
join Humanité in this effort of communication with the faithful and unification of the intellectual 
Left.534 Ce Soir also published the 1938 manifest of intellectuals that criticized right-wing pacifism in 
the face of war with Germany as “faux pacifisme.”535 Like Commune, these journals kept their left-
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wing collaborators connected, informed, and engaged in a collective effort of anti-fascism. Right-
wing writers were not included among their contributors. 
These left-wing journals were linked in a professional network that included publishing 
houses that managed both the journals and authors sympathetic to the cause. In this way, revue 
collaborators gained important publishing connections. Editons Clarté, the Librarie de l’Humanité, 
and Editions Sociales Internationales were firms particularly sympathetic to communism while the 
Gallimard press retained an open catalogue but tended to welcome NRF contributors because of its 
close ties to the revue.536 Although right-wing writers like Drieu la Rochelle might be included in 
Gallimard’s catalogue, they would not find the sort of camaraderie and sympathy there that left-wing 
writers did. Most, including Drieu, would eventually take their work elsewhere. 
Revue teams not only provided segregated professional networks, they influenced writers’ 
social interactions as well. Although, under Paulhan, the NRF attempted to retain the apolitical 
priorities of the journal, Gide’s interest in communism severely altered its tone.537 The newly 
politicized team was an intellectual and social community unto itself. The staff met socially after 
hours at Gide’s home, in the nearby Pont Royal bar, or in the home of communist writer Malraux. On 
a larger scale, contributors were invited to extravagant summer retreats in Burgundy where they could 
participate in symposia, outings, and even parlor games. Retreats like these allowed aspiring young 
authors like Sartre to make professional contacts with Gallimard publishers and with the entire 
network of prestigious NRF writers. On a weekly basis, the wives and families of NRF staff would 
come by to watch the printing process before journeying out together as a giant family to a nearby 
restaurant.538 This polarization of social interactions due to revue team socialization did not eliminate 
friendships between left and right-wing writers. But it contributed to a general sense of collective 
identity with those who shared these spaces of daily intellectual life. Such intimate networks of 
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sociability and professional support created a strong sense of identification with the left-wing revue 
teams, publishing networks, petition communities, and political organizations. In contrast, the 
exclusion of right-wing intellectuals tended to reinforce the sense of intellectual and personal 
separation between the two political camps.  
 
The Anti-Fascist Intellectual Experience 
The collective intellectual identity of the Left was not purely based on the community of left-
wing revues, manifests, and front movements. It was also a product of the shared experiences of being 
an intellectual of the Left, experiences that were not shared by those of the Right. As in previous 
periods of engagement, the intellectual Left’s close relationship with the Third Republic and the 
university system would continue to affect its experience of daily intellectual life. Their more 
distanced relationship to the Catholic Church remained much as it had in previous decades; but it was 
less and less of a distinguishing factor for left-wing intellectual experience.539 During the 1930s, 
however, left-wing intellectual experience would also be influenced by new relationships to the 
international community. 
The relationship of the anti-fascist Left to the Third Republic, especially after the Comintern 
shift in 1935, continued to be a close working partnership. Under the Popular Front, the intellectual 
community of the Left enjoyed, more than ever before, the governmental support and protection of an 
intelligentsia. Left-wing intellectuals saw themselves as especially valued by this new government, in 
part because many leading left-wing intellectuals like Leon Blum had taken leading roles. This close 
relationship between the intellectual Left and the regime included State mandated repression of their 
intellectual opposition on the Right in 1936. Although the Front would not last long, the symbiotic 
 
539 Right-wing intellectuals, particularly those sympathetic to fascism, increasingly disassociated 
themselves from the Catholic Church in the 1930s. Although the AF intellectuals would continue to claim ties 
to Catholicism, the reprimand by the Vatican would sever its ties to the institution of the Church. Relationships 
to the Church, therefore, no longer played an important role in distinguishing Right and Left intellectual 
experience and identity. 
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relationship of the Left and the government during these years would be touted by the Right as 
evidence of a distinctly left-wing experience of intellectual life that engagés of the Right did not 
share.  
Liberal republican and socialist universitaires continued to dominate the university system in 
the 1930s. This perceived left-wing atmosphere in the university influenced not only the experience 
of the universitaires themselves, but also the experience of the student population. There were 
statistically more left-wing students at the ENS throughout the 1930s,540 and the perception of their 
dominance led these students to engage differently from their right-wing classmates. While the Right 
began the creation of right-wing student journals like the Revue Française,541 the left-wing students 
concentrated their efforts on university related youth movements and school sections of political 
parties. And, while the students of the Left were mentored through the existing professorial 
relationships and the guidance of Lucien Herr, the excluded right-wing minority searched beyond the 
classroom for external mentoring relationships with men like Massis who introduced them to the 
world of journalism. It is perhaps because of these early student experiences at the ENS that so many 
right-wing Normaliens of the 1930s engaged primarily through their literary work while their left-
wing peers in the university track were more likely to join parties and consider writing a 
supplementary activity.542 
This early introduction to intellectual life on the Left was indicative of the distinctive 
relationship that the intellectual Left had to international political parties. It would be a mistake to 
believe that there was “any natural incomprehension between the Right and political parties.”543 But, 
despite the electoral efforts of the Patrie Française, the AF, or the PPF, there was no political party on 
 
540 This numerical dominance of the Left at the ENS has led historians to treat the presence of right-
wing Normaliens as an aberration. Rubenstein, What’s Left?,12.  
 
541 Created by right-wing students Thierry Maulnier and Robert Brasillach. 
 
542 Rubenstein, What’s Left?, 9-27. 
 
543 Sirinelli, Histoire des Droites en France, 18.  
241 
the extreme Right that provided the sort of organization, doctrine, and international network for its 
intellectuals that the Socialist and Communist parties provided. It has been estimated that, by the 
1930s, the PCF was the most powerful and organized communist party outside of Russia. Its 
“initiative in mobilizing intellectuals on an international as well as national level” cannot be 
disregarded when considering the experience of the left-wing intellectuals.544 When the Comintern 
realized in 1932 that intellectuals were a vital component of revolutionary preparation, new efforts 
were made to court intellectuals to its side. Fellow-traveling became a way of intellectual life for 
many during these years and even those who remained technically unaffiliated benefited from the 
party structure.  
The relationship that the Left had to international circles meant that being an intellectual of 
the Left provided extensive opportunity for international cultural exchange. Left-wing intellectuals 
developed ties to foreign thinkers at writers’ congresses and saw themselves as collaborating on a 
daily basis with intellectuals from across Europe at literary revues like Commune. The Right would 
be much slower to capitalize on the benefits of such international collaboration with German and 
Italian intellectuals, in part because there was no official fascist party in France that could facilitate 
such exchanges. Despite these attractions, the influence of party doctrine and Comintern policy on 
intellectual expression could, occasionally, adversely affect the experience of the Left. Aragon’s 
poetry was admittedly geared to the official party line and its tone and message had to be altered as 
Comintern policy shifted over the years. Gide was distressed to find that even in the French hosted 
AEAR congress, the Comintern was able to influence the schedule of speakers so that dissidents were 
not invited or only able to speak at late hours. He found the party expectation that every anti-fascist 
and pro-soviet writer produce social realist works to be so restrictive on his intellectual expression 
that he preferred to not write at all during his years of association with communism. And, when the 
Comintern declared that anti-fascism was no longer a priority of the intellectual community after 
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1939, many intellectuals found themselves required to support the very ideology they had joined the 
party to combat.  
The Left’s relationship to the Third Republic and the Popular Front, to the ENS and its 
engagement opportunities, to an organized party, and to an international intellectual community 
meant that intellectuals of the Left experienced engagement and intellectual life differently from their 
right-wing peers. These different experiences, when combined with separated intellectual 
communities like the front movements and the left-wing revue networks, helped to foster among the 
intellectuals of the Left a sense of distinct, separate collective intellectual identity.  
 
The Anti-Fascist Intellectual Model 
 The model of intellectual identity created by the Left in the 1930s was able to incorporate a 
diverse array of political positions under the aegis of intellectual anti-fascism. By operating as an 
anti-fascist bloc, and by creating a supportive partnership with the Third Republic and an 
international intellectual community against fascism, the intellectual Left assured itself dominance in 
the discussion of public affairs. This hegemony gave them a certain mentality of engagement that 
their peers on the Right would not share. It also created an abyss between concepts of model 
intellectual values and behaviors. According to the model developed by the Left, being a true 
“intellectual” required first and foremost an opposition to the values and programs of the fascists. The 
intellectual also engaged in the name of universal abstractions, social egalitarianism, and the 
international ideal. His role was to be a spokesman for the masses, a social revolutionary, and a 
member of an international community of thought. Intellectuals on the Left were also identified by 
their participation in certain collective communities like the AEAR or CVIA congresses, anti-fascist 
petitions, left-wing revue teams, and publishing firms. Those who engaged in public affairs outside of 
these communities and in opposition to the values and programs of the anti-fascist Left were 
denounced by the Left as anti-intellectual and even anti-French. They were denied the right to speak 
as intellectual guides for the nation and were excluded and marginalized in the intellectual 
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community. Their resentment of this exclusion, both real and imagined, would lead them to create 
their own image of the intellectual. Abel Bonnard and Ramon Fernandez took the lead in developing 




RIGHT WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY IN THE 1930S: THE CASE OF ABEL BONNARD 
 
Abel Bonnard was one of the more prestigious intellectuals of the extreme Right in the 1930s 
and was engaged in a wide variety of intellectual groups, petitions, and revues.  Although Bonnard 
began his politicization in the 1920s as a Maurrassian, he demanded a more active solution during the 
1930s. Despite his anti-German education from the AF, he was drawn to the promise of German 
fascism. Although his ideas would never be as extreme as those of more notorious fascist intellectuals 
like Robert Brasillach, Bonnard’s extensive involvement in a wide variety of intellectual communities 
make him a good representative of the right-wing socio-political world. Bonnard also was at the 
forefront of the crusade against the perceived left-wing hegemony and expressed, more clearly than 
most, his resentment of this intellectual monopoly. He is representative, therefore, of the intellectual 
who turned from royalism to fascism in an effort to overthrow the dominant left-wing concept of 
society and intellectual identity. 
 Born in 1883, Bonnard had, by 1908, already begun to secure his literary reputation with 
three books of poetry, Les Familiers, Les Royautes, and Les Histories, all published by Fayard who 
was sympathetic to conservative writers. Before volunteering for World War I, he had also completed 
two additional novels. During the immediate post-war years, he traveled extensively across Europe, 
the Far East, and Brazil. His writing on China would receive the Grand prix de Litterature from the 
Academy, but would provoke much opposition on the intellectual Left for its blatant approval of 
French colonialism.545 During these years, he was also beginning what would become a prolific career 
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in journalism.546 As early as 1912, he had begun writing for Figaro and had garnered a reputation for 
Maurrassian sympathies and a strong opposition to republicanism. By 1925 he began developing his 
ideas in the daily paper of Georges Valois, Nouveau Siècle. Here he pled for a European movement 
that would free people from the double myths of parliamentary democracy and Marxism. His 
association with this organ of the Fascieau would mark him early on as a “homme de droite” who was 
searching for a more active alternative to the AF.547 
Despite these early forays into extreme right political journals, Bonnard would not begin his 
active intellectual engagement until the beginning of the 1930s. As an Academy member, his 
engagement was particularly welcomed by the right-wing groups seeking intellectual legitimization. 
In the early 1930s, Bonnard showed particular interest in mentoring the intellectual youth. He became 
an early leader of the Cercle Fustel de Coulanges where he specialized in questions of pedagogy and 
regularly published appeals to the youth in the new non-conformist revue 1933.548 After 1935, his 
name was prominent on both the Defense de l’Occident manifesto, as one of its sixteen Academy 
signatures, and on the Manifeste aux intellectuels espagnols.  
 In 1936, Bonnard published one of his most politically significant works, Les Modérés. This 
book was an impassioned attack on the moderate republicans who had formed an antifascist alliance 
with the socialists and communists of the Left. The result, Bonnard claimed, was that there was no 
longer any representation from the Center, simply one large party of the Left. The book was a violent 
rejection of the social philosophy, moral crisis, and abstract intellectualism he believed to see on this 
united Left.549 The intellectual Right welcomed this book as the official refutation of the recently 
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formed Popular Front and raised Bonnard as a symbol of their cause.550 Although he would not 
publish the sister essay, Les Reactionnaires, which was a critique “from the Right” of the royalists, 
until 1941, it was already apparent by 1936 that Bonnard was becoming disillusioned with the royalist 
Right of the AF.551 By 1936, he had abandoned Maurrassianism for fascism along with other ex-AF 
affiliates.552 
Bonnard’s new foray into extreme right engagement outside the AF would lead him to the 
more active PPF of Jacques Doriot. As early as 1936 he had begun directing the party’s monthly 
journal Rassemblement national and within a year was presiding over many of the functions of the 
Cercles Populaires Francais, the intellectual arm of the movement. This new inclination toward 
fascism was intensified in 1937 when Bonnard traveled to Germany. Along with fellow travelers 
Brasillach and Alphonse de Châteaubriant, he would return from his visit and his personal interview 
with Hitler enthusiastic about the fascist experiment and the Fuhrer.553 Although Bonnard would 
eschew biological anti-Semitism and maintain a lifelong friendship with Jewish writer André Suares, 
his support for fascism and his silence on the anti-semitism it encouraged cannot be ignored. His only 
commentary on Jews, La Question Juive in 1937, expressed his concern over the mixing of races and 
did little to redress the excessive anti-Semitism of his peers on the Right.  
After the defeat in 1940, Bonnard became an active collaborationist writing for such regime 
friendly revues as Brasillach’s Je Suis Partout, Chateaubriant’s La Gerbe, and Drieu’s 
reconceptualized NRF. He also took leading roles in the Groupe Collaboration and the LVF, and was 
named Minister of Education for Vichy in 1942. With such extensive pre-war fascist sympathies and 
wartime collaborationism, it was not surprising that after the Liberation, his name was prominent on 
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the CNE blacklist or that he was convicted of treason in abstentia and forced into exile in Spain until 
his death in 1968.  
In the 1930s, Bonnard chose to engage actively in order to overturn what he perceived to be 
the hegemony of a united Republican-Left front. His resentment of this dominance was expressed not 
only in his condemnation of the Left, but also in his attempts to legitimize and promote his own right-
wing and fascist friendly values of intellectual realism, elitism,  regeneration through national 
revolution, and Franco-German rapprochement. This resentment and desire to legitimize alternative 
intellectual values, when combined with his engagement in a variety of right-wing communities and 
networks, led Bonnard to construct a new model of right-wing intellectual identity for the 1930s.  
 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
The right-wing intellectuals of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates had focused their resentment 
on the domination they believed the Left exerted over the university system. During these years they 
had struggled to overturn the Left’s claim that “the intellectual” was a man of the university who 
promoted certain left-wing values like scientific utilitarianism and internationalism. By the 1930s, 
although the left-wing dominance of the university had not abated, right-wing resentment and 
frustration had found broader targets. During the 1930s, and particularly during the years of the 
Popular Front, the intellectual Right felt that it was excluded, even ostracized, not simply from the 
university system but from public affairs in general. The ties between the Popular Front and the 
intellectuals of the Left contributed to right-wing suspicions of a conspiracy against them and 
reinforced their sense of segregation and exclusion. Bonnard would be one of the most vocal 
opponents of this hegemony. His engaged work took on new tones of resentment and new themes of 
intellectual responsibility and left-wing oppression. He demanded not only that the unwarranted 
dominance of the bloc be overturned, but that the intellectual Right be recognized instead as the 
legitimate guides of public affairs. 
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Bonnard found the hegemony and repression he so resented to be present in all the aspects of 
his daily life as an intellectual, from mentorship of the youth to participation in public life. He 
believed the Left had monopolized the university system and thus prevented both the intellectuals and 
the ideas of the Right from gaining the ear of the youth. His resentment of this hegemony would find 
an outlet in the Cercle Fustel de Coulanges, a group of right-wing intellectuals devoted to overturning 
the left-wing influence on education and replacing it with their own. An article in the Cercle’s 
Cahiers summarized the Right’s frustration saying, “an incessant propaganda under the aegis of the 
Third international, has rallied all the educators to Marxism.” Because of this, it continued, “there 
exists currently a Marxist pedagogy, a Marxist doctrine of education. Its organs are spread in the 
larger public, it disposes of defenders in the ministry and University…and proposes Marxism to our 
students not as a doctrine of the past but as one of the future and of progress.”554 Bonnard was 
particularly incensed that the teaching of history had been “deformed and perverted since the 
beginning of the century by the socialist and communist ideologies of the teaching Left.”555 Distorting 
history allowed the Left to present its own ideas of internationalism and egalitarianism as those that 
had built the nation. Without a true knowledge of their collective national past, Bonnard believed the 
Left would find it increasingly easy to “manipulate students to their will.”556 But control of the 
university and mentorship, Bonnard feared, was only one step in a larger plan for left-wing 
domination of all of French intellectual life. Marxist dominated pedagogy in the University was, 
Bonnard concluded ominously, an attempt by certain intellectuals to dominate a profession that 
“implied disinterest so that they could control all the world” without suspicion.557 
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Bonnard’s resentment of the dominance of the Left was, therefore, not limited to its 
appearance in the university system. His frustration and fury was directed toward the intellectual Left 
as a whole which he believed exerted an unwarranted and unhealthy dominance over the entire 
intellectual milieu of the 1930s. This dominance was in great part a result of their ties to the regime. 
In general, he wrote, it sufficed that an intellectual be well disposed toward the regime of the Popular 
Front for him to be treated as an intellectual master.558 These “lapdogs of the regime” had only to 
declare themselves communists to add an additional “rosette of ésprit” to their reputation among the 
public. “While the true sages and authorities on the human race” on the Right dared not say anything 
against the increasingly dominant Left, Bonnard wrote in outrage, the destructive ones “intimidated 
everyone with their reel of sophisms,” and for this were “adorned with intellectual prestige.”559
During these years, Bonnard was arguing, it was necessary to be a supporter of the Popular Front to 
be considered an intellectual. Those who agreed with the ideology of the Left, no matter the strength 
of their minds, were granted the authority of an intellectual master. “They promenade in society,” he 
wrote of the intellectual Left, “distributing around them the diplomas of intelligence. Only these 
certificates were never awarded according to the value of the minds but according to the color of the 
opinions. If one showed finesse and judgment but remained attached to the social order, he obtained 
from them no praise, but if another, unreasonable and haphazard, declared himself against this order, 
the desired diploma was soon awarded to him and he carried it proudly.”560 In other words, those who 
aligned themselves with the ideas of the dominant Left rose to intellectual prominence while those 
who opposed these ideas were rejected and excluded from this new construction of intellectual 
identity and social authority. 
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The intellectuals of the Left claimed for themselves not only the titles and authority of the 
intellectual elite but also the determination of what made “intelligence.” Bonnard claimed that much 
of this attempt to dominate the term was a calculated effort to exclude the Right from such a 
legitimizing concept. Yet beyond this opportunism and strategy, he wrote, there was the truly 
ingrained sentiment among the intellectuals of the Republic and extreme Left that “there is always 
intelligence in being a socialist and that there is never intelligence in being a royalist.”561 It was this 
sentiment, which had become woven into the mental fabric of society since the Dreyfus Affair, that 
Bonnard believed to secure the real hegemony of the intellectual Left. Intelligence, when used by the 
Left in the 1930s, came to be synonymous with the communist intellectual values and with the vague 
idealism and abstraction of the Left. “When one realizes,” Bonnard continued, “that this disposition 
has been spread in France from the salons to the cabarets, from the men of the world to the students, 
and that one has believed everywhere that it suffices to declare oneself against the principles that 
maintain human society in order to prove themselves intelligent, one is surprised that the rudiments of 
order have survived.”562 Bonnard expressed his furious resentment of this invisible hegemony saying 
that the Left had given the term intelligence new vogue among its adherents but that it “mocked that 
which it designates essentially.”563 In an effort to delegitimize this automatic association of 
intelligence with the Left, Bonnard argued that the Left did not understand the true meaning of 
intelligence because it associated it with its values of abstraction and universalism rather than its 
necessary component, realism.  
Bonnard also resented the implications made by the Left that their concept of the intellectual 
was the only one which favored freedom of thought and the goal of progress. The intellectuals of the 
Left, he wrote, “claim to prove to us by their opinions that they have a free mind… and to suggest 
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that all other minds have only a choice between prejudices.”564 In truth, he would write, “that which 
one calls having a free mind is only that of having the prejudices of a little group of intellectuals 
which has put itself in the position of distributing diplomas” and who “believe to have acquired by the 
handling of abstractions, the right to rule all things.”565 Bonnard was quick to show that this claim to 
be the only representatives of free thought hid an even more sinister form of domination and 
repression. Free thought was not only attributed to the intellectual Left alone, it was to be allowed to 
the intellectual Left alone. One article reported that a socialist deputy had cried, “Liberty yes, but not 
for those who do not think as we do!” Here, the article continued, was “thesis of the Popular Front: 
entire license given to the faithful of this government to act in their guise, all the repressive force of 
the state turned against the opposition.” In this, it asked, how is the Popular Front’s domination of 
intellectual life any better than fascism? In fact, it is worse because while fascism also restricts its 
own partisans, the “fascism of the Popular Front closes the opposition in prison only to free the field 
to its own unleashed troops.”566 
Bonnard was particularly resentful of the Left’s attempt to delegitimize the Right by 
associating its own views with progress and those of the Right with regression. This association of the 
Right with backwards political and social thought had been commonplace since the Dreyfusards’ 
crusade against Brunetière. However, Bonnard wrote, it had become the cornerstone of the 
communist intellectual’s argument that Marxism offered a progressive, scientific path to the future 
while fascism reverted to the old traditionalism and blind nationalism of the Middle Ages. In an 
attempt to describe the dramatic division that this strategy yielded, Bonnard wrote, “the antithesis that 
the philosophes and romantics instituted between a past of darkness and a future of light is 
rediscovered in the antithesis that current political discourse has established between the Right and 
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the Left.” He continued by recalling a story of a socialist orator who had made this association quite 
clear by saying “Waldeck-Rousseau wanted to go toward the future. What did he do therefore? He 
went toward the Left.”567 Claiming the legitimizing ideal of intellectual and social progress was just 
one more way that Bonnard believed the intellectual Left was attempting to dominate the intellectual 
milieu of his time. Had the Left only threatened to dominate the intellectual field, Bonnard might 
have felt more confidence in the ability of the intellectual right to overturn its influence. Yet this was 
not the only area in which he found a hegemonic Left. 
In its most generalized form, Bonnard believed the entirety of the political and governing 
system was dominated by the Communist-Republican alliance. Although this political hegemony was 
not specifically targeted against the intellectual milieu, Bonnard argued that there was a strong 
correlation. If all of public affairs, from international relations to socio-economic policies, were 
controlled by the Left, to the exclusion of right-wing ideas and values, these ideals would be 
engrained in the public mind and the intellectuals of the Right would face an uphill battle to change 
public opinion. In a left-wing world, there would be no room for right-wing intellectuals. With this in 
mind, Bonnard began his crusade against the Popular Front with Les Modérés.
Bonnard’s first task in Les Modérés was to prove the collusion of the moderate republicans of 
the political center with the extreme left socialists and communists. In truth, he summarized, “there is 
only one party in France: that which encompasses the Left and the Extreme Left.”568 The political 
Left controlled the government and excluded the persons and ideas of the political Right in the same 
way that the intellectual Left excluded the intellectual Right: by purporting to “have all the virtues” 
and by “excommunicating all that which was excluded from it.”569 They assigned themselves a 
“moral superiority without bothering to justify it” and in announcing this superiority of their sect, 
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claimed they owed nothing to those they dominated and did not regard them as equals.570 By aligning 
themselves with the extreme Left, the Moderates had been compensated with high offices, but they 
had also allowed the infiltration of the communists into positions of power. “They have found opened 
to them,” he wrote of the communists, “all the gates of the fortress that a government worthy of its 
function would have defended against them, and thus they have enjoyed the protection of the State in 
the destruction of the nation, of society, and of the State itself.”571 
“Politics,” Bonnard complained, “is no longer a battle because one side no longer fights. 
Those who claim to constitute an opposition have a spirit so intimidated by their adversaries that they 
do not dare to offend by a single truth the system of lies where they are enclosed. They salute the 
same idols as the men of the Left.”572 Even the conservative republicans, Bonnard wrote, had been 
captivated by the republican ideals of egalitarianism, democratic liberties, and international fraternity. 
In these parties of the so-called conservatives, there was a “prejudice in favor of revolutionary 
opinions.”573 In short, within the current Republican system, there was no longer any opposition, 
“there is only the excess of the Left that exists without counterpoint.”574 Only the external opposition 
of the politically excluded extreme right remained.  
 This extra-parliamentary extreme Right, Bonnard believed in the early 1930s, was 
represented by what he termed the “reactionaries” among whose number he counted himself. The 
reactionaries, he wrote, were given this name which “marked a rupture and an absolute opposition to 
the established regime which is evil in its essence according to us.”575 These reactionaries were 
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epitomized by the leaders of the Action Française. Unfortunately, Bonnard wrote in his eventual 
disillusionment with the AF, because the world was allied against them and their values, because the 
regime deprived them of any chance to serve their nation, because it excluded them from the places of 
power, they had separated themselves from the life of the world.576 By isolating and alienating their 
intellectual community from the general public and embracing a political form disconnected from the 
needs of modern society, the AF had become ineffective and inactive. During these years where 
Bonnard sensed the entire political world of France to be dominated by the Left and the only external 
opposition to have been rendered ineffective that he found a new opportunity for the excluded Right: 
fascism.  
 Bonnard’s resentment of the intellectual hegemony of the Left was paired with a 
corresponding desire to delegitimize this dominant power and legitimize the alternative model and 
values of the Right. The Left was accused of allowing an international party to manipulate and 
corrupt its freedom of thought and of debasing its intellectual ability in socialist realism. While 
Bonnard dismissed left-wing values as dangerous and “false ideas” that were unnatural for the 
French, he hailed those of the Right as “the ideal of French political thought and culture.”577 He urged 
the French Right not to have any fear of acting or “shame of their opinions, even when their 
adversaries treat them as fascists.” For if, he continued, the ideas of the Right were those of fascism, 
as the Left said in an attempt to discredit them, then despite the fact that the Left “had made a 
bogeyman of it,” fascism was a valuable resource.578 
As it had been for his predecessors on the engaged Right, the most effective means of 
delegitimizing the intellectual Left while legitimizing the intellectual Right was to display the 
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differences in intellectual values, worldviews, and concepts of intellectual responsibility and role 
between the two camps. By clearly noting these differences from the dominant intellectual model 
being promoted by the Left, men with substantial intellectual and journalistic prestige, like Bonnard, 
hoped to convince the public that their ideas and their thinkers, though demeaned as fascist or anti-
intellectual by the Left, were in fact legitimate alternatives. As Bonnard would write, “It is here that 
the men of thought are able to be useful …far from repeating to them that differences in political 
opinion are of little importance” the intellectuals should instead “fulfill their duty” by giving an 
example of committed opinion and marking clearly the differences that exist between the camps.579 In 
particular, Bonnard believed that the right-wing values of Realism, Elitism, and fascist renewal 
through Franco-German rapprochement separated the intellectuals of the Right from the Left and 
gave them their own distinctive identity. 
 
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Realism 
 Essential to this right-wing intellectual identity was an appreciation for and a connection to 
the Real. This was, Bonnard was always quick to point out, a value that the intellectual Left was 
unable to comprehend. Just as the intellectuals of the Right, from Barrès to Maurras, had before him, 
Bonnard claimed that having a concept of intelligence and a social vision that was grounded in reality 
and backed by experience made his intellectual guidance more effective in meeting the actual needs 
of France. The romance of the Real was not new to the Right. As in the past, 1930s realism implied 
that intelligence was only true if it was produced from contact with the social, geographical, and 
temporal realities. Because of this, the Right continued to reject abstraction, universals, and absolute 
truths that remained essential to the Left’s concept of intelligence. But, the changing circumstances of 
the 1930s would give the Right’s understanding of realism a new layer of complexity. With the new 
influence of fascism, there was an increasing tendency to see intelligence as a product of an organic 
collective rather than an individual. The new fascist glorification of action also contributed to the new 
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understanding of intellectual realism. Ideas that were in contact with the Real were ideas that could be 
put into action and practically applied. Finally, intellectual realism began to be connected to the 
fascist concept of the complete man. The true intellectual was a “complete man” who drew 
inspiration not only from rational thought but also from his experience, sentiment, will, and inherited 
wisdom.  
Bonnard was adamant that Realism was a quality found only on the intellectual Right since 
the intellectual of the Left was incapable of recognizing or relating to the Real. He accused the 
Popular Front in general of “abhorring all reality” and epitomizing the “irrealism which the entire 
nation had attained.”580 The intellectuals of the Left were so immersed in their abstract theories that 
they were incapable of appreciating the reality that surrounded them. “The intellectuals that I know,” 
Bonnard wrote, “whose profession is to understand all, no longer understand anything because they 
close their windows to think at the very moment where they ought to open them wide…they have not 
enough mind for the reality which is offered to them.” In particular, Bonnard accused the Left of 
dwelling in intellectual abstraction and verbalism rather than attempting to understand the restrictions 
that reality placed on their ideas or the implications that their thought would have on real social life. 
He accused the erudite thinkers of the Left of weaving beautiful phrases like “acrobats” high above 
the plane of real life. These ideas and visions, particularly those envisioned by the Marxists, of 
egalitarianism, higher standards of living, and an end to war, might be beautiful and enticing, he 
warned, but they could never be effectively applied because they had no basis in real historical 
experience. 
The Right’s appreciation of the current, French reality gave them a distinctive understanding 
of their role and responsibility as intellectual guides that the Left would not share. According to 
Bonnard, the Left believed that being an intellectual necessitated a separation from real society in 
order to develop a superior idea of a perfected humanity. The role of the intellectual of the Left was to 
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be a disinterested critic removed from the impurities of real society and a visionary of better 
alternatives. Once theorized, their abstract vision could be imposed on the existing reality. Their 
universal values and abstract theories, Bonnard concluded, “are only a common expedient…to ignore 
the world. One formulated that which the world ought to be in order to dispense with going to see for 
oneself that which it had become.”581 But, he continued, despite their beauty, these universal values 
and theories had not started with an honest assessment of man and society as it currently existed, but 
rather with rationalizations, high ideals, and an abstract understanding of “humanity.” Because of this 
they were sterile, inapplicable to the real world, and insignificant to society.  
The intellectual of the Right, on the other hand, saw his duty differently. Rather than 
dreaming of the world as it should be, Bonnard wrote, the true intellectual’s “role is to know the 
world ‘such as it is’ in order to prevent it from remaining such as it is.”582 To fulfill this role, the 
intellectual needed to be able to “rediscover the attraction, the taste, the love of the real” and to know 
the world rather than simply critique it. Only by first recognizing and accepting the world as it was, 
could the intellectual find the power to act on the world in order to change it. Action in the realm of 
the real was therefore key to right-wing concepts of intellectual responsibility and engagement. 
Unlike the intellectual of the Left, who Bonnard described as “the man who serves himself of words 
in order to separate himself from things,” the intellectual of the Right, the “true man” eschewed this 
sterile verbalism in favor of intellectual action, preferring “to use words in order to know and make 
known these things.”583 Verbalism, which Bonnard associated with the intellectual Left, sought to 
hide and ignore, Realism, which he attributed solely to the intellectual Right, sought to uncover and 
change through action.  
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Bonnard’s attachment to intellectual Realism would lead him to reject the term “intelligence” 
in favor of “good sense” and “character.” His distinction between the two concepts was drawn from a 
tradition of right-wing Realism stretching back to Massis’ appreciation of sentiment and experience 
and Barrès’ concept of collective wisdom. Yet, it was also influenced by the new fascist theme of the 
“complete man” as the foundation for social change. Bonnard’s dismissal of the term “intelligence” 
and his related article entitled “je n’aime pas les intellectuels”584 were immediately touted by the Left 
as an indication of his anti-intellectualism. However, Bonnard was not dismissing either the 
traditional concept of intelligence nor the title and role of the intellectual, but only the connotations 
these terms had assumed under the dominant Left. To clarify, he wrote in the first paragraph of the 
offending article: “I myself am an intellectual,” and used the title to describe his peers on the Right. 
The article specified that the reason he “did not like intellectuals” was because the intellectuals of the 
Left “believe only in the type of merit that they flatter themselves of having.” In particular, Bonnard 
clarified, these “faux intellectuels” believed in the merit of abstract, rational, logical thought divorced 
from the other sensibilities that made man complete and real.585 
Bonnard also made it clear that his preference for “character” and “good sense” was not a 
rejection of intelligence but rather a heightened concept of it that was divorced from this rationalism 
of the Left. He wrote of the two concepts, “Is there an incompatibility between good sense and 
intelligence? I do not believe it. On the contrary, true intelligence is only a magnificent extension of 
good sense. But there is an enormous gap between good sense and false intelligence.”586 False 
intelligence, he made clear, was that which he had attributed to the Left, based on “brilliant words” 
and ideas “without any sort of verification in reality.” It was, he emphasized, “entirely the opposite of 
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intelligence.”587 Common good sense and character, in contrast, were “augmented, enriched, refined 
in the harmonious development of an individual born to think” until they became true intelligence.588 
Good sense in the hands of these thinking men would produce not vacant words but “useful words, 
words that have value by the application that one is able to make of them in real life.”589 “The so 
called intelligence, “he wrote of the left-wing concept, “is only the wandering in a void, good sense is 
a practical intelligence on a sure terrain.”590 This sure terrain of true intelligence was the 
accumulation of experience in the real world by a long history of the collective French people.  
In clear opposition to the Left’s concept of intelligence as an individual accomplishment of 
private logic and reasoning, Bonnard saw intelligence as Barrès had: as an expression of collective 
wisdom. “Good sense,” he explained, “is the wisdom of all speaking from the mouth of one, the 
speech it inspires is not the invention of an individual…it recalls to us the virtues proven by the 
centuries.”591 The theme of collective wisdom would also be influenced by the new fascist discourse 
of the organic nation. To be a nationalist rather than an internationalist, to be rooted in the reality of 
one’s time and space rather than in vague assumptions about humanity provided the intellectual with 
“a manner of entering into things.” This organic connection with the essence of the nation made him a 
“concrete man…animated by more force than he could have been by himself, proud of the grandeur 
in which he participated.” It was the intellectuals of the nationalist and fascist Right, who “being both 
men of thought and men of heart” had this essential organic connection with the nation.592 
The role and responsibility of the realist intellectual, therefore, was to draw on all of the 
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solution to the contemporary malaise. This required an active participation in the life of society, an 
appreciation of the accumulated wisdom in national traditions, and an understanding of society “as it 
is” rather than “as it should be.” Being a realist meant thinking on the level of the national rather than 
the international, the concrete rather than the abstract, and the utilitarian rather than the utopian. In 
practice, this meant speaking and thinking in terms of the French people rather than the abstract, 
universal “People” and of “National Revolution” rather than “Revolution.” It was, Bonnard 
concluded, a responsibility understood only by the Right. 
 
Elitism and anti-Egalitarianism 
 Bonnard’s work also consistently emphasized another intellectual value of the Right that 
distinguished it dramatically from the intellectual Left: the desire for an elite. While the intellectual 
Left glorified the democratic ideal of egalitarianism or, as the communists did, called for revolution to 
level society, the intellectual Right favored hierarchy and elitism. In Bonnard’s writing, this was 
expressed through opposition to democracy and communism and the egalitarianism he believed was 
the common foundation for both political forms. Bonnard’s concept of elitism and anti-egalitarianism 
was strongly influenced by his early background as a Maurrassian, yet by the late 1930s he had 
broken with the Action Française vision of the elite. Instead of one tied to monarchism, Bonnard 
began to advocate a new type of elite which remained a prerogative of the Right, but was influenced 
more by fascism than monarchism.  
 The evils of egalitarianism and the Republican crusade against social hierarchy and elitism 
began, Bonnard believed, with the enlightenment and the French Revolution. Bonnard and others on 
the Right saw a long history of struggle between the “two Frances…revolutionary France of the 
Rights of man enflamed with pure republican mystique and conservative and traditional France.”593 
The first was incontestably linked to the “Left since it is in the ideas of the Left that the purest 
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democratic doctrine is incarnated” while the second was the patrimony of the intellectual Right.594 
Egalitarianism and a hatred of any form of elitism was, Bonnard believed, the most noxious outcome 
of this Revolution. The steady decline of France was due in great part to the fact that the “nation 
remained impregnated with the abstract idea of man that the 18th century had formed and that 
democracy had translated by saying that each man was the equal of another.”595 The great danger, 
Bonnard wrote, was that this “master idea” “was so well admitted” that it didn’t even have to be 
expressed any more. It had become engrained and almost incontrovertible in the public’s mind.596
Such a hegemonic ideal gave the Left a real political power over the Right and prevented the Right 
from effectively replacing the defective egalitarian political formats with right-wing, fascist 
alternatives. It was the role of the intellectual of the Right to root out this engrained view of man and 
replace it with a more natural, organic concept of society. 
According to Bonnard, the ideology of egalitarianism and its republican incarnation had 
proven to be unviable in the modern world because of the failures of the Third Republic and the 
revolutions against democratic governments across Europe. Bonnard wrote as early as 1933 that 
democracy was “everywhere obsolete” and that the responsibility of the intellectuals should not be 
attempting to revive or even eulogize it but rather to determine “with what noble form to replace 
it.”597 His engagement was founded in his opposition to democratic ideal of the equality of all men.  
Election of representatives was simply allowing the blind to lead the blind. The fear of a tyrannical 
elite instilled in the public by the Jacobins led them to prefer automatically their less threatening peers 
as leaders. Those who had some wisdom or talent in public affairs were immediately made suspect 
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Bonnard was convinced that “the good of the people is only able to be assured by an authority which 
is not directly emanated from it nor subject to being revoked by it.”598 It needed leadership with 
vision and authority beyond its limited comprehension in order to reemerge from the chaos into which 
democracy had thrown it.  
Communism did not escape Bonnard’s critique either. As a sister political form to democracy 
founded on the ideal of egalitarianism and social leveling, Marxism, Bonnard decided, took the 
concept of homogenized mediocrity to extremes. “Communism,” Bonnard wrote, “renders man 
stupid…the internationalist is a consumed, dehumanized, leveled man.”599 The responsible 
intellectual celebrated the unity of the patrie in all its various social levels and envisioned the nation 
in solidarity, while “the socialists and their friends on the left, the Bolsheviks, destroy the patrie by 
means of the following idea: there is no vertical solidarity…there is only a horizontal international 
solidarity.”600 This idea of international solidarity based on class consciousness was, Bonnard fumed, 
enticing to the intellectuals of the Left whose excessive egalitarianism caused them to champion the 
downtrodden. The communist goal, according to Bonnard, was a society lowered to the level of the 
proletariat. Here all those with talent and potential, like the savant and the writer, were made to resent 
their “original social sin” and to strive toward mediocrity in order to serve the communist revolution.  
 Bonnard believed his struggle to destroy the engrained notion of egalitarianism was more 
than just a political crusade against its communist and democratic incarnations. Elitism and anti-
egalitarianism were also essential to his concept of the intellectual’s responsibility to defend 
intelligence and culture. Egalitarianism, which Bonnard equated to social leveling in both its 
democratic and communist formats, demanded that men be conceived as equals not only under the 
law but in questions of moral, intellectual, and social leadership abilities as well. This was both 
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unnatural and unwise according to Bonnard. He constantly expressed his concern that “when it is 
equality that one wants, it is uniformity that one obtains.”601 Uniformity was an assault on culture and 
Western civilization. As one article put it, the intellectual’s duty to defend culture “was one of the 
strongest motives for leading against democracy the defense of the Intelligence that it degrades and 
the people that it enslaves in stupidity.”602 
Bonnard’s concept of intellectual responsibility therefore demanded that he not simply 
denounce the evils of egalitarianism but seek to replace it with a new and viable Elite. “Democracy,” 
Bonnard had written, is an immense enterprise of abasement. If you are convinced that it is the enemy 
of nobility and of human reason as of the happiness of men, if you believe that the societies it 
penetrates tend toward baseness, it is necessary to recreate principles that will be capable of 
engendering a contrary order.”603 This new order opposed to democratic egalitarianism was originally 
conceived by Bonnard as one of monarchial hierarchy but would eventually evolve into a concept of 
social elites led by a fascist style “chief.” Rather than the vague system of representative elections, 
Bonnard wrote, “man today wants to have leaders who are seen, where a power is exercised.” The 
chief would be chosen and advised by the elite who would automatically recognize his worth, rather 
than the public who lacked this foresight.604 He would exercise an authority to speak and act in the 
name of the people and would embody their will without being tied to their whim. And, instead of the 
democratic and Marxist desire to “reduce the elite to the dominant socio-economic class of the time,” 
Bonnard proposed this elite be chosen, not through “market criteria,” but through meritocracy.605 
This meritorious elite that Bonnard believed would be the force to reconstitute France would 
not be a permanent body of aristocrats as the royalists had conceived but rather a fascist elite which 
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drew from all levels of the social hierarchy. This “solid harmony, this marvelous constellation of 
elites” would be representative of the best talents of each layer of the national social structure and 
would work together to recreate French values and mentalities.606 This vision was in clear opposition 
to the communist vision. Instead of class conflict which would destroy the elite in order to create a 
level society of proletarian equals, the right-wing intellectuals envisioned class cooperation that 
created a new elite within their respective social stations. The existing class structure would remain, 
but each class would be represented and led by its most meritorious members. They would envision 
themselves as French nationalists rather than part of an International of proles. In this way, the 
transformation that Bonnard envisioned for society would be a “constructive revolution” of fascist 
inspiration rather than the “destructive revolution” that he attributed to the communists.  
Bonnard’s belief in the necessity of an elite and the destructive nature of egalitarian 
ideologies placed his vision of the intellectual in clear opposition to those of both the republicans and 
the communists. While Alain promoted the “precious equality of persons,” Gide supported working 
class revolution, and Aragon called for class warfare, Bonnard was advocating natural inequality, 
social stratification, and the cooperation of a new elite united across these strata.  
 
Decadence and Renewal 
 The discursive themes of decadence and renewal became increasingly popular tools in the 
cultural politics of the intellectual Right during the 1930s. Their prolific use among writers ranging 
from the more moderate Massis to the extremist Brasillach, especially during the years leading to the 
occupation, reveals the increasing influence of fascism on the entire spectrum of the intellectual 
Right. Decadence and renewal were, for Bonnard in particular, intimately linked to the right-wing 
ideals of Realism, elitism, and opposition to democracy and communism. As such they were 
culturally and intellectually powerful tools for critiquing the Republic and the Left and for rallying 
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intellectual support for a Third way like French fascism. They were also part of a common language 
distinctive to the intellectual Right that indicates a more fundamental separation in intellectual 
worldviews from that of the Left.  
 As early as Les Modérés, Bonnard was connecting the idea of decadence to the existing 
parliamentary democratic system and that of renewal to his concept of intellectual Realism and an 
elite. The elite would be composed of complete men, rooted in the Real and connected to the virility 
of the ancient and medieval past rather than the corruption of post-1789 France. “These regenerated 
French,” Bonnard wrote, would recognize “democracy for what it is, they would see the immense 
enterprise of abasement, and prove that it degrades men.”607 Bonnard’s concern in Modérés was not 
whether the destruction of democratic “decadence” was warranted, but rather, “if there will be enough 
of them [the complete and virile men] to save their country and remake it.”608 Bonnard saw this 
“remaking” of France to be the new role and responsibility of the intellectual elite. As early as 1931, 
before fascism had provided him with a viable solution, Bonnard was already posing the problem of 
the decadence of the current demagoguery and the need for a group of intellectuals, like those of the 
cercle Fustel, to provide an alternative. Others in the cercle imitated this denunciation of the 
decadence. One article claimed “democracy brings the enslavement of intelligence and the decadence 
of the intellectual.” The only option for the cercle and the intellectual Right as a whole was to try to 
“convince our colleagues [on the intellectual Left] that in favoring democracy, they contribute to the 
intellectual ruin of their country.”609 
By 1938, as international tensions escalated, Bonnard intensified his contrast between left-
wing decadence and the necessary promise of right-wing renewal by painting it as an apocalyptic 
struggle between the forces of good and evil. “When I speak of combat,” he wrote of the duty of the 
 




609 Cahiers Fustel de Coulanges; revue bitrimestrielle, July 1936. 
 
266 
engaged intellectual, “ I mean this action that we must without reserve and without relaxing lead 
against the base and deceitful ideology [of the Left] in order to replace it with the just notions and 
noble ideas by which a people is able to be reborn.” Only then, he continued, will France, like so 
many other European nations, “reassure themselves by their abundance of life that they have survived 
the risk that they ran of dying.”610 The call “to remake France” and the “necessity of being reborn” 
from the existing “social decadence” became part of a new language distinct to the intellectual Right 
in these years appearing in articles, speeches, and even a few manifests like the Magnifique reveil des 
intellectuels francais.611 It was not only the language that was distinctive, but also the concept of 
social rebirth. Being reborn and remaking France required not a literal revolution like that of the 
communists but rather a figurative revolution: the reprioritization and renewal of all the general ideas 
and values in society. This necessitated not a struggle of arms between classes but rather an internal 
growth within each individual. It was this internal renewal that Bonnard believed fascism alone could 
accomplish with its return to national tradition, glorification of action, realism, and its reliance on 
Force and Will.  
 With the apparent triumph of fascism during the occupation, those intellectuals of the Right 
like Bonnard who inclined toward collaborationism would declare fascism and Vichy to be the 
regenerating renaissance they had been calling for. “The government of France,” Bonnard would 
write of the new Vichy government, “has solemnly announced to us the collapse of a guilty regime 
and the birth of a regenerating regime…when it concerns for a whole nation being reborn, the 
creation of a noble and energetic state is the necessary condition for all renewal.”612 Only the 
collaborationist government, they believed, in realizing the principles of fascism, could bring about 
the vital energy, the glory of the past, the spirit of fraternity, and the conditions of spiritual and 
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material life necessary to restore France to its rightful place in Europe. This rebirth of France, 
according to thinkers like Bonnard, would be accomplished with the cooperation of fascist Germany.  
 
Franco-German Rapprochement 
 Perhaps the most striking evolution of the intellectual Right in the 1930s was the transition 
that it made away from the anti-Germanist influence of Maurras and the Action Française. This 
expansive intellectual organization had held sway over the ideas of nationalism within the intellectual 
Right for three decades, but its successive failure to bring about the anti-revolutionary coup it had 
promised, particularly on February 6, caused many disillusioned supporters to seek an alternative. 
Bonnard was one of many to find this alternative in fascism. Although Maurras would manage to 
combine his sympathy for fascism with a continued anti-Germanism by identifying with the Italian 
version, most of the fascist sympathizers of the late 1930s, including Bonnard, were forced to discard 
the remnants of their AF anti-Germanism for the new ideal of Franco-German rapprochement and 
collaboration. Because they increasingly saw fascism as the counterpoint to the Popular Front and 
communism, right-wing intellectuals like Bonnard quickly made rapprochement an integral part of 
their concept of intellectual responsibility. This image of intellectual duty further separated their 
concept from that held by the intellectual Left. Although the Left favored an International of Thought, 
they did not include Nazi Germany in their vision, and, although the Right favored rapprochement 
with Germany and Italy, they did not include non-fascist nations in theirs.  
 Bonnard had broken with the Maurrassian model of integral nationalism and anti-germanism 
as early as 1936, although he continued to lend his name to several AF events.613 In the place of what 
he came to consider the isolated nationalism of Maurras, he began to believe in the benefits of an 
International of European nationalisms where French nationalism would combine its energy with 
others in order to effectively destroy democracy and communism. Given this new fascination with 
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other European nationalisms, it was not surprising that Bonnard traveled to Germany as a journalist in 
1937. It was in his reflections on this voyage and his interviews with fascist leaders, including Hitler 
and Rosenberg, that Bonnard most clearly outlined his new vision of intellectual collaboration and 
Franco-German rapprochement. 
After speaking with Hitler, Bonnard wrote that he was convinced the best interest of Europe 
lay in rapprochement. “If reciprocal knowledge is necessary between all the nations,” he wrote, “it is 
particularly indispensable to France and Germany. In that where all the values are concerned, where 
the fate of general civilization is decided along with the fate of the patrie, France and Germany are 
involuntarily linked in solidarity.”614 Germany and France, he believed now, were the two European 
geniuses whose mutual cooperation was essential to the regeneration of the continent and the struggle 
against the communism. They had been equal contributors to the cultural legacy of Europe through 
science, music, art, and literature. Their continued exchange would not cease to be fruitful in the 
future. Bonnard was convinced that the “artificial” cultural antagonism that had been placed between 
them during World War I had been exacerbated by the “false intellectuals” who desired that France’s 
natural bond with Germany be replaced with a forced relationship to the USSR. It was the true 
intellectual’s responsibility to increase the fruitful relationships between the two neighbor nations.  
Working toward this rapprochement would be an important part of the right-wing 
intellectual’s role and duty. “The best way to favor a rapprochement,” he wrote, “is to multiply the 
personal relationships between the Germans and French of all classes. Thus will be created, outside of 
politics, the relationships that are necessary to influence politics itself.”615 The only way to create 
these personal relationships on the popular level, was for French intellectuals to develop cultural 
liaisons with German intellectuals and organize outlets in science, art, music, or even sports for this 
interaction. Rapprochement, he wrote, began “not by embraces but by exchanges.” These exchanges 
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would be “crowned at the top by those which attach between the two nations the savants, the 
professors, the writers, and the artists and thus will establish itself, outside of politics, a reality of 
sentiments of which politics itself will only be able to profit.” In this way, the intellectuals would be 
“fulfilling their function and doing their duty” to preserve culture, serve peace, and connect 
themselves with their international intellectual peers.616 
Bonnard attempted to model responsible intellectual behavior by participating in a variety of 
Franco-German exchanges including writers’ congresses and a pilgrimage to Germany. But his most 
effective engagement would be the steady stream of pro-German, pro-fascist, and pro-cultural 
rapprochement articles and speeches. His powerful “Berlin en Mai” essay enthusiastically recounted 
the speeches of Hitler and Goebbels. He praised the industrial, commercial and cultural advances 
made since Hitler’s rise to power, and described the fraternal bonds nurtured between the youth of all 
classes as the great alternative to communist class war. Germany was presented in Bonnard’s work as 
the sister nation to France that would most effectively ally with her “against the elements of universal 
destruction” which was communism.617 In summation, Bonnard pleaded for his readers to see the new 
Germany as a “promise” to the virile peoples and nations and to rise to meet that promise by 
regenerating France and seeking rapprochement. These articles in favor of Nazi Germany reveal 
Bonnard’s belief that the responsibility of the active, engaged intellectual was to bring about the 
cultural and political rapprochement of France and the new Germany.  
 
Bonnard and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model 
 Bonnard’s engagement during the 1930s was inspired by his resentment of what he perceived 
to be a left-wing hegemony over every aspect of public affairs and intellectual life. He was convinced 
that the intellectual Left dominated and excluded the Right from the university, the conceptualization 
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of intelligence, progress, and free thought, and the prestige accorded to intellectuals by the regime. 
Because of this dominance, he believed the Left had been able to attach their idea of rational, abstract 
intelligence to the very title of “intellectual.” As they had been defined by the Left, therefore, 
Bonnard did “not like intellectuals.” But, when conceived according to the vision and values of the 
Right, he considered himself to be an intellectual. Denouncing the monopoly of the Left and 
legitimizing the intellectual Right would be an essential component of Bonnard’s engaged work and 
would distinguish his approach to engagement from that of the intellectual Left. His compulsion to 
legitimize the Right as an alternative to the intellectual Left led him to highlight the different values 
and worldviews that existed between the two camps and the very different concepts of intellectual 
role and responsibility that resulted. Intellectuals of the Right were representatives of a “good sense” 
that was inspired by all the elements of real life rather than “intelligence” that drew only from 
rationalism. They were actively involved in meeting the needs of society “as it was” rather than 
passively envisioning society “as it should have been.” The intellectual of the Right favored the 
creation of an elite and a vertical solidarity within the nation rather than promoting an unrealistic 
egalitarianism and international class consciousness. Right-wing intellectuals could be distinguished 
by their language of decadence and renewal and by their concept of a national revolution. 
Intellectuals of the Right like Bonnard who had broken with the AF would also be marked by their 
desire for Franco-German rapprochement. Bonnard’s resentment, mentality of engagement, and 
concept of intellectual values and role revealed a distinctly right-wing model of intellectual identity 
that continued the right-wing traditions of the previous decades while evolving to meet the needs of 
the new political climate. In this he would be joined by Ramon Fernandez.
CHAPTER 11 
 
RIGHT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY IN THE 1930S: THE CASE OF RAMON 
FERNANDEZ 
 
Fernandez, like Bonnard, worked to create an alternative model of intellectual identity based 
on the intellectual values and communities of the Right. Although Bonnard’s intellectual evolution 
was indicative of the great majority of the fascisant intellectuals of the 1930s Right who came from a 
background of political conservatism or Action Française royalism, there were many intellectuals 
who were drawn to the new Right from the revolutionary Left. Ramon Fernandez is representative of 
the intellectuals of this trajectory. Despite his early adherence to the SFIO and his support for the 
AEAR and CVIA, Fernandez would come to be classified as an intellectual “of the Right” by 
contemporaries and historians because of his late 1930s disavowal of communism and fascination 
with fascism.618 This was a classification he was first resistant to, but then embraced as he sought to 
disassociate himself from the intellectual model of the Left. 
Although Ramon was officially born a citizen of Mexico, he would take on French 
citizenship in 1927 after studying at lycée Louis-le-Grand and the Sorbonne and marrying a 
Frenchwoman. His Mexican citizenship would, however, prevent him from being drafted in World 
War I. Fernandez, like many on the Left, was trained at the Sorbonne to become a professor and 
taught for four years at the college de Montcel. He eventually turned to a career as a writer, a literary 
critic, and a journalist. By 1922, Fernandez had begun writing articles and literary criticism and 
received an introduction to Jacques Rivière at the NRF. This would begin a twenty year association 
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with this revue that spanned not only the years of Gide’s influence, but also the fascist period under 
Drieu’s direction in the early 1940s. During the 1920s and early 1930s, Fernandez also wrote for 
other left-wing journals including the Bulletin de l’Union pour la Verite, Europe and Commune and 
founded the republican weekly Marianne with Emmanuel Berl. He maintained, during these years, 
the adherence to the SFIO that he had begun in 1925. As late as the February 6 riots, Fernandez 
would write that he was disturbed by the French fascists and that they had made of him, if not a 
communist, at least an anti-fascist revolutionary. 
However, by 1935, Fernandez had become more engaged in political affairs and had grown 
disillusioned with the communist influence on the Left’s understanding of nationalism, revolution, 
realism, and the working class. This disillusionment was expressed in his politically charged 1935 
novel Les Violents where his evolution toward “socialisme fasciste” was first indicated. While before 
he had supported the republic and the socialists despite his disapproval of the communists, he now 
saw the three parties to be one and the same adversary. In his search for a nationalist party that could 
counter the adverse effects of the communists, he found the Parti Populaire Français of Jacques 
Doriot. Doriot had himself been a committed communist and mayor of the communist stronghold 
Saint Denis until being expelled from the party for questioning doctrine. In 1936, he created the 
nationalist PPF that would oppose the communists, socialists, and Popular Front to the point that it 
began to favor fascism. The PPF professed ideas and visions of class cooperation, national socialism, 
French independence from international forces, and alternative economic policies that brought it 
closer to the intellectual values of the extreme Right and distanced it dramatically from the 
intellectual Left. Fernandez would be attracted to the movement as early as its creation in 1936 and 
would join the party in May 1937. By December, his name would appear in the right-wing Manifeste 
aux intellectuals espagnols, placing him on the side of the “fascist” rebels under Franco and clearly 
opposed to the intellectual Left who favored the Spanish popular front. 
By 1937 Fernandez had become a leading member of the PPF and was writing regular 
columns in the PPF organ Emancipation Nationale on intellectual responsibility, the differences 
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between left and right-wing intellectuals, and the dangers of intellectual communism. The title of one 
article, “Qu’est-ce qu’un intellectuel?” was emblematic of the primary force behind his engagement. 
In May of 1938, he took a leading role in the creation of the Cercles Populaires français. This 
movement was created explicitly to counter the influence of the left-wing AEAR and its maisons de 
culture. Although there was much discussion of the place of the CPF in creating a link between the 
working class and the right-wing intellectuals, the movement was clearly designed to appeal to and 
communicate with the intellectuals. The CPF was the most active of Fernandez’s efforts to bring 
intellectual and philosophical values the forefront of the PPF organization and to make it the party of 
the intellectuals on the Right.  
After the occupation, Fernandez continued in his right-wing trajectory as a collaborationist. 
In October 1941 he joined a coterie of fascist intellectuals traveling to the Weimar congress of writers 
where he spoke on the role of the intellectual in the new Europe. With the mounting hostility between 
Vichy and occupied Paris, Fernandez took the side of Paris and converted the CPF to anti-Vichy, pro-
German propaganda. Like Bonnard, Fernandez was disinterested in the rabid anti-Semitism of the 
collaborationists but his occasional articles supporting Jewish separatism cannot be excused or 
ignored. His articles in the anti-Semitic collaborationist press, from Aujourd’hui to La Gerbe, also 
implicate him in the anti-Semitic propaganda of the time. Fernandez was spared official judgment for 
this anti-Semitism and his broader collaborationism, however, since he died just weeks before the 
liberation of Paris.  
Fernandez has been recognized as an exemplar of the intellectual engaged in politics.619 His 
evolution from the intellectual Left to the intellectual Right provides important insight into the 
significant group of intellectuals who felt themselves drawn to fascism from origins on the Left and 
were thereafter recognized as being “of the Right.” Most importantly, he was perhaps the intellectual 
of the 1930s who was the most conscious of his role as an intellectual. Fernandez made intellectual 
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identity, intellectual values and responsibility, and the distinction between intellectuals of the fascist 
right and communist left a focus of every piece he wrote, regardless of topic, in the late 1930s.  
 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
Although Fernandez would be considered an intellectual of the Left until around 1935, after 
this time, he would have all the fervor of the recently converted. His missionary zeal for the PPF and 
its crusade against the left-wing intellectuals of the Popular Front would cause Fernandez to become 
one of the most outspoken intellectuals of the camp “dits de droite” in the 1930s. In particular, 
Fernandez was insistent on unmasking the hegemony he believed was exerted over intellectual values 
and engagement in the inter-war years by the communist Left and on asserting the moral and cultural 
authority of his new right-wing intellectual community. Fernandez, like Bonnard, believed the 
hegemony of the Left had extended beyond the university setting. He resented the Left’s monopoly 
on the title and role of the intellectual and their dominance in the most general aspects of daily 
intellectual and political life. This resentment and desire for legitimacy would affect both the tone and 
the themes of his engaged work. His articles and speeches would be laced with denunciations of left-
wing hegemony, efforts to claim the role of the intellectual for the Right, and attempts to delegitimize 
the intellectual Left.  
Initially, Fernandez’s resentment of the Left was expressed purely as an angry denunciation 
of their hegemony over intellectual life. In one of his clearest attempts to explain this hegemony, 
Fernandez wrote, “The complaisance of the men of the Left does not cease to astonish me. They do 
not claim only to have an opinion, which is their right, but they claim to have THE opinion, that 
which is not their right. They not only claim to have intelligence, which is possible after all, they 
claim to have THE intelligence, the only, the unique intelligence. They do not only claim to have 
good sentiments, they claim to have THE good sentiments.” In short, he concluded “these adversaries 
of monopolies have the monopoly on genius. These enemies of trusts make a trust of all the human 
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qualities. Such, at least is their pretension. But they are far from accurate.”620 Fernandez was furious 
and resentful that by being categorized as a fascist intellectual, he had been excluded from the moral 
superiority and cultural authority associated with the role of the intellectual. Despite the presence in 
the oppositional camp of recognized, engaged men of thought like Maurras, Bonnard, Drieu, and 
Fernandez himself, the intellectuals of the Left continued to claim for themselves the “monopoly” 
over French thought, intelligence, culture, and the best interests of society.  
To make matters worse, Fernandez fumed, they had convinced the public both at home and 
abroad of the legitimacy of this dominance. When reflecting on the “scandal” that was the submission 
of French intellectuals to the Popular Front, Fernandez was even more distressed by the public’s 
perception that the “intellectual” could only support the Popular Front. In a line reminiscent of 
Barres’ 1899 declaration, Fernandez wrote, “that which is more serious still is that many foreigners 
currently imagine that French intelligence is entirely on the side of the Popular Front.”621 This 
international perception of the intellectual was a coup for the intellectual Left that Fernandez angrily 
attributed to “the unpardonable act of brainwashing” by the Popular Front thinkers.622 This 
manipulation of opinion by the intellectual Left, according to Fernandez, came out noticeably in their 
engagement in favor of the Spanish writers of the Left. He wrote that the intellectual Left “says to the 
readers that it concerns here the ‘authentic representatives of Spain. The others, the intellectuals of 
Spain ranged against the Marxist tyranny of Madrid and Barcelona are only, without doubt, bloody 
mercenaries disguised for the cause in the false feathers of authentic intellectual representatives.”623 
But, Fernandez wrote, discrediting the intellectual Right of Spain was nothing compared to the Left’s 
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efforts to keep the intellectual Right of France out of public favor. The key to this discredit would be 
anti-fascism. 
Anti-fascism was the primary tool of the intellectual Left in its crusade to disempower the 
intellectual Right. As such, it received the focused fury of Fernandez in his tirades against left-wing 
hegemony. In an article tellingly entitled “Incapables d’avoir raison contre Doriot…les ‘intellectuels’ 
s’en consolent en le representant comme un croquemitaine fasciste,” Fernandez claimed that what the 
“intellectual,” placed in quotes to suggest the dubious nature of his title, calls fascism today are “all 
the political programs opposed to that which he has elaborated in the silence of his room, between his 
dreams and his books.”624 In other words, the intellectuals of the Left labeled as fascist any 
intellectual program that was rooted in social reality, opposed their communist utopias, and therefore 
categorically of the Right. Unable to justify their accusations of fascism, Fernandez continued 
angrily, “these sirs have invented a prefascism” which they accuse all their opposition on the Right of 
displaying. In truth, Fernandez wrote, the label of fascist and prefascist was simply a refusal to enter 
into a debate of ideas with the intellectual Right. “Behind the proposal of ‘anti-fascism, one senses a 
great fear of thinking, of creating,” in short, a refusal to fulfill the responsibilities of an intellectual. 
Instead of accepting the intellectuals of the Right and debating their ideas, Fernandez explained, the 
intellectuals of the communist Left chose to automatically discredit them. “M. Langevin is a great 
savant, M. Maurras a great mind, M. Montherlant a stylist of great value, here are the facts,” 
Fernandez wrote as example. “Here now is what the communist tactic draws from the facts: Langevin 
is with us therefore he is a genius. Maurras is against us therefore he is an idiot and naturally a 
fascist.”625 This showed the irresponsibility of the so-called intellectuals of the Left who hid behind 
anti-fascism to avoid discussion, Fernandez wrote. “These intellectuals do not attempt at all to be
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right, they simply give ‘right’ to themselves.”626 This was the epitome of an abusive intellectual 
hegemony. 
To counter this hegemony, Fernandez would not hesitate to claim the title and role of the true 
intellectual for himself and his peers on the intellectual Right. In an article on the Second Congress of 
the PPF, Fernandez spoke clearly of his own role in the party. “I pronounce myself here as an 
intellectual,” he began, explaining that Doriot had given him the momentous task of “representing the 
intellectuals” for the PPF and of organizing its intellectual community the CPF.627 Fernandez believed 
that, unlike the communist and socialist parties that utilized intellectuals simply to glorify the 
workers, the PPF was the “party of the workers and the intellectuals.”628 As such, he wrote, 
intellectuals felt welcomed and did not have to “sacrifice their culture” or their intellectual integrity, 
as social realists did, by adhering. It was in his capacity as the organizer of the PPF intellectuals, he 
continued, that he had been able to note the large number of recognized writers and savants who had 
chosen to engage through the PPF. “I have observed,” he emphasized here, “the quality, the cultural 
value of the intellectuals who have come to us.”629 And, he would write in later articles, “in the 
enthusiastic response of the intellectual elites… very few weeks pass where I do not find in the 
register some eminent name.”630 In his effort to legitimize the right-wing intellectual of the PPF, it 
was not uncommon for Fernandez to list these “eminent names” of PPF associated intellectuals who 
were popular or had achieved academic honors like Bonnard, Drieu, and Bertrand de Jouvenel.  
Claiming the title and role of the intellectual and calling attention to the distinguished names 
of the Right did not automatically assure the right-wing intellectual legitimacy and authority. With 
this in mind, Fernandez worked diligently to outline what he considered to be the true “task of an 
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intellectual” and to distinguish “those intellectuals worthy of the name” on the Right from those like 
the left-wing Guehenno and Benda “who have not wanted to see clearly and have failed in their 
task.”631 Part of this legitimizing strategy for Fernandez was to emphasize his own decision to 
convert. “I served the ideas called ‘of the Left’ for years” he wrote, “but toward the end of June 1936, 
from the point that one could see clearly the methods of this majority, such service was no longer 
possible.”632 Fernandez argued here that in order to continue to uphold intellectual responsibility and 
the values of any truly French intellectual, it had been necessary for him to leave the Left for the PPF 
and the ideas called “of the Right.”  
Now, his intellectual responsibility lay in “taking back [from the dominant Left] one by one 
all the ideas, one by one all the words which compose our mental universe.”633 Taking these ideas, 
like family, fidelity, authority, and liberty back and returning to them their right-wing content, 
Fernandez and his collaborators believed, was one of the responsibilities of the true French 
intellectual, and it was only available to those who were in touch with the values of the intellectual, 
nationalist Right. Also, far from the internationalism proclaimed by the Left to be the hallmark of the 
French intellectual, Fernandez would write that “the intellectual, the true one” would produce a work 
of genius that was “only able to be national.”634 By showing the international, communist Left 
incapable of intellectual responsibility and the nationalist Right preternaturally disposed toward it, 
Fernandez hoped to legitimize the concept of right-wing intellectuals and to replace the Left’s 
dominance over intellectual authority. 
 Fernandez was also intent on discrediting the ideology of the Left itself by revealing the 
inherent dangers of communism. The hegemony that allowed the “intellectual bolshevization of 
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France” was, according to Fernandez, undeniable. “One of the preoccupations of the Left since 
1936,” he wrote, “has been to establish that only the communists and their allies are capable of saving 
France, of understanding French interests.”635 This hegemony over the role of French social and 
moral guide was completely unwarranted according to Fernandez. Communism, he explained, was 
“the action of a party in the pay of a foreigner who has dragged the French flag in the mud and France 
into the manure.”636 They have been able to “trace a circle of black magic so that nothing is able to be 
truly French without being designated as reactionary and renegade.”637 Communism, therefore, could 
not represent French thought or French culture because it had no comprehension of national things 
and worked only to destroy them and their proponents. Yet, Fernandez wrote, communism still held 
sway over the public mind. “The bolshevik publishing houses,” he argued, “institute sweetly a 
veritable dictatorship over thought.” And the intellectuals of the Republic, if they did not welcome it, 
were unable to see its infiltration.638 
Rather than indicating a defense of culture as the “anti-fascists” boasted, Fernandez wrote 
that “antifascism, when led by the communists, contented itself with attracting “naïve intellectuals to 
it in order to maneuver them like puppets.”639 Under the Marxist spell, intellectuals “were obligated to 
undermine the forces of free intelligence, of free will, of energy, and notably of all that which makes 
the force and traditional grace of French civilization.”640 What greater proof, Fernandez was asking, 
could the public need to see that the communist thinker betrayed culture and True France and was 
unfit for the role of intellectual. “French thought,” he continued in order to drive this point home, 
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“expresses the exact opposite of Marxist thought…and as French thought is living, strong, and rich 
from a glorious past, it declares war on those who want to crush it.” The true representatives of 
French thought, Fernandez wrote, were those on the intellectual Right who defended its vital national 
sources. And “to distinguish its enemies, the criteria is simple,” he wrote with flourish, “all the 
intellectuals, whatever be their claims, who accept being led by the Marxist tactic and therefore who 
accept Marxism, who betray French thought and with it universal thought.”641 The communist 
“intellectuals” were therefore disqualified from the role of the French intellectual and the right-wing 
intellectuals were its true representatives. 
In order to redefine the intellectual for the Right and separate it from the ideals fused to it by 
the Left, Fernandez had to clearly differentiate his own concept of intellectual values and role from 
that of the Left. Throughout his engaged work, he highlighted intellectual values that he believed 
distanced him from his peers on the Left, particularly the communists, while uniting him to the true 
intellectuals of true France. His emphasis on intellectual Realism, the necessity of an elite, class 
cooperation, and nationalism linked him to a broad network of intellectuals on the new Right while 
emphasizing his separation from those of the Popular Front and communism.  
 
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Class cooperation and anti-communism 
 During the 1930s, the intellectuals of the communist sympathizing Left from the more 
hesitant Gide to the extremist Aragon were praising the USSR for the destruction of the bourgeoisie 
through class conflict. These intellectuals saw social relations and economic corruption to be so 
irreparable that salvation could only come from a revolution where ownership changed hands and 
social class dominance shifted. In an effort to aid this revolution and the proletarian dictatorship it 
would prepare, many of these writers altered their literary production to cater to the needs and 
interests of the masses. In clear opposition to this concept of social class relations and the 
responsibility of the intellectual, Fernandez would promote the PPF ideal of class cooperation, oppose 
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the communist idea of revolution, and reject the soviet’s worker-focused culture. In these ways, he 
made obvious the division that now existed between his right-wing concept of class, culture, and 
social change and those of his peers on the communist Left.  
Fernandez retained a real concern for the working class from his left-wing origins that would 
color his involvement in the new Right of the 1930s. Although the CPF was primarily an organization 
for intellectuals whose appeals to the workers were of secondary concern, these appeals were always 
made. And, although Fernandez’s new fascination with the PPF and the intellectual Right led him to 
focus primarily on the need for an elite, many of his articles and speeches returned to the issue of the 
masses and the working class. Unlike the communist sympathizing intellectuals, however, Fernandez 
did not make the People or class revolution a theme of his work. Nor did he see the role of the 
intellectual to be inspiring conflict between the workers and the elite. “The intellectual ought to go to 
the people, not to say ‘People you are God,” Fernandez wrote, “and not to say ‘me, the thinker, I am 
God’ but rather to say ‘we, all of us, have a great task which is to construct a nation.” This view of the 
true role of the intellectual, Fernandez wrote in an effort to distinguish his own vision from that of the 
intellectual Left, would not be “found in these ‘intellectual’ journals of the Popular Front.”642 
In striking contrast to the communist ideology, Fernandez and the PPF continued to see 
“profit as the motor of economic activity” and rather than seeking to destroy the capitalist urge, 
sought only to reign in its most extreme abuses.643 Profit, Fernandez believed, was not the evil in 
itself. Rather it was the diversion of all profits to the owners that created economic disaster. If the 
workers had a legitimate part of the profit from their industry, then cooperation could continue 
without the need for a communist style conflict. Fernandez also supported the PPF in its recognition 
of the bourgeoisie. “The PPF, unlike the Marxists and the Liberals,” its program read, “considers the 
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French social type.”644 Because the bourgeoisie was a vital part of the French socio-economic 
landscape, rather than a superfluous, parasitical class, Fernandez and the PPF would devote as much 
of their economic discussion to small business protection and tax relief as they did to working class 
conditions and rights. Most importantly, however, Fernandez and the PPF opposed the communist 
economic ideology and the doctrine of class conflict by demanding that the public recognize that the 
problems of the French nation were not all economic in nature. A Marxist revolution against 
bourgeois capitalism, the PPF stated, would not cure France. “To reduce the national and social 
transformation which imposes itself on France…to the struggle against a certain economic regime is 
to shrink, pervert, and finally mask and evade the real problem. All our evils do not come because our 
production of material goods rises from private initiative.”645 Like Bonnard, Fernandez believed that 
instead of class revolution in the Marxist style, the role of the intellectual was to promote a 
reformation of the French esprit and mentality. This reformation would only come about through 
mutual understanding, national fraternity, and inter-class cooperation, not through class antagonism 
or conflict. 
Fernandez was quick to compare the communist method of inspiring class hatred to that 
created under the Terror during the Revolution. In this way, he attempted to use the Left’s 
omnipresent discursive themes of “Revolution” and “the People” against them. “Here is the source of 
the evil which today kills the philosophy of the Popular Front,” he wrote, “It is the faith of Rousseau, 
the faith of the Terror. It elects a part of the nation that it calls ‘the People’ and that it makes the 
exclusive object of its adoration and its wills. All the rest is its enemy all the rest is the perfidious 
conspiracy against ‘humanity.”646 Such an approach to French class relations, Fernandez believed, 
would only lead to the sort of national division and disaster that the Terror had produced. Rather than 
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glorifying the working class and demonizing the owning class in order to create or intensify a sense of 
division and irreconcilability, Fernandez wanted a class policy that was rooted in French nationalism. 
Like Bonnard, he wanted a vertical solidarity rather than a horizontal, class based one. “Render to the 
workers, to the masses, a sense of the national will,” he wrote, “such is the only path for a creative 
revolution capable of uniting all the French.”647 It was his concept of nationalism uniting the working 
class with the owning class in a common effort of national growth and shared economic prosperity 
that Fernandez believed distinguished his concept of economics and class relations from the 
communists. He would make this distinction quite clear saying, “The Popular Front is not able to 
achieve unity because they detest certain classes, groups, because they reject portions of France. But 
nothing of that which is French is foreign to us.”648 How could any thinking man, Fernandez 
wondered, reject the possibility for social change shown by this “total adhesion to the nation” for the 
“deceitful rut of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”649 
Fernandez’s approach to class cooperation was mirrored by his concept of the role of the 
intellectual. Although the committed party intellectuals of the Left were small in number, their 
powerful influence over the concept of the left-wing intellectual led Fernandez to cite them most 
often in his effort to differentiate the role of the right-wing intellectual. The PCF intellectual of the 
Left had come to see his responsibility to culture to be a responsibility to the working class. The 
proletariat became the audience, the subject, and the muse of any literary work and the intellectual 
was made ashamed of his own superior education and talent. Soviet culture was worker-focused 
culture and all else, even literature that avoided social and economic issues, was suspected of 
bourgeois or even aristocratic inclination. For Fernandez, intellectual responsibility borrowed from 
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intellectuals and workers were to participate in a harmonious exchange where each learned from the 
other’s strengths. “The CPF” Fernandez wrote of what he believed was the incarnation of this vision, 
“intends to proceed differently” from the communists and the Maison de Culture. “They believe that 
workers and intellectuals have essential things to say to one another…that it is necessary neither to 
intellectualize the worker nor to demagogically proletarize the intellectual.”650 For Fernandez, the 
Cercles were an effort by the intellectuals to “collaborate together and better know” the workers in 
order to “save France from the Marxist enterprise” that was class conflict and worker domination.651
This collaboration of the intellectuals with the workers envisioned that the intellectual would 
provide “nourriture intellectuelle” to the masses, inculcating them with respect for the traditions and 
history of the nation.652 This responsibility gave cultural and moral authority to the intellectuals rather 
than deeming them incapable of understanding the workers’ revolution or finding them useful only 
when their work was easily accessible to the lowest of the masses. Fernandez summarized this 
essential difference between Left and Right saying, “we think, on the contrary, that in place of 
reducing the nation to the people, it is necessary to raise them to the equal of the nation.”653 Rather 
than finding in the masses as they were the ideal for France, Fernandez believed that the ideal for 
France needed to be inculcated in the masses until they grew to meet its high standards. This 
difference in conceptualizations of intellectual responsibility and the potential of the working class 
was perhaps one of Fernandez’s most intense reasons for rejecting intellectual communism. Without 
naming names, Fernandez would write “Neither nationalism nor communism completely assures the 
birth, development, and perfection of the essential activities which raise the spirit. All that one is able 
to say is that some political forms, some social measures are more proper than others for the 
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protection of culture and spiritual values and favor their continuation.”654 There could be no doubt 
about whether it was communism or nationalism that Fernandez believed was more “proper” for these 
tasks.655 
Fernandez’s concept of class cooperation was therefore essential to both his vision of socio-
economic relationships and to his concept of intellectual responsibility. Since Fernandez understood 
the role of the intellectual to be both guide in social affairs and leader in cultural concerns, class 
cooperation was an important element of his concept of intellectual identity. It therefore played an 
important part in his rejection of the communist intellectual model and his creation of a new 
intellectual model for the new Right.  
 
Realism 
 In the early 1930s while he was still affiliated with the intellectual Left, Fernandez made little 
to no mention of the concept of realism. It was not until he broke with the communist Left in 1936 
and found a new intellectual community on the Right that he began to incorporate the idea of 
intellectual Realism into his thought and work. As it had been for his predecessors on the Right, 
Fernandez’s concept of realism was closely tied to his nationalism. True intelligence was that which 
was applicable and relative to France, not of an abstract nature supposedly valid for universal man. 
Fernandez made a point of critiquing the Left writing, “there are no pure ideas valuable in all 
circumstances.”656 Instead there were ideas based on experience and a connection to reality that fit the 
needs and situation of each society. While communism offered a utopian vision of revolution based 
on the musings of Marx, the PPF and the Right provided a concrete program of cooperation that 
showed a true understanding of the reality of French social relations in the 1930s. Because of this, 
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Fernandez would quickly identify intellectual realism as a distinctive trait of the new intellectual 
Right. 
 Fernandez was quick to use intellectual realism as a tool by which to judge the intellectuals of 
the Left and find them wanting. When comparing his new heroic figure Doriot to the Popular Front’s 
Blum, Fernandez wrote, “Read the astonishing texts of Leon Blum, observe the formation of the 
abstract ideas of an intellectual completely ignorant of the political reality…He is an ignorant and 
stubborn mystic, stubborn from ignorance, who is reduced by it to accusing reality for the defeat of 
his false ideas.”657 This, Fernandez argued, was why the Popular Front would fail. Its intellectual and 
political leaders remained convinced that the abstract theories they had concocted in the classroom or 
borrowed from Marx could be applied, without any alteration or adaptation, to the present day French 
society. His critique of Blum extended to the entirety of the Popular Front ideology. The intellectual 
revue of the Front, Vendredi, had “failed,” he wrote, “because the philosophy of the Popular Front, 
that which its editors claimed to expose and defend, is a false philosophy, because it does not 
correspond to anything real.”658 Intelligence, intellectuals, intellectual revues, and governments, 
Fernandez believed, all demanded more than ideas and theories to succeed. They needed the stability 
and force which came only from their ability to put into action, in the real world, the ideas they 
represented. 
In striking contrast to the sterile abstraction of the Left, Fernandez painted the intellectuals of 
the Right, particularly those of the PPF, as the representatives of realism. The PPF in particular, 
Fernandez wrote, chose to “look the world in the face… the world as it is, that our masters have 
hidden from us.”659 This real world, Fernandez wrote, was that of Europe, of France’s place within 
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France. While the Left attempted to ignore or reject this reality that did not suit their vision of the rise 
of international communism, the PPF had chosen to accept the existing reality and design its ideas 
and programs to function within the new reality. The PPF, Fernandez continued, unlike the 
communists, did not develop “ideas to adhere to for one time and always.” Rather it adapted its ideas 
to the experiences of the world at the time.  Doriot, he wrote, “is more savant and artist than 
philosopher, more intelligent than theoretical. All his ideas have issued from a direct collaboration of 
his thought with things…one is not able to consider them in isolation as beautiful pure ideas that a 
solitary philosopher perfects at his desk.”660 It was his grounding in the real nature of society, 
Fernandez believed, that gave Doriot “true political intelligence” and the PPF its ability to respond 
actively to the needs of France during the crisis of the 1930s.  
The ideology of the PPF, Fernandez believed, was the only one to which the true intellectual 
could adhere and still retain his responsibility to guide society in the ways of the real. It was the only 
party that could “propose living responses to the agonizing questions which pose themselves to the 
man who makes reflection his métier.”661 Instead of, as the communists did, “pronouncing words” 
and “fashionable theories,” the intellectuals of the PPF worked to have an idea that had a life and a 
significance, which could be realized for society.662 “Here is why,” he wrote, “the PPF is an 
admirable educator of the intellectual. It obliges him…to remain in constant contact with reality. 
From the intellectual cocoon he leaves a man, and this man, in becoming a man, becomes more 
intelligent because he has become more true.”663 Although such statements would be attacked by the 
Left as indicative of anti-intellectualism, it was clearly the abstraction and isolation of the 
“intellectual cocoon” that Fernandez opposed, not the concept of the engaged thinker itself. In fact, he 
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proclaimed the PPF educated intellectual as the “true intellectual,” one who was rooted in social 
realities and had intelligence formed by experience, not just logic and reason. Because of this, 
Fernandez suggested, the intellectual of the Right was not only distinct from the intellectual model of 
the Left, he was a superior guide for society.  
 
Necessity of an Elite and a “Chef” 
 While the democratic and communist intellectuals struggled for social equality and the 
collapse of any hierarchy or elitism, Fernandez was writing a series of articles on the necessity of an 
elite and the need for an authoritative Chef. Fernandez believed the republicans and communists had 
corrupted the true meaning of equality, yet it had become their standard, their “crème tart” in the 
window of the Republic. According to the PPF intellectuals, the Left’s commonly accepted, yet false 
idea of equality led to the “simultaneous leveling which the utopians of socialism dream of.”664 It was 
this mass leveling of humanity, envisioned by the intellectual Left, that Fernandez found most 
harmful to the nation and particularly at odds with the worldview of the intellectual Right.  
Equality had been linked in the revolutionary slogan with fraternity and liberty, but, 
Fernandez wrote, neither of these other two valuable concepts were compatible with democratic 
equality. “Without discipline, without the joyful recognition of each of his place in the hierarchy there 
is no life possible for men united in a group. This discipline is the only condition for liberty.”665 True 
liberty and true fraternity could only be found when each worked together in cooperation for the best 
interests of the free nation. It was when he recognized the necessity and value of his proper place in 
this national effort of cooperation that man truly made himself the equal of all his peers. The 
intellectuals of the Left, Fernandez believed, could not comprehend this concept of equality within 
hierarchy. 
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 The cooperation of equals within a hierarchy, according to Fernandez, required the concept of 
elitism that only the intellectual Right understood. Rather than an elite based on materialism or class 
as the democrats and communists envisioned, the PPF elite would be a fraternal collection of the 
talented men of all the levels of social life. This elite envisioned by the PPF intellectuals was an 
ensemble of persons particularly qualified to lead particular aspects of social activity. Democracy 
failed to recognize that all men were not equally qualified for these leadership positions. In a real 
society, the Left’s abstract vision of the equality of man was not only foolish, it could be 
debilitating.666 It was particularly dangerous since the elite would provide not only leadership within 
its particular cadre but also advise the Chef. As Fernandez put it, “there is no strong society without a 
chef, no society at all without an elite.”667 The chef would have need of an elite cadre of men in each 
area of social life who could advise him on the needs of that social domain. They would be his 
“knowing lieutenants.” The intellectual elite would be prominent among this group of public leaders 
and would be responsible for organizing the other elites. They would be identifiable by several 
characteristics, Fernandez believed, including the proposal of realistic ideas rather than abstract 
theories and the maintenance of a traditional morality. Clearly, the intellectual elite was to be 
composed only of right-wing intellectuals.  
 The role of these intellectuals would be to prepare the current democratic society for the 
changes necessary to restructure society. In democratic societies, he was convinced, a wealth and 
class-based elite already existed that manipulated society behind the curtain of proletarian 
dictatorship or representative government. In the new society proposed by PPF intellectuals, 
Fernandez continued, the elites would be out in the open and would be given social power and 
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class or wealth, they would be self-made and chosen by their peers as leaders.668 This official 
recognition and investment of an elite, Fernandez sincerely believed, was what the fascist intellectuals 
of Portugal, Spain, Germany, Italy and Japan had initiated under their new governments.669 It was 
also what he envisioned for France after the revolution of mentalities that would be brought about by 
the PPF. The role of the PPF intellectuals was to pave the way for this revolution and organize the 
resulting system of elites.670 
Leading this system would be a Chef selected by and from the collection of elites. 
Democracy could not institute a true chef because the electors would never choose a man they 
believed to be superior to them.671 And the communists, Fernandez wrote, could never create one 
because he would always be responsible to Moscow and the Party rather than to France and his 
elites.672 Only in the nationalist organizations of the Right like the PPF was there any understanding 
of what a true chef was, “of his nature, his function, and his necessity.”673 Unlike the men of the Left 
who avoided all that could not be explained by logic or a theoretical doctrine, the men of the Right 
accepted that the true Chef was a product of nature, not logic and that his actions were not confined 
by any accepted doctrine or plebicite. The Chef would not be bound by the demands of the people or 
of a theory because it was his responsibility to embody the characteristics that the masses lacked and 
to fulfill their needs even before those needs were recognized. Fernandez attempted to explain the 
rationale for such license writing “The chef commands because he sees that which the others do not 
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yet, his authority results from a difference in optics.”674 Only the French Right was able to accept the 
sort of organic relationship that would exist between the true chef and the nation.  
 Fernandez’s vision of a harmony of social elites and an authoritative, organically linked chef 
at their head echoed that of Bonnard, Drieu la Rochelle, and many other of the intellectuals of the 
fascist sympathizing Right. More importantly, it clashed dramatically with the worldview and social 
vision of both the more democratic republicans and the committed communists of the intellectual 
Left. As the crisis in Europe escalated, these conflicting visions of social organization and leadership 
became increasingly central to the separate self-identification of their intellectual promoters.  
 
Nationalist Man and Nationalism 
 Fernandez and the PPF intellectuals also had a distinctly right-wing concept of man that was 
influenced by their nationalism. Fernandez adamantly opposed the Left’s internationalism in favor of 
a strong French nationalism built on a sense of the past and tradition. In his concept of the New 
Europe, France would be a cultural and intellectual leader and would regain its former glory among 
nations. In this pursuit, Fernandez recognized the new governments of Italy and Germany as models 
for rebuilding a French strong nation within a new international mosaic of strong nations. His concept 
of man would be drawn from this nationalist worldview.  
 The PPF was clear to separate its own view of man and the French nation from the 
internationalist and economic concept of universal man created by the Left. “The politicians of the 
Left and the socialists in particular, consider man in two ways,” PPF works explained, as an electoral 
creature and an economic creature.675 In both ways it did not matter if “this man is Chinese, French, 
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provides the value.”676 The nationalist, right-wing, and PPF understanding of man was much 
different. Rather than “this monstrous and false conception of man, accepted by all that which is 
socialist, Marxist, and Bolshevik, we oppose a man who refuses to be a machine and who senses 
himself something other than material.”677 Their concept of man was as a national being, “a man of a 
long line, of a long history, of a province, of a métier.” The Frenchman gained his identity not from 
his economic station or electoral ability but from his enracinement in the nation. Fernandez was 
incensed by the “Marxist intellectuals who detested France by order” in an effort to uphold the 
internationalism of the Party. He recalled a communist lycée professor who said that when a regiment 
passed he had to “surmount the guilty weakness” that caused him to be moved by patriotism.”678 To 
this falsely internationalist man, he opposed a nationalist man connected to his patrie rather than 
foreign to it.  
 As they had differentiated their view of man, the PPF would also be certain to separate their 
idea of the nation from that which they believed was proposed by the Left. In his efforts to explain the 
PPF vision of France, Fernandez wrote “in sum, the PPF will remake the core of the True France.”679 
He argued that this “True France” was not a mute piece in the soviet world, “as those who confound 
the Popular Front with France” believed, it was a leader among autonomous nations with a glorious 
past.680 “For the internationalists,” the PPF believed, “France is a country like any other… the 
equivalent of the Ukraine in the union of socialist republics.” However, “for us, France has a 
particular figure, a past, traditions, a soul, and a pride.”681 Only a nationalist politics like that 
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Only the nationalist parties of the Right, Fernandez believed, could renew France so that it could take 
its place in the New Europe being created by the fascist nations. “To the France degraded and leveled 
of the Marxist world, we oppose a France brilliant with initiatives and intellectual, social, and 
political values…a patrie that will once again give lessons and models to the universe.”682 For 
Fernandez and his peers on the new intellectual Right of the 1930s, this strong, rooted France was the 
only “True France” and its leadership in a mosaic of autonomous European nations was the only 
internationalism that could be sustained. 
 Fernandez’s concept of PPF nationalism was a product of the new ideas and tensions of the 
1930s and of his strong recoil from his left-wing origins. Like Bonnard’s nationalism, Fernandez’s 
was distanced in many ways from the integral, monarchist, and anti-German nationalism of Maurras, 
Massis, and the Action Française Right. But his nationalism was also a product of right-wing 
influences in many ways, particularly in the channeling of Barrèssian concepts of enracinement. As 
such, his nationalist approach to “True France,” like his ideas of class cooperation, realism, and the 
necessity of an elite, identified him unmistakably as an intellectual who was in solidarity with the 
newly evolved Right of the 1930s.  
 
Fernandez and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model 
Despite, or perhaps because of, his early experience on the intellectual Left, Fernandez would 
be one of the most committed proponents of a separate right-wing intellectual identity. His resentment 
of the hegemony that the Left exercised over the title of intellectual, the role of social guide, and the 
daily activities of political and intellectual life, colored all of his work during the late 1930s. It gave 
him a distinctly right-wing rage and mentality of engagement that would distance his approach to 
intellectual life from that of the Left. Rather than engaging directly in the discussion of fascism and 
anti-fascism, Fernandez believed it was necessary to first denounce the hold of the Left over the 
public and to deny them the “monopoly on genius.” Each article on social and political affairs, 
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therefore, was laced with demands for equal intellectual authority. Even his engagement in the PPF 
was done primarily through the CPF as a “representative of the intellectuals” who had been ostracized 
from the Left dominated mainstream. Fernandez’ sense that he and his peers on the fascisant Right 
were excluded from the public image of the intellectual and from recognized cultural authority led 
him to engage his work in a redefinition of the intellectual according to right-wing ideals. This 
redefined intellectual valued class cooperation rather than conflict, Realism rather than universalism, 
elitism rather than egalitarianism, and organic nationalism rather than internationalism. He fulfilled 
his role and responsibility to society by advocating middle class social reforms and fraternization 
between intellectual elites and workers, participating in real French society, and promoting a new 
nationalist hierarchy. Fernandez’s efforts to outline a new model for intellectual identity led him to 
not only differentiate his political and social values from the Left but also to turn to alternative socio-
professional intellectual communities. Here, among his right-wing peers, he would continue his work 
of engagement and redefinition of intellectual life. 
CHAPTER 12 
 
THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD OF THE 1930S RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND 
THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE 
 
The world of the Right during the 1930s was a complex system of interconnected 
communities that were linked through personal and professional networks and a shared sense of 
purpose. Although these communities would remain officially unaffiliated and often jealously 
guarded their memberships, they were loosely united by their opposition to communism, the Popular 
Front, and democratic Republicanism and by their fascination with the fascist movements of Europe. 
They were also linked by the intellectuals who tended to write for a variety of revues, participate in 
numerous cultural outlets, and create socio-professional ties with fellow intellectuals in these other 
communities. Although they could not participate in all of these groups of the Right, Bonnard and 
Fernandez were both at the center of this web of connected networks. Their participation in these 
alternative communities and the resulting relationships that they formed with the Republic, the 
university, and the international intellectual community gave them a distinctly right-wing collective 
identity that would alienate them even further from the collective intellectual identity created on the 
Left.  
 Despite a history of proscription by the Republic, the right-wing, anti-parliamentary ligues 
continued to flourish in the early 1930s. However, intellectuals did not tend to play as prominent a 
role there as they had during the years after the Dreyfus Affair. Taittinger’s Jeunesses Patriotes, 
Coty’s Solidarite Française, and even de la Rocque’s Croix de Feu, which by 1938 would outnumber 
alone the combined memberships of the PCF and SFIO, garnered little active participation by the 
intellectual milieu. Even the once mighty force of the Action Française was, by the 1930s, losing its 
attraction for many right-wing intellectuals. However this did not indicate any innate hostility 
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between these right-wing ligues and the intellectuals. The ligue’s paramilitary style and charismatic 
leadership in the struggle against the Left would provide the intellectuals of the Right with 
inspiration, confidence, and a sense of collective élan with these active and often violent ligue 
organizations. In place of active participation in street ligues, the intellectuals tended to congregate 
instead in organizations like the coterie of non-conformist intellectuals of the Jeune Droite, the 
cultural organizations of the PPF, and the numerous cercles sympathetic to the ideas of the extreme 
Right.  
 Although Bonnard and Fernandez would not be considered participants in the Jeune Droite 
movement, these non-conformist writers were developing a parallel concept of right-wing intellectual 
engagement and their networks would all often intersect. The nucleus of the JD was comprised of 
young but talented intellectuals like Brasillach, Maulnier, Jean de Fabrègues, Jean-Pierre Maxence, 
Claude Roy, and Jacques Laurent.683 While connected to the Action Française by the influence of 
Maurras and the mentorship of Massis, these intellectuals rejected the closed nationalism, anti-
Germanism, and monarchism that its doctrine of engagement imposed on them.684 Instead they 
proposed an active engagement against democratic decadence and a nationalist, non-marxist, non-
monarchist revolution to renew France. Although they had no official party or tangible organization, 
the collection of right-wing intellectuals that made up the JD would have great influence over their 
peers on the Right through the various journals they created like Revue Française, Combat, and 
L’Insurge, and through the expansive range of their contributions to other right-wing journals. Like 
Bonnard and Fernandez, these JD writers attempted to articulate a “version of nationalist 
engagement” and a concept of the right-wing intellectual in contrast with the intellectual camp of the 
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Left.685 In this way, they were one of the many voices in the network of the Right that reinforced the 
sense of a distinctive right-wing intellectual identity and contributed to a sense of collective 
community.  
 Although there would be no anti-communist umbrella organization like the AEAR or CVIA 
on the intellectual Right, many right-wing intellectuals who did not find a home in the traditional 
arms of the AF or its JD offshoot found a like-minded community in the PPF of Jacques Doriot. Here 
disillusioned intellectuals from the left, center, and traditional right were brought together in a new 
community that was self-identified as a party of the Right because of its opposition to the communists 
and the Left. It was here that a writer with origins on the left like Fernandez could commune and 
collaborate with a former Maurrassian like Bonnard and a self-proclaimed fascist like Drieu la 
Rochelle. Fernandez would write excitedly of the powerful bonds that the collective community 
would have on him and the other intellectuals saying, “For fifteen years I disputed with Drieu. But 
now we no longer dispute. It is the miracle of the PPF. Before we were never in accord by either 
nature or friendship…but now we love each other well and find ourselves in the same party.”686 
Among the diverse intellectuals who formed this “miracle” community could be found such 
recognized names of the intellectual Right network as Alfred Fabre-Luce, Bertrand de Jouvenel, and 
Camille Fegy in addition to Paul Marion, Jacques Boulenger, Paul Chack, and Claude Jeantet.687 
The PPF had no single doctrine or foundational text but it did have a party program that both 
reinforced and influenced the ideas of its intellectual supporters. Primary in this program was the 
crusade against bolshevism in all its forms, including both the USSR and the Popular Front. 
Bolshevism, it made clear, was the cause of the current malaise of France, the corruption of its 
politics and decadence of its culture and society. The PPF painted itself as the “party of renewal and 
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reconstruction of the patrie” and proposed moral, social, and economic reforms that countered those 
of the Left. 688 In the PPF program, Bonnard found affirmation for his ideas of realism, elitism, and 
Franco-German rapprochement and Fernandez found reinforcement for his ideas on class 
cooperation, the need for a chef, and nationalism. The PPF also provided a social world for its 
member intellectuals and public supporters. It had annual congresses, worker organizations, a 
“sections feminines,” brigades of shock troops, youth programs, and even an aviation club.689 Most 
importantly, it gave great attention to the community of intellectuals it had attracted, providing them 
with the CPF, journalistic outlets in Emancipation Nationale and La Liberte, opportunities to give 
lectures, and a place of honor in its organization.  
The CPF was created at the instigation of Fernandez and was placed under his authority, 
although its meetings would have several presidents over the years, including Bonnard. In one of the 
first meetings of the CPF, Fernandez explained their purpose. “These cercles of which I am the 
founder,” he said, “have been created with the aim of fraternity and comprehension, our desire being 
to see the intellectuals and the manual laborers collaborate together.”690 Although the PPF could not 
be seen as a right-wing AEAR, Fernandez was insistent that the intellectuals of the Right have an 
outlet for the dissemination and elaboration of their ideas and values like the intellectual Left had in 
the Maisons de Culture. “In short,” he continued in explaining the CPF’s purpose, “we want, as in the 
communist maisons de culture, to inculcate in them [members] our faith and our dynamism.”691 The 
new group’s purpose was summarized in a speech that declared, “it is to put a stop to the conquest of 
the intellectuals by the communist party that we have created the Cercles populaires. We want to 
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inculcate in the intellectuals the true sense of French politics.”692 The CPF would also provide proof 
of the intellectual legitimacy and responsibility of the Right. In “the AEAR organ Commune,” one
PPF intellectual fumed, “one explains admirably that the nationalist Right disinterests itself in 
questions of education, laboratories, artists and writers.” The CPF would serve as an arm to end this 
“intellectual propaganda” and reveal the true intellectual priorities of the Right.693 
Here in the CPF, according to its description in the Emancipation Nationale, the PPF 
intellectuals would have “recourse to all the means of expression which are able to adapt critical 
reflection to the conditions of social action: meetings, lectures, courses, brochures, etc.”694 In these 
meetings and lectures, the PPF intellectuals would speak to fellow writers, students, members of the 
liberal professions and the few working class members who were encouraged to attend.695 Topics 
varied from discussions of love, poetry, and cinema, to the more politically engaged issues of the new 
Germany, intelligence and character, African colonialism, Salazar’s Portugal, and National 
Revolution.696 PPF intellectuals also made efforts to expand the reach of their efforts by taking their 
lectures abroad. Fernandez would give a series of seven lectures during a week in Morocco and 
created, by the end of his travels, a Moroccan branch of the CPF.  
Although the CPF and its parent organization the PPF would provide some of the most active 
intellectual arms of the Right, they would not be the only intellectual communities sympathetic to the 
ideas and values of the Right. Bonnard was actively involved in one of these many groups, the Cercle 
Fustel de Coulanges, which attracted several of the intellectuals of the Action Française milieu. The 
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education and the defense of intelligence and French patriotism.”697 Its range was not as great as the 
CPF but it claimed to have recruited over two thousand members of the intellectual and teaching 
milieu and boasted that its influence was better measured by the “furious attacks that L’Humanité,
Populaire, La Ligue des Droites de l’Homme, and the University” had launched against it.698 The 
Cercle united those right-wing intellectuals and educators who valued nationalism, the classical 
humanities, militarism, colonialism, and a rejection of the intrusion into culture of bolshevism and 
republicanism. The cercle intellectuals also communed in a more socio-professional environment 
through the collaboration on a Cahiers that ran for over a decade and a series of independent 
publications.699 Personal ties and professional networks were also forged through a series of banquets 
for the socialization and exchange of ideas among its members.  
Physical groupings of intellectuals like the JD, CPF, and Cercle Fustel would not be the only 
means of building a sense of collective identity among the intellectual Right. As they had during the 
Dreyfus Affair and the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, manifests signed by like-minded intellectuals 
were able to create a sense of imaginary community. It has even been suggested that larger manifests 
like the Défense de l’Occident were designed to be frontist responses to organizations like the CVIA 
and created the same sense of collective engagement that these groups created for the Left.700 These 
petitions provided an additional forum, in addition to journalism, speaking tours, and literature, for 
the intellectuals to engage in international or national affairs. They also allowed intellectuals to share 
the resentment they felt toward the Left, the demand to be recognized as intellectuals, and the belief 
that they represented the true values of French intelligence and culture.  
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Some of these manifests were quite small, gathering only the signatures of those in the 
revue’s or the author’s immediate intellectual network. One such smaller manifest in the 
Emancipation Nationale entitled “Un magnifique reveil des intellectuels francais” gathered mainly 
writers associated with the PPF like Bonnard, Fernandez, Drieu, Brasillach, Boulenger, Chack, and 
Maulnier along with a few non-PPF intellectuals like Henri Massis.  These signers vaguely demanded 
national unity among all the social classes and the renewal of France through French, rather than 
foreign, inspired reforms. Despite its small size, the manifest was able to group these writers and 
claim for them not only the title of intellectual but the right to speak out as intellectuals on issues of 
social importance.  
In October 1935, Henri Massis penned the much larger Defense de l’Occident manifest which 
had sixty-four signatures, including twelve Academy members, in its first publication. Like the 
smaller petitions, the manifest sought to provide a platform for intellectuals to collectively engage in 
a particular public concern, in this case, the colonizing efforts of Mussolini’s Italy. The manifest 
proudly proclaimed the right-wing signers to be “the French intellectuals” and argued that it was 
because of their vocation as intellectuals that they felt the responsibility to speak out against the 
sanctions placed on Italy. “While the acts of men, to whom the destiny of nations is confided, risk 
putting in danger the future of civilization,” the manifest began, “those who consecrate their work to 
the things of intelligence ought to make known with vigor the demands of the mind.”701 It continued 
to explain that Rome was the home of Western civilization and that efforts to stifle the growth of Italy 
indicated that “intelligence” had “abdicated its authority” in favor of political ideology. In closing, it 
again claimed the title and responsibility of intellectuals saying, “As intellectuals, we ought to protect 
culture with even more vigilance since we profit from its benefits, we are not able to allow 
civilization to decide against itself. To prevent such a suicide, we appeal to all the forces of the 
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esprit.”702 The right wing signers were clearly claiming the right to speak as intellectuals and the duty 
to conserve culture and guide affairs. They were also denying this continued right to the thinkers of 
the Left who had “abdicated” their responsibilities to intelligence by dabbling in left-wing politics.  
The 1937 Manifeste aux intellectuels espagnols was the other major manifest to publicly 
assert the ideas of the Right against those of the intellectuals on the Left. This manifest was written in 
clear response to the leftist Declaration des intellectuels republicains that supported the Spanish 
popular front. Here again, the signers of the right-wing manifest claimed themselves to be 
“intellectuels francais” in the very first sentence.703 These forty-two self-proclaimed intellectuals, 
including Fernandez and Bonnard, again announced themselves to be the ones faithfully representing 
the demands of culture and intelligence. They also stated, in an obvious effort to contrast their ideas 
of this representation with those on the communist Left, “we place ourselves above all politics” and 
cited their belief in the “fraternity of the classes, not their reciprocal hatred” and the right to defend 
the nation against exterior interference under pretext of ideology.704 In close, they emphasized that 
they, as right-wing intellectuals, were speaking for “la vraie France.” All of these manifests, no matter 
their size, were efficient methods for building a sense of collective intellectual identity and shared 
intellectual values.  
One final significant source of collective identity construction among the intellectual Right in 
the 1930s was revue team. Revue journalism continued to be one of the main outlets for intellectual 
expression by the Right since it felt increasingly excluded from the University. While the young 
students of the Left continued the traditional path from ENS to professorships before augmenting 
their engagement with literary or journalistic efforts, the students of the Right found external, non-
university mentors and tended to leave the ENS for immediate literary careers. The camaraderie and 
shared purpose of these right-wing revue teams built a strong sense of collective identity both within 
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the team and in the larger web of journals connected by one or more contributors. Of course, the 
network remained a right-wing one since, other than the occasional publication in the NRF, right-
wing writers were refused at the left-wing journals and had little interest publishing there. Some of 
the most powerful intellectual revues on the Right, beyond the ever dominant Action Française and 
the Revue Universelle, were Candide and its radical offshoot Je Suis Partout, Gringoire, and the PPF 
journal Emancipation Nationale. When combined with the networks of smaller journals, the web of 
right-wing journals became a powerful tool for building collective community and socio-professional 
ties.  
Candide, published by Fayard and directed by Gaxotte, had direct ties to the Action Française 
and brought in a number of its collaborators including Bainville, Daudet, Lucien Rebatet, and 
Brasillach. The enormous circulation of Candide, around 400,000 during the years of the Popular 
Front, made it a formidable opponent for the Left whose journals could not begin to compete with 
such numbers. Candide would retain, however, the maurrassian anti-germanism and would distance 
itself from the extreme fascisant camp. Because of this, several of the writers tempted by fascism and 
German renewal, like Rebatet and Brasillach, would gradually pull away from Candide and take its 
international offshoot, Je Suis Partout, with them. JSP, also published by Fayard, attracted many of 
the young writers who were disillusioned by AF inaction and sought a new avenue of engagement. 
These included the Jeune Droite writers Brasillach, Maulnier, and Claude Roy as well as other non-
conformists and fascist sympathizers like Fegy, Jeantet, and Pierre-Antoine Cousteau.705 Bonnard was 
drawn to JSP by his friendship with Lucien Rebatet which had been formed when they both 
collaborated on the right-wing revue Courrier royal. As early as 1932, JSP was showing an interest in 
both Italian and German fascism and was a strong advocate of anti-communism, nationalism, elitism, 
and the charismatic chef. It was also one of the most anti-Semitic of the right-wing journals of the 
1930s. Gringoire, with a circulation near 600,000, enjoyed the status of being the most highly 
diffused weekly of any paper in the 1930s. It also enjoyed the redoubtable talents and prestige of 
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writers Henri Béraud, André Tardieu, and Drieu la Rochelle. Gringoire writers were active in the 
opposition to sanctions on Italy and the general defense of fascism. Thanks to Béraud, Gringoire also 
expressed more vividly than many revues the increasing Anglophobia of the fascist-sympathizing 
Right in addition to the usual anti-republicanism and anti-communism. Gringoire also participated, 
though not to the same extent, in the increasing anti-Semitism that was found in JSP. Most 
importantly, Gringoire was one of the leading opponents of Leon Blum and the Popular Front. The 
mass circulation of the paper did not fail to influence fellow right-wing intellectuals and its ideas and 
articles were often cited in smaller right-wing papers.  
Fernandez and Bonnard would both find a fraternal community in the PPF journal 
Emancipation Nationale. Here they collaborated with writers like Drieu la Rochelle, Maulnier, 
Brasillach, Jeantet, de Jouvenel, Fabre-Luce, and Boulanger. The popular daily paper of the PPF, La 
Liberté, would also employ many of these same intellectuals to fill its columns on cultural interests, 
public affairs, and political news. In the pages of the EN, right-wing intellectuals supported one 
another in the effort against communism and the Popular Front, support for Franco in Spain, 
discussions of nationalism and renewal after decadence, elitism and the need for a chef, and the place 
of the intellectual. While Fernandez tended to limit his engagement to the pages of the EN, Bonnard 
would expand his literary collaboration to the pages of several smaller right-wing journals. 1933, a
journal created by Massis and published by the sympathetic firm Plon, welcomed Bonnard as an 
occasional collaborator, particularly in articles directed to the youth. In yet another Plon revue, La 
Revue hebdomadaire, Bonnard shared his talents and ideas, particularly on the need for an elite, with 
Gringoire’s Tardieu and JSP’s Bellesort.  
Individual right-wing revue teams created a sense of solidarity, shared purpose, and social 
camaraderie among their contributors leading to a real identification by these writers with their 
journal and their peers. When compiled with the sense of a larger community of like-minded 
intellectuals in other, linked journals, a real sense of intellectual sociability and collective identity was 
created. This right-wing collective identity, created outside of and in opposition to the communities of 
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the Left, reinforced the sense of separation and difference that the Right believed to exist between 
their own identity as intellectuals and that of the Left.  
 
The 1930s Right-Wing Intellectual Experience 
This sense of separation created by alternative socio-professional communities was 
compounded by the fact that intellectuals on the Right tended to experience the daily aspects of being 
an intellectual differently from those on the Left. Their different understanding of what it meant to 
“be an intellectual” was due in great part to their different relationships with the Third Republic, the 
university, and the international community.706 This distinctive experience would compound the 
Right’s sense of its alienation and differentiation from the intellectual Left. 
The relationship of the intellectual of the Right to the Third Republic, particularly under the 
Popular Front, was one of contention and opposition. Unlike the intellectual of the Left who enjoyed 
support and positions of prestige and authority under the State, the intellectual of the Right continued 
to see daily intellectual life as a struggle against state sponsored repression. The suppression of all 
right-wing leagues and organizations after the failed assassination attempt on Leon Blum simply 
provided proof for the right-wing engagés who already believed in a government conspiracy to 
eliminate them. Instead of working within the Popular Front and serving as its intelligentsia, the 
intellectual of the Right believed it was his duty to work within organizations and parties that sought 
to destroy the Front and replace the Republic with a fascist style Chef. As in previous decades, the 
intellectual of the Right equated intellectual life with the life of political opposition and the search for 
new alternatives. 
The relationship between the Right and the University system remained as contentious as that 
between the Right and the State. While the young students of the Left were continuing to make 
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professional and political connections through mentors at the ENS and Sorbonne, the students of the 
Right found themselves increasingly unwelcome and unhappy in these mentoring opportunities. 
Brasillach recalled that in listening to the student group around Herr, he felt out of place and 
uninspired. While students of the Left were turning their turnes into socialist cells and participating in 
the efforts of the larger socialist and communist party organizations, students of the Right searched 
for alternative routes to political and professional prominence. Massis became the particular friend 
and patron of the young ENS group that included Brasillach and Maulnier and would provide them 
with journalistic opportunities at Revue Universelle and 1933 and introduce them to the Plon editors. 
The Action Française student paper L’Étudiant Français, also provided an easy transition for young 
right-wing students of talent seeking entry into the world of letters and political journalism. Other 
mentors included Pierre Gaxotte, who introduced young Normaliens of the Right to the sympathetic 
publisher Fayard, and Jean Prevost, who provided internships for students at his right-wing paper 
L’Intransigeant.707 
These networks of mentors, patrons, and political organizations were available much more 
quickly to the “right-wing students who, by not taking provincial teaching positions like those of the 
Left, stayed in Paris and worked their way through these networks” until they had gained 
prominence.708 Because, statistically, the intellectuals of the Right tended to enter the literary and 
journalistic world earlier and in greater number than their Leftist and Centrist peers, they had the 
advantage of anteriority and dominance in that path to political engagement. Therefore, while 
journalism served as a supplementary form of political engagement for many on the Left, it was the 
primary way of life and of engagement for the Right. Fernandez would make the distinction quite 
clear in his discussion of “qu’est-ce qu’un intellectuel” on the Left and Right. On the Left, he gave 
the example of Popular Front universitaire, and self-proclaimed intellectual Victor Basch whom he 
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wrote “would be totally unknown except to a few students” had he not joined in the Front efforts. “On 
the Left,” Fernandez explained, “one becomes an intellectual not by the good works that one puts on 
the literary market but by the oral protestations that confer an unmerited dignity.”709 In contrast, he 
continued, the intellectual of the Right earned his authority and legitimacy by producing intelligent 
pieces of journalism and literary works of high caliber. It was the support of the Popular Front, 
according to Fernandez, that gave the universitaires of the Left their unmerited public exposure. 
The experience of intellectual life on the Right in the 1930s would evolve from that of 
previous decades due to the new influence of international intellectual communities on French 
intellectual life. In the years before the Occupation, the influence of the “magnetic field of fascism” 
would certainly be felt by the intellectuals of the Right, particularly in an evolution of their anti-
Semitism. However, it would not have the same sort of influences that the Communist party had for 
intellectuals of the Left. This was due in great part to the fact that the Communists had one vibrant 
example, the USSR, and one doctrine drawn from a single theorist. There was one party line, one 
official instruction to all the parties which claimed to be communist or fellow-traveling. The PCF had 
the Comintern to help it organize and structure its programs and its members. The fascist 
sympathizers, on the other hand, had no single theorist or doctrine and no single exemplar. Maurras 
looked to Mussolini’s Italy for inspiration, Fernandez to Salazar’s Portugal, Brasillach to the Spanish 
Phalange and Belgian Rexism, and others like Bonnard to Hitler’s Germany. Because of this, the 
fascist leaning intellectuals lacked the organization and doctrinal unity of their communist 
sympathizing peers on the Left. Since Hitler and Mussolini declared that fascism was not for export, 
there was no Comintern, no Pravda, and no international organization or Comintern approved leaders 
like Thorez.  
Because of this lack of organization, however, the intellectuals drawn to fascism did not 
experience the same constraint on their literary expression, their choice of speakers at congresses, or 
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their political affiliations until after the Occupation. Instead, the intellectual Right saw itself as 
creating, not a satellite of a larger political entity, but rather its own unique, French form of the vague 
phenomenon which was fascism.710 They often claimed that they represented French thought and 
culture while the communist fellow-travelers were slaves to a foreign nation and an un-French 
political ideology. Fernandez accused the “intellectual agents of Moscow” of “penetrating the French 
salons” and demanded that the thinkers who sympathized with the PPF build a veritable “maginot line 
before its infiltration.”711 Other EN articles claimed that the Maison de Culture’s writers “drew from 
the foreigner their political orders”712 while “our comrades have sacrificed nothing of their own 
culture in adhering to the PPF.”713 Specifically, they accused the intellectuals of the Popular Front and 
the communists of “submitting to the extra-intellectual intelligence of the party,” “adopting the ‘line,” 
or “becoming a gear in the machine.”714 Unlike these party activists, “like M Louis Aragon,” who had 
been “deintellectualisé” by their submission to the international communist party, Fernandez claimed 
those of the PPF, the AF, and other right-wing parties remained fully French and fully capable of their 
intellectual responsibility.715 Being an intellectual of the Right, according to these engagés, did not 
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make one part of a larger International of Thought. Instead, the intellectual was, by definition, a 
nationalist man in an intellectual mosaic, connected and yet distinct from his international peers.  
However, the lack of any official party organization or international doctrine did not prevent 
the influence of foreign fascist ideas from inspiring the French intellectuals to give new emphasis to 
anti-Semitism.716 Anti-Semitism had been extremely rare in the work of Abel Bonnard until his turn 
to fascism in mid 1937. During this year, he suddenly began to treat the idea in essays like La 
question juive. Here he recognized the Jews as “others,” warned against the “racial mixing” and 
cultural disruption that would come from the “Jewish invasion,” and claimed the “excess of Jews” 
was a sign of “French decadence.”717 Such ideas were certainly not foreign to the traditional French 
Right, but they had been relatively foreign to Bonnard’s work before his interest in international 
forms of fascism. Fernandez would not adopt anti-Semitism until after the Occupation.  
Being an intellectual of the Right did not imply the same relationship to the government and 
Popular Front, the university and its professional trajectories, or the international communities and its 
organizing parties as being an intellectual of the Left. These different relationships contributed to a 
different understanding of what intellectual daily life entailed. This different experience of political 
and professional life would both contribute to and result from the intellectual Right’s sense of a 
separation in intellectual values and segregation of communities. All together, these factors would 
yield a distinctive right-wing concept of intellectual identity and an alternative model of intellectual 
role, responsibility, and behavior. 
 
716 The idea that fascism tended to influence its sympathizers by degrees, in various levels of 
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The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the 1930s 
The model of intellectual identity created by the fascist sympathizing Right in the 1930s 
would continue in the pattern developed by the anti-Dreyfusards, but would evolve to meet the 
changing environment of the interwar years. During the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, the intellectual 
Right had been rejected by the Left as reactionary and excluded from the university system. In the 
1930s, the rise of fascism caused the French Left to see the Right not simply as backward but as a 
dangerous, “pre-fascist” threat. The Left consolidated its forces in a Popular Front and excluded all 
“fascist” intellectuals from public affairs in general. Resentful of this new, expanded ostracism, 
intellectuals like Bonnard and Fernandez sought not only a new path to the minds of the youth, but an 
alternative form of government and social organization. To gain authority, right-wing intellectuals 
engaged not only to combat the politics of anti-fascism and communism but to redefine intellectual 
identity according to right-wing ideals. The struggle to legitimize the right-wing intellectual and 
overturn the left-wing hegemony became a primary theme in their engagement that distinguished the 
tone and content of their work from that on the engaged Left. The intellectuals of the Right were also 
distanced from those of the Left by their emphasis on themes like decadence, True France, and the 
Real, and their visions of class cooperation, a hierarchy of elites, and Franco-German rapprochement. 
These distinctive right-wing values led not only to a right-wing model of true intellectual role and 
responsibility but also to the formation of segregated intellectual communities and networks to foster 
these values. Right-wing intellectuals were identified by their participation in certain parties, cercles, 
and movements, their appearance on certain manifests, and their relationships to certain journalistic 
and publishing networks. The right-wing collective identity fostered in these segregated spaces 
contributed to and was influenced by the Right’s perception of its relationship to the places of power 
and influence like the government, university, and international parties that affected daily intellectual 
experience. Together, these elements contributed to a distinctly right-wing concept of what it meant 
to be an intellectual and an alternative model of intellectual identity to counter that of the dominant 
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Left. This concept of the right-wing intellectual would evolve yet again after 1940 to address the 
changing place of the Right under German occupation. 
SECTION V 
 
THE OCCUPATION, 1940-1944 
 
The 1930s had been a time of great engagement for the intellectuals of both the Left and 
Right. The rise of fascist states in Europe had united the Republican Center and the communist Left 
in an anti-fascist front. And the increasing influence of communism in France brought together 
diverse elements of the Right against this front.  Both camps portrayed their struggle as the 
preservation of French values and active engagement became synonymous with intellectual 
responsibility on both sides of the political divide. The rising intensity of engagement led to an even 
more passionate struggle to control the identity of the legitimate intellectual. The Leftist front 
increasingly excluded the Right from not only the intellectual world but also the political affairs of 
the nation. In response to this increased marginalization, many young intellectuals of the Right began 
to actively promote an alternative political system for France, based on foreign fascist models, that 
was more in keeping with their ideological ideals. Although the declaration of war in 1939 and the 
subsequent 1940 invasion would momentarily bring together intellectuals from both sides of the 
political divide,718 the resulting occupation would violently re-divide the intellectual world to an 
extent previously unimaginable.  
The division of the French intellectual world during the years of the Occupation resembled 
that of the 1930s division between the “anti-fascists” and those opposed to the Popular Front. 
However, the new source of division, the choice to collaborate or to resist, evoked much stronger 
passions in an intellectual environment that was already strained by the events of the war, occupation, 
and censorship. During the Occupation, the resistance believed its opponents were traitors to the 
 
718 Intellectuals of the fascist Right like Brasillach found themselves fighting the German invasion 
alongside extreme Left intellectuals like Sartre. 
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intellectual ideals of the patrie, free thought, and human rights while the collaborationists viewed the 
resistors as saboteurs of French civilization’s last chance to renew itself and take its place in the new 
world order. There was a sense on both sides that an apocalypse for France was imminent. With this 
radicalized view of the danger posed by the opposing camp, differences in opinion were now 
reinforced with violence, denunciation, imprisonment, or death, making all previous intellectual 
differences and resentments, even those of the more volatile 1930s, seem like mere academic 
exercises. Never had it seemed so important for intellectuals to clarify the differences between the 
two camps and legitimize their own group as the nation’s rightful intellectual guides.  
These efforts to differentiate resistance and collaborationist concepts of intellectual identity 
during the Occupation were so effective that they have become one of the main obstacles to the 
integration of the Right into the intellectual narrative. The distinctive values, ideals, and behavior of 
the collaborationist intellectual, particularly given our understanding of the Holocaust, make it very 
difficult for historians to accept that the collaborationists believed they were acting in accordance 
with any intellectual ideal. Despite the presence of many recognized writers and artists on the 
collaborationist Right, therefore, the historical community has consistently struggled to reconcile the 
concept of the true intellectual with that of collaboration. For intellectual historians, the figure of the 
responsible French intellectual during the occupation can only be represented by the writers of the 
Resistance.  
Although they are not identified as such, it was the intellectual Right who served as the only 
authorized French intellectuals of the time. Both the German government in the North and Vichy in 
the South repressed and persecuted the intellectuals of the Republic and the Left and provided 
financial, material, and institutional support to the collaborationists. The Right dominated the 
authorized press, publishing houses, and even the university system and worked in tandem with a 
government that reinforced its values. Despite the fact that the structures of intellectual hegemony 
changed hands, the intellectual of the Right would still identify with the images and discourses of 
exclusion and struggle that had defined his identity during the previous decades. After so many years 
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of being considered anti-intellectual and excluded from cultural authority, the intellectual Right 
eagerly seized control of all aspects of the intellectual world, yet it never felt secure in its new 
position of power and continued to feel the need to justify its choice of intellectual collaboration as 
that of the legitimate intellectual. And, although the Resistance lacked the tools to dominate the 
intellectual world during these years, its clandestine, oppositional status during foreign occupation 
gave it newfound claims to moral superiority and patriotism. Therefore, this brief period of right-wing 
dominance during the Occupation continued the developing pattern of right-wing resentment, 
exclusion, and struggle for legitimacy.  
The months before and after the German invasion of June 1940 seem best described as those 
of indecision and chaos, particularly in the intellectual world. In the months leading to the phoney 
war, the intellectual Right had been staunchly Munichois and pacifist, leaving the bellicose 
nationalism to the communists. With the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, however, the committed 
communists suddenly lowered their objections. This led the Republicans to mobilize more urgently 
not only against the fascist Right but also their former allies from the Popular Front. Communist 
outlets like L’Humanité and the PCF were both banned by the government and remained clandestine 
operations that favored Germany and opposed both de Gaulle and the Allies until the German 
invasion of the USSR in 1941. With the declaration of war, several intellectuals of both the Left and 
Right, from Brasillach to Sartre, served in the military. Many of those on the Left who had opposed 
fascism in the 1930s like Aron, JR Bloch, and André Breton sought exile in America, England, the 
USSR, and even Brazil while others like Malraux and Gide simply fled Paris to the unoccupied South 
or the colonies. Those who remained in France, choosing to “wait and see” what the occupation 
would bring, were faced with decisions about collaborationism.  
The great majority who remained in France were neither ardent resistors nor collaborationists. 
For most, even in the intellectual world, life in occupied Paris and Vichy required an element of 
collaboration balanced by an element of resistance. On either extreme of this gray zone in the 
intellectual world, however, was a polarized minority of vocal intellectuals who spearheaded the 
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divisive struggle to monopolize true intellectual identity. The intellectual Resistance drew primarily 
from the anti-fascist camp of the 1930s, although the communist writers would not become a 
dominant force in the resistance until summer 1941. Intellectual resistance was achieved primarily 
through the clandestine press and the numerous small papers and rare literary journals that were 
published underground. As the Otto lists, which named the writers hostile to Nazi Germany who were 
to be excluded from publication, grew in length, writers of the Left increasingly turned to 
participation in the clandestine press. By the Fall of 1941, one of the earliest civilian resistance 
organizations, the Front national (FN), created a section for writers called the Comité national des 
écrivains (CNE). By the following year, it had formed its own literary journal, Les Lettres Françaises,
which would become the home of some of the most prestigious intellectuals of the communist and 
republican Left. The Resistance supported de Gaulle as the only representative of the French 
government, praised the Allies, and urged efforts of sabotage and resistance. By the Spring of 1942, 
the tide of war had turned and the Resistance gained increasing force and energy. With the fall of 
Mussolini, the landing of de Gaulle in Algeria, and the German defeat at Stalingrad, this new 
Resistance force began to envision itself as the victors. After 1943, they developed two new themes in 
their work: the construction of a post-Liberation France and the punishment of those, particularly the 
intellectuals, who had collaborated. 
Collaborationism was not completely synonymous with the intellectual Right of the 1940s 
since several intellectuals of the Right, even those who had been fascinated by fascism in the 1930s, 
were unwilling to accept fascism in the form of German occupation. However, the great majority of 
intellectuals of the extreme Right maintained their ideological trajectory and supported either the 
National Revolution of Vichy or the collaboration of the occupied zone. Those who chose to engage 
in the unoccupied zone, like Maurras, Massis, and Bonnard, were drawn by the ideas and the political 
and professional opportunities that Vichy offered to those intellectuals who supported its national 
revolution. They found Petain to be the Chef they had sought and believed Vichy was the incarnation 
of a French nationalist fascism. Those, on the other hand, who returned to Paris were disenchanted 
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with the more conservative Petain, although they admired his second in command, Laval. They 
advocated the cultural policies of Germany in France, as relayed to them by the cultural ambassador 
Otto Abetz, and supported Germany’s attempts to drain the men and materiel of France for its war 
efforts. The most committed among them advocated the shooting of resistance hostages and the 
deportation of Jewish families. Although there are numerous stories of collaborationist intellectuals 
like Brasillach and Drieu using their newfound political authority to secure the release of fellow 
intellectuals of the Left, more often the now dominant intellectual Right used their power to unleash a 
vendetta against their opponents. Collaborationist papers and publishers were the only ones reinstated 
in the occupied zone and those intellectuals who took the opportunity they provided accepted not only 
the financial backing of the Nazis but their censorship and political line as well, including biological 
racism. Although some collaborationists, like Drieu, recognized the impending defeat of Germany as 
early as 1943 and slowly withdrew from active collaboration, this would not erase their culpability in 
the eyes of the intellectual Resistance.  
The occupation turned the tables on intellectual hegemony, placing the previously excluded 
extreme Right in positions of cultural power and repressing the intellectual Left. However, this did 
not alter the struggle on either side to differentiate their intellectual values or to legitimize their 
intellectual model as the best for the French patrie and civilization. While the intellectual Right 
enjoyed a hitherto unknown dominance that came with supporting the party in power, the intellectual 
Left laid claim to patriotism, free thought, and the moral superiority of the oppressed opposition. As 
in previous times of crisis and engagement, both sides created intellectual communities and networks, 
public on the Right and clandestine on the Left, to help them carry out their struggle for intellectual 
legitimacy. Most importantly, both sides continued to develop severely disparate concepts of what it 
meant to be an intellectual.  
CHAPTER 13 
 
LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE OCCUPATION: RESISTOR 
INTELLECTUAL VALUES 
 
After the initial confusion of the occupation and the scattering of the intellectual community 
had subsided, “two attitudes became apparent: one either accepted or rejected the occupation.”719 The 
decision to join the intellectual Resistance or Collaboration must be attributed at least in part to the 
dramatic division in intellectual values between the two camps. In both the Northern and Southern 
zones, the Left-wing writers who would form the body of the intellectual Resistance quickly found 
themselves unwelcome in the places of intellectual power they had previously called home, from the 
university to the ministry to prestigious revues like the NRF. Even when their presence was not 
officially condemned, they felt, as the Right had for so many years, that their values were no longer 
represented there. These institutions that had defined left-wing intellectual identity for the first half of 
the century were now controlled by the collaborationists. The intellectual of the Left was forced to 
redefine intellectual identity as opposition to, rather than participation in, these traditional bastions of 
left-wing values.  
 Despite the new right-wing monopoly over political and intellectual institutions, the 
intellectual of the Left would continue to be marked by a certain confident mentality of engagement 
that, once again, the Right would not share. The Left believed that regardless of its clandestine status, 
it remained the intellectual authority for the public and that its values were inextricable from the 
popular concept of intellectual identity. As the first number of Combat confidently explained, the 
“majority of our patrie remains faithful to its traditions of honor and of liberty” and recognized its 
 
719 Sapiro, La Guerre des écrivains, 21. 
 
318 
intellectuals as those who defended these anti-fascist ideals.720 The intellectual Left felt certain that 
although the Right had displaced it from power, they had not replaced it in the French imagination. In 
fact, they were certain that their opposition to foreign occupation gave them a moral authority and 
patriotism that the Right could no longer claim. This moral superiority became essential to the Left’s 
new approach to engagement and redefinition of intellectual authority. As Sartre would later explain, 
those who opposed collaborationism came to believe that there was “a moral elitism of the 
Resistance” and that the war and the occupation “was gradually creating a new class of moral 
leaders” on the anti-collaborationist Left that would take over direction of France at the end of the 
war.721 
Although they were physically ostracized, the intellectual of the Left would not adopt the 
discourse of exclusion, resentment, and struggle for public legitimacy that had characterized the 
engagement of the Right. Resistance articles presented their authors as the legitimate, albeit 
displaced, authority and the spokesmen of the silent majority, instead of portraying them as a minority 
forced to struggle against a hostile, engrained nation-wide mentality. Rather than being preoccupied 
by their new exclusion from official positions of power, the intellectual Left redefined intellectual 
power as moral superiority and named themselves its only representatives. The Comité National des 
Ecrivains claimed in its 1943 manifest that it united “the intellectual elite of the entire nation” and 
“gave to the writers of France and to all its intellectuals the general mobilization of the mind against 
the Barbarians.”722 Ironically, while the Right enjoyed the role of the regime’s intelligentsia for the 
first time, they continued to conceive of their engagement as a struggle for legitimacy among a 
resistant public. And, while the Left was physically excluded from places of intellectual power, they 
continued to present their engagement as emblematic of the only recognized intellectual model. 
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 Intellectuals of the Resistance maintained their confident perception of unaltered authority in 
part because they continued to uphold many of the ideals that had become synonymous with 
intellectual responsibility since the Dreyfus Affair. The collaborationist Right’s belief in the cultural 
and intellectual benefits of Franco-German collaboration, their fascination with action and 
physicality, their belief that Realists accepted the occupation, and their concept of France as a 
component of the New Europe all clashed with the traditional elements of Republican and left-wing 
thought. By 1942, the republican and communist intellectuals engaged together once more, united by 
their opposition to the collaborationist Right and their shared values of rationalism, universalism, and 
a revived Jacobin nationalism.  
The intellectual stance that would most distinguish the resistors of the Left from their right-
wing peers during the occupation was the basic refusal of collaborationism. This anti-collaborationist 
identification was made clear in one of the first manifests of the Resistance that claimed to speak for 
the entire body of French intellectuals. “Against the bestial terrorism installed in our nation by the 
barbarian occupant,” the statement read, “we the intellectuals of France, writers, artists, 
professors…raise before French opinion and before the collection of the civilized world a solemn 
protest.”723 The manifest repeatedly emphasized that “the intellectuals of France” were defined during 
the Occupation by their refusal to collaborate, to publish, or even to accept the defeat. “We the 
intellectuals of France,” the manifest continued, “reject with scorn the shameful appeals of a 
cowardly submission.” The Right, it argued, partook in intellectual life as it had been reinstated and 
authorized by the Germans, which was an intellectual life that was really “a regime of terror installed 
under the cover of cultural ‘collaboration.” Instead, the intellectual as redefined by the Left would 
“take part in the liberating struggle,” putting their “knowledge, their art, and their authority in the 
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service of the immortal cause of the patrie.”724 Active anti-collaborationism was therefore the 
hallmark of the true intellectual.  
 Anti-collaborationism required a reconceptualization of the role of the intellectual during 
wartime. Some writers like Gide, Sartre, and Paulhan initially continued publishing in the occupied 
press in the belief that it was their responsibility as intellectuals to continue the cultural life and 
expression of France despite occupation. However, by the end of 1940, the intellectual Resistance had 
determined that the new role of the intellectual was to oppose this occupied press and declared that 
“all legal literature was treasonous literature.” The CNE in particular equated fascism and 
collaborationism with barbarism and the destruction of culture. It therefore made the role of the 
organization, and the responsibility of the intellectuals affiliated with it, the “anti-collaborationist 
struggle against the institutions, literature, and culture of collaboration as well as the individuals who 
collaborated.”725 While the Right argued that continuing to publish according to the German dictates 
was the only way to promote French culture in the new Europe, after 1940, the intellectual of the Left 
increasingly saw his duty as an intellectual to be refraining from publishing in the mainstream press. 
They would therefore turn to the clandestine presses where they could fully express their own values 
without fear of reprisal or censorship.  
Here in the clandestine press, the role of the intellectual as a writer was once again 
celebrated. The declaration of the role of the writer in Les Lettres Françaises read, “In this world of 
lies in which we are forced to live, our role as writers is to ‘shout the truth.”726 The professors of the 
university who rejected the intrusion of Vichy into the educational system also published a statement 
declaring the true role of the professor was “to take the necessary initiative and contribute by our 









intelligence, and to safeguard, complete, and orient the programs that the Nazis sabotage.”727 By 
1943, the CNE had solidified its position on the role of the intellectual and published its official 
manifest. “Do not listen to those who ask, what are we able to do, we are only intellectuals?” the 
manifest declared. Instead, “aid in all your means with your science and your intelligence in the 
sabotage of this monstrous collaboration.”728 The “intellectual at his post,” the manifest explained, 
was the one who participated in the battle to expel the German invader, not the one who withdrew 
from the struggle or, even worse, like the collaborationist intellectuals, accepted the German yoke.  
Intellectual opposition to collaborationism necessarily involved an opposition to the 
influences of Nazi and German culture in France. The Left, which had favored cosmopolitanism, 
internationalism, and the influence of German culture since the Dreyfus Affair, now found itself 
calling for pure French culture and intellectual patriotism while the Right called for Europeanism and 
cultural exchange with Germany. Borrowing from the vocabulary of the inter-war extreme Right, the 
Germans became the “barbarians” and the “Boches,” who had “stomped under foot all our intellectual 
patrimony.”729 All language of internationalism and Franco-German cooperation was replaced by a 
new left-wing nationalism and all previous admiration for German writers, musicians, and scientists 
evaporated in the Resistance press. As one resistance paper would explain, “our program, our 
tendency is summarized in our name, Valmy, the first victory of the Revolution against the 
Prussians.”730 The CNE, even after the return of the communist influence in 1942, would proclaim its 
role as “a movement created by intellectuals for intellectuals” to be “the grouping of all the French 
intellectuals around a single mission: the defense of the patrie and of its spiritual patrimony.”731 
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However, the collaborationist Right also presented its Franco-German collaboration and 
Europeanism as a broader form of French nationalism. It was therefore necessary for the Left to 
recapture its 19th century monopoly on nationalism by reviving an older form of the word more in 
keeping with its values. While the intellectual Right claimed to continue to represent French 
nationalism by collaborating with the Germans in order to create a new and stronger France, the 
intellectual Left reverted to a Jacobin inspired nationalism laced with the Revolutionary vision of 
True France. In this way, the Left made a concerted effort to monopolize the concept of French 
nationalism and True France, so valuable during wartime, for its own camp. “Do not be tricked,” read 
one manifest from 1941 that claimed to be the “spokesman for numerous intellectuals,” “do not be 
tricked by appearances, True France is not the minority which has supported if not provoked a 
capitulation without honor. It is not the journalists who today praise the vanquisher.”732 Instead, True 
France was the “man of thought, the writers, the universitaires, and savants, the representatives of the 
sacred tradition” of 1789 who had launched papers protesting collaboration and occupation. It was not 
the collaborationist “masters of the day” but the resistors who truly knew the “soul of the nation” and 
the best interests of France.  
The Left’s return to Jacobin nationalism was perhaps best revealed in its continuing 
identification with the universal absolutes of Revolution, the People, Democracy, and the Rights of 
Man at the foundation of the republican ideal. The Manifest of the Intellectuals in 1941 highlighted 
the Left’s defense of these absolutes as the major point of division between Right and Left. It 
declared that the struggle of collaborationists and anti-collaborationists was not a struggle in the 
traditional sense but rather a struggle between men who were “divided by esprit.” On one side were 
the traitors who had succumbed to the force of an anti-French ideology that negated the values on 
which the nation had been built, on the other were those “for whom truth, justice, tolerance, national 
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independence, love of peace, fraternity and humanity are the only world that is inhabitable.”733 Both 
communist and republican intellectuals alike turned to the symbols and discourse of the French 
Revolution in an effort to link democratic values and the promise of communist revolution to a 
historic and victorious France. “Tell them” Henri Laugier wrote concerning French publications in 
America, “that France has maintained her faith in the efficacy of the principles of 1789, of the 
Revolution, of the Rights of Man, of popular sovereignty and of free institutions.”734 The universalist 
vocabulary of individual rights, democracy, egalitarianism, tolerance, and revolution practically 
became a required element of any resistance article. “France,” one article in Franc-Tireur said, “has 
remained ardently and fiercely republican and searches no other doctrine than the Rights of Man so 
odiously derided by the so-called French government.”735 Because of this, it would be on the 
“republican idea, the new and true republican tradition, that France, delivered from the Nazis and 
from Vichy, would shape her future anew.”736 
The Left’s celebration of Enlightenment universals and their incarnation in the democratic 
system extended during the occupation to include praise for the representatives of democracy abroad 
from de Gaulle to America and England. While the intellectual Right was declaring the bankruptcy of 
western democracy and joining their anti-communism to an increasingly bitter anti-Americanism, the 
Resistance press had only praise for the English, American, and eventually Soviet allies. In keeping 
with the philosophy that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the intellectuals of the Resistance 
disposed of any previous anti-American or anti-British sentiments and renewed their former 
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support of all the Allies in a front reminiscent of the anti-fascist movements of the 1930s.738 There 
was less unanimity on the desirability of the Free French and de Gaulle but many of the resistance 
papers with the largest circulation and greatest longevity would be staunch supporters of both. Franc-
Tireur claimed General de Gaulle was the only person qualified to maintain order during the period of 
transition that would surely come after Liberation.739 Combat reminded readers that the Allies had 
recognized the Free French, not Vichy, as the official government of France in 1942.740 And 
Liberation consistently praised de Gaulle as the “anti-Petain” who was the true leader of France.741
Although admiration for de Gaulle was not unanimous, it remained a clear point of division from the 
intellectual Right for whom opinion on the “traitor” was quite clear.  
The intellectual Left also revived its longstanding association of intellectual identity with 
rational thought. During the years of the occupation, left-wing rationalism was highlighted by both 
camps as the counterpoint to the Nazi concept of intelligence as a product of irrational will, action, 
and sentiment. In particular, the Left emphasized its devotion to mental calculation and rational 
thought in order to distance itself from the fascist focus on the physical body as a source of 
inspiration. Action, the body, masculinity, and the “complete man,” who relied on sources outside the 
intellect, were important themes in the work of the collaborationist Right. The Left rejected these 
sources as anti-intellectual, “mystical,” and a “Barbarism” that was a “degradation of French 
thought,” specifically because these sources existed beyond the boundaries of rational analysis.742 The 
 
However, it is apparent that during the few years of the occupation, anti-American sentiment was, at least 
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Right welcomed this portrayal of fascism as irrational and mystical while continuing to see it as the 
only possible trajectory for French intellectuals. The Left’s emphasis on rational thought over 
irrational reaction also had important implications for left-wing intellectuals’ continuing opposition to 
anti-Semitism. Racism, even that purported to be scientific or biological, was identified by the 
intellectual Left as a strain of irrational thought that conflicted with the fundamental goals of the 
Enlightenment, and therefore with the French intellectual tradition. Although the Resistance did not 
always make the defense of the French Jews a central component of its work, its fundamental 
opposition to the idea of a racial elite served to distance its idea of responsible intellectual 
engagement under the occupation from that of the Right.  
Overthrowing the imposed values of the Nazis and creating an alternative became essential to 
the role and responsibility of the resistant intellectual. “Above all, the écrivains resistants believed 
that their task was to formulate moral ideals opposed to Fascism.”743 After they were formulated, 
Sartre explained, the responsible intellectual was required to act on these anti-fascist ideals by 
rejecting them in his work. The responsibility of the writer, he said, was to shed light on injustice, to 
stir the public to action, to demand human freedom and reject oppression. It was not possible, he 
clarified, to create good art that favored anti-semitism, imperialism, or oppression. Collaborationist 
writers like Drieu and Chateubriant who defended these fascist inspired programs, according to the 
Left, had betrayed their responsibility as intellectuals. Because of this, the intellectuals of the Left 
during the Occupation developed an important new theme in their engaged work and a distinctly 
“resistor” sense of purpose and role. Particularly after 1943, the intellectual of the Left was intent on 
outlining “the role that he might be able to play in creating a new France once victory had been 
achieved.”744 This involved not only redesigning the Republic for the post-war, but also punishing the 
intellectual traitors of the Right. 
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 The values and positions shared by the intellectual Resistance of anti-collaborationism, 
universalism, Jacobin nationalism, and rationalism would separate the resistant Left from their 
collaborationist peers. Their values provided them with a different concept of intellectual 
responsibility and role, a different representation of True France, different visions of the post-war 
world, and different allies in their struggle. These elements of intellectual identity were nurtured in 
the clandestine communities and networks that the Resistance created to combat the Right’s 
newfound monopoly over the traditional intellectual structures. 
 
The Intellectual World of the Left: Communities, Networks, and Intellectual Experience 
The occupation forced a complete “restructuring of the intellectual space” and yielded an 
intellectual environment in which the intellectual Left was forced to create new communities and 
formulate new practices for itself. The broad moral and ideological abyss that the intellectuals of both 
the Left and Right perceived between their two camps meant that these communities and networks 
created by the Left would be even more segregated and isolated from those of the Right than they had 
ever been before. Collaborationists would never have considered writing for the resistance papers, 
and the model Resistor, except during the initial period of confusion after the defeat, adamantly 
refused to participate in collaborationist circles. As resistant intellectuals gathered in this clandestine 
network and developed new intellectual practices amenable to the underground experience, they 
redefined for themselves what it meant to be a true intellectual under the Occupation.  
The Resistance intellectual communities created tight bonds of friendship, loyalty, and shared 
values between their members. There was a certain “resistance mystique of solidarity and 
camaraderie based on common danger” that many intellectuals had not found even in their inter-war 
engagement.745 The fraternity they found in clandestine communities and in the acts of literary 
resistance provided them with a previously elusive collective identity and a sense of greater purpose. 
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In Simone Beauvoir’s work Le Sang des Autres, the young intellectual dies happily at the end, her 
“search for identity ending with the revelation of Resistance solidarity.”746 For many besides 
Beauvoir, the experience of the clandestine intellectual resistance remained one of the happiest 
memories of intellectual life and they worked diligently to prolong its effects after the Liberation. The 
model of the Resistance community became a discursive theme in almost every essay published 
during the occupation on the ideal restructuring of society, politics, and class relations after the 
Liberation.747 The resistance community, which the Left idealized as a classless society without party 
divisions, political angling, or involvement by the Right, was to be the new model for “human 
relations in the new France.”748 When the Liberation brought these tightly linked and fiercely loyal 
communities into the open and returned them to dominance, they maintained their self-containment 
by excluding the intellectual Right.  
The principal organization of the intellectual Resistance was the Comité National des 
Ecrivains. The CNE was created in the occupied zone in the Fall of 1941 at the suggestion of Jacques 
Decour, a prominent resistor and editor of the pre-war AEAR organ Commune. It was to be the 
intellectual section of the civil Resistance movement the Front national de lutte pour l’independence 
de la France (FN). The FN was dominated by the Communists, but included Gaullists, republicans, 
and unaffiliated professionals and workers. The first committee of the CNE had seven resistance 
leaders including François Mauriac and Jean Guéhenno. A second section was created by 1943 in the 
southern zone at the suggestion of Aragon. Both sections drew from the experience and techniques of 
mobilization and organization learned during the anti-fascist crusades of the 1930s and provided an 
umbrella organization for resistors.749 
746 Ibid., 50. 
 
747 One resistor wrote “it was the only period of my life when I lived in a truly classless society.” Ibid., 49. 
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The CNE, unlike the FN and other early resistance movements that focused on acts of 
political and paramilitary resistance, was exclusively devoted to intellectual activities and to opposing 
the intellectual collaborationists. As the center of intellectual organization for the resistance, the CNE 
was able to “impose norms of conduct for writers” and define true intellectual identity in part by 
adherence to its programs.750 Its redefinition of intellectual norms and intellectual responsibility 
according to Resistance values, practices, and associations was an essential component of its attempt 
to recapture public opinion and earn international recognition.751 The CNE mobilized and organized 
the various left-wing intellectuals who had been excluded from their previous positions of dominance 
in the university or literary world. While protecting their anonymity, the CNE proclaimed these 
engagés to be the true and original intellectual representatives of France; displaced by anti-intellectual 
pretenders. By the Liberation, it claimed to have attracted over two hundred of these intellectuals to 
its ranks who might otherwise have remained isolated voices or never have engaged in the resistance 
on their own. In this way, the CNE worked to create not only a collective forum for more effective 
engagement but also a collective identity, as the legitimate intellectuals, for its adherents. 
Since engaged resistors were excluded from their strongholds in the university, the most 
effective tool of mobilization for the CNE and the intellectual Resistance was the newspaper or 
journal. The CNE’s official organ was Les Lettres Françaises. The journal would become the primary 
outlet for the prestigious writers of the resistance and would unite them in the resistance program as 
outlined by the CNE.752 Decour’s original manifest to the writers of France was prominently 
displayed in the first issue, published in 1942, and declared to its readers, “Lettres Françaises will be 
 
750 Ibid., 17. 
 
751 Its success in solidifying its own concept of intellectual responsibility as the true one can be gauged 
by its ability to conduct the post-war purges with little immediate reaction. 
 
752 The manifest of the CNE was published in the first authorized number of the journal in 1944. 
Decour had argued for the need for such an organ to be the voice of the CNE and by 1941 would bring in the 
former editor of the NRF, Jean Paulhan, to plan its realization. Decour’s arrest and execution, and the resulting 
fears that the journal’s contributors had been exposed, delayed the initial number of the journal. However, by 
September 1942, the first issue was published and distributed under the direction of Claude Morgan. 
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our weapon and through its publication we intend to take our place as writers in the struggle to the 
death waged by the French nation to free itself from its oppressors.”753 The claim to speak for the 
majority of the French nation against the minority of collaborators and the foreign occupiers would 
remain a central theme in all the articles of the paper for each of its nineteen clandestine issues.  
In its few pages, the writers created articles on the politics of the war, the movement of 
military forces, and the martyrs of the Resistance. However, the main force of the paper was in the 
struggle waged against its collaborationist opponents. Paulhan provided literary critiques that praised 
resistance writers and denigrated the work of “compromised” artists as that of a lower tier of writers. 
Sartre, Mauriac, and Morgan provided portraits of writers like “Drieu la Rochelle ou la haine de soi” 
that theorized on the psychological aberrations and treasonous intentions of the collaborationist 
writers. Most essays and literary critiques provided some sort of invective against the collaborationist 
press, the quality of its writers, and the constrained literature produced under foreign censorship. One 
article lamented, for example, “alas, there is not much left of what was fine in the NRF” under the 
new direction of Drieu.754 In contrast with this collaborationist work, Lettres Françaises consistently 
promoted literature written by its own network of authors, like Sartre’s Les Mouches and foreign 
literature by allied authors like Ilya Ehrenburg, as that of the real, untarnished literary elite. 
The writers who gathered together in the Lettres Françaises équipe included intellectuals 
who had been prominent and successful before the war and those who were coming of age during the 
occupation and would become significant forces in the post-war literary world. Here, anonymously, 
Aragon, Guéhenno, Paulhan, Mauriac, Cassou, Frenaud, Vercors, and even Julien Benda wrote 
alongside newcomers Sartre, Roy, and Camus. The CNE of the southern zone would also begin its 
own literary journal Les Etoiles with writers like Aragon, Emmanuel, Prévost, and Malherbe. By 
1944, it had added such notable voices to its pages as Schulmberger, Valéry, Duhamel, and the 
Tharaud brothers. Many of these same writers published work in other resistance papers linking the 
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resistance journalists in a large network united by anti-collaborationism. Combat, for example, which 
published 58 clandestine issues, employed the talents of Camus, Sartre, Gide, Raymond Aron, and 
eventually Malraux who all wrote for other Resistance papers as well. In addition to the continued 
publication of L’Humanité and Le Populaire, the Resistance message was carried by numerous new 
resistance papers. Défense de la France published 47 clandestine issues, Le Franc-Tireur put out 37,
and Liberation Sud and Liberation Nord circulated over 240 issues together. Intellectuals were 
particularly prominent in L’Universite Libre which was first published in 1943 by Sorbonne 
professors as the organ of the university resistance.755 
Resistance intellectuals in exile found communities in the Voice of America, BBC, and the 
Ecole des hautes etudes de New York.756 The journal La France Libre was an important literary 
community for several writers in exile including Bernanos, Aron, and Romains. Its first issue 
explained that its mission was “to undertake a crusade of ideas” that would struggle against the moral 
acceptance of defeat and restore a civilization founded on human liberty.”757 Like its hexagonal 
partners in the intellectual Resistance, France Libre claimed to represent the true intellectuals of 
France in order “to affirm the French intellectual presence to the world and exert an antidotal effect 
on the French.” Although it was published in London, was made available mainly in New York, 
Algeria, and Cairo, and only published an abbreviated version in France, it claimed to be the voice of 
true France and the true intellectual. As the self-proclaimed organ of True France, rather than the 
occupied and treasonous France, France Libre devoted many of its articles to defining the identity of 
the French nation. In particular, the writers here emphasized the democratic, revolutionary roots of 
national identity and added the tag line Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité to its journal title to remind readers 
of what they believed to be the true tradition of French political thought. 
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Resistance journalists saw their role as engaged intellectuals to be formulating and promoting 
the themes of the Resistance: opposition to German influences, opposition to collaboration and its 
supporters, and support for de Gaulle, republican ideals, and the Allied forces. These communities of 
resistance writers and the papers they produced were “journals of combat…they are the voice of the 
Resistance and express its point of view.”758 But these papers would have all had extremely limited 
circulations, reaching many fewer readers, had they not had the support of sympathetic publishing 
houses.  
Although Gallimard would survive the occupation with its reputation relatively untarnished, 
it was authorized to publish its catalog of pre-occupation writers only after agreeing to publish the 
new NRF under the direction of Drieu la Rochelle. It would remain a publishing house which was 
friendlier to anti-colaborationist writers like Aragon than any of the other authorized presses, but it 
was under strict censorship and would publish no “controversial” pieces. The truly oppositional 
works of literature and journalism were published by the Editions de Minuit. Minuit published 
Sartre’s Les Mouches, Guéhenno’s Dans la prison, and Vercor’s Le Silence de la Mer among other 
clandestine works. Unlike many of the other clandestine resistance operations, like the Bibliotheque 
française, which was a communist affiliated publishing house, Editions de Minuit remained relatively 
autonomous and independent of the communist influence. However, it remained open to all resistance 
authors and ideologies as long as they opposed the occupation and collaboration. Such sympathetic 
publishers were spaces of refuge for the resistance intellectual where his ideas and values were 
welcomed rather than persecuted and there was no fear that one would be turned over to the 
authorities by the publishers or the other contributors. 
The intellectual Resistance was not segregated from the larger intellectual structures of 
France by its separate, clandestine spaces and communities alone. The very act of writing, publishing, 
and distributing clandestinely in opposition to the occupying force and the official government 
resulted in dramatic changes in intellectual practice and behavior. These newly created behaviors and 
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the decisions they involved would make the experience of intellectual life on the Resistant Left much 
different from that of the collaborationist Right during the occupation, leaving two different 
conceptions of what true intellectual experience entailed during these years.  
 
The Resistance Intellectual Experience 
Once again, the relationships that intellectuals had to spaces of power in the government and 
university would impact their experience of daily intellectual life and their concept of what “being an 
intellectual” entailed. With the creation of Vichy and the occupation of the North, the 
collaborationists became the new intelligentsia and replaced the Left in positions of power and 
influence in the government and its university system. The Left was reduced to clandestine activity 
outside of and in opposition to its traditional institutions. This new set of relationships created a new 
set of practices and behaviors on the Left that became essential to the model of intellectual identity 
that they formed under the occupation.  
The intellectuals of the Resistance found themselves, for the first time, outcasts from the 
governing regime. They no longer had ties to the ministry, but more importantly, they could no longer 
identify themselves as the intellectual representatives and advisors of the Republic. Forced to redefine 
their authority and legitimacy for the public, the Resistance initially drew on the language of the 
extreme Right by proclaiming themselves the representatives of “the voice of Real France which is 
stifled by dictatorship.”759 However, as previously seen, this Real France bore little resemblance to 
the True France of the Right. After 1942, the language shifted to an association with the “government 
of France in exile” led by de Gaulle. An article in Combat reminded readers that the Free French was 
“the legal government of France” and its only independent and free representation.760 By allying 
themselves with de Gaulle, the intellectual Resistance was able to reassert its relationship to the 
French Republic and the government. According to the Resistance intellectuals, the government, like 
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they themselves, had been merely displaced, not replaced. However, this new allegiance made the 
resistance intellectual, more than ever, an enemy of the current regime. The experience of a political 
repression more severe than anything imagined by the pre-war Right would lead the Left to new 
practices and behaviors adapted to intellectual life underground.  
The new relationship of the Left to the University would also have important implications for 
intellectual practice and identity construction. Under the direction of Bonnard, Vichy’s Ministry of 
Education ejected communist, socialist, and Jewish universitaires and replaced them with 
collaborationists. Even the structure of the university underwent a right-wing reconfiguration as two 
new chairs with anti-Semitic themes were introduced to the Sorbonne. The university was no longer a 
welcoming space for the intellectual Left and the cultural authority associated with the universitaire 
was now extended to the extremists of the Right. Many left-wing universitaires did continue their 
work in education and even conducted clandestine resistance efforts from within. Contributors to 
Libre France, the “organ of French university forces,” made the recruitment of universitaires and 
students the primary focus of their engagement. Châteaubriant was incensed to discover that several 
members of his collaborationist community Groupe Collaboration were in fact devoted recruiters for 
the Resistance within the university. However, for the most part, the intellectual Resistance no longer 
associated intellectual identity with the life and practice of the universitaire. Instead, during this time 
of repression, they redefined intellectual identity according to new practices in journalism. 
Even before engaging in the active intellectual resistance, writers of the anti-collaborationist 
Left faced a difficult professional and moral decision about their role and responsibility as 
intellectuals that the collaborationists would not. Those who chose anti-collaborationism had to 
choose between continuing to write and publish their work and forgoing an open literary production 
while France was under foreign occupation. Especially in the early months of the occupation, before 
the clandestine press became a viable force, writers like Sartre and Gide were willing to continue 
publishing books and articles under the reauthorized presses. They believed that French intellectuals 
had a duty to produce literature to show the world and the French people that French civilization had 
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not been defeated. The same sense of a professional and moral imperative was found in the 
university. Writing, publishing, and teaching were essential to these intellectuals’ sense of role, 
responsibility, and identity and the decision to leave these spaces of intellectual legitimacy for exile 
or clandestine resistance was difficult to make. It was also difficult for many to withdraw from the 
literary and journalistic world since they knew that their places would be taken by less scrupulous and 
less talented writers eager to capitalize on the new demand for authors. The agonizing decision that 
many left-wing, anti-collaborationist intellectuals had to make between their art and their politics was 
a traumatic process that the pro-collaborationist Right did not have to experience. 
Once made, the decision to engage in active intellectual resistance yielded an entirely new set 
of practices and behaviors. One of the most tangible changes was the result of the material 
deprivation that clandestine publication entailed. Although the collaborationist Right had some 
material shortages due to the financial and material strain of the war, they were negligible compared 
to the shortages suffered by underground presses. Added to the material shortages were the limits 
placed on publication and distribution both by the rudimentary nature of the underground press and 
the fear of detection. One of the earliest resistance papers, Valmy, noted these initial hardships of 
setting up an underground publication. The director recalled that the paper had started as the 
publication of brief slogans passed hand to hand. Eventually it became a paper with several pages but 
was printed out of a resistor’s home on a child’s toy printing set. The first edition had only fifty 
copies and was passed hand to hand to prevent detection by authorities.761 Paper was perhaps the most 
vital and the most limited supply. While authorized collaborationist papers were receiving financial 
support from the Germans in the North and allotments of paper from the Comission de controle du 
papier d’edition in Vichy, the resistance papers were reduced to “requisitioning” paper from these 
larger journals. Because of this shortage, resistance papers usually only had two to four pages of 
much smaller size and were printed only on one side so that they could be posted for multiple readers 
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rather than individual consumption.762 Contributors were severely limited in their expression and 
most were forced to dispense with their stylistic prose in favor of terse, instructive pieces. Few 
journals were able to maintain even a consistent monthly schedule and many smaller papers were 
forced to shut down after only a few issues.763 The experience of intellectual life as one of instability 
and adaptation was a trait that resistance intellectuals came to identify as part of being a true 
intellectual under the Occupation.  
Although material difficulties forced new practices on the resistant intellectual community 
that dramatically changed the experience of book publication and journalism, perhaps the most 
significant change in intellectual experience was the new danger associated with these previously 
innocuous professional activities. The story of Decour’s arrest and execution, or that of the seven 
members of the Musée de l’Homme’s Résistance team of writers, would be repeated throughout the 
occupation. The Défense de la France network of writers had over a third of its three thousand 
members imprisoned, sent to camps, or executed.764 The Bernhard and Otto lists made quite clear 
what sort of literature would be punishable in these ways for both the writer and the publisher. 
Instructions for both distributors and readers of Combat made the danger and the necessary changes 
in intellectual practice clear. “Let us recommend to you the utmost caution,” it warned distributors, 
“distribute the newspaper as fast as possible, avoid keeping bundles of it at home, never write any 
name on a newspaper.”765 The danger of intellectual opposition severely affected how resistors were 
able to go about their daily life as intellectuals. All writers, even those like Raymond Aron who wrote 
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in exile, worked under pseudonyms or simply left their pieces unsigned. Meetings between 
publishers, editors, and writing staff that had once been occasions for weekly socializing, literary 
discussions, and mentoring of new writers became hurried, secret affairs. Paulhan opened the offices 
of the NRF to Lettres Françaises writers late at night and others met publishers secretly or in guarded 
and protected spaces. And writers and publishers were constantly forced to be suspicious, guarded, 
and extremely careful in all their literary activities since even the offices, studies, and libraries of 
private homes were not immune to search and seizure by the Gestapo or Milice. 
Intellectuals of the Resistance, therefore, found the experience of intellectual life under the 
occupation much different from their peers on the collaborationist Right. Physically they were 
scattered across France and the allied world, cut off from the traditional Parisian intellectual spaces 
and legitimizing cultural institutions they had once dominated. Professionally they found publication 
of books difficult to arrange and circulation of that work necessarily limited. Even expression through 
journalism was limited by available space in the severely abbreviated pages and the limited number of 
issues. Resistance writers therefore found that they could not say what they wished in the open, 
prestigious spaces they were accustomed to, that in the clandestine press their stylistic elements were 
cut for brevity, that they had few opportunities to publish, and that once published, they could not 
take ownership of their work. The danger of opposition under the occupation created a necessity for 
these clandestine, anonymous intellectual practices that severely altered the left-wing resistance 
writer’s concept of intellectual life and the experience of engagement under the occupation. It would 
create a very different concept of what it meant to be an intellectual, particularly among the 
generation of writers coming of age during the occupation, from that being formulated on the 
collaborationist Right. 
 
The Resistance Intellectual Model 
 Under the Occupation, the intellectuals of the Left found themselves, for the first time, 
excluded from their positions of dominance in the political field and in their traditional intellectual 
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institutions. These new relationships led to a redefinition on the Left of what the model of intellectual 
identity involved. The intellectual of the Resistance, despite repression, continued to believe the 
French public still accepted them as the only legitimate intellectual guides. This was in part due to 
their continued defense of the themes and worldviews, from universalism to Rationalism, that the Left 
had associated with intellectual responsibility and role since the Dreyfus Affair. Even a new emphasis 
on French nationalism was reconceptualized in the Jacobin, Enlightenment tradition to distinguish it 
from the nationalism of the Right. Under the Occupation, however, Resistance intellectuals no longer 
enjoyed positions of prominence and power in the intellectual communities, from the university to the 
NRF, that they had habitually dominated. Whether they were literally ejected by the 
Collaborationists, or felt isolated in the hostile environment, the intellectuals of the Resistance saw 
the need to create new communities and networks, most often underground, to organize their 
engagement and provide a collective socio-political identity. Belonging to these new communities 
would become an important part of the Left’s model of intellectual behavior under the Occupation. 
The Resistance intellectuals were distinguished by a confident approach to engagement, a certain set 
of left-wing cultural values, an association with organizations of the Resistance, and a new set of 
intellectual practices and experiences that were adapted to their new relationship to centers of power 
and intellectual life. These elements would be used to distinguish the “true” intellectual of the Left 
from the “collaborationist” of the Right and served as the foundation for the reconstruction of left-




INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE COLLABORATIONIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF 
PIERRE DRIEU LA ROCHELLE 
 
Pierre Drieu la Rochelle has perhaps been one of the most studied of all collaborationist 
intellectuals, second only to Robert Brasillach. This is due in part to the large body of work that he 
left behind and his overwhelming tendency toward introspection. Drieu seems to have written his own 
ideas and emotions into most of his fictional works and took great pains to explain his itinerary, 
thought process, and motivation in all of his politically engaged articles. Because of this, he is 
particularly well suited for any study of intellectual self-conceptualization and identity construction. 
His self-analysis and popularity among scholars, however, has not produced any real consensus on his 
trajectory toward collaborationism. In many ways, Drieu must be considered an eccentric individual 
whose motivations make him a poor representative for his intellectual peers. However, the desire for 
legitimacy that he expressed, the intellectual and political values that he promoted, and the 
communities that he engaged in during the Occupation were representative of a broader intellectual 
trend among the collaborationist Right and make him an important spokesman for intellectual identity 
construction during this time. 
 Drieu was born in 1893 to a religious, conservative, and bourgeois family that he would 
eventually come to despise. After a less than impressive scholarly performance at the Sorbonne, 
Drieu enlisted in the military to fight in World War I. Here he found the camaraderie and the active 
engagement in the world around him the he believed made of him not an abstract and isolated 
individual but a complete man.766 Even after being wounded, he still found war to be a necessary 
 
766 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Chronique politique, 1934-1942 (Paris: Gallimard, 1942), 3. 
 
339 
experience for all men and nations that tested their strength by destroying their decadence and 
individualism.767 After the war, Drieu joined the Dadaists and forged a personal friendship with Louis 
Aragon. However, after Aragon turned to communism, Drieu would break publicly with the group 
and personally with Aragon. During the 1920s, he was drawn toward Action Française royalism only 
to be disappointed in integral nationalism.  
 Integral nationalism was inappropriate for modern times in which the struggle against 
American and Soviet powers, he predicted, would necessitate a European union based on 
autonomous, but cooperative nationalisms.768 This European union would need the guidance of a 
strong France but also the force of the new fascist Germany. Drieu began his infatuation with fascism 
and Germany in 1934 when he traveled there and met Otto Abetz at a meeting of the Sohlbergkreis, a
movement that sought Franco-German cooperation. During this time, Drieu wrote the articles that 
would become Socialisme Fasciste and publicly announced his sympathy for the fascist ideology. In 
his search for a French version of the fascist alternative, Drieu was drawn to the PPF of Doriot. From 
1936 to 1938 he would be the ideological voice of the PPF and would form strong bonds with fellow 
PPF intellectuals Ramon Fernandez, Abel Bonnard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Alfred Fabre-Luce, and 
Georges Suarez.  
 By 1938, Drieu had become disgruntled by the PPF’s failure to take action and to build a 
strong fascist France that could be the partner of Nazi Germany. By 1939 he had resigned. With the 
declaration of war in 1939, Drieu tried to gain a post as a liaison officer with the British or a cultural 
diplomat to Spain, but his previous admiration for fascism prevented both. After briefly considering 
flight to England and suicide, Drieu chose to remain in Paris and attempted to work with the German 
victors to bring about the equal cooperation he had envisioned. With this goal, he found Paris, rather 
than Vichy, allowed him the greater freedom of expression and possibility to effect real cultural 
liaison. Because of this, he turned down a position as Censor of Literary Production in Vichy to write 
 




in occupied Paris. During the occupation, Drieu wrote for Châteaubriant’s La Gerbe, the PPF’s 
Emancipation Nationale and La Révolution Nationale, and Brasillach’s Je Suis Partout. Abetz 
offered him the direction of the newly re-staffed and now authorized NRF. Although Drieu attempted 
to keep several of the original NRF staff, including Gide and Paulhan, he would effectively turn the 
revue into a voice of collaborationism.  
 Drieu had not previously shown anti-Semitic tendencies and had been married to French 
Jewess Colette Jeramac, but he would quickly accommodate himself to the biological anti-Semitism 
of the collaborationist press. He had never considered the Jews to be fully assimilated Frenchmen and 
believed they were excessively modern, cosmopolitan, and bourgeois and therefore a danger to his 
vision of France. Because of this, his writings on French culture, European collaboration, and the 
fascist political vision tended to dovetail with the required anti-Semitic tone of the time.769
By 1943, however, Drieu had become dissatisfied with the Nazis. He had not found the equal 
partnership for France that he had sought and Germany appeared to be steadily losing ground to 
America and the USSR. In 1943, he shut down publication of the new NRF and, although he would 
continue to write for other collaborationist journals, reduced the level of his engagement. After two 
suicide attempts in the summer of 1944, Drieu succeeded in ending his life in March 1945 in order to 
avoid a summons to appear before a Liberation tribunal. Several historians have attempted to see his 
despair over collaborationism in these final years as a statement of his rejection of fascism and even a 
new respect for communism, but his secret diary of these final months indicates differently. To the 
end, although he recognized that they had triumphed, Drieu maintained his opposition to communism 
and democratic republicanism and, despite its failure, maintained his devotion to the fascist ideal.  
 The scholarship on Drieu reveals the continuing resistance by the historical community to 
recognize intellectuals of the Right, particularly during the occupation, as legitimate, though different, 
representatives of intellectual identity. Golsan has rightfully attributed this to an inability by scholars 
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to bridge the “insurmountable abyss” that has been arranged between fascism on one hand and culture 
on another.770 As such, the concept of a fascist, much less a collaborationist, intellectual is untenable. 
The earliest work on Drieu, by Resistance intellectuals eager to explain collaborationism as 
intellectual irresponsibility or psychological aberration, reduced his ideological attachments to 
political expediency, professional opportunism, suicidal tendencies, and a pathological loathing of 
himself and his intellectual class.771 Since these Liberation era assessments, scholarship on Drieu has 
progressed surprisingly little.772 However, the perception of an abyss between collaborationism and 
intellectual identity is not a product of post-war historical scholarship alone, but a continuation of a 
century-long left-wing dominance over the idea of the intellectual. Drieu struggled to define himself 
as an intellectual against what he perceived to be an ingrained association. It is necessary to recognize 
Drieu’s own claims to intellectual identity, his resentment of left-wing hegemony, and his distinctly 
collaborationist model of intellectual role and responsibility.  
 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
 During the interwar period and particularly the years of the Popular Front, intellectuals of the 
Right had not only felt excluded from the centers of intellectual power and legitimacy like the 
university but from the larger arena of moral and political affairs. Drieu and his fellow 
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collaborationists entered into the intellectual world under this left-wing hegemony and would carry 
the resentment and sense of oppression that it fostered in them long after 1940 when the literal 
domination of the Left ceased. Identifying with the oppressed minority had become second nature to 
the point that, although they reveled in their newfound cultural and political dominance, they found it 
hard to discard the discourse and behavior of their decades-long struggle. Drieu expressed quite well 
the feeling shared by many collaborationists that, despite their new positions of power in the 
intellectual field, they still faced an uphill battle to change the mindset of the French people. He 
believed the public had not only been predisposed over the century to favor left-wing values and 
political views, they had been taught to look to the Left for their intellectual guides and to view the 
Right, particularly the fascist Right as anti-intellectual. In response, Drieu adamantly proclaimed 
himself both an intellectual and a collaborationist, especially after the Liberation denied this duality.  
 Drieu’s belief in the necessity of a continued struggle for legitimacy was based in great part 
on his concept of the world prior to the 1940 defeat. For Drieu, the dominance of the republican 
ideals, communist influence, and left-wing intellectual milieu had been so complete before 1940 that 
nothing short of a complete revolution in thought, not just personnel, could unseat it. He recalled his 
personal experience of this left-wing hegemony saying, “Ever since I returned from the other war, I 
had suffered censure. At times I didn’t even write the articles, I knew so well that they wouldn’t be 
published. Between 1920 and 1930 I was a sleepwalking journalist—I could not write during the day 
so I wrote in my sleep.”773 He had had to use “intrigue,” he said, simply to break into the “enthroned” 
journals like NRF. Once he had “broken in,” however, he felt excluded and unwanted. By 1940, 
resentful of this continued lack of welcome, he wrote, “I have decided to no longer set foot in the 
NRF where the Jews, the Communist sympathizers, the former surrealists and all sorts of men who 
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believe in the principle that ‘the Truth is on the Left’ dominate.”774 Yet, for Drieu, this frustrating 
experience of intellectual exclusion had been only the sign of a more sinister hegemony by the Left. 
This dominance was not one of individual censors but of a broad public mindset that was now 
so ingrained that it resulted in a type of public autocensure. “The France which had read Sorel, 
Barres, Maurras, Peguy, Bernanos, Celine, Giono…was not strong enough to impose itself on the 
France which had read Anatole France, Duhamel, Giradoux, Mauriac, and Maurois,” Drieu 
complained. “What is one able to do with a people made morons by two centuries of rationalist and 
individualist teaching?”775 Several times he noted that France “is entirely what its educators have 
made it” and lamented the fact that these educators were the “pacifist and the antimilitarist, the 
atheist, and the petty socialist” who had instilled their “sclerotic, rationalist values” in the people from 
youth.776 Even the triumph of fascism would not turn them to the ideas of the Right if the Right did 
not continually struggle to legitimize these ideas and destroy the invisible dominance of the Left. 
Initially, Drieu had hope that Vichy would win this struggle. “Vichy works hard,” he wrote, “Vichy 
beats itself against a world of perfidious difficulties, against a hell of evil wills.”777 But, he soon came 
to realize, the long held “prejudices” of the public could not be changed by Vichy since even the men 
of Vichy had been formed in part by left-wing republican values and unseen communist influences. 
“Vichy is very poor and very sad,” he would eventually conclude, “This old France of the Right, all 
used and eaten away by the long submission to the prejudices of the Left, has tried to replace this 
France of the Left, but the replacement has the same defects as the predecessor.”778 Even Vichy had 
not been able to shed its invisible, ingrained, left-wing tendencies in order to become fascist. 
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Perhaps Drieu’s most blatant expression of resentment of the Left’s entrenched monopoly 
over thought was reserved for his private journal. The Left, he wrote, which was composed of 
“radicalism, socialism, and communism at the same time,” was “a little milieu full of arrogance and 
of self-importance which thinks it holds the monopoly on intelligence, on art, on everything.”779 
Against this monopoly, Drieu wrote, “I am on the alert, on the defense against the dominant prejudice 
which is the prejudice of the Left, a prejudice accumulated in my nation for more than two 
centuries.”780 And although “the majority of the French have made it a habit to always think and to 
feel in this direction,” Drieu accepted that it was his duty, as an intellectual opposed to this dominant 
mindset, to reorient their thought toward fascism and collaboration. In this endeavor, he believed, he 
was in the intellectual minority despite the opportunities for a tangible dominance over the field that 
the Occupation provided.  
By seeing and portraying himself as a representative of the oppressed, vilified, and even 
martyr-like minority, despite the power that the occupation provided for his views, Drieu was able to 
continue to identify with the right-wing discourse of exclusion and isolation and see himself still as 
the misunderstood prophet. “I am always found in the opposition,” he wrote, “This is the proper place 
for the intellectual…there is always a majority among the intellectuals, I am content to always be 
against this majority.”781 Drieu wrote that, far from seeing the occupation as an opportunity to be part 
of the dominant majority, he had always known that he would be in the minority by accepting 
collaborationism. “When I returned to Paris in the end of August 1940,” he explained, “I said to 
myself that I would never write in the Parisian press- one would detest me too much in my quarter. A 
month later I took an article to Châteaubriant—his solitude had attracted me. Never will men pardon 
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us for this trait of non-conformism.”782 His intellectual responsibility to be the prophetic voice of the 
minority, according to Drieu, had trumped his desire to be adored by the people. Conformity during 
the occupation, Drieu wrote, far from being an acceptance of fascism and collaborationism, was 
actually Resistance which “conserved the old forms of the spirit of the literary Left.”783 The true 
avant-garde of thought, and therefore the intellectual pariahs, were, according to Drieu, still on the 
Right. 
The image of the prophet in his hometown was one that Drieu returned to consistently in 
order to identify himself as the intellectual leader against a hostile mindset. “It is necessary to give up 
being politically linked in the present to accept the position of prophet,” Drieu wrote of his own 
feeling of isolation from the majority thought of his time. “I have truly been a prophet,” he wrote, “in 
reading the prophets, I discover that they were ‘collaborationists,’ they knew that all of a certain form 
was lost” and sought to lead the people toward the new horizon.784 The image of himself as “prophet” 
not only encouraged Drieu’s perception that he was oppressed in a world predisposed against his 
values, it also lent a moral quality to his new concept of the role and duty of the intellectual. He wrote 
in his post-Liberation self-defense statement that “the main reason I was hated” was because he 
accepted the reality of French weakness in the world. “It was natural that I should be hated,” he wrote 
piously, “and an intellectual worthy of the name has no alternative but to put up with hatred as 
stoically as possible; his duty is to continue in his thankless task.”785 The responsibility of the 
intellectual, as conceived by Drieu and the Right, was to point out the failures of the status quo and 
design radical alternatives that would not earn immediate public acceptance. He continued, “I came to 
Paris in 1940 fully determined to break with the vast majority of French opinion for a long time to 
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come…despite my fears and my hesitations I forced myself to do what I thought was my duty.”786 By 
placing intellectual responsibility on the side of the collaborationists and claiming that it was they, 
rather than the resistance, who were hated during the occupation years, Drieu was able to envision 
himself as the morally superior prophetic martyr. It was the invisible but dominant hand of the 
intellectual Left, in this scenario of the occupation, that remained the hegemonic power. 
The self-portrayal of collaborationists as a minority against the engrained and still dominant 
ideology of the Left may have been a device that allowed them to return to the comfort of their 
decades-long discourse of exclusion and resentment. Or, it may have truly been the way that the 
collaborationist Right perceived the task of converting the public to fascism. Either way, the 
perception that their new control of the intellectual field would not be accepted as legitimate by the 
public, led intellectuals like Drieu to proclaim more than ever their right to the title and role of the 
intellectual. His written self-defense began with a single statement of his most intimate identification: 
“I am an intellectual.” He continued by explaining that he remained both an intellectual and a 
collaborationist throughout the occupation and that these were not mutually exclusive terms as the 
Resistance intellectuals had claimed. “I do not plead guilty” he wrote of the charges of intelligence 
with the enemy and treason, “I believe that I acted as an intellectual and a man, a Frenchman and a 
European should have acted.”787 In his peroration he continued this line of defense by beginning, “I, 
the intellectual, acted perfectly consciously according to the idea that I had formed of the duties of an 
intellectual.”788 
In claiming the title in this way, Drieu needed to also explain his distinctly right-wing 
concept of the role and duties of the intellectual and how this, unlike the concept on the Left, was able 
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beyond the event, to take risks, to try out the roads of History…to be outside the crowd.”789 This duty 
required the intellectual to step outside the ivory tower and experience life as a complete man, rather 
than as a theoretician like the Marxists did. “In order to ‘look’ the best,” he wrote, “I should have 
situated myself at the lowest level, been a pure intellectual, purely contemplative, entirely 
disincarnated.”790 This “action” and submersion in life of the Right was, Drieu believed, entirely 
foreign to the intellectual Left whom he accused of abstract intellectualism. “I say,” Drieu warned 
these intellectuals of the Left, “you will sleep and you will die as democrats and liberals or you will 
awaken, rise, and triumph as fascists.”791 Intellectual theory might produce beautiful ideas he wrote, 
but this was not the place of the true intellectual in a time of crisis. “In times of crisis,” he explained, 
“it is the least of the duties of the intellectual who wishes to remain in some measure a man to expose 
himself…to anger and hatred.”792 This meant actively exploring the “roads” offered by unpopular 
ideas like fascism and participating in their incarnation. “I wanted,” Drieu explained of his concept of 
role, “to make myself the intellectual counselor of that which was: a world on the path to 
metamorphosis.”793 In short, it was to be actively engaged in the political path which seemed best for 
the future of society and to help bring about the renewing change. For Drieu, the path was fascism 
and the responsibility: collaboration.  
Drieu and his peers on the collaborationist Right actually dominated the intellectual spaces 
and structures of occupied France and forced the resistant Left underground through persecution, 
censorship, and intimidation. This was a position they had not enjoyed since the Dreyfus Affair and in 
many ways they seemed unable to believe their fortune. Although they could not claim actual 
exclusion or minority status in the intellectual field, they made every effort to identify themselves in 
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this way. Their struggle for legitimacy, as Drieu explained, was no longer against a hegemony of left-
wing personnel but against the continuing dominance of left-wing values, political ideals, and 
representations of true intellectual identity. As their right-wing predecessors had, the collaborationists 
attempted to outline their own model of intellectual identity by differentiating, yet legitimizing, their 
alternative intellectual values.  
 
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Realism and “the Body” 
 For Drieu, the role and responsibility of the intellectual was not tied to the rational thought or 
“pure intellectualism” that he associated with the Left, but rather to participation and experience in 
the real world. This demanded the intellectual have a certain predisposition for action and force and 
an appreciation of the physical, corporeal elements of man. Drieu’s fascination with the “Body” and 
the fascist complete man were emphasized by the Resistance as indications of his irrational and anti-
intellectual engagement. However, according to Drieu, the right-wing intellectual did not disdain the 
things of the mind but rather sought to merge thought and action, mind and body into a harmonious 
existence reminiscent of the Greek ideal. He believed the Left’s reliance on intellect and rationalism 
had divorced it from the physical reality and created an imbalance that led toward cultural decadence. 
It was the role of the intellectual, as conceived by the collaborationist Right, to restore balance by 
reintroducing the physical element and renewing and rejuvenating man and his sources of inspiration.  
Since the Dreyfus Affair, the intellectual Right had insisted that they alone were able to meet 
the needs of real society. Drieu saw realism to be an integral part of his new model concept of the 
fascist intellectual that separated it from the intellectual of the Left.  His autobiographical character 
Gilles explained that he “had a horror of the attitude of the intellectuals who oppose to social life, 
such as it is, one knows not what abstraction of it.”794 Instead, he spoke of the “true French reason” 
which was not abstract rationalism but rather a complete intelligence that “embraced all the elements 
 
794 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Gilles (Paris: Gallimard, 1939), 384. 
 
349 
of the being” that were offered by both the abstraction of the soul and the physical realities of the 
body.795 Unfortunately, Drieu complained, the intellectual Left took great pains to portray the 
intellectual who was in touch with this reality as un-intelligent and anti-intellectual. “It is a great 
political trick in France to leave the impression that the adversary is not intelligent,” Drieu explained, 
“The popular front treated the fascists of France and the fascists of other countries as imbeciles. But 
what is it to be intelligent? It is not showing how agile one can be at picking dry notions off a tree; it 
is the gift of wresting from the universe the most constant means of living largely.”796 He argued that 
according to the Left, those who favored the physical world, concrete experiences, and the sentiments 
born from active engagement were no longer intellectuals. In actuality, Drieu wrote, this supposed 
anti-intellectualism gave them the only intelligence worthy of guiding the people: a knowledge of 
their needs and of the real paths possible to achieve them.  
In practice, this connection to the real and rejection of left-wing rationalism meant that the 
responsibility of the intellectual was to accept the world “as it is” rather than “as it could be.” During 
the occupation, this meant accepting the realities of the defeat, of the invasion, and of the occupation. 
It was the role of the intellectuals not only to collaborate themselves, but to urge the general public to 
cooperate. Resistance, according to Drieu, was simply a return to the void verbalism and abstract 
utopianism that had characterized the intellectual Left for decades. “What matters today,” Drieu wrote 
in the first months of the occupation, “is not what the French say, it is what they do. They collaborate. 
Repair roads and bridges—rebuild France. English radio is pretty but it is for those who have nothing 
to do. It has little to do with the reality, with the immediate French reality, with the question of life or 
death for the men, women, and children of this nation.”797 According to Drieu, the intellectual Left 
proved its idealism and detachment from the concrete realities of life by refusing to accept the 
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parameters imposed by occupation. Instead, the responsible intellectual of the occupation, according 
to Drieu’s concept, had a duty to involve himself in the “ugliness” of reality in order to make the best 
of it. “One must assume one’s responsibilities,” he wrote in his post-Liberation defense, “join impure 
groups, acknowledge that political law obliges us to accept contemptible or odious allies. We must 
dirty our feet, at least, but not our hands. And this is what I did.”798 According to Drieu’s concept of 
identity, although collaboration had “dirtied his feet,” he had been acting as a responsible intellectual 
by accepting and engaging in the real circumstances of the time. 
 The right-wing intellectual’s romance of realism also informed his sense of intellectual 
inspiration and intelligence. The real or complete man, who was to be the model for both society and 
the intellectual, was not a rational abstraction or an intellect divorced from physical, bodily 
experience, but rather an amalgam of the intellectual and the physical. Intelligence, therefore, needed 
to draw from both the rational thought of the mind and the experience and sensation of the body. The 
Left rejected these latter irrational sources of intelligence as “anti-intellectual,” but Drieu believed 
them to be a truer expression of intellectual life. Because of their devotion to Enlightenment 
rationalism, Drieu believed, the Left ignored the full spectrum of intelligence that the Right 
appreciated in the complete man.   
Drieu’s vision of the complete man was the foundation for his concept of fascist intellectual 
identity. In clear contrast to the abstract intellectuals of the Left, whom Drieu accused of mental 
asceticism, the fascist intellectual model combined intellectualism and action.799 This would be the 
message of his L’Homme à cheval. “Men of action are important only when they are sufficiently men 
of thought,” he wrote, “and men of thought are only valuable because of the embryonic man of action 
they carry within themselves.”800 The true intellectual represented in the work was drawn to the 
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“heroic form” of the Chef and fulfilled his responsibility and role by actively aiding the leader to 
accomplish change. For Drieu, the true intellectual spoke not from an intellectual assessment of life, 
but rather from the passionate and emotional involvement that came from the combination of thought 
with revolutionary action.801 In short, Drieu’s concept of the true intellectual would “combine the role 
of the pure intellectual with that of the man of action.”802 According to the intellectual Right, fascist 
action was not anti-intellectualism or “opposition to thought, but rather a new thought substituting 
itself for an old thought.” And the new fascist thinkers were not anti-intellectualists or opposed to 
culture, but were rather “extraordinary thinkers who by tying up thought in their action reinforce this 
thought rather than isolating and weakening it.”803
For Drieu and many of his collaborationist peers, the desire to celebrate both the intellect and 
the bodily sources of intelligence and culture led to a new, fascist-inspired discourse of “the Body” 
that would not be shared on the Left.804 Among the collaborationists, the Body became a device to 
critique the values of the Left, to justify anti-Semitism and misogyny, and to create an image of the 
new virility they envisioned for France. According to Drieu, the “French national body,” which was a 
product of each individual body in the nation, had been a strong and healthy organism during the 
Medieval Age thanks to the celebration of both the spiritual and the physical in that time. After the 
Enlightenment, however, the intellectual Left had devalued physical action and force in favor of 
rationalism. As a result, the individual body had been deemphasized in education and culture and the 
national Body had been weakened. In contrast to the “New Man” or “Hitlerian Man” developed by 
the rest of Europe, Drieu wrote, “France has created its opposite: a nation of sitters, Pernod drinkers, 
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babblers in committees.” This ignorance of the body, initiated under the Enlightenment, was fostered, 
he continued, by the “teachers, professors, and intellectuals who directed the political majority in 
France through the freemasons, radical and socialist parties.” Because of this asceticism and 
“condemnation of the physical by the old, deranged world of the intellectuals of the Left,” France was 
weakened in comparison to her European neighbors.805 It was the duty of the intellectual to lead 
France toward a reintegration and celebration of the body that would eventually strengthen the body 
of the nation as a whole. 
The focus that Drieu and many of his collaborationist peers gave to the fascist cult of the 
body influenced their conceptions of gender and masculinity in a way that would distance them even 
further from the intellectual Left.806 For Drieu, women and the femininity they represented were a 
constant presence in his life as wives, mistresses, and affairs yet never as friends, equals, or 
professional peers.807 “For years after the other war,” he wrote during the occupation, “one might 
have thought I was especially interested in women. In fact I was much more interested in men. For 
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me the drama of friendship between men is the whole heart of politics.”808 Drieu’s preference for 
masculine friendships and environments was amplified by his increasingly negative view of women. 
His literary portrayal of women, from Myriam and Dora in Gilles to Camilla and Conchita in 
L’Homme à cheval, reveal his relative misogyny. According to Drieu, women were focused on their 
own narrow personal ambitions and did not understand the larger implications of politics, war, or 
revolutionary action. As such they could not be taken seriously as intellectuals, journalists, business 
owners, or political activists but only as mothers, wives, and domestic caretakers. He was particularly 
incensed against women because he viewed them, like he did purely rationalist intellectuals, as the 
antithesis of the healthy, strong body that he found essential to the creation of the complete man. 
Drieu’s concept of the gulf existing between regenerative, active masculinity and decadent, inert 
femininity was one which was reinforced and exacerbated by his engagement in fascism and 
collaborationism.  
Drieu’s understanding of France as an organic national body, that was a product of all the 
individual Frenchmen, would also inform his anti-Semitism. Collaborationist anti-Semitism marked a 
clear separation in the values and worldview of the intellectuals of the collaborationist Right and the 
resistant, anti-fascist Left during the occupation.809 Although initially Drieu was resistant to Nazi 
ideas of biological racism, he and his collaborationist peers continued a right-wing intellectual 
tradition, stretching back to the enracinement of Barrès, of seeing Jews as foreign elements within the 
French national body that corrupted its purity.810 With this intellectual heritage, the extreme Right 
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was more susceptible to the racist philosophies of the Nazis than the Center and Left. By 1940, Drieu 
had settled into a firm language of anti-Semitism that, while not biological, was clearly connected to 
his ideas of decadence, renewal, and the need for a healthy French body. In keeping with a right-wing 
tradition stretching back to Barrès, Drieu believed Jews were only French by assimilation and 
therefore remained a foreign element in the national body. They were connected to the decadence, 
rationalism, materialism, modernism, and liberalism that he believed were at the root of French decay 
and therefore their removal would be the first step in the return to health.  
Although the majority of Drieu’s journalism remained surprisingly free of radical anti-
Semitism, his private journal during these years reveals a more sinister form of anti-Semitism that 
tended to distinguish the collaborationist intellectuals. He suggested in the journal that one could 
avow a sort of “intelligent anti-Semitism” which recognized that Jews were deprived of taste and 
intelligence and therefore incapable of being artists or writers. Those who infiltrated the literary world 
ruined it with their self-interest and their “insufficiency in handling the treasures of the French 
tradition.” Benda, for example, was a pedant and Suares a false genius.811 They were also all, he 
insisted, drawn to communism and therefore incapable of leading French to political health.812 
Despite this unsuitability, Drieu complained, the Jews had, before the war, taken command of all the 
revues and publishing houses and had kept those writers, like himself, who spoke the truth about the 
fascist revolution from publishing their work.813 It was no different in the rest of the intellectual world 
from political administration to the Sorbonne, to the field of Medicine. Therefore, while the anti-
fascist Left showed appreciation and support for Jewish intellectual talent and rejected the language 
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as well as the sentiments of anti-Semitism, the Right identified the Jews as a foreign, hegemonic 
presence in the body of France that needed to be “surgically removed.”  
 Drieu’s argument that he had acted as a responsible intellectual during the occupation was 
based in great part on his belief that it was the role of the intellectual to work within the existing 
reality, to promote a concept of intelligence drawn from both physical and intellectual sources, and to 
actively engage in the strengthening of the French body. This perspective on intellectual identity 
enabled him to rationalize his seemingly anti-French and anti-intellectual anti-Semitism, misogyny, 
glorification of action and physicality over intellect, and acceptance of the occupation and 
collaboration as essential to his role as a French intellectual. 
 
Europeanism 
 Drieu and many on the collaborationist Right believed that, after 1940, the age of the 
independent nation state had been replaced by the new age of the European union. This shift would 
mark an important evolution in the thought of the intellectual Right which had for decades associated 
their identity with nationalism and the protection of the French patrimony. As the Resistant Left 
adopted the discourse of nationalism to their own Jacobin tradition, the intellectual Right sought to 
explain its new attraction to Europeanism as an expanded form of nationalism that was more viable in 
the post-1940 global community. The Right argued that the idealists of the Left, because they were 
detached from the reality of France “as it was,” were unable to see the necessity of working within 
this new European conglomerate and so clung stubbornly to patriotic nationalism or communist 
internationalism. In particular, the Resistance intellectuals, Drieu wrote, failed to see the result of 
their outdated nationalism would be either victimization by America and England or by the USSR. “It 
is this that our brave men in the resistance do not understand,” Drieu wrote of this end result, “they 
live still in the anachronistic vision of a world where each state lives isolated and ideally 
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sovereign.”814 As the prophets of a better way, the intellectuals of the Right saw their role to be 
redefining French nationalism, promoting a broader European identity among the French, and 
engaging in liaison efforts to cement the alliance. 
 Drieu claimed that his combination of “a morose love of France with a naïve and violent faith 
in Europe” had been a life-long obsession that neither the traditional Right nor the internationalist 
Left had accepted or fulfilled. Only fascism would eventually vindicate the merger of these seemingly 
opposed concepts through the idea of collaboration.815 In the modern world, the continental power 
was like the fascist ideal of the complete man. While the complete man combined the seemingly 
contradictory concepts of thought and action, the New Europe would combine the seemingly 
contradictory ideas of nationalism and internationalism. As early as Socialisme Fasciste, Drieu was 
calling for the reassessment of the nationalist idea in the modern world. Such critical “analysis of the 
nationalist idea” and its increasing ineffectiveness in a world of industrial, economic, and 
demographic superpowers was, Drieu wrote, “the proper role of the intellectual.”816 By 1940, he 
believed he had found the solution. By creating a league of fascist nations, a “veritable Geneva of 
socializing fascisms,” that were united under German leadership and followed its model of military 
and political force, Europe, and through her, France, could compete with the other continental 
powers.817 
Drieu was always very careful to emphasize the benefits of such a league to France in order 
to prove that Europeanism did not indicate an anti-nationalism, anti-patriotism, or anti-French 
sentiment on the part of the collaborationists. Instead Europeanism was portrayed as a nationalism 
that transcended petty border divisions and created a more powerful and effective “True France” 
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within a mosaic of other like-minded nations. Needless to say this vision of Europe where traditional 
French nationalism was subordinated to the greater continental good was radically opposed to the 
idea of “True France” held by the Resistance. For Drieu, True France was not “purely concrete, 
attached to the soil or the peasantry, nor was it purely abstract, attached to the divine name of 
France.”818 In particular, he emphasized, France was not bound up in a single governing ideology like 
democracy.819 This inability to identify True France with its name, soil, or government was revealed, 
he sneered, by the failed attempts at nationalism made by the Resistance Left. True France was “a 
moral figure,” and a culture and a people whose content was more important than the structure that 
contained it. For this reason, in the modern day, France as a nation could exist better in the structure 
of a European conglomerate than in the traditional hexagonal borders. For the collaborationist Right, 
Europeanism was the true nationalism.  
 The role of the intellectual, therefore, was to redefine French identity along European lines 
and to engage in an active effort to achieve this new continental collective. Europeanism, however, 
would not be anything like the internationalism envisioned for decades by the intellectual Left. Drieu 
emphasized he had never been “an internationalist in a pacifist, humanitarian manner, not a 
universalist” like those on the Left who claimed internationalism.820 His Europeanism was not an 
“internationalism of individuals which is cosmopolitanism” nor the sort of union of centrally 
controlled soviet satellites imagined by the communists.821 Rather it would be a type of European 
Empire or League of Nations that allowed autonomy and the maintenance of distinctive national 
politics, cultures, and local economies while accepting the unifying ideology of fascism. Its 
autonomous national components, like pieces in a mosaic, would form a larger power that would be 
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united against the superpowers. In his pre-war novel Gilles, Drieu envisioned how this new collective 
identity of “European patriotism” would be formed when the European nations had to defend 
themselves as a group against the invasion of the Americans and the Russians.822 Yet this new 
collective identity, did not, like Left-wing concepts of internationalism, destroy the integrity of each 
national identity. It simply amplified their force.823 
In practice, this new sense of a collective European identity necessitated a certain level of 
cooperation between the nations of the new Europe and between their intellectual leaders. The first 
step in such an alliance, would of course be intellectual, military, and economic collaboration with 
Germany. “A country cannot live any longer on its own land,” Drieu explained, “it needs the land of 
others and their factories and resources as well as their talents and geniuses.”824 The intellectual was 
to take his part in the effort to merge talents and geniuses into a continental collective by participating 
in the exchange of scientific research with the Germans, attending writers’ congresses in Weimar, 
giving lecture tours throughout Germany, translating German works into French for university use 
and public consumption, and producing german propaganda. Intellectuals also had a duty to support 
other forms of European collaboration from joining in active military units on the Eastern front to 
convincing French workers to work in the German factories to denouncing Jews in hiding. In this 
way, the collaborationists believed they were fulfilling their duty to create a new European body in 
which France was a harmonious partner.  
The concept of Europeanism that was neither anti-nationalist nor internationalist in the 
traditional left-wing sense distinguished Drieu and the collaborationist intellectuals during the 
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occupation. While the Resistance looked to revive traditional cultural patriotism and political 
nationalism, the collaborationists envisioned international exchange and a federation of fascist 
nations. This differentiation between resistance and collaborationist worldviews would be intensified 
when Parisian intellectuals like Drieu became disillusioned with the National Revolution of Vichy 
and determined that France could not transform herself independently into an equal partner for 
Germany. Instead, they began to favor a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany where France would 
play the role of the junior partner or mentee.  In contrast, the Resistance intellectuals would turn 
toward England, America, and the USSR in order to defeat the possibility of a German led Europe.  
 
Anti-Communism and Opposition to the Allies 
 Identifying as an intellectual, for collaborationists like Drieu, was in part defined by 
opposition to the programs of both communism and democracy and to their incarnation in the Allies. 
During the Occupation, the intellectual Resistance found its natural allies in the anti-fascist front: the 
communist and democratic powers of the Allies. Any previous anti-Americanism or anti-British 
program by the communists was quickly set aside as was any hesitation about Stalinist Russia by the 
more democratically minded resistors. In contrast, the collaborationist Right would make hostility 
toward England and America central to its discussion of political responsibility and, after 1941, find 
new depth in its pre-war anti-communism. Collaborationist intellectuals, like Drieu, found both 
ideologies to be incompatible with their ideas of intellectual responsibility, culture, and intelligence. 
Therefore, they constructed their identity as right-wing intellectuals around an opposition to these 
ideas and to the Allies. 
 Throughout his life, Drieu made occasional statements that indicated a willingness to 
consider Stalinist Russia as a possible alternative to liberal democracy. He was inclined toward 
nationalist socialism and authoritarian governments which he believed Stalinism could provide were 
it to free itself more from the Marxist model. And, toward the end of the occupation, as Drieu realized 
that Nazi Germany was collapsing, he suggested that it would be the USSR which would succeed 
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Germany in monopolizing Europe since it had proven itself the stronger of the two competitors. 
Several historians have taken these statements as an indication that Drieu, in the last years of his life, 
had turned from fascism to a fascination with communism out of opportunism or a desire to prophesy 
the future power.825 This, however, underestimates the strength of Drieu’s life-long anti-communist 
convictions and the incompatibility of his concept of intellectual identity with the communist 
philosophy.  
 Even as a youth, Drieu would analyze his reasons for turning to the Right rather than the 
communist or socialist Left and determine, “it was because there was nothing on that side for me.”826 
The socialism that he envisioned for France was based more on the idea of bourgeois led reform than 
the proletarian revolution of Marx and would later align more closely with fascist ideas of national 
socialism than communist ones.827 Drieu was also opposed to the communist concept of intelligence 
and education which he considered to be a leveling of genius and a prevention of the natural 
intellectual elite.828 With the rise of fascist thought in the 1930s, Drieu’s opposition to communism, 
particularly as it related to intellectual affairs, would be even more marked. “For an intellectual,” he 
wrote in The Young Man and the Older Man, “there is something tedious about being among 
communists. I am not at ease with them…they have a jargon that is at least half a century old…and 
they all repeat the same thing…always simplistic, without nuances.”829 Drieu often noted this failure 
of communism to meet the intellectual needs of its following suggesting in L’Agent double, for 
example, that while the Left should be willing to open their minds to the ideas of the Right, it would 
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be a mistake for the Right to do the same.830 This was because the Left was limited to “doctrine,” 
Drieu believed,  making it intellectually deprived.831 In the last year of the occupation and Drieu’s 
life, when many claim he turned to an appreciation of communism, these same convictions and anti-
communist values remained, even in his private journal self-reflections. “What unhappiness that one 
is not able to abandon oneself to communism,” he wrote when considering the Soviet victories over 
the Germans. But, he continued, “I am against communism.”832 According to Drieu, communism was 
a negation of intellectual responsibility.833 Anti-Communism and by correlation, opposition to the 
USSR, was therefore a unifying theme of Drieu’s work and of the collaborationist Right as a whole. It 
put their intellectual itinerary in direct conflict with the Resistance intellectuals who, particularly after 
the summer of 1941, were heavily influenced by communist resistors and looked to the USSR for 
liberation and renewal. 
Drieu was equally opposed to the existing liberal democratic society that the Resistance 
sought to reinstate after Liberation. Gilles, who describes Marxism as “a stupidity,” an “enormous 
joke,” and “an unrealistic repetition of the gospels,” would express this dual hostility saying, “Not 
believing in Marxism and even detesting it with all my force, I do not want any less for the Marxists 
to destroy present society.”834 This disgust with liberal democratic society and its incarnation in 
France would extend during the occupation to a hatred of the democratic allies, England and America 
in particular, who wished to restore it. Although anti-Americanism and antagonism toward England 
were not foreign to the intellectual Right before the occupation, it had not been an overwhelming 
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theme. Many right-wing intellectuals had traveled to England and America to share their work, and 
even Drieu had shown a particular affinity for these two nations before 1940.835 However, after the 
occupation, collaborationist intellectuals, including Drieu, developed anti-Americanism and anti-
English sentiment into a main theme of their work. In contrast, the intellectual Resistance would erase 
all signs of their previous anti-American and anti-English discourse. 
This theme became a significant aspect of right-wing intellectual identity in part because the 
intellectual Right equated its role as intellectual guides with the reconstruction of a culturally strong 
Europe. One of Drieu’s main complaints against England was that it had turned to favor America 
instead of Europe. “England is no longer of Europe,” he wrote in 1941, “in order to save itself from 
Germany it has engaged its men and goods with America.” Because of this, they had to now be 
considered, “Americanophiles, that is to say, traitors to Europe.”836 America was not able to 
understand Europe, Drieu believed, because they were unable to fully appreciate European history, 
art, music, and literature, or to comprehend the European tradition and mentality. American culture 
was an amalgam of culturally void pop art. It was an assimilation of a melting pot of international art 
forms with no strong roots or clear identity. Most importantly for France, American culture was 
invasive and homogenizing. If England was abandoning the legacy it shared with Europe in favor of 
the American alliance, then she was equally foreign in nature to France. “What does America 
understand of Europe?” he wrote, “we are therefore against the English hegemony which is only able 
to be an American hegemony.”837 
Drieu and his collaborationist peers defined their role as intellectuals in part by their efforts to 
rebuild a strong European culture. They believed that communism and American democracy were 
both anathema to traditional European culture and intellectual expression. Therefore, rejection of 
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these foreign ideas and cooperation with fascism, the only purely European ideology, became an 
essential aspect of their concept of intellectual responsibility and identity.  
 
Drieu and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model 
In his post-Liberation self-defense, Drieu would indicate, perhaps better than any other right-
wing intellectual, the existence of an alternative model of intellectual identity on the extreme Right. It 
was according to this alternative model that Drieu could see his collaboration and his occupation 
engagement as fulfilling “the duties of the intellectual” despite accusations of anti-intellectualism and 
betrayal from the Left. In keeping with the pattern of intellectual behavior essential to this alternative 
identity construction in previous decades, Drieu’s engagement would be driven by a strong 
resentment of the Left’s hegemony and a desire to legitimize his own concept. Despite the newfound 
dominance of the Right over the intellectual field during the Occupation, Drieu continued to approach 
engagement as a member of the minority opposition. He saw himself as a beleaguered prophet whose 
truth was rejected by a public predisposed to left-wing ideas and models of intellectual identity. 
Against this hidden hegemony of the Left, Drieu pronounced himself both a fascist and a legitimate 
French intellectual. The model of the fascist, collaborationist intellectual that he constructed would 
draw from many of the traditional values of the intellectual Right from anti-communism and anti-
democratism to a romance of the Real. The collaborationist intellectual continued to see his duty to lie 
in accepting the circumstances of the time, promoting alternative sources of intelligence outside 
rationalism, and denouncing the anti-intellectual nature of communism. However, the new 
collaborationist intellectual would also emphasize new themes and discourses like that of the Body 
and propose a vision of nationalism as Europeanism that significantly altered traditional right-wing 
ideas of French national identity. The role of the intellectual, therefore, also came to involve a 
promotion of physical vitality, a merger of thought and action, and active engagement in 
collaboration and the European collective community. Drieu’s understanding of what it meant to be 
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an intellectual would be reinforced by other right-wing intellectuals in the collaborationist community 
like Alphonse de Châteaubriant who were also constructing alternative visions of intellectual identity.  
CHAPTER 15 
 
INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE COLLABORATIONIST RIGHT: THE CASE OF 
ALPHONSE DE CHÂTEAUBRIANT 
 
Alphonse de Châteaubriant has been overshadowed in the scholarship on collaborationist 
writers by the more flamboyant figures of Brasillach and Drieu. Yet he was equally if not more 
involved in the activity of intellectual collaboration and was at the center of two of the most important 
intellectual communities for collaborationists: Groupe Collaboration and the weekly journal La 
Gerbe. In both his independent work and his contribution to these two intellectual communities, 
Châteaubriant would strive to convince the public that the values and programs put forth by the 
collaborationists were the only intellectually viable options. To succeed in this struggle, he had to 
both distinguish his vision and values from those of the republican and communist intellectuals who 
had been dominant before the war and claim the role and responsibility of the French intellectual 
guide for himself and his fellow collaborators. 
 Châteaubriant was born in 1877 to a Catholic family whose ancestors had emigrated from 
Hamburg, Germany to become gentlemen farmers around Nantes. His preparation for Saint-Cyr and 
his subsequent military service would give him a lasting admiration for military strength but would 
also, surprisingly, lead him to become a Dreyfusard in 1898.838 After his military service, 
Châteaubriant was introduced to the Dreyfusard world of letters where he wrote for Republican 
journals like Le Radical and formed lasting friendships with left-wing writers like Romain Rolland. 
By 1911, Châteaubriant had published his first major novel, Monsieur des Lourdines, to great critical 
acclaim and had won the Goncourt prize. The events of World War I would prove politically decisive 
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for Châteaubriant. His participation in the war led him to increasingly apocalyptic views of 
democratic Europe and an intense antipathy for bolshevism.  
 During the interwar years, Châteaubriant signed Rolland’s Declaration d’Independence de 
l’Esprit out of friendship for its author but increasingly found himself at odds politically and 
ideologically with his friend. By 1922 he published Briere, which had won the grand prix du roman 
from the Academy, and Reponse du Seigneur in Massis’ Revue Universelle. During these years he 
also began the spiritual renaissance that would lead him to an unorthodox interpretation of 
Catholicism and Christianity. His political path toward the Right and fascist collaboration would not 
begin, however, until he traveled to Germany in 1935 seeking inspiration for his next novel. The 
novel would be set aside in favor of a work on the New Germany he believed he had found entitled 
Gerbe des Forces. The work was met with hostility by the Left and was hailed during the occupation 
as the epitome of collaborationist literature. The initial visit was followed in 1936 by a more 
extensive trip during which Châteaubriant interviewed Hitler, Goebbels, and Ribbentrop, spoke to a 
mass meeting of Hitler youth, and assisted in the opening of the Olympic Games in Berlin.839 For the 
next few years before the war, Châteaubriant would plea for rapprochement and cultural collaboration 
between France and Germany and would personally return to Germany to give lectures and to have 
his works translated and published in German. He increasingly found the changes made by fascism in 
the new Germany to be the solution to the French crisis that had become disastrous under the Popular 
Front. In particular, he saw Germany to be France’s only strong ally against communist infiltration.  
In 1940, immediately after Pétain’s speech asking for an armistice, Châteaubriant would meet 
with the printer Jean Floch and begin preparations for a new European journal to be published in 
Paris: La Gerbe. Gerbe quickly earned approval to begin publishing from the Propagandastaffel and 
put out its first issue July 11, 1940. Over the years the journal would gather to it some of the most 
prominent names of the intellectual collaboration including Brasillach, Drieu, Giono, and Celine. But 
its most tireless contributor would remain Châteaubriant who contributed over 86 articles during its 
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publication. He would also help found the Groupe Collaboration in 1940, which was to be “a 
veritable crusade against the rhetoriticians from whom came the decrepitude of the French spirit.”840 
The organization was created specifically for the intellectual milieu to spread its collaborationist 
visions and values in the areas of economics, literature, art, music, and the sciences through 
publications, lecture tours, and workshops. In other words, it was a tool of intellectual legitimacy 
whose mission was to struggle against the existing republican and left-wing intellectual paradigm. 
As early as autumn 1941, Châteaubriant expressed his disappointment in the National 
Revolution of Vichy and promoted collaboration directly with the Germans as the only possibility for 
the creation of a new fascist France. This included an increasing participation of Gerbe in the anti-
Semitic discourse and denunciation of the Resistance; positions encouraged by the German occupier. 
In particular, Châteaubriant encouraged the publication of radical anti-Semites Georges Montandon, 
Céline, and Gobineau in Gerbe and made no protests against the 1942 ordinances requiring the 
yellow star or against mass deportations. He condoned the declarations of the Comite pour l’épuration 
de la race francaise and supported the creation and activities of the Milice. By 1944 he would even 
sign a “Declaration commune sur la situation politique” demanding that Vichy join Germany in the 
war effort and create even more repressive ordinances against the “promoters of civil war” in the 
Resistance.  
Châteaubriant would continue to be a staunch proponent of both the Nazi efforts and the 
fascist ideals even to the Liberation, but he understood the realities of his precarious political situation 
and so fled France in July 1944. For much of 1945, he was part of the community of collaborationist 
intellectuals in exile at Sigmaringen where he reunited with many Groupe and Gerbe contributors. By 
October, Châteaubriant had been listed on the CNE list of undesirable authors, had a warrant placed 
for his arrest, and had fled to Austria to live under the name of Dr. Alfred Wolf. He would be tried in 
absentia by the High court in France and condemned to death in 1948 but would remain safely in 
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exile until his death by natural causes in 1951. Despite his prominence during the years of the 
occupation at Gerbe and Groupe Collaboration, Châteaubriant was seldom the object of post-war 
apologies by the Right, other than those conducted by his son, and since then has received relatively 
little attention from historians.841 
The oversight can be attributed in part to scholars’ suggestion that Châteaubriant’s 
collaborationism was based less on fascism and more on his unorthodox approach to Christianity.842 
This latter interpretation tends to underplay the fascist characteristics of his thought in order to more 
dramatically highlight his spirituality and millenarian discourse.843 Although this approach to 
Châteaubriant has revealed many of the complexities of his thought and is an important reminder of 
the diverse motivations for intellectual collaboration, it has also obscured many of the intellectual and 
social values that distinguished Châteaubriant from the Christian Left, while uniting him closely to 
his recognizably fascist peers. Châteaubriant may have seen the world through the lens of spirituality, 
but this did not prevent him from identifying himself as a legitimate, right-wing intellectual. Those 
who consider Châteaubriant an isolated Christian writer usually find his ability to attract prominent 
collaborationists to his journal and his Groupe very surprising and are hard pressed to explain his 
success. It is in his identification as a collaborationist intellectual, not a Christian, that Châteaubriant 
and his Occupation engagement are best understood. 
 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
 Like Drieu and the other collaborationists, Châteaubriant did not imagine that the new 
positions of power that he enjoyed in the intellectual field had actually changed public perception of 
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intellectual identity. He believed that for over three decades, the intellectual Left had exercised 
something of a monopoly over the conceptualization of intellectual values and responsibility and had 
engrained a certain perception of France and her international relations in the public imagination. 
Intellectuals had been associated with democratic ideals, avant garde communism, and most 
importantly, anti-fascism, while all those who had called for an end to the Republic, a fight against 
communism, and an appreciation of the fascist program had been categorized as anti-intellectual. This 
perception would not be changed simply because the German occupiers had placed the 
collaborationist intellectuals in positions of dominance. In fact, their very connection to the German 
enemy would make their program of a national revitalization through fascism and European cultural 
cooperation suspect to the French. Because of this, Châteaubriant approached his engagement as a 
struggle against a defeated yet engrained mentality and felt the need first to legitimize his positions as 
those of a viable intellectual.  
 According to Châteaubriant, the intellectual leaders of the Left, these “murderous, 
sleepwalking Mandarins,” who took their ideas of France from “from the abstract geometric figures 
that dance under the sky of their minds,” had continued to monopolize discourse in France well after 
the Popular Front. Instead of approaching the new Germany as a source of strength and adapting the 
fascist ideals to better the French nation, they had retreated into their “immortal principles” and 
accused all outside of these principles of treasonous and anti-French thought. “Official thought,” he 
concluded, “had descended on France without the least political sense, the least notion of the spirit or 
the law of other peoples, without any intelligent, direct view of the true interests of the French 
people” but only with their “blind prejudices” and the “miserable nourishment of lies and 
stupidity.”844 Men like Châteaubriant and the Gerbe staff, he explained, had tried to oppose this 
official thought of the Republic and the communist Left with new, healthy fascist ideas, but had been 
rejected, marginalized, and excluded from intellectual discussion until the occupation had given them 
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a platform from which to speak. “Those who grew fat off the regime had not permitted it to be 
questioned,” one article explained, “they imposed a conspiracy of silence against the non-
conformists.” This “conspiracy of silence” against the Right had been enforced not only by the 
“politicians of the Left” who imposed their “crude and limiting anti-fascism” but also, he wrote, “by 
the ‘intellectuels’ who aided them and who claimed to express through them their ‘humanism.”845 
Châteaubriant was convinced that these “prejudices and stupidities” of the pre-war 
intellectual Left and their “official thought” continued to dominate the minds of the French even after 
their fall from official power. “There are too many men in this country,” Châteaubriant wrote 
resentfully, “in the train of old sensibilities and slow in the virile disciplines; too many men in false 
liberty, in false individualism, in false instruction, in false intelligence.”846 And “these men, in their 
narrow blindness, continued to suffocate France.”847 If France were to regain her stature and her 
independence in the world, he believed, society needed to shake itself loose from the official thought 
and values, from the “false intelligence” of the intellectual Left and “purify” its “sullied minds.” This, 
he wrote, was the “struggle” that the intellectuals of Collaboration and Gerbe engaged in. The first 
issue of the revue Collaboration would emphasize the nature of this struggle saying their group was 
“desirous of scattering with the light of experience the unjust preventions sewn into the minds of the 
French and the sterile scorns amassed in their hearts.”848 It was in this way made clear that the reason 
that the intellectual collaboration had to struggle to legitimize its values before the public was because 
the harmful conceptions of the intellectual Left had been so long engrained that they were literally 
paralyzing the nation. “We have searched to bring back our compatriots to the very sources of life and 
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of thought,” the principles of the revue would emphasize two years later, “to untangle them from the 
conceptions which have been paralyzed by a century and a half of aberration.”849 
The language scattered throughout other articles only emphasized this vision of struggle 
against a dominant mindset and the surgical effort, the “work of demolition,” needed to uproot it.850 
The journal Gerbe was described as “an organ of our effort and of our struggle” and later as an organ 
of “action and of purge.”851 In language reminiscent of Drieu’s those who sought to proclaim the new 
way of fascist health were described as the “prophets who cry in the desert” of predetermined 
intellectual misconceptions.852 The intellectual Resistance was described as the “deficient elite which 
had not known how to or wanted to clarify the country.”853 They were the “rival who represents a past 
world which does not want to die” in a life and death struggle, “a last duel,” or a “war of the worlds” 
with the collaborationists and “the new world which wants to live.”854 Because of them, France was a 
“prisoner of its conceptions” and was prevented from renewal by its “old illusions.”855 They were the 
“carriers of an intellectual bacteria” that continued to sicken society long after the first contamination 
decades before.856 The collaborationist intellectuals, in contrast, were consistently described as 
engaged in a “arduous task” to transform the public perception of Germany, intellectual life, and 
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national responsibility. To change these engrained mindsets one article summarized, “it was 
necessary to struggle against a profound intoxication of the minds” by the Resistance.857 
In these articles was found the familiar, decades-long self-portrayal of the intellectual of the 
Right as the minority opposition, struggling against a dominant intellectual Left position. Despite the 
new monopoly they enjoyed under the occupation, the collaborationists returned to their stock 
discourse of oppression, exclusion, and the rejected prophet. A declaration in Collaboration 
complained, “In France, the clairvoyant servants of the nation have only received incomprehension 
and ingratitude.”858 In case there was any doubt, the clairvoyants in the declaration were identified as 
the intellectual milieu of Collaboration. Later articles explained that Groupe Collaboration had been 
formed because, as a misunderstood minority, the collaborationist intellectuals’ “actions were often 
betrayed and annihilated by an uncomprehending public opinion” and they needed a friendly space to 
reinforce and support them in their work.859 For the great masses of society, Châteaubriant reiterated, 
“things are not clear and it is necessary for us to clarify them.” But, he continued, “this is not always 
easy for we are plunged in the shadows, the shadows of false liberty and of false sentiment of self, of 
false intelligence and false guidance. So many things are against us!”860 The many forces assailing the 
collaborationist intellectual included the “blind or abused crowd, the adversaries too interested that 
nothing be changed… and the reactionaries who deliberately sacrifice the nation.”861 In short, the 
collaborationists urged, they could not be seen as the new masters of thought under the occupation 
since they were still the misunderstood and marginalized prophets of truth. After the Liberation, 
Châteaubriant would continue this theme in his work, explaining that the collaborationist had been 
like “the man who sees things too early.” Though they had tried to “rise above the battle and see as 
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far ahead as possible,” the “intellectual Resistance, armed to the teeth with the passions of the 
preceding century,” had crushed all hope of progress and revitalization and “shot those for whom the 
problem posed itself in its true and vast proportions… suppressed them as traitors.”862 
Yet, far from being traitors, Châteaubriant and his peers at Collaboration believed they had 
been the only intellectual representatives during the Occupation. The members of Groupe 
Collaboration in particular would proclaim themselves “intellectuals” and would state that true 
intellectual responsibility lay not in Resistance or even neutral “waiting” but in guiding society 
toward collaboration. “Is it not the duty of those who know and who had [before the war] vainly tried 
to give to the French people the necessary warning and put it on guard” the Groupe asked, “to take up 
again the task interrupted by the catastrophe of war?”863 Châteaubriant would declare that he himself 
had fulfilled this collaborationist understanding of intellectual responsibility saying that he was, “in 
the middle of my compatriots, the sower of the very principles of health that experience had 
elucidated in my consciousness.” It was his role to “remake France” by “giving it a better 
comprehension of its true political situation” which meant, during the occupation, understanding its 
new role in a fascist Europe.864 In his final statement of self-defense, Châteaubriant would write that 
he, as a true intellectual, had “acted with the most total sincerity in the view of that which I believed 
to be the interests of my nation” and that insinuations of intellectual irresponsibility by the Left were 
“the result of ignorance and the credulity of politicized men.”865 
This collaborationist understanding of intellectual identity during the Occupation would lead 
Châteaubriant, like Drieu, to protest vehemently against his designation as an intellectual traitor 
during the Liberation and post-war purge. He saw the CNE blacklist and the purge to be proof that the 
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intellectual Resistance and the Left had not ceased to exercise a monopoly over the understanding of 
intellectual values in France. The intensified exclusion and elimination of the intellectual Right 
during the post-war years was, to Châteaubriant, only confirmation of their abusive and unwarranted 
hegemony over the concept of intellectual identity. When describing the renewed hegemony of the 
post-war Resistance, Châteaubriant would write, “As for me, laureate of the Goncourt and the 
Academy, I see myself today erased from French literature…I have suffered erasure because I had 
loved my nation to the point of sacrificing to it the works” of my life.866 The intellectual Left had 
monopolized conceptualization of the intellectual during the Occupation, Châteaubriant sorrowed, but 
after the Liberation, former collaborationists were not even allowed to pose the Right as an 
alternative. 
In previous decades, the intellectual Right had believed its exclusion from claiming the 
position of the intellectual in a debate, the university, or the political system, was a result of the Left’s 
relationship to power and ability to control the intellectual field. During the occupation, when this 
control was reversed, the Right determined that its exclusion was in fact a result of French society’s 
engrained conceptualization of intellectual identity. This sense of a more fundamental exclusion from 
intellectual life drove the collaborationist Right to continue its efforts to differentiate its concept of 
values, role, and responsibility from that of the Left. As Châteaubriant would write of the continuing 
abyss between understanding of intellectual identity, “the incomprehension that our adversaries 
manifest on this essential question [of what values and choices led to the true health of France], 
shows us one more time that our minds are divided into two different types.”867 For Châteaubriant, the 
German fascists were closer in mentality and values to him than the French intellectual Left. “There 
are no longer sentiments, traditions, or nationalities which oppose one another,” he explained, “there 
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are only two conceptions of life, one excluding the other.”868 In Châteaubriant’s opinion, the 
intellectual Left had one conception of life, the intellectual Right another, opposing one. If one were 
to legitimize the intellectual Right, it was important to first make clear the divisions in the two 
conceptions. 
 
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: The Fascist Complete Man 
 Châteaubriant believed that one of the most important worldviews that distinguished his 
concept of the intellectual from that created by the Resistance was the belief in the fascist complete 
man. He believed the right’s embrace of the concept of the “new” or “complete” man and the Left’s 
rejection of it was not just a minor discrepancy in political views but rather revealed two deeply 
divided understandings of the essence of man and society. “Societies,” he explained, “always 
construct themselves on a certain foundation and this foundation is the idea that they have made of 
man- a religious, metaphysical, ontological idea. They construct themselves on this man and for this 
man.”869 The modern, democratic society of the French Republics had been created around a vision of 
“the man of material progress, the man of techniques, of positive and experimental science” and 
above all, the man of the Rousseauian Social Contract.870 But this concept of man was incomplete, 
inadequate to embrace the complete man and the society structured around their concept was thus 
flawed and in decline. The intellectual of the Right had a duty to propose a new concept of man based 
on the fascist model and, from this, a new structure for society. 
 This inadequacy of the republican, materialist man was expressed in society not simply as a 
surface social decadence, but as a “decadence of essences, a global abasement of human values in the 
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human conscience.”871 For Châteaubriant, this decadence of essences was revealed by a collapse of 
traditional and Christian values that had sustained the West for centuries. “In the man of the West,” 
he wrote, “there was, constructed by the work of generations, an architecture of values among which 
were love, obedience, consciousness of duty, honor, respect, and courage.”872 During the years of the 
Republics, these values had faded and been falsified, resulting in the crisis in values that modern 
society faced. Châteaubriant would attribute this collapse of values to the new understanding of the 
essence of man that arose from the increasing industrialization of society.873 A shift had been made 
socially from concern about the quality of man’s culture and mind to an interest in the quantity of 
goods he could produce and consume. And after the impact of Rousseau and the French Revolution, 
the shift had been made from leadership by a recognized elite to government by a numerical majority 
of isolated individuals. This concept of man as materiel and as an isolated individual within a 
nameless mass, according to Châteaubriant, was inherently flawed and incapable of sustaining man or 
a viable society. Yet, it remained the only vision of man on the intellectual Left. 
The fascist and collaborationist Right, in contrast, had recognized the inadequacy and decline 
of the Left’s conception of man and had embraced a new vision. “A radical change has intervened in 
the fashion of conceiving life,” Châteaubriant wrote in explanation, “a positive value of life is 
imposed on the conscience accompanied by the revelation of the principles of conduct and action 
which render it possible. And these are completely foreign to those [the Left] who until now have 
reigned.”874 The intellectual of the Right drew this new positive assessment of man and life from the 
fascist understanding of man as “complete.” The complete, new man was understood not an isolated 
individual in a proletarian mass or a material being but a vital and integral member of a collective 
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body and a spiritual being. Châteaubriant would define the new “collective” man as “a being who 
comes from a total, absolute, fundamental rupture with the man of the Social contract.”875 The man of 
the social contract was an isolated individual who was connected to society only in order to preserve 
his goods and was politically an “emasculated practitioner of political representation.” In contrast, he 
continued, with “the new man, an entirely different concept of self intervenes… the new man is not 
an individual separated from all others…his spirit refuses this egoistic conception, he is attached by 
all his most profound energies to the life of the community.”876 This alternative concept of man 
constructed by the intellectual Right was the foundation of a new concept of society and government. 
Instead of political representation, the new man was a being of action and direct participation. His 
interest was not in his own affairs alone but in the well being of his collective community as a whole. 
In striking contrast to the man of the Left, the man envisioned by the fascist Right was “organic,” 
connected to others in his society and to the body of the nation itself.877 In sum, Châteaubriant, 
believed, the new organic man, unlike the individualist and materialist man of the republicans and the 
communists, would put “at the foundation of his life the sacrifice of his personal interests to 
something greater than himself.”878 
To achieve this new man and organic society, it was necessary that man’s understanding of 
himself and of his society literally undergo a spiritual rebirth.879 According to Châteaubriant, his role 
as an intellectual was to be in guiding this rebirth. In Germany, he wrote, he had seen “the state 
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recreated around the human person himself and the world become new again.”880 In Châteaubriant’s 
view, fascism offered a “reconstitution of man,” a revolution, not of men against men like the 
Bolsheviks wanted, but “a revolution within man, a revolution in the spirit of man.”881 It was, he 
wrote, “the immense role and the incalculable responsibility of the writer…to sow the images, to 
lavish in every place the germs of action, and accumulate in the mental humus of his generation all 
sorts of figures who will only demand to grow!”882 These fascist images were to be the nourishment, 
the incentive, and the exemplar for the reconceptualized new man.883 Because the average man could 
not remove himself from the epistemological confines of his current existence in order to envision the 
possibility of rebirth, the intellectual guide, who was able to see beyond these boundaries to the 
fascist possibility, had to provide this vision for them. Naturally, it was only the intellectual who had 
accepted the fascist principles and the concept of a new man who could truly fulfill this role. 
Châteaubriant believed that his very understanding of man and society was fundamentally 
opposed to that created and maintained by the intellectual Left and the Resistance. Interwoven in his 
understanding of the new fascist man was his rejection of the decadence of modern, materialist and 
democratic society, his appreciation of collective society, and his millenarian desire for a rebirth of 
man on earth. His desire to play a part in this rebirth of man and society would be an essential factor 
in his concept of his role as an intellectual.  
 
Franco-German Collaboration 
 Like many of the collaborationists, Châteaubriant had developed a fascination with Germany 
well before the occupation. For these intellectuals, collaboration provided not only the possibility to 
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model France on a successful fascist nation, but also an opportunity for cultural exchange with one of 
Europe’s most influential artistic, scientific, and intellectual powers. While the intellectual Resistance 
promoted cultural nationalism and opposition to all things German, Châteaubriant and the intellectual 
collaborationists would find their role and responsibility as intellectuals to be precisely in the 
promotion of intellectual recognition, exchange, and cooperation with Germany. “Our ‘intellectuals’” 
of the pre-war years, one article explained, “had a large responsibility for the ignorance in which we 
have been plunged about the real Germany.”884 In contrast, the collaborationist intellectual believed 
his role was to look beyond the prejudices of the crowd to see the truth of fascist Germany and the 
possibilities for intellectual and cultural cooperation. The writers of Groupe Collaboration were 
passionate about this component of their intellectual duty. They devoted their work to convincing the 
public of the cultural affinities between Germany and France, the desirability on both sides of 
intellectual exchange, and the importance of collaboration for France.  
 Châteaubriant and Groupe Collaboration believed that by promoting the intellectual affinities 
of Germany and France and seeking cultural collaboration, they were serving the best interests of 
intellectual life. Most of the group’s articles referenced the fact that the two neighboring nations had 
long been the primary cultural geniuses of Europe with “equal importance in the intellectual life of 
Humanity.”885 One speech argued that “these two peoples, having received from the creator such 
gifts, ought not create politics which risk leading to catastrophe, but ought always to remember the 
obligations that they have to themselves, to each other, and to all of Europe.”886 For the 
collaborationists, Germany was France’s natural intellectual peer, so mutual spiritual enrichment was 
guaranteed by their collaboration. Collaboration writers credited Germany’s great scientific and 
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philosophical minds with influencing the French Enlightenment and its Romantics with providing 
new avenues in literature and music. France in turn, they wrote, had provided a language of grace and 
beauty to German thought.887 These exchanges, Châteaubriant argued, had provided the cultural 
leadership for European civilization. It would be intellectually irresponsible to abandon this fruitful 
exchange simply because politics had opposed the two nations in war. Instead, intellectuals had a duty 
to encourage the two nations to “stimulate one another, and to complete one another in the domain of 
sciences and arts” for the good of both their own national interests and the interests of intellectual life. 
Collaboration, according to the fascist intellectuals, put culture above politics and the needs of 
civilization above petty national quarrels. In this way, Châteaubriant was able to justify collaboration 
as morally superior to resistance and as the choice of the true intellectual.  
 Collaborationist intellectuals also believed they were fulfilling their responsibility to French 
society and the nation by encouraging such collaboration. As the demonstrably weaker of the two 
parties, France needed to incorporate what it could of the German genius in order to revitalize itself 
and return to its place of cultural authority. Because he believed that France had the most to gain from 
cultural collaboration, Châteaubriant would emphasize consistently the continued willingness of 
Germany to cooperate as cultural equals and the willful blindness of the French Resistance who 
rejected these overtures. Hitler was portrayed as being willing to “bury the hatchet of war and 
establish an alliance” of intellectual equals while France was shown to be self-destructive in its 
xenophobic nationalism. “The vanquisher still proposes to us friendship and reconciliation,” one 
article marveled, “and we refused!”888 Much attention was also paid to the efforts of Francophile 
German cultural ambassador Otto Abetz and the German version of the Comite France-Allemagne to 
promote cultural alliances with the recalcitrant French intellectual elite. Most prominent in these 
arguments about the importance of collaboration with the occupier, however, was the enumeration of 
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the benefits that France would receive from intellectual cooperation. The collaborationist intellectuals 
described the possibility of learning from German technological advances, scientific discoveries, and 
cultural resources. “Is this not a great adventure to draw the poets of France and Germany together?” 
one article asked, “and by poets we mean all the aristocrats of the mind, those who compose truly the 
elite, who are apt to create or at least to lead, writers, artists, thinkers or savants.”889 According to 
Châteaubriant and the Groupe Collaboration, Franco-German collaboration was essential to the socio-
economic, technological, and cultural regeneration of France. As such, it defined the duty and 
practice of the intellectual elite.  
 Châteaubriant believed that collaborationist intellectuals also fulfilled their duty to France by 
strengthening the new Europe. According to Châteaubriant, Europe was being “assaulted” by two 
continents: Asia, in the form of Russia, and America. In order for Europe and her civilization to 
survive, it was necessary that “the two expressions of its genius [France and Germany] closely unite 
themselves” against these superpowers.890 Against left-wing accusations that collaboration was an 
alliance that only contributed to a Germany hegemony over Europe, the collaborationists argued that 
Franco-German collaboration was a cooperation of equals rather than the submission of a conquered 
people.891 In fact, the collaborationists claimed it was the Allies who planned the degradation and 
division of the French empire in order to promote their self-interests. While the USSR and America 
had no need of a strong France, they wrote, “Germany needs a strong France to support the new 
Europe and be the ‘living link’ between Europe and Africa”. She was “therefore interested in 
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maintaining the force of France.892 According to Châteaubriant and his peers, a strong Europe was the 
only defense that a single nation like France had in the new global community that was dominated 
economically, militarily, and culturally by the continental superpowers. And since only Germany 
seemed capable of leading a European superpower, cooperation with Germany was the only means 
for France to “regain the place which it had lost” in a revitalized Europe.893 It was the intellectuals 
who engaged in this cooperation, according to Châteaubriant, who fulfilled their duty to Europe, and 
through it, to France. 
While the intellectual Resistance promoted cultural nationalism, isolation from German 
overtures, and support for the Allies, the intellectual collaborationists were advocating the natural 
affinities between German and French cultures, the mutual benefits of intellectual exchange with the 
new Nazi Germany, and the need for cooperation to create a Europe powerful enough to compete 
with the continental superpowers. For Châteaubriant, the latter was the role and responsibility of the 
true intellectual, the former the mark of intellectual irresponsibility and treason to France. 
 
Intellectual Realism 
 Châteaubriant, like Drieu and their predecessors on the intellectual Right, would highlight the 
theme of intellectual Realism as one that distinguished his approach to intellectual life from that taken 
by the Left. His understanding of intellectual realism would involve two different but linked 
imperatives. One was to accept and react to the lived reality of the nation, society, and man “as it 
actually is” rather than devising intellectual solutions based on an idealized abstraction. For 
Châteaubriant, this would involve accepting the reality of the decline, defeat, and occupation of 
France by Germany and the necessity of collaboration. The other imperative was to recognize the 
reality of Europe’s decline relative to the continental superpowers, particularly the USSR, and the 
dangers that communism would have for French civilization. The collaborationist Right’s 
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understanding of Realism was in total opposition to the rationalism, abstraction, and what 
Châteaubriant referred to as the “intellectualism” of the resistant Left. As it had been for his 
predecessors on the Right, this rejection of “intellectualism” was not a rejection of intelligence or 
engagement as the term “anti-intellectual” has been taken to mean. Rather, it was a rejection of the 
sterile, abstract logic devoid of other contributing sources like sentiment and experience that he 
associated with the pre-war Left. For Châteaubriant, the true intellectual was one who applied his 
intelligence to real circumstances and who accepted, in return, the influence of real external forces on 
his reasoning. 
 In his Cahiers, Châteaubriant would muse over the differences he found in his own approach 
to intellectual identity and that taken by the “man of intellectuality” on the Left. “Intellectualism often 
lacks the substantial truth,” he began, since abstract thought alone was a superficial exercise if it had 
no relation to man and the reality of his culture. “Intellectuality is a magnificent mirror, precious 
among precious things,” he conceded, “but the false intellectual and the bad intellectual wrongly and 
inconsiderately fill this with finite forms, instead of removing it from these finite forms to let integral 
life be reflected there.”894 To be truth, according to Châteaubriant, thought had to work in real life, 
beyond the confines of theory and reason. The “false intellectuals,’ he continued, “do not see the 
force of things” in the real world and so have not known how to prevent the evils that have arisen 
from the attempted application of their false ideas. In particular, Châteaubriant was thinking of the 
application of Marxist theory on a French society ill suited for it.895 Even in his last journal entries 
during the post-war, Châteaubriant maintained that pure intellect was inadequate to approach the real 
world.896 “The man of intellect,” he wrote, “only knows the intellect, and is incapable of knowing and 
measuring the gifts of the intellect in their relation to total life.”897 




896 Note that especially in these final years, Chateaubriant considered the reality of man to be more 
spiritual in nature so his rejection of abstract rationalism was more influenced by his religious beliefs.  
384 
 Châteaubriant would devote much of his discussion of the inadequacy of abstract rationalism 
to chastising the intellectual Left. Because they could not detach themselves from abstraction to 
approach reality, he found them not only false, but irresponsible intellectuals. “The intellectuals say 
of that which they do not understand” on the Right, he scoffed, “that it is ‘confused.’ They ignore that 
there exists a certain level of intelligence to which they are not initiated, not able to know with their 
intellect.”898 This would be lamentable but not irresponsible, he continued, if they did not attempt to 
denounce all those who searched beyond these confines. “The error committed by the disciples of the 
rational method considered as the only means of knowing,” he continued resentfully, “consists in 
believing that the searchers who transport themselves beyond this method have broken relations with 
reason. They call this extra-rational domain the domain of the irrational.”899 It was not “irrational,” he 
fumed, to attempt to know man and society by means other than a distant and removed rationalism. 
Those who did so, he wrote, reminded him of “the men who have only learned how to ride a horse in 
the riding manuals” and yet still dared to advise those who had real riding experience.900 “Pure 
intellectualism,” he summarized, “is only an image without substance.”901 To advise society properly 
as an intellectual, one needed more than knowledge of the manual, more than an image of life, one 
needed all the resources that real experience could provide.  
 Châteaubriant would intentionally contrast these false intellectuals to his own concept of the 
true intellectual who was formed by fascism. The intellectual elite, he explained, had been corrupted 
by democratic society and enlightenment values like rationalism. In order to responsibly guide the 
“people who wait and hope” toward the future they deserved, the intellectual himself needed to be 
 
897 Alphonse de Châteaubriant, Fragments d’une confession (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953), 108. 
 
898 Châteaubriant, Cahiers, 236. 
 
899 Ibid.  
 
900 Ibid., 257. 
 
901 Cahiers Franco-Allemande March 1939. 
 
385 
reeducated by fascism. “It is necessary that the vain subtleties of abstract rationalism which, in many 
of them, falsifies the sense of life necessary to lead,” one article explained, “be replaced by a 
profound and direct vision. To abandon intellectuality is to rediscover true intelligence.”902 The direct 
vision and true intelligence which belonged to the fascist intellectual was one which came not from “a 
master or a book, but from daily observation, constant meditation on things, persons, events…it does 
not isolate itself…it is not an exercise of memory but the fruit of experience of all that which is able 
to touch the spirit.”903 Such an intellectual formation, the collaborationists claimed proudly, “is only 
able to come from us.”  
 In daily practice, being a realist intellectual of the Right meant first and foremost the 
acceptance of defeat, occupation, and the necessity of collaboration. As one Groupe Collaboration 
speaker put it, “you have a choice, to take refuge in a wild but useless Resistance, to wait for the turn 
of events to take position, or to loyally fulfill the conditions of an armistice that France solicited. You 
have seen that the first of these attitudes…put our nation in catastrophe.”904 Collaboration was the 
only realistic approach to the current circumstances of France, Châteaubriant believed. It was also the 
only possibility for Europe to gain the strength necessary to preserve its autonomy and its civilization 
in the face of assault from the US and particularly the USSR. “Collaboration, does not concern simply 
universal fraternity,” he wrote, “but a more clarified…more Realist comprehension of the true 
international situation. The question is that of the health of humanity.”905 
The role of the realist intellectual would, therefore, also be to warn the public of the 
dangerous international situation posed by a weak Europe and a victorious USSR. Anti-bolshevism 
had been a strong element in the thought of the intellectual Right for decades and it would be a 
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driving principle for Châteaubriant. Communism, he believed, was not only a political ideology 
opposed to fascism, it involved a completely different, and in his mind unviable, concept of man and 
society. This communist concept of man was of the “homo economicus…completely dominated by 
the material world.”906 Because they understood man as a material being rather than a spiritual one, 
all their images and conceptions of life and society were based on relationships of materialism. The 
danger to humanity would be, Châteaubriant wrote, “if all societies came to construct themselves on 
and for the man of material.”907 Such a society, he continued, would turn all questions of life and 
culture into economic issues and lead to the mindset that “a renovation of French economic thought is 
imperative in order to save French intellectual man.”908 Instead, Châteaubriant argued, the reverse 
was necessary, since only a revitalized mind and soul could envision true socio-economic reform. 
Anti-communism would therefore become an essential element of Châteaubriant’s understanding of 
intellectual responsibility. “It depends on us,” he wrote, “educated men and the so-called enlightened 
of our era to make a revolution of our own account instead of freeing the reigns of the world to 
bolshevism…this popular dementia.”909 In practice, this responsibility to oppose and replace 
communism would require intellectuals to “make common cause” with the fascist governments of 
Europe “against the common enemy; international bolshevism,”910 and against “Gaullism… the 
antechamber of Communism.”911 
According to Châteaubriant, the sterile intellectualism of the Resistance had led to a 
misunderstanding of man, society, and the international situation. As a result, they had misled the 
public and failed in their responsibility to France. Châteaubriant was adamant that intellectual 
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Realism was a value and an approach limited to the intellectuals of the collaborationist Right. It was 
they who were connected to the actual needs and experiences of society and could devise solutions to 
its real problems.  
 
Châteaubriant and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model 
 Châteaubriant would join Drieu in creating his own alternative model of the intellectual to 
counter that constructed over the century by the Left. Although he, like Drieu, would introduce new 
themes, such as the significance of “images,” to the conceptualization of the right-wing intellectual, 
his process of identity construction would follow the same model developed since the Affair. 
Châteaubriant did not believe that the newfound power of the Right under the Occupation had 
actually changed public perceptions of intellectual identity and values. He continued, therefore, to 
assume that his ideas and values would be incompatible with the public’s view of intellectual 
engagement. Like his predecessors on the Right, Châteaubriant felt it was necessary to first struggle 
against these “blind prejudices” of the Left’s hegemonic “official thought” before ever entering into a 
specific debate. This mentality of engagement, even in a time that the Right controlled the political 
and intellectual field, would continue to separate him from the intellectuals of the Left and link him to 
his predecessors on the Right. His resentment of the Left, perception of their invisible hegemony, and 
desire to validate his own intellectual alternative would lead Châteaubriant, as it had his right-wing 
peers, to claim the title and role of the intellectual while distancing his values and worldviews from 
the Left. Châteaubriant’s understanding of intellectual Realism, desire for Franco-German 
collaboration, and fascination with the fascist complete man would all align him incontestably on the 
collaborationist Right and separate him from the intellectuals of the Resistance Left. From these 
values he developed a new sense of intellectual role and responsibility during the Occupation. 
Intellectuals, according to Châteaubriant, were responsible for creating a set of images, drawn from 
sources outside the intellect, in order to inspire a complete man. They fulfilled their duty to the nation 
and broader European civilization by encouraging Franco-German exchange and collaboration. And 
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they accepted the reality of the occupation and the international threat to Europe posed by the 
continental superpowers. Châteaubriant developed his concept of the intellectual in conjunction with 
his collaborationist peers. To amplify their struggle and to more effectively promote collaborationist 
values to a reluctant public, these intellectuals would come together in collaborationist intellectual 
communities. These communities, like those of the pre-occupation intellectual Right, were created to 
nurture their values and provide them with a source of support in what they perceived to be a still 




THE WORLD OF THE COLLABORATIONIST RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, AND 
THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE 
 
In the decades leading to the war, intellectuals of the Right had felt their ideas and intellectual 
values had been excluded from both the political milieu and the mainstream intellectual communities 
by the Republic and Left. In response, they adopted a new political vision and created alternative 
intellectual communities in order to reach the public. During the Occupation, the intellectual Right 
could hardly feel excluded from the spaces of political and intellectual power since their fascist and 
collaborationist values were the only ones authorized by the German government. However, those 
who chose active collaborationism were a relative minority and remained unpopular with much of the 
general public.912 The collaborationists’ perception of this consistent unpopularity and rejection, even 
when they were in power, would make them increasingly eager to work together in intellectual 
communities that could magnify the effect of their individual engagement. As they had been during 
the interwar period, these communities of intellectuals were linked in extensive webs of socio-
professional networks by common memberships and a shared sense of purpose. And, as in the past, 
these communities would be spaces of sociability and collective engagement that welcomed the 
collaborationist Right while excluding the Resistance and the Left. For the Right, as it had been for 
the Left, belonging to certain segregated collective communities was an important part of their daily 
life as intellectuals and an integral component of their definition of intellectual identity during the 
Occupation. 
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 Many collaborationist intellectuals were linked, though not necessarily active members, in 
the major collaborationist political parties of the Occupation period. These parties would not have as 
many members during the occupation as they had in the pre-war period, but their journalistic organs 
attracted several intellectual contributors and linked them to their cause. It would be the journals, 
rather than the parties themselves, which would most directly influence the sense of collective 
intellectual identity. Eugène Deloncle’s Mouvement Social Révolutionnaire (MSR) had only 20,000 
members in 1941 but one of its supporters, Jean Fontenoy, was the editor of Revolution Nationale and 
Rassemblement. These two papers expressed views extremely sympathetic to the program of the 
MSR, at least in the early years of the occupation, and would eventually win intellectual contributors 
as prominent as Drieu and Brasillach. A second collaborationist party, Déat’s Rassemblement 
national populaire (RNP), was created with the partnership of Deloncle to promote the idea of a single 
fascist party in France, to increase French anti-communism, and to protest against the hesitancy of 
Vichy. The RNP took over the previously Radical paper L’Oeuvre in September 1940 and made it a 
powerful organ of this party. Finally, Doriot’s Parti Populaire Française (PPF), which had been shut 
down before the war, was reinstated with German approval in 1942. It maintained its pre-war organ 
Emancipation Nationale and added the PPF affiliated paper Cri du Peuple. Both of these would 
attract a network of intellectual contributors including Châteaubriant, Bonnard, and Fernandez.  
Some of the smaller political and special interest organizations that arose during the 
occupation would also draw intellectual support, if not participation, and would link collaborationists 
to one another in a larger ideological network. One of these smaller groups was the Comité 
d’épuration de la race Française, which worked to exclude Jews from the larger social life of France. 
This group advocated National Revolution, the concept of a united Europe, and the elimination of the 
“foreign” elements in France.913 Intellectuals from Bonnard to Châteaubriant supported its efforts and 
Groupe Collaboration members even handed out literature on its behalf. The Comité d’Action Anti-
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Bolchévique was headed by historian and writer Paul Chack and would be an important distributor of 
anti-communist literature and propaganda in the collaborationist intellectual circles. Equally opposed 
to communism was the Légion des Volontaires Françaises (LVF) of which Châteaubriant would be an 
honorary Legionaire. The idea for the LVF had been suggested by the PPF in June 1941 and would be 
prohibited in Vichy until Laval gave it public recognition in 1943. Châteaubriant and the Groupe 
encouraged the French youth to enlist in the legion and volunteer for military service against the 
USSR on the Eastern front. Several Groupe members, including Marc Augier, would even join the 
volunteer troops themselves. Each of these smaller collaborationist groups linked members in a 
common purpose, from anti-Semitism to anti-communism, and gave them yet another space to engage 
as a collective group and promote their ideas before the hesitant public. 
Perhaps the most recognized and most influential of the collaborationist organizations, 
however, was not officially a political party or political organization but a cultural one. Groupe 
Collaboration was formed in Paris in September 1940 and had earned approval to operate in Vichy by 
November 1941.914 Under the presidency of Châteaubriant and the direction of Jean Weiland, it 
would gather to it some of the most prestigious names in science, arts, and letters in the 
collaborationist camp. Among its directing committee were found the names of noted savant Georges 
Claude, Academicians Abel Hermant, Abel Bonnard, Cardinal Baudrillart, and Pierre Benoit, and 
public intellectuals and journalists Drieu la Rochelle, Rene Pichard du Page, and Ernest Fornairon. 
Groupe Collaboration also had the distinction among the collaborationist organizations of having the 
largest membership, with numbers estimated around 100,000, and of having the only membership to 
increase during the final years of the occupation when the war was turning against the Germans.915 
The sense of collective purpose that the Groupe provided for its intellectuals was summarized by its 
statutes. The Groupe was to assemble those who desired to see a New France reborn within the New 
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Europe, support the policies of collaboration as they had been outlined at Montoire, and establish a 
spirit of cultural and intellectual collaboration between France and the “real Germany.”916 
Many of the intellectuals drawn to Groupe Collaboration, including Châteaubriant, had been 
long time advocates of this Franco-German rapprochement and had participated in the earlier efforts 
of the intellectual exchange organization Comité France-Allemagne. Many of its members, including 
Châteaubriant, Bonnard, Celine, Chack, and Hermant, also participated in the Cercles européen, a 
group whose mission was to “facilitate contacts between the writers, intellectuals, economists, 
industrialists, and businessmen of diverse nationalities of Europe.”917 The overlapping memberships 
made Groupe Collaboration and Cercles européen more like a single network than two separate 
organizations. Their members came together in any venture intended to educate the public about the 
New Germany and the benefits of collaboration. They engaged their work through lecture series, 
speeches by French and German intellectuals, and cultural exhibitions. Perhaps one of the most 
popular of these was the lecture series on bolshevism provided by German professor Friedrich Grimm 
which toured the provinces after great success in Paris.918 Speeches were given on “Le Progres 
scientifique et l’Europe nouvelle,” and “Le Savant et la Societe” that professed the benefits of 
intellectual collaboration for the sciences and the possibilities of sharing technology and discoveries. 
Others provided visions of “Littérature Européenne” and the role of music in the New Europe. For 
those in the general public who could not attend these lectures and events, Groupe Collaboration also 
offered a radio address on Radio-Paris where such intellectuals as Bonnard, Fernandez, Paul Chack, 
Edmond Pilon, and Bernard Grasset gave short talks on cultural affairs and collaborationism.  
Groupe Collaboration itself was divided into smaller sub-communities that were intended to 
group intellectuals by their primary cultural interests. These sections included the Economic, Literary, 
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Artistic, Musical, Cinema, and Scientific groupings. Sub-committees of the group and its sections 
would spread throughout the occupied zone, into the provinces of the Southern zone, and even into 
North Africa for a short time.919 As the reflection on the Groupe’s first year would explain, “many 
come to us…conscious of the necessity of grouping themselves” in order to accomplish their vision of 
France.920 The Groupe, its sections, and its provincial committees all grouped intellectuals and 
supporters who sought to amplify their voices in a collective engagement. These groups were not only 
more effective than individual engagement, they also provided collaborationists with smaller, more 
intimate groups of peers with which to identify within the larger collaborationist camp. 
This was particularly important in the case of the Groupe’s Youth section, the Jeunes 
d’Europe Nouvelle (JEN). This sub-group, created in May 1941 and led by Jacques Schweizer, would 
hold its own youth congresses, provide a cadet program for school youth, offer protection squads for 
Groupe Collaboration meetings, and sponsor social events with the “section féminine.”921 It held 
demonstrations during certain anniversaries of the war, set up a summer camp to foster the exchange 
of ideas among the collaborationist youth, and arranged weekly showings of fascist films. 922 These 
activities were designed to build a sense of fraternity, solidarity, and collaborationist purpose in the 
next generation. The Groupe’s vision in creating the JEN, Fornairon would explain, was not to create 
yet another militant youth group but “to support among our youth of the New Europe, the formation 
of a training ground of leaders.”923 This philosophy meant that the JEN would cooperate, rather than 
compete, with the other collaborationist youth groups like the Jeunesse Franciste and the Jeunesses 
Nationales Populaires “permitting the JEN to make contact with their comrades” in a great “fête of 
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youth.”924 The Groupe’s effort to create for its youth a space of intellectual sociability where 
collaborationist ideas could be freely exchanged was a reflection of its vision for its own, adult 
members.  
The intellectuals of Groupe Collaboration enjoyed yet another collective space, that of the 
journals Collaboration and La Gerbe. Collaboration was the bi-monthly official organ of the Groupe 
and its pages served as a support network for the Groupe’s writers. Its mission, as indicated by its 
motto “Rénovation Française, Reconciliation Franco-Allemande, Solidarité Européene,” echoed that 
of the larger Groupe and of the collaborationist community as a whole. Here Groupe members 
published the texts of their speeches, provided new essays on collaboration and culture, and promoted 
the literary work and collaborationist activities of its members and its sections. The bulletin provided 
a sense of imaginary community for those intellectuals who shared in the work of the Groupe, but had 
little opportunity or time to socialize with its other contributors. It also provided the Groupe 
intellectuals with yet another avenue for collective engagement and identity formation.  
La Gerbe was a much larger hebdo that was able to attract and link together a majority of the 
prominent writers of the right-wing intellectual world.925 Its pages boasted the familiar names of 
Claude, Bonnard, Hermant, Brasillach, Drieu, Cocteau, Giono, Marcel Ayme, Bernard Fay, and 
Celine in addition to the almost weekly articles of its director Châteaubriant. Gerbe would use its 
space to advertise the events of Groupe Collaboration, to promote the independent publications of its 
contributors, and to speak on cultural and intellectual issues as well as ideological and political ones. 
A quick overview of the articles in Gerbe during its four year publication finds the familiar 
collaborationist themes of Europeanism, anti-bolshevism, anti-republicanism, and the revitalization of 
France through the new Fascist man modeled by Germany. Various articles clearly directed to the 
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formation a new intellectual elite, the transformation of education, the promotion of “la vraie culture” 
that was European fascism, and stepping outside the “tour d’ivoire” into the real world. These articles 
reveal both a collective vision for France under the occupation and a shared concept of the values and 
responsibilities necessary for intellectuals. The pages of Gerbe allowed collaborationist intellectuals 
not only to publish their views, but also to feel they were surrounded by others engaged in the same 
struggle.  
The network that was created between Groupe Collaboration, Collaboration, and La Gerbe 
was tightly knit and easily recognized. But these intellectuals were also linked, through common 
contributors and a shared mission, in an extensive web with other major journal teams in the occupied 
zone. The German Propagandastaffel helped launch several Paris daily papers in early 1940 including 
Matin, Paris-Soir, and La France au Travail where some of the prominent collaborationists like 
Bonnard published occasional pieces. Châteaubriant and Drieu contributed to Doriot’s Cri du Peuple 
while the daily Aujourd’hui, which claimed to address a literary and theatre clientele, employed the 
editing talents of writer Georges Suarez. Smaller organs that promoted intellectual collaboration like 
the Cahiers Franco-Allemande would continue to draw support from French intellectuals interested in 
cultural exchange with Germany.926 And Revolution Nationale, which promoted itself as a “political 
and literary” weekly after having distanced itself from the MSR in the latter years of the occupation, 
would draw Brasillach, Combelle, Rebatet, and Drieu. Two of the most anti-Semitic papers of the 
occupation, Au Pilori and Je Suis Partout, would also be linked to these intellectual networks. Au 
Pilori made itself the advocate of many collaborationists, even those who did not write for it. For 
example, they wrote an article whose argument was: “Drieu is an intellectual…but he is a true 
one.”927 Although Au Pilori was too extremist for many, Brasillach’s Je Suis Partout and Gerbe were 
the premier organs of the collaborationist intellectuals in the occupied zone. JSP employed a long list 
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of intellectuals whose names, from Celine to Rebatet and from Bonnard to Hermant, were found on 
the rosters of many other collaborationist journals and organizations.  
One final collaborationist journal that deserves mention was the new, occupation version of 
the NRF directed by Drieu la Rochelle. The NRF had been the stronghold of the Republican Left in 
the interwar period and had even engaged in sympathetic discussions of communism under the 
influence of Gide. Its writers had included such notable names of the intellectual Left as Gide, 
Mauriac, Aragon, Schlumberger, Benda, Sartre, and Benjamin Cremieux. With the occupation, the 
journal had been shut down and production stopped for the second half of 1940. Otto Abetz and the 
Germans, however, had an interest in maintaining the appearance of cultural continuity in order to 
ease the transition of occupation. For this reason, they reauthorized the NRF in December 1940 under 
the direction of committed collaborationist Drieu.928 Drieu attempted to retain many of the pre-war 
intellectual elites of the paper and succeeded, at least for a few issues, in attracting Paulhan, Gide, and 
Alain. However, as the occupation wore on, those who chose to publish in the NRF were increasingly 
aware that they were writing for the Germans, not the NRF of old, and that their participation would 
be seen as intellectual collaboration. The list of contributors would therefore show a significant shift 
from its pre-war roster. In the place of the usual names of the Left, one found Chardonne, 
Jouhandeau, Giono, Alfred Fabre-Luce, Morand, Fernandez, Bonnard, Montherlant, and regular 
pieces by Drieu. Therefore, despite any efforts to retain the names of the revue’s founders, Drieu 
made of the NRF a “lieu de vigilance” whose writers were, from then on, marked as collaborationists 
and as part of the extreme Right.929 
Networks of interconnected revue teams, cultural outlets and intellectual organizations, and 
even political parties provided spaces for intellectual sociability where collaborationists could feel 
themselves part of a larger collectivity. These spaces gave intellectuals a sense of solidarity in the 
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shared responsibility of intellectual collaborationism and the promotion of fascist values among the 
hesitant public. Most importantly, it created intellectual communities that were exclusively right-wing 
and collaborationist and excluded the ideas and the intellectuals of the Left and the Resistance. Being 
a part of these right-wing organizations, activities, and socio-professional networks became essential 
to the right-wing idea of intellectual life, practice, and engagement. From these communities, 
therefore, collaborationist intellectuals constructed a distinctly separate collective identity than that 
formed in the circles of the intellectual Resistance.  
 
The Collaborationist Intellectual Experience 
The networks and communities of the collaborationists were not the only components of this 
distinctive, right-wing concept of collective intellectual identity. The schism caused by the occupation 
created two very different understandings of the proper relationship of the intellectual to the 
government, the university, and the authorized literary and journalistic milieu. As a result, the 
practices, behaviors, and daily experiences of the collaborationists during the occupation were 
entirely distinct from those of the resistors. Their different experience of daily intellectual life gave 
them a distinctly right-wing understanding of what it meant to be an intellectual during Occupation. 
While Drieu and his peers on the Right would continue to defend their practices and experience as the 
proper actions of an intellectual, the Left would denounce this experience of intellectual life under 
foreign occupation as treasonous and anti-intellectual. It would be the Left’s understanding of 
responsible intellectual behavior under the Occupation that would triumph after the Liberation. 
 The intellectual Right, for the first time since the Affair, would experience life as the 
authorized voice, rather than the repressed opposition, of the governing regime. Bonnard found 
himself the Minister of Education under Vichy with the power to restructure the Sorbonne according 
to his fascist ideals. Maurras identified himself as the counselor of the Prince in his new position as 
informal advisor to Pétain. Drieu was offered a position as Censor of Literary Production in Vichy 
which he turned down in order to accept Abetz’s offer to direct the new NRF. Collaborationist 
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intellectuals found themselves feted by the fascist-friendly regimes in the North and South and 
officially recognized as the only intellectual spokesmen for France. With this new relationship to the 
governing regime came a similar change in the relationship of the Right to the university. Once a 
stronghold of the Republic and the Left, the university system under the Occupation became 
increasingly open to the intellectuals of Right and their values. Jewish and communist professors 
were replaced with instructors sympathetic to the new government and the Sorbonne was expanded to 
include chairs in anti-Semitic studies. Although journalism and literature would remain the primary 
professional trajectory of the Right, they no longer felt excluded from the university experience. 
This new relationship between the Right and the official spaces of power in France would 
have important implications for daily life and intellectual practice. While the Left was forced to adapt 
its practice and engagement to life underground, the Right would enjoy the privileges of the 
intelligentsia. Although the material shortages of war would affect the entire intellectual milieu, it 
was ameliorated to a great extent for the collaborationists. Papers like Gerbe received direct financial 
support from the German cultural embassy and were able to pay their contributors handsomely 
despite the wartime economy. Eleven journals, including Gerbe, JSP, Au Pilori, and Revolution 
Nationale were given priority status in the distribution of restricted materials like paper and ink. This 
significantly affected the ability of collaborationist intellectuals to write and publish. While the 
clandestine journals of the Resistance were often unable to produce on even a consistent bi-monthly 
schedule, collaborationist journals could be assured enough materials for consistent daily publication. 
And while the Resistance papers were limited by their equipment, supplies, and the nature of 
underground printing to limited pages and circulation numbers, the collaborationist presses produced 
much longer papers, with full length columns for its contributors, and circulations that could reach 
around 140,000.930 For the intellectual collaboration, the daily practice of journalism entailed no great 
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personal risk, no need to requisition supplies, and no unusual limitations on the length or frequency of 
articles. It was a much more stable experience of occupation journalism than that of the Resistance. 
Individual authors experienced similar effects of German support. While the Bernhard and 
Otto Lists created pariahs on the intellectual Left who were no longer authorized to be published, the 
German occupiers made equally influential efforts to promote the work of the intellectual Right. A 
list was compiled of 189 works by collaborationist and fascist friendly authors like Drieu, Brasillach, 
Châteaubriant, Chardonne, Rebatet, Montherlant, Morand and Giono. These works and all new pieces 
by their authors were to be welcomed and given priority publishing rights by those publishing houses 
that wanted to retain the good graces and material support of the Germans.931 Collaborationist writers 
also found an additional perquisite of German support. Works by Châteaubriant and at least ten other 
French authors were selected for translation and publication in the German speaking world. Others 
had their works adapted for German cinema, and many were invited for speaking tours and Writers 
Congresses, like those held in Weimar and Nuremberg.(ibid) Collaborationists were also welcomed 
and their work eagerly solicited by the authorized publishing firms. The most notorious of the 
collaborationist publishers was Grasset publishing who handled many of the writers at Gerbe and 
JSP. Those collaborationists who were not already part of his catalogue, including Drieu, were 
actively seduced from their original firms. Grasset was not the only firm to welcome 
collaborationists, however. Other sympathetic firms included Baudiniere, Denoel, Sorlot, and 
Editions de France.932 Once again, the very essential intellectual practice of publishing work was 
extremely different for those favored by the regime and those repressed by it. 
The experience of intellectual life as the representatives of the regime was not always a 
positive one, however. The financial assistance and the preferential publishing came with stipulations 
and demands that severely altered the intellectual expression of the collaborationist intellectuals. 
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There were three main German services for controlling intellectual expression, even in the authorized 
presses: the Propaganda-Abteilung which controlled the production of pro-German propaganda as 
well as basic censorship, the Institut allemande, headed by cultural liaison Karl Epting, which 
promoted collaborationist material, and the Ant Schrifttum that arranged the censorship and 
elimination of undesirable works.933 In the southern zone, Inter-France, a supposedly autonomous 
“cooperative society of the press” that eventually included 180 authorized periodicals, was created to 
assure that journals and writers promoted a positive view of both Germany and Vichy.934 In 1940 and 
afterward, any director attempting to authorize a journal in the occupied zone had to appear before the 
Propagandastaffel offices on the Champs-Elysées and pledge to support both Germany and its 
military efforts and to align itself with all propaganda directives.935
These directives included specific instructions on the content, tone, and language of all radio 
and press expression. In 1944, for example, journalists were instructed to minimize the effects of the 
aerial offensive and to suggest the invention of more powerful weapons by Germany, to continue 
condemning the imperialism of Stalin, and to advertise the American refusal to recognize the Comité 
d’Alger as the provisional government of France.936 German interference in intellectual expression 
could take even more intrusive forms. At Gerbe, the weekly column “Le fait de la semaine” under the 
name “Aimé Casar” was actually written by Eitel Moelhausen from the Berlin ministry of Foreign 
affairs. Châteaubriant, despite his position as director, had no editing control over this column. 
Perhaps even more disruptive to the intellectual experience than the overt censorship, however, was 
the new practice on the intellectual Right of auto-censure. Collaborationists like Châteaubriant, Drieu, 
and their journals had few instances of direct censorship because they conformed their writing to the 
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expectations of the occupiers. Although for most, this conformity was a result of ideological 
alignment with Germany, there are indications that public writings did not always express the full 
thought of the authors. Drieu’s private journal entries, for example, express more defeatism, 
frustration with the German effort, and admiration for Soviet power than was ever permitted in his 
public journalism.  
Conformity to the Nazi propaganda directives would also heighten the anti-Semitism of the 
collaborationist writers. Although many like Brasillach, Rebatet, and Celine rejoiced in the newfound 
freedom to express their long held anti-Semitic vitriol, others like Fernandez, Bonnard, and even 
Châteaubriant, had expressed little or no anti-Semitism before the occupation. Châteaubriant had 
maintained his life-long friendship with Romain Rolland throughout the inter-war period despite the 
“mutual distancing” caused by the dramatic opposition of their ideas. But, when Châteaubriant 
conformed to the anti-Semitism of Gerbe, his friend was dismayed by the new trajectory and wrote a 
final letter of farewell saying, “you know what distances me above all from you, it is the brutal, 
injurious anti-Semitism which fills the columns of…the pages [of Gerbe].”937 Whether from 
conformity to the Nazi directives and expectations or out of an intense and long-held biological 
racism, the collaborationist intellectuals’ support and participation in anti-Semitism would drastically 
differentiate not only their intellectual values and social worldviews but also their intellectual practice 
from those of the Resistance and the Left. Anti-Semitic language, discussions of the legitimacy of 
biological racism, denunciations of Jews, and approval of the measures taken against the Jewish 
population were found only on the collaborationist Right.  
The collaborationist Right developed a new relationship to the occupation government and its 
authorized spaces like the university that allowed it to experience life as the intelligentsia for the first 
time. As the only official intellectual authority, they received newfound material, financial, and 
ideological support from the regime that allowed them to continue to write, publish, and publicize 
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their work in ways that the Resistance could not. For the Right, being an intellectual under the 
occupation came to mean working closely with the regime, often in positions of political power, 
publishing in the large authorized presses, participating in cultural exchange efforts with the 
occupying power, and accepting censorship, directives, and even a new anti-Semitic tone and 
vocabulary in one’s work. While the Right redefined intellectual identity under the Occupation 
according to its new experiences, the intellectuals of the Resistance would do the same, creating a 
new standard of acceptable intellectual behavior under foreign occupation that was defined by their 
own experience of clandestine life.  
 
The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Occupation 
Drieu and Châteaubriant were influential spokesmen for collaborationist intellectuals who led 
the way in claiming to be intellectuals as well as fascists. In their efforts to merge these two defining 
elements of their identity, they would continue the pattern of identity construction that, over the 
century, has yielded a relatively consistent model of the right-wing intellectual. Both men resented 
the hegemony that they perceived the Left to exert over both the concept of the intellectual and the 
cultural field. Although they would gain dominance over the intellectual world under the Occupation, 
Drieu and Châteaubriant continued to see themselves as excluded from the public’s perception of the 
intellectual. They felt it was necessary, in every effort of engagement, to first struggle to dispel the 
engrained perception that the intellectual was, by definition, of the Left. In their struggle for 
legitimacy and intellectual authority, they worked to distinguish their own fascist values and 
worldviews from those of the Left while still claiming the identity, responsibility, and role of the 
intellectual. According to their alternative model, the intellectual advocated Realism, Europeanism, 
and a concept of man as “complete.” In practice, this meant that the role of the intellectual was to 
work within the reality of the occupation by engaging in collaboration, to promote physical action and 
virile force rather than overly intellectualized concepts of man and culture, and to actively work 
toward a redefinition of French nationalism along continental lines. Collaborationists came together 
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in communities segregated from the intellectual Left to create a network of socio-professional support 
and camaraderie and to amplify each individual’s engagement. Participation in and association with 
this interconnected web of collaborationist communities, from revue teams and political parties to 
youth organizations and publishing firms, became an important aspect of right-wing collective 
identity. The relationship that these collective communities and their individual intellectuals had to 
the new regime and its institutions would also provide the collaborationists with a distinctly different 
experience of intellectual life, behavior, and practice than that on the resistant Left. After the 
Liberation, the Resistance intellectuals would return to power and definitively link intellectual 
responsibility to the experiences, communities, and values of the Left. In contrast, despite the efforts 
of post-war intellectuals of the Right like Jacques Laurent and Maurice Bardèche, the Right would be 
linked to Nazism, denied any claim to intellectual identity, and practically erased from historical 
reflections on the intellectual life of the century. 
SECTION VI 
 
THE POST-WAR, 1945-1967 
 
The choice of collaboration or resistance during the occupation would deeply divide the 
intellectual world and resulted in the creation of two distinctly different understandings of true 
intellectual responsibility, values, and experience during these years. The intellectual extreme Right 
would continue to identify itself as the oppressed minority and maintain its discourse of exclusion, 
resentment, and struggle despite enjoying its first real intellectual hegemony in decades. With the 
Liberation of France, the Right’s perceived exclusion from the conceptualization of the intellectual 
would become, more than ever in the past, a reality. The stain of Nazism and the glorification of the 
Resistance during the post-war period would effectively return the Left to a position of intellectual 
dominance and exclude the Right not only from positions of power within the political and cultural 
world, but from the ability even to identify as a member of the intellectual elite or express their ideas 
as alternatives. This post-war concept of intellectual identity as a republican and left-wing construct 
would also become the basis for the majority of the historical interpretations of intellectual life in the 
twentieth century. 
The post-war period, from the Liberation to the colonial conflicts, was a period of dramatic 
political transition, national reconstruction, and transformation in both the conception of True France 
and of the place of the true intellectual. With the Liberation, the ideas of the Right were quickly 
discredited and the ideas and figures of the Resistance became not only the dominant voice in the 
political and cultural world, but the only voice. As early as the first clandestine papers of the 
occupation, the Resistance intellectuals had promoted two programs for the post-war period which 
they would proceed to carry out: the construction of a new French Republic, founded on the 
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principles and relationships discovered during the Resistance, and the punishment of the 
collaborationists. Visions of a cooperative new Republic with all the parties of the Resistance soon 
evaporated in the reality of internal divisions.938 These divisions would destabilize the political efforts 
of the Fourth Republic and cause friction among the various representatives of the Republican and 
Left intellectual elite. However, despite these internal divisions, the Right would continue to view 
these parties as a united left-wing bloc. 
The intellectuals of the Republic and the extreme Left were, at least initially, able to agree on 
the second course of action: the purge. Although the punishment of all political, economic, and 
intellectual collaborators would influence the exclusion of the Right in the French public space, it is 
the punishment of intellectuals for “intelligence with the enemy” under Article 175 that would most 
affect post-war understanding of intellectual responsibility and identity. Collaborationist intellectuals 
were accused of betraying the “French soul,” and of “collusion with a foreign power.” In short, they 
had betrayed a “certain idea of France” held by the Resistance.939 Fifteen writers, including Georges 
Suarez, Henri Béraud, Brasillach, Châteaubriant, and Drieu would be charged with treason and 
sentenced to death. By August 1944, a second law was created that sought to punish collaborationists 
for “indignité nationale,” rather than political treason, and carried prison sentences, fines, and the loss 
of citizenship rights including voting, teaching, and writing for the French press.  
The CNE, which was increasingly dominated after the Liberation by the PCF, would become 
the most prominent institutional advocate of the purge of the intellectuals. It created, in September 
1944, the first of three blacklists identifying writers accused of espousing Nazi ideology, supporting 
the relève and Milice, and opposing the allies and Free French. By October, it had expanded the 
initial twelve name blacklist to 165 and had brought the list to the Ministry of Justice to help steer 
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judicial indictments. However, it was not the judicial punishments which would most damage the 
intellectuals on the blacklist, but the proscription that the CNE placed on their work. Publishers, 
journals, and other writers refused to work with writers identified by the CNE as collaborationists, 
effectively excluding them from the mainstream post-war intellectual world and forcing them to find 
new, separate avenues for their intellectual expression.  
Due to the purge, the CNE proscription, and the general delegitimization of the intellectual 
Right in the early postwar years, most public discussions of intellectual responsibility, the right to 
err,940 true intellectual values, and the necessity of engagement were carried out within the intellectual 
camps of the Left and Center. In these internal debates of the Left, the PCF and the communist 
intellectual vision held the greatest influence. Sartre and the majority of Les Temps Modernes “third 
way” intellectuals would come under its sway by 1952 and, initially, even the Catholic intellectuals of 
Esprit would enter into a hesitant alliance with intellectual communism.941 During the mid 1950s, 
news of Soviet purge trials, deportations, and even the campaign against Yugoslavia were denied, 
rationalized, or dismissed as anti-communist propaganda by intellectuals of both the extreme Left and 
Third Way leaving anti-communism to the Gaullist intellectuals like Aron.942 News of American 
action in the Korean War promoted strong anti-Americanism and an increased leniency for the USSR 
as did PCF led efforts to limit atomic proliferation through the Stockholm Appeal. It would not be 
until 1956, when Khrushchev’s report against Stalin emerged and the Soviets crushed the Hungarian 
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majority of the intellectuals of the Left, however, believed that the thought of the collaborationists had too many 
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uprising, that intellectuals would show the first significant disillusionment with the USSR, resulting 
in mass resignations from the PCF and even a petition calling for its ban.943 
However even this blow did not immediately dethrone the hegemonic influence of 
communism. While many continued to look to the USSR and simply to call for reform of the party 
from within, the majority maintained their faith in communism and revolution, though not the USSR 
or the PCF, by turning their attention to the newly emergent communist nations in China, Southeast 
Asia, and Cuba. Communist revolution would therefore remain, well into the 1960s, the “grid of 
political analysis and the system of ideological reference” for the intellectual milieu.944 There might 
be dissent and debate over its course of action, but there was never any question of supporting its 
opponents on the Right.945
The efforts to contain communism and the global struggles for independence would spark 
new debates about intellectual responsibility on the Left and Right. Although the French interventions 
in Indochina during the late 1940s would raise relatively little interest among the intellectual milieu, 
the war for Algerian independence from 1954 to 1962 and the later involvement of the US in the 
Vietnam conflict would become the new crusade of the engaged intellectual on the Left and give new 
life and influence to the extreme Right. It is true that, at least initially, division of the intellectual 
camp over the issue of Algerian independence was not clearly an issue of Left and Right. Numerous 
intellectuals who considered themselves “of the Left” including Camus and Jacques Soustelle were 
opposed to the idea of an independent Algeria. However, it is important to note that while several left-
wing intellectuals supported the idea of French Algeria, none on the extreme Right advocated an 
independent Algeria. By 1960, de Gaulle and democratic republicans of the Center had joined the 
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majority of the intellectual Left in supporting independent Algeria as the most logical course for 
France and pushing for the withdrawal of French forces there. At this point, only the extreme Right 
would continue to support the OAS and to argue the benefits of French control. Subsequent 
intellectual division over the efforts for independence in Vietnam would be much more clearly 
marked between the Right and Left. The intellectual Left supported communist inspired revolution by 
Ho Chi Minh against the American forces and the extreme Right, despite its own anti-Americanism, 
denounced soviet aid as communist infiltration and dismissed the intellectual Left’s reports of 
American atrocities as propaganda.  
The events of the post-war era are extremely significant for any discussion of intellectual 
identity. The main crusades of the engaged intellectuals, from the institution of the purge to the 
question of independence, were connected to two larger themes: French national identity in the post-
war and the identity of the intellectual representative. The purge raised questions not only of political 
traitors to True France but of intellectual responsibility, intellectual treason, and the right to err. It 
also allowed the dominant intellectual Left to exclude those on the Right it deemed irresponsible from 
practicing and identifying as intellectuals in the mainstream public. By the early 1960s, when the 
Right had reinserted itself into the intellectual life of the nation, the intellectual Left felt threatened 
once again and revived its discourse of national and intellectual identity. These debates over national 
and intellectual identity would create a climate of confusion and instability in the years leading to 
May 1968.  
CHAPTER 17 
 
LEFT-WING INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY DURING THE POST-WAR: REPUBLICAN AND 
EXTREME LEFT VALUES  
 
The euphoria of the Liberation for the intellectuals of the Resistance would quickly turn to 
questions about post-war society. New international powers threatened to reduce France to a minor 
player on the global stage and led intellectuals to question not only the place and role of France in the 
new post-war world but also the essential values that would define her role. Since intellectuals were 
the representatives of this national essence, the post-war would also be a time for intellectuals to 
reflect on the nature of intellectual identity. For many on the Left, “authentic” intellectual identity 
would, for the first time, become synonymous with active engagement against all forms of 
oppression. The post-war also sparked new interest in defining not only who could be considered 
French and intellectual but what it meant to be “of the Left” or even the Republican Center instead of 
“of the Right.” These preoccupations of the post-war intellectual elite show a renewed interest in the 
conceptualization and definition of French intellectual identity. On the Left, they reveal a desire to 
distance left-wing intellectual values from those of the extreme Right, to return these left-wing values 
to public dominance after four years of suppression, and to exclude the Right from participation in the 
new intellectual identity.   
Since the Right was disgraced and completely excluded from public affairs in the immediate 
post-war, the initial public campaign to define the values, visions, and behaviors of the true French 
intellectual took place more as internal debates among the various members of the Resistance than as 
a struggle with the Right. During the post-war years, the front created by the Resistance slowly 
disintegrated into a complex array of diverse republican and extreme Left camps that each had 
different perspectives on intellectual responsibility. At its most conservative pole, this spectrum 
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would include the liberal republicanism of Raymond Aron, Jean Paulhan, and the intellectuals of 
Figaro and Preuves as well as the Gaullist intellectuals like Malraux and Mauriac. On its most 
extreme Left, it would extend to the committed PCF intellectuals of Lettres Françaises, Action, and 
Nouvelles Critiques from Aragon to Claude Morgan. In between the two, were the intellectuals of the 
revolutionary but non-PCF “Third Way” which included Camus and the catholic intellectuals of 
Mounier’s Esprit, but which was unquestionably dominated by Sartre and the collaborators of Les 
Temps Modernes.
Although PCF intellectuals had a tremendous impact, it was the Third Way intellectuals, 
epitomized by Sartre, who were the most influential in defining the intellectual model of the Left 
during the post-war years. The writings and ideas of liberal republicans like Raymond Aron and 
Gaullists like Mauriac were often marginalized by these more dominant extremists of the Left 
because of their opposition to social revolution. Despite their differences with the extreme Left, 
however, the republican Center intellectuals must still be considered a product of the Resistance and 
of the ideals of the anti-fascist Left when comparing them to the intellectuals of the extreme Right. In 
the eyes of the intellectual extreme Right, the Gaullists and republicans were not merely part of the 
Resistance, they were co-conspirators of the PCF in the hegemonic Leftist bloc. For this reason, 
former conservatives like Mauriac who had turned to Gaullism would be singled out for attack by the 
resentful Right as often as Sartre and the PCF intellectuals. The Right’s perception of a left-wing bloc 
of former Resistance intellectuals was not entirely fabricated. Although each faction of the Left had 
its own perspective, there were certain views that had united them in the Resistance and would 
continue to provide some continuity in the post-war era.  
In particular, the distinct factions of the Center and Left would be united by a mentality of 
engagement formed by their participation in the underground resistance. The Resistance intellectuals 
believed that the collaborationists had proved themselves irresponsible and dangerous during the 
Occupation. Therefore, under the auspices of the CNE, they worked to deny intellectual identity and 
engagement to the Right after the Liberation. Although several intellectuals like Camus became 
411 
disenchanted with the purge, they all benefited from the absence of the right-wing intellectuals. As 
Malraux would famously claim when speaking of the Gaullists, “What is there today in France? Us 
and the Communists, and nothing else.”946 Since there were no longer any opponents to the Right, the 
intellectual of the Left expressed no concern that his work might be dismissed as anti-intellectual 
while this was a dominant theme in the work of the Right. The Left was also not preoccupied with 
matters of censorship, isolation, exclusion, or “intellectual ostracism” like the Right was.947 The 
intellectual of the Left did not struggle to find an outlet for his work or an audience receptive to its 
arguments. In particular, left-wing engagés benefited from the ability to disseminate their version of 
the history of France and the intellectual during the Occupation without contradiction from the Right. 
While the Right continued to approach its engagement as a struggle against oppression, exclusion, 
and ostracism, the Left’s mentality of engagement was, once again, one of self-assured dominance.  
The diverse factions of the Center and Left could also be identified by several shared 
intellectual values drawn from a century long tradition of left-wing thought. Of all the internal 
discussions of intellectual identity, the most concise effort to define the intellectual Left and its 
values, and to distinguish it as a bloc from the Right, was found in the special number of Les Temps 
Modernes published in the Spring of 1955. This number, devoted to “La Gauche” considered the 
drastic division between the thought of the extreme Right and the extreme Left, the values that united 
the diverse factions of the Left, and the essential definition of the Left as conceived by its 
intellectuals. A summary enquête in the issue determined that despite their internal divisions, the 
intellectual Left and Right were internally cohesive mentalities that were distinctly different from one 
another and opposed at their very essence. 948 “The findings of this study,” it concluded, “show a 
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fundamental difference between the man of the Left and the man of the Right.”949 The entire issue 
clearly summarized these differences that the LTM intellectuals believed separated the intellectuals of 
the Left from the Right. These included a certain interpretation of the war and Liberation, a 
dedication to universalism, an opposition to colonialism, and a vision of social revolution. 
Despite minor disagreements, the intellectual Left shared a fundamental historical 
interpretation of the war and Liberation years that required a distinctly left-wing view of the purge 
and the right to err. The intellectuals of the Left united behind a narrative of the war that described 
France as the nation of 40 million resistors, the government as the Free French in exile, and de Gaulle 
as the prophet of the mobile army and the liberator of France. According to this historical perspective, 
which would become the standard interpretation of the war in France until the work of Robert Paxton, 
the people had silently rejected collaboration, Vichy was treasonous to France, and de Gaulle was the 
only legitimate leader of the liberated nation. This narrative made the punishment of the “minority” 
collaborationists through a purge seem more justifiable. A few intellectuals associated with the 
Resistance, like Maulnier and Paulhan, rejected the idea of the purge and defended the intellectual’s 
“right to err” as essential to free expression. However, as a majority, the Left was united behind both 
the necessity of the purge and the refusal to see collaboration as a forgivable error. The PCF and 
existentialist intellectuals in particular argued that the collaborationists’ “opinions” had led to real and 
foreseeable consequences for France and that their speech had therefore taken on the characteristic of 
an act that could be judged. The intellectual did not have the “right to err” or to free speech, according 
to the Left, if it resulted in the oppression of others. The purge was the enforcement of this new 
understanding of intellectual responsibility. The language of betrayal and legal culpability attached to 
the collaborationists during the purge indicated the Left’s attempt to define and limit intellectual 
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identity to the thinkers who shared the values of the Resistance.950 In response, the intellectual Right 
resentfully declared themselves “political prisoners” of the ideological dominance of the Left and 
compared the purge to the Terror of 1793 saying it had been created “to punish unpopular, that is, 
extreme right-wing political opinions.”951 But the historical interpretation of the Left would 
predominate. The purge was seen by the majority of contemporaries as just retribution for intellectual 
betrayal of France that was necessary in order to exclude from intellectual activities, the “men whom 
France is carrying within her, like foreign bodies, whose existence poses a problem for justice.”952
This concept of the purge as “justice” and of the execution of intellectuals for collaboration as 
morally justified was linked to the continued appreciation, on the republican and extreme Left, of the 
traditional left-wing value of universalism. If there were, as the Left had maintained over the century, 
an abstract humanity and a universal man, then there was also a set of universal human rights, an 
abstract standard of morality, and a universal conscience. Events like the Holocaust and the 
occupation of France were able to be universally condemned according to these standards and their 
individual supporters punished. While the Right argued for extenuating circumstances and the 
impracticality of any supranational standards for behavior and rights, the Left supported international 
bodies that were to represent the universal conscience of an abstract humanity. In practice, the Left’s 
idea of a “universal conscience” and abstract standards of civilized thought and behavior led it to 
actively support the Nuremberg Trials, the “crimes against humanity” clause, the partitioning of 
Germany, and participation in the United Nations, in addition to its own internal purge. Although the 
Left continued to couch these universalizing aims in terms of the French nation, a strategy which had 
proven popular during the years of the Resistance, they would “interpret France’s identity in terms of 
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its universal mission” rather than its national or European one as the Right did.953 The true essence of 
the French nation, representatives of the intellectual Left argued, was found in the universal goals of 
world peace, international justice, and freedom from oppression first elaborated in 1789. Therefore, 
according to the intellectual Left, French nationalism was exemplified by such international bodies as 
the UN and international tribunals. The Left’s internationalist interpretation of True France would, 
therefore, correspond to a vision of intellectual responsibility to the nation and to civilization that was 
in keeping with their universalism.   
The idea of a universal conscience and a duty to guide not just France, but humanity, was 
linked to the Left’s new postwar passion of anti-colonialism.954 The debate over independence for 
Algeria would not initially create a clear Left-Right division since several noted intellectuals of the 
Left, like Camus and Soustelle, favored French Algeria. However, by the time of the debates over 
American involvement in Vietnam, it was clear that being an intellectual of the Left included an 
opposition to colonialism. As Sartre summarized, the intellectuals of the Left believed that 
“colonialism is in the midst of destroying itself, but it still influences the atmosphere, it is our shame, 
it mocks our laws, it infests us with racism…our role [as intellectuals] is to aid it in dying.”955 Peace 
and the ability to focus on social change, they believed, demanded an end to all wars, but particularly 
those carried out under the aegis of imperialism and economic oppression.956 
In practice, this demanded that the intellectual of the Left conceive of his role not as an ivory 
tower theorist for hexagonal France, but as a globally vigilant activist. While the French colonial 
struggle in Vietnam had attracted little intellectual or public interest outside of LTM and Esprit, the 
conflict in Algeria would quickly align the entire intellectual community to an extent that 
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contemporaries compared to the Dreyfus Affair. Initially, the majority of the intellectual Left devoted 
their engagement to a protest against the use of torture and the inequalities and exploitation of the 
colonial system in general. Even the PCF, during the early years, would not support the idea of a fully 
independent Algeria. However, as the Right and the Republican government increasingly tried to 
justify colonialism as a beneficial and necessary experience for the people of Algeria, anti-
colonialism, opposition to continued war in Algeria, and eventually even support for an independent 
Algeria became the “cement” that would group “divergent political positions on the Left” and clarify 
the division as a “Right-Left cleavage.”957 The identification of the intellectual of the Left with active 
protest against colonialism would intensify during the post-1965 debates as the intellectual Left 
engaged en masse again to denounce American involvement in Vietnam. 
Their position on Algeria would therefore become an important part of the Left’s 
distinguishing concept of intellectual identity. The majority of the dominant Left was against 
colonialism and later in favor of Algerian independence, so they set the parameters of this discussion 
of identity by asking “whether an intellectual…could advocate French colonialism in Algeria or 
express admiration for the so-called advantages Western colonialism had brought to Algeria.”958 
Despite the Republic’s identification with its overseas empire and the presence in the colonialist camp 
of figures like Camus, “it soon became clear that intellectual legitimacy was going to become more 
allied with anti-colonialism and a new vision of France.”959 Because of their dominance over the field 
the Left was able redefine French national identity, and with it intellectual responsibility, on their 
value of anti-colonialism rather than French empire. Colonialism was argued to be, not a system for 
encouraging progress, but a system of exploitation, oppression, tyranny, the loss of human rights, and 
even torture. As such, it was a violation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the revolutionary 
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and enlightened values which were the essence of French national identity.960 Intellectual legitimacy, 
in turn, was gained by defending these Rights of Man in France and throughout the new global 
community. 
The Left, therefore, identified its anti-colonialism as part of a larger left-wing responsibility 
to promote egalitarianism and social revolution. As intellectuals, they saw themselves as inheritors of 
the Enlightenment and Revolutionary legacy and so sought to engage their work against all forms of 
racial intolerance, paternalism, inequality, economic exploitation, and political oppression. The idea 
of social revolution, both in the colonies and at home among the working class, would be essential to 
the Left’s concept of the intellectual and to its portrayal of legitimate engagement. In particular, the 
Left, whether socialist, communist, or third way, emphasized revolutionary symbols and discourses, 
the culture of social rights and progress of 1789, the image of popular revolution, and the 
identification of the Nation with the People in its engaged work.961 Although they continued the 
resistance language of nationalism, intellectuals of the Left identified French national identity with 
the themes of revolution that were enjoying universal success rather than with the specific traditions 
and territories of France. Therefore, as the representatives of the true French nation, the intellectuals 
of the Left “defined their own identity and their authority based on arguments drawn from the 
language of revolutionary politics.”962 According to the intellectual Left, support for social revolution 
was the rule by which one could “identify those who properly constituted the nation and exclude 
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traitors.”963 As a correlate, support for social revolution was the mark of those who properly 
constituted the intellectual elite and opposition to it, the mark of the intellectual traitors. 
The LTM enquête on “La Gauche” identified this support for social revolution, particularly in 
exploited colonies, as an integral part of the role of the intellectual. The Left, this enquête argued, 
believed in a transformation of society through revolution. This was based on the intellectual Left’s 
understanding of the innate goodness and perfectibility of man and the role of the intellectual to 
progress society by changing the material conditions. In contrast, the enquête argued, the Right was 
skeptical about the possibility of any social evolution and ignored the impact on man that material 
conditions had. This was due to the Right’s distrust of man and its belief that society could only 
devolve into decadent decay over time. This very different understanding of man, society, and the 
necessity of material changes was the key, the enquête concluded, to the Left and Right’s distinctive 
post-war engagements. In the same issue, Beauvoir summarized this difference between the 
intellectuals and the Right in “La Pensée de Droite, aujourd’hui..”964 Since the fall of fascism, she 
wrote, the Right saw no future except decadence, decline, and the collapse of civilization. Since they 
had no positive vision of the future, Beauvoir continued, the Right could only define itself negatively. 
“The contemporary Right no longer knows what it defends,” she decided, “it defends itself against 
communism, that is all.”965 By rejecting the revolutionary alternative provided by communism, the 
intellectual Right made itself the protector of social difference, privilege, racism, and inequality 
which they called “Civilization.” But, she wrote, the Right fails to recognize that the “civilization” 
they cling to is not the “civilization” envisioned by the intellectuals of the Left. The responsible 
intellectual did not defend status quo inequalities but fought actively for a world civilization of equals 
that was possible only through social, and even communist, revolution.  
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Out of this left-wing approach to intellectual responsibility in the post-war would come 
Sartre’s existentialist understanding of the “authentic intellectual.” This was an exclusively left-wing 
concept that would dominate the public’s understanding of intellectual identity and engagement until 
the 1970s. Sartre’s vision of literature as a “social function” and of the intellectual as an agent for 
change would become the driving force behind Les Temps Modernes, as noted in its opening 
“Presentation.”966 The authentic or true intellectual would not accept or support injustice and 
oppression, but would rather work specifically to eradicate these by actively engaging his work in 
political affairs. Authentic intellectuals were therefore pledged to engage against the injustice of 
capitalism and colonialism and in favor of revolutionary change to man’s material social condition. 
The “authentic intellectual,” it concluded of the role of the left-wing intellectual, “wants to be a 
universal man…in solidarity with the oppressed.”967
Although the post-war Left was internally divided on many issues, it shared a fundamental set 
of intellectual values, drawn from a long tradition of engagement, that distinguished it clearly from 
the post-war Right. The intellectuals of the Left continued to identify legitimate intellectual practice 
with the Enlightenment ideals of racial tolerance, egalitarianism, social revolution, abstract humanity, 
and the universal rights of man. In the post-war, the Left would also be identified by its shared 
perspective on the wartime narrative and, at least initially, the necessity of a purge. Because they 
effectively controlled the intellectual field for more than a decade after the Liberation, the intellectual 
Left was able to fuse these values to the post-war concept of intellectual identity and responsibility. 
The dominance of the intellectual values of the Left was reinforced by the hegemony of its revived, 
and no longer clandestine, intellectual communities and socio-professional networks. Participation in 
these left-wing communities would become another important component of the Left’s understanding 
of intellectual identity. 
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The Intellectual World of the Left: Communities, Networks, and Intellectual Practice 
 After four years of clandestine activity, suppression, and persecution, the intellectuals of the 
Resistance were eager to retake their positions of dominance in the intellectual field and revive the 
communities and networks that would give their individual engagement collective force. This process 
required not only the purging and banning of collaborationist and right-wing parties, revues, 
publishing firms, cultural organizations, and youth movements but the recreation of these 
communities for the extreme Left. The diversity of the post-war Left, particularly in its relation to the 
USSR, would mean that the intellectual world of the Left remained relatively fractured despite the 
idealistic hopes for unity during the early months of the Liberation. However, this pluralism of left-
wing communities did not prevent the sort of cross-over networking and intellectual socialization that 
had characterized the decades before the war. And, as always, the communities and networks of the 
intellectual Left, no matter how internally divided, remained united in their opposition to and 
exclusion of the values, programs, and thinkers of the intellectual Right.  
 The Comité National des Ecrivains would remain, especially during the early years of the 
post-war era, the most significant community for intellectuals of the Left. It portrayed itself as the 
premier organization of the Resistance and drew to it over two hundred intellectuals including the 
prestigious and actively engaged Valery, Vercors, Malraux, Duhamel, Schlumberger, Guéhenno, 
Mauriac, Morgan, Eluard, Frénaud, Camus, Sartre, Cassou, Roy, Paulhan, Triolet, and Aragon who 
would serve as its general secretary. Initially, it was able to unite its membership behind the mission 
to purge France of the fascist and collaborationist influences of the previous four years. In its first, 
non-clandestine meeting after the Liberation in September 1944, it called for the “just punishment of 
the imposters and traitors” of the intellectual field and gathered over sixty signatures for its 
“manifeste des ecrivains francais.” In the manifest, the CNE members proclaimed the CNE as “the 
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only representative and acting organization of French writers.”968 Post-war editors and revue directors 
obediently followed its blacklist proscriptions and intellectuals, even those who were concerned by 
the excesses of the treason trials, were united behind its efforts to delegitimize the intellectual Right. 
The clearest statement of this community cohesion and sense of collective identity and shared 
purpose was published as early as September 1944. “The members of the CNE,” it read, “have 
engaged themselves to refuse all collaboration to the journals, revues, collections, etc, which publish 
a text signed by a writer of which the attitude or the writing during the occupation brought moral or 
material aid to the oppressor.”969 In this way, the CNE defined proper intellectual practice for the 
collective community of the former Resistance intellectuals.  
 The CNE was also the umbrella organization for several other sources of intellectual 
community. The CNE sponsored salons and literary discussions at its siege at the Maison de la pensée 
francaise on Saturdays. Here intellectual leaders like Aragon and Eluard spoke on current events and 
literary themes, foreign and often communist writers were feted, and aspiring young authors were 
given opportunities to be mentored and made legitimate in the eyes of the public. Most importantly, 
perhaps, was the community that was formed around the CNE organ Les Lettres françaises. The 
communist dominated journal had been extremely active during the resistance years and would retain 
most of its original PCF and soviet contributors including Vercors, Aragon, Thomas, Severine, 
Triolet, Roy, JR Bloch, Ehrenbourg, and its director Claude Morgan. Most of the CNE manifests and 
declarations were found in the pages of Lettres françaises and the journal would be responsible for 
publicizing the CNE’s program and value system, particularly that of the extreme PCF contingent of 
the CNE. The strong connection and network that existed between the CNE, Lettres françaises, and 
the intellectuals of the PCF was one that was readily recognized by contemporaries.  
 The PCF was therefore another important socio-professional community for the intellectual 
extreme Left, even though it could only claim a fraction of the intellectual field as committed party 
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members. As it had during the interwar years, the PCF was able to draw to it committed intellectuals 
like Aragon, Roy, and Daix but garnered its real influence from its ability to draw non-PCF 
intellectuals into its sphere of influence through its affiliated organizations, revues, cultural 
congresses, and petitions. Communism, according to the PCF, was the path to the future, the party of 
revolution, progress, and enlightenment that left-wing intellectuals, by definition, supported. It 
provided them with the moral superiority of being on the side of the oppressed, the working class, and 
the exploited. After the occupation, the communist party, as the strongest organization to emerge 
from the Resistance, would also take on the mantle of the preserver of the French cultural patrimony. 
All of these were irresistible lures for intellectuals.970 The PCF became an important community for 
the non-communist intellectuals of the Left by providing ceremonies for national and cultural heroes, 
referencing past French intellectuals in its pieces, and celebrating French national tradition, 
particularly revolutionary tradition. On a more material level, communist membership provided 
writers with translation rights in soviet controlled countries, promotion of their books and articles by 
one of the dominant political parties in France, invitations to travel and speak in the USSR, and 
various awards and conference honors.  
 As it had in the interwar years, the PCF would also sponsor many congresses and movements 
directed toward the intellectual in order to draw non-party intellectual supporters to its sphere of 
influence. As early as June 1946, the PCF organized one of the largest gatherings of intellectuals 
since the war: the Congrès de la Pensée. The texts from the Congress would be published the 
following year as Le Parti communiste, les intellectuels et la nation in order to spread the force of this 
effort of collective engagement to those who had not attended the congress.971 Perhaps most 
influential, though, was the World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace which had been created in 1948 
in Poland by communist intellectuals and the Cominform. The French subsidiary would be the 
Mouvement des Intellectuels Français pour la Défense de la Paix. The Peace Movement would draw 
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to it such prestigious names as Vercors, Cassou, and Sartre by proclaiming its mission to be, not the 
spread of communism, but the end of colonial wars, the defeat of lingering fascism, and the 
preservation of European national independence. The Movement would initiate its own congress in 
1949 and one year later would be instrumental in gathering over 14 million signatures for the 
Stockholm Appeal. These congresses provided communist sympathizing intellectuals with yet another 
platform for engagement. In 1952, for example, Sartre spoke at the Vienna congress on the necessity 
of German reunification, UN recognition of the Peoples Republic of China, and an end to colonial 
war in Indochine.  
The PCF controlled journals were perhaps the clearest source of intellectual community 
where PCF members and non-party intellectuals were able, at least in the early post-war years, to 
work together. The PCF organ Action initially drew to its pages not only doctrinaire PCF writers, but 
also non-party contributors including Benda, Merleau-Ponty, and Mauriac. After 1947 this 
camaraderie would slowly disappear as the party tightened its restrictions on non-party line 
contributions, but the initial effort had forged socio-professional networks between many of its 
former writers. Other PCF organs included La Pensée where Langevin and Joliot-Curie attempted to 
connect Marxism to traditional French philosophy, Ce Soir where Aragon remained a constant 
contributor, La Nouvelle Critique and L’Humanité. Each of these journals would suffer internal 
dissent and debate over issues ranging from Tito’s Yugoslavia to the appropriate response to Hungary 
to the place to accord Althuser’s interpretations. Yet, despite the dissention and fracturing of their 
revue teams, these journals remained important centers of professional networking and of intellectual 
sociability. Like the congresses and the participation in the party structure itself, these journals 
provided a space where like-minded intellectuals could share ideas and values and work collectively 
to achieve their intellectual visions for France.  
The PCF was not the only organization to provide a sense of intellectual community for its 
members. The short lived Third Way party Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionnaire (RDR) 
organized mass meetings featuring intellectual speakers like Camus, Breton, Sartre and Richard 
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Wright until its decline in 1949. Even the SFIO and its journal Populaire remained a viable option for 
those like Camus who rejected the dogma of the PCF. The centrist democrats André Malraux and 
Raymond Aron formed journalistic networks at the democratic papers Preuves, L’Aube, and Figaro.
Mounier’s Esprit, which had briefly connected to the RDR and allied with the P972CF until 1949, 
would provide an intellectual community for the catholic, third way intellectuals. The intellectual 
collectivity of Esprit was instrumental in creating the “nouvelle gauche” spaces that provided the left-
wing youth with a socially progressive alternative to communism. When Algerian protesters were 
massacred by the police in Paris, Esprit would be one of the first to gather its intellectuals for a 
collective expression of outrage.973 Its socio-professional network and collective community would 
extend to its publishing firm Seuil, which published the majority of the Esprit contributors and was 
led by Esprit writer Paul Flamand.974 However, the third way intellectual community around the 
revue équipe of Esprit could not compare in influence to the most dominant revue team in the post-
war intellectual world: that of  Les Temps Modernes.
The sense of community and shared purpose created by the revue team of LTM was an 
undeniable influence on the conceptualization of responsibility and identity among its contributors. 
The 1945 comité de redaction composed of Aron, Beauvoir, Leiris, Merleau-Ponty, Albert Oliver, 
and Paulhan would undergo several changes as Sartre turned toward communism and by 1955 had 
been restructured around Claude Lanzmann, Marcel Péju, and Jean Cau. Yet, at each point in its 
evolution, this collective of intellectuals saw themselves as “firmly rooted on the Left.” In its first 
issue, Sartre outlined this collective purpose in his “Presentation” and spoke of the team and the 
contributors as a collective “we.” As a collective entity, they agreed to use the pages of the revue to 
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“change the social condition of man and the conception he has of himself.”975 They were also united, 
particularly after the departure of Aron, in the demand for social revolution rather than legislative 
reform to effect this change. As the political color of the revue changed over time to follow Sartre’s 
communist conversion, the evolved revue team would reflect the new political themes of 
communism, anti-Americanism, and an increasing opposition to colonialism. Whether as contributors 
or committee members of the revue, these writers benefited from a professional network and 
collective political purpose that influenced their own individual concept of intellectual identity. But 
they also gained a sense of themselves as individuals within a larger, like-minded collective by 
forming social bonds with fellow contributors. LTM writers often congregated in the café de Flore to 
work, debate, or simply socialize. “Flore was truly our club,” Sartre wrote of this social space and 
intellectual community, which was clearly a left-wing territory as, on the other extreme, le Bar du 
Pont-Royal was a right-wing space. The dominance and prestige of the LTM in the post-war 
intellectual field, similar in many ways to that of the NRF in the interwar years, meant that being a 
part of the LTM community was an important connection for any left-wing intellectual and became a 
valuable part of their self-identification.  
 One final source of intellectual community and collective identity for the post-war 
intellectual Left would be the imagined communities created by the numerous manifests and 
petitions. As they had in all previous periods of intellectual debate, manifests and petitions provided a 
forum for intellectual engagement and expression that united its signers in an imagined community of 
shared values. Although the signers might never have any true social contact, they were brought 
together through the petition into an intellectual community that extended beyond these material 
limits to encompass all like-minded intellectuals. The petitions of the intellectual Left began 
immediately after the Liberation with the manifests in Lettres françaises calling for the purge. The 
Manfeste des écrivains français was signed by sixty intellectuals of the Resistance including Aragon, 
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Benda, Camus, Eluard, Guehénno, Malraux, Mauriac, Sartre, and Paulhan. Later petitions ranged 
from one encouraging publishing firms to boycott the collaborationists listed on the CNE blacklist to 
one calling for clemency for Brasillach by those on the Resistant Left. Some petitions would divide 
the intellectual Left, like those created during the crisis of the Hungarian suppression in 1956. 
“Contre l’intervention soviétique” signed by those former PCF supporters who were protesting the 
Soviet action like Sartre, Vercors, Roy, Beauvoir, Leiris, and Morgan, would be strenuously opposed 
by those whose petition stated collectively, “we, communist militants, resolved to be and remain so, 
have decided to express ourselves from within the Party.”976 Yet, even these seemingly divisive 
petitions still created sub-communities within the intellectual Left that allowed intellectuals to group 
themselves in order to amplify their engagement.  
Perhaps the most significant battle of petitions was that which would occur during the 
Algerian War between the intellectuals of the Left and those of the newly revived Right. As early as 
1955, a federation of left-wing intellectuals united against colonialism would be created under the 
name Comité d’Action des Intellectuels contre la Poursuite de la Guerre en Afrique du Nord. This 
comite’s principles would be signed by hundreds of supporters including Martin du Gard, Mauriac, 
Breton, Guehenno, and Sartre. The following years would see a flurry of manifests from both sides as 
intellectuals attempted to determine their position on Algeria in particular and colonialism in general. 
Yet the most significant would be the Manifest of the 121, or the “Declaration sur le droit a 
l’insoumission dans la guerre d’Algerie,” which initially could only be published outside of France 
because of its incendiary statements advocating insubordination among the French troops in Algeria. 
The 121 intellectuals who signed the manifest included such familiar names as Beauvoir, Sartre, 
Eluard, Lefebvre, Roy, Vercors, and Vidal-Naquet. The signers were united in seeing the conflict in 
Algeria as an imperialist and racist war carried out against a people seeking independence. They 
called collectively for an end to the “criminal and absurd combat” which was “operating overtly and 
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violently outside all legality” and compared the use of torture there to the abuses of Hitlerian 
Germany.977 In response, the Manifeste des intellectuels francais would be published and signed by 
over 300 figures, predominantly the intellectuals of the recently revived extreme Right. The use of 
petitions and manifests to create a powerful bloc of intellectuals and amplify their engagement in a 
collective voice would continue after Algerian independence, particularly on the Left, as intellectuals 
sought to protest collectively against the war in Vietnam. These petitions, all of which saw repeated 
the same names of the intellectual Left, included an accusation of genocide in Vietnam in 1966, a call 
for a “day of intellectuals for Vietnam” in 1968, a mass protest against the bombing campaigns in 
1972, and a letter to the university professors of America signed by over 650 French intellectuals later 
in the same year.978
Whether through participation in organizations like the CNE and PCF and their subsidiary 
networks, through engagement in powerful revue teams like the LTM, or through the act of signing a 
petition, intellectuals of the post-war Left found numerous ways to recreate intellectual communities 
that reinforced their values. Such communities not only supported intellectuals in a like-minded group 
and amplified their individual engagement, they contributed to a sense of collective identity that 
impacted the way the intellectual of the Left conceived of his identity as an intellectual. But this 
collective identity as an intellectual of the Left, as opposed to the Right, was influenced by yet 
another factor, the distinctive experiences and practices that would be found during the post-war only 
among the intellectual Left. 
 
The Post-War Intellectual Experience 
 The Liberation brought with it another complete reversal of the intellectual field as the right-
wing collaborationists were expelled from the places of political and cultural power and replaced, 
once more, by their opponents on the resistant Left. This shift in relationships to the regime, the 
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university, and the publishing world would bring a change in daily intellectual life for the Left. 
Particularly in the years immediately following Liberation, the intellectuals of the Center and Left 
enjoyed a newfound political power through the CNE. Although ostensibly a cultural organization for 
writers, the CNE wielded considerable power under the provisional government and influenced 
judicial decisions, legislation, and the very tenor of the new Republic that was being constructed. 
Under the provisional government and the Fourth Republic, the liberals like Aron and Gaullists, like 
recently reformed communist André Malraux, enjoyed a compatible, if not always conflict-free, 
relationship with the regime. Malraux would even become Minister of Information and later Minister 
of Culture under the new government. And, although the Third Way and PCF intellectuals would 
clash with de Gaulle over several issues and attack his positions as those of the Right, the communists 
enjoyed more freedom and influence under the post-war governments than they had in any previous 
decade. In particular, they benefited from de Gaulle’s disgust with the collaborationist extreme Right. 
Right-wing collaborationists like Bonnard and Maurras, for example, were stripped of their seats in 
the Academy for their activities under the occupation. When new members were considered for their 
seats, de Gaulle was influential in assuring that only Resistors replaced them.  
This return to power in politics was mirrored by a return to power in the university and 
publishing world. The intellectual Left quickly regained its close identification with the Sorbonne, 
filling in those positions left vacant by the purged collaborators with new professors dedicated to the 
ideals of the Resistance. The ENS student body recovered its left-wing inclination and the PCF 
became the party of choice among its members. An enquête conducted by L’Express in 1957 
indicated that communism and left-wing ideology had effectively “pervaded classrooms and become 
the intellectual apprenticeship for a series of generations.” When asked which writer had most 
affected the youth of the day, the leading response was Sartre, followed by Gide and Mauriac.979 The 
intellectual Left would also take advantage of the vacancies left by the purge to install itself in the 
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offices of the larger collaborationist journals like L’Intransigeant and to re-exert control over the 
major publishing firms like Gallimard. While the intellectual Right would struggle to earn 
authorization for even a few literary journals and had to create their own publishing firms, the 
intellectual Left, and the young aspiring writers who turned to the Left, once again enjoyed a large 
number of well publicized and well financed options. The Left’s return to its accustomed relationship 
with the government and university, and its new control over the publishing world meant that the 
practices and experiences of the intelligentsia, universitaire, and mainstream journalist, were once 
again an important component of the Left’s concept of what it meant to be an intellectual.  
The post-war purge made the intellectuals of the Right, more than ever before, pariahs within 
the cultural community. While those claiming to be intellectuals on the Right were viewed with 
suspicion and hostility, those on the Left had immediate public authority. This abyss created by 
collaboration influenced the way intellectuals of the Right and Left practiced their profession and 
experienced engaged intellectual life. Due to its delegitimization in the eyes of the public, the 
intellectual Right was much less effective in the battle of petitions, at least until their revival during 
the Algerian war. This, in essence, left the traditional intellectual practice of signing manifests and 
gathering petitions in the hands of the Left for much of the post-war period. Even as late as the left-
wing petitions over US involvement in Vietnam, the intellectual Right would be largely absent from 
the petition battle. Instead, they would turn to street violence and youth demonstrations to voice their 
disapproval.980 
Although the intellectual Right still had political journalists like Bardèche and the intellectual 
Left could produce several ivory tower intellectuals, the suspicion placed on right-wing engagement 
meant that the Right tended to avoid politicization while the Left embraced it as central to their 
understanding of intellectual duty. Many of the intellectuals on the Right who sought to reenter the 
literary and intellectual field were forced to legitimize their work by operating, or at least appearing to 
operate, in the realm of pure, disinterested art. Laurent and the Hussards would take great pains to 
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portray their literature and their journalistic endeavors as the expression of art for art’s sake and to 
clearly mark their work as “apolitical” to avoid being targeted as fascists. In striking contrast, Sartre’s 
camp, as well as the PCF intellectuals who together dominated the intellectual Left, demanded that all 
responsible literature be both politicized and engaged. Literature was not to be an aimless expression 
of exuberance and certainly not a celebration of decadence but rather had a clear social mission and 
political purpose. It was to serve the needs of the oppressed, whether proletariat or colonist, and to 
provoke social revolution and the transformation of man. Even the Left’s turn to philosophy would 
not indicate a return to ivory tower disengagement. Philosophy, like journalism, theater, and literature 
before it, would become the new vehicle on the Left for political theorizing and refining the practice 
of engagement.  
This politicization of the Left would yield one final difference in their intellectual experience. 
As it had for the interwar Left, the PCF and soviet communism would provide the postwar Left, even 
those who rejected the party, with the main point of ideological reference. From this ideological 
dominance, the Left would gain a measure of organization that would help it to focus its engagement 
and amplify its effectiveness. However, the communist party’s inability to constructively absorb 
debate and dissent from its sympathizers would also lead to internal strife on the intellectual Left. 
Whether communist party member or not, intellectuals on the Left who spoke out against the PCF 
line were certain to be attacked by the committed intellectuals for being “right-wing,” “fascist,” or 
“pro-American.” Even Sartre’s camp was berated by the PCF, in the years before he turned to the 
party, for its existentialist view of man which conflicted with that of the Marxist conception. While 
the intellectual Right in the post-war, as in the interwar years, suffered from disorganization and 
political ineffectiveness because of its lack of an organized party leadership or even a clear socio-
political doctrine, the Left suffered from the reverse. Although it certainly did not quell all dissent, the 
influence on public opinion of the PCF’s disapprobation could not be ignored by intellectuals who 
hoped to retain their audience and authority.  
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The intellectual Left’s compatible relationship to the government, university, and official 
publishing world gave it a distinctly different experience of daily intellectual life and practice than the 
stigmatized and ostracized intellectual of the Right. These two different experiences of intellectual 
life in the post-war would provide yet another distinctive frame of reference for the construction of 
collective identities on the Left and Right. 
 
The Left-Wing Intellectual Model 
In the past, the intellectuals of the Right had been frustrated by what they perceived to be the 
Left’s unfair dominance over intellectual life and the public’s understanding of intellectual identity. 
However, except for a few isolated cases, this de facto dominance and the resulting marginalization of 
the Right had been relatively intangible. In the post-war, the hegemony of the intellectual Left and the 
near total ostracism of the Right became institutionalized by the purge.  More than ever in the past, 
therefore, the intellectual Left would be unchallenged from the Right in its formulation of social 
values, education of the youth, and dominance of professional and honorary titles and positions. The 
intellectual, as outlined by this left-wing model, had been part of the Resistance and retained a desire 
to cleanse France of fascism and the collaborationists. Intellectuals had a certain perspective of the 
war and liberation that favored the parties of the Left and denied the intellectual Right the “right to 
err.” They defended the concept of a universal man and the ability of international bodies to 
determine universal standards of morality and conduct and enforce them in individual nations. They 
opposed all forms of oppression, including colonialism, and sought to eradicate these inequalities 
through social revolution. In practice, this made the intellectual of the Left an internationally minded 
activist and revolutionary rather than an isolated theorist. The intellectual of the Left participated in 
certain organizations like the CNE and the Peace Movement, wrote for a variety of journals 
considered “of the Left” from L’Humanité to Les Temps Modernes, and actively participated in 
petitions like the Manifest of the 121. Finally, the engagés of the Left had a certain understanding of 
what it meant to “be an intellectual” that developed from their rediscovered monopoly over the 
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intellectual field. Even after the purge had ended, this left-wing model of intellectual identity would 
remain the only recognized model due to the difficulty that the extreme Right had in overcoming the 
entrenched positions of the Left and recreating a space and legitimacy outside the stain of 




INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE POST-WAR EXTREME RIGHT: THE CASE OF 
MAURICE BARDÈCHE 
 
Maurice Bardèche has attracted more historical interest for being the brother-in-law of Robert 
Brasillach than for being a neo-fascist intellectual of the post-war. This is due in part to the fact that 
Bardèche preferred literary studies to political involvement during the interwar and occupation years 
and so has not been included among the interwar fascist intellectuals. However, with the purge of his 
more compromised peers, and particularly the execution of Brasillach, Bardèche emerged from his 
ivory tower. He was an extremely vocal opponent of the post-war purge, spoke out against the 
international justice proclaimed at Nuremberg, initiated negationism, and wrote radical articles in 
favor of French Algeria. In the post-war decades where it seemed that those who remained on the 
Right wanted to distance themselves from fascism, Bardèche would proudly proclaim “I am a fascist 
writer” and would work to legitimize the concept of a neo-fascist intellectual. In all of these guises, 
Bardèche was a significant force on the intellectual extreme-Right of the postwar decades. And, for 
all of these reasons, he has been intentionally excluded from any contemporary or historical 
understanding of postwar intellectual identity. His sense of frustrated resentment with the left-wing 
hegemony, his desire to legitimize and exculpate fascist intellectuals, and his frank discussion of the 
values and visions of the post-war extreme Right make him a valuable contributor to right-wing 
intellectual identity.981 
981 Ian Barnes, one of the few historians to study Bardèche and, more importantly, to accept him as an 
intellectual, explains, “Bardèche has a position of great importance in French right-wing intellectual thought 
because he was the only post-war French fascist of any intellectual distinction and provided continuity with 
1930s literary fascism… he revives the old ideas of fascism but transcends them by introducing fascist 
aestheticism and heroism into a new ideology for the post-war world.” Ian R. Barnes, “Antisemitic Europe and 
the ‘Third Way’: The ideas of Maurice Bardèche, Patterns of Prejudice 34, no. 2 (2000): 57. 
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 Bardèche, born in 1907, was raised in a republican family and considered himself a 
revolutionary among his conservative peers at the lycée Louis-le-Grand. But he would quickly align 
himself with the nonconformist students there including Brasillach and Maulnier. He maintained 
these close friends at the ENS and eventually married Suzanne Brasillach. During the war, Bardèche 
was classified as unfit for battle and spent the war months moving his family away from the front. 
During these months, Bardèche remained apolitical, but would recall later in his Souvenirs that he had 
been irritated by the left-wing promoters of war against Germany that he called the “clan, resolved to 
impose its decision on us despite our rejections and our anger.”982 He was indifferent to the collapse 
of the Third Republic, finding it a corrupt and weak government, and took from the experience of war 
and defeat, not any desire for vengeance but instead an “intellectual condemnation of certain ideas 
which had tricked us…like Democracy.”983 
Although Bardèche would not be actively engaged in collaborationist politics, he would 
accept a position as chair of nineteenth-century literature at the Sorbonne which had been left open by 
its former Jewish occupant.984 His concern during the occupation years, he recalled, was not with the 
larger political decisions of the day but rather with the daily affairs of wartime existence. He would, 
however, contribute occasional articles to Brasillach’s Je Suis Partout and also held small literary and 
political discussions with a circle of students at the ENS. When several of these students turned out to 
be directors of a resistance paper, Bardèche would say he felt betrayed and would withdraw even 
further from political discussion, claiming he had no time for political engagement due to his teaching 
responsibilities.985 Bardèche did, however, see the defeat of Germany with trepidation. It did not 
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signal, he wrote, the victory of France but rather the victory of the “enemies of these fascist regimes I 
had admired and the victory of the democracies that I had detested.”986 
He felt himself confirmed in this opinion when, with the Liberation, he was detained in 
Drancy with other collaborationists and then sent to Fresnes. After the execution of Brasillach and his 
own trial where his apolitical wartime pursuits were confirmed, Bardèche would be freed from prison 
only to discover his property had been seized by the Resistance. It was during these times, he would 
write, that he found himself part of a new community of former collaborationists. The execution of 
Brasillach and the purge of his peers would galvanize Bardèche and lead him on a new path of 
political journalism and engagement. His Lettre à François Mauriac would initiate his engagement 
on the extreme Right as both an opponent of the purge and an advocate for fascism. When, because of 
his political views, he was released from his publishing firm, Bardèche would form his own 
publishing house, Sept Couleurs, in 1949. Here he would print not only his next two controversial 
works on Nuremberg, which would earn him a trial for treason, a prison sentence, and a reputation as 
a Negationist, but also a catalogue of Brasillach’s works which were not allowed at other publishers. 
By 1952, he had also founded the right-wing revue Défense de l’Occident which would be a source of 
intellectual community for the excluded Right for over a decade.  
 In the years that followed, Bardèche would become one of the most vocal and visible 
representatives of extreme-right wing thought and the most prestigious among the intellectual 
proponents of neo-fascism. He would represent France at the “conférence européene des mouvements 
néo-fascistes” in Malmo, Sweden in 1951 and would be an active supporter of the International Amis 
de Robert Brasillach. His essay “Qu’est-ce que le fascisme?” would lay out the groundwork for the 
creation of a new neo-fascist ideology and attempt to distance the ideas of fascism from the failed 
incarnations of Nazi Germany, Italy, and Vichy. During the late 1950s, Bardèche would describe 
himself as merely a “passionate spectator” of the debates over French Algeria. But, by 1960, he was 
writing numerous articles defending French Algeria and third world colonialism and advocating what 
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he considered to be a new concept of racism based on segregation. Under his guidance, Défense de 
l’Occident would become one of the centers of this extreme-right intellectual approach to 
international affairs continued in the next decades by the Nouvelle Droite and GRECE. 
 Bardèche’s boldness in speaking of himself as a right-wing intellectual and a neo-fascist 
makes him something of an anomaly in the post-war. However, his resentment of the marginalization 
of the Right, his desire to revive the positive aspects of right-wing ideology, and his effort to 
legitimize extreme-right wing values and writers were a common theme among the various groups of 
the extreme Right. As one scholar of Bardèche realized, “a review of the literature emanating from 
the extreme Right in France since 1945 makes it clear that Bardèche has…articulated the fears and 
values of a pariah caste as well as the psychological consequences of prolonged ideological isolation 
and the defensive reactions it engenders.”987 Bardèche was, therefore, a valuable spokesman for the 
disempowered thinkers of the extreme Right and for their distinctive conceptualization of true 
intellectual identity in the post-war world.988 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
 During the occupation, intellectuals of the Right had held the places of power in the 
intellectual field and yet had continued to feel that the public’s perception of intellectual identity 
remained molded by the discourse, values, and visions of the Left. In the post-war years, this 
perception of exclusion from intellectual identity and public leadership would become a reality as the 
intellectual Right was effectively cut out of the intellectual discussion of the day because of their 
association with the defeated policies of fascism and collaboration. Collaborationism and fascism 
were deemed the ultimate expression of the anti-French and the anti-intellectual and its supporters 
were no longer accorded the right or the opportunity to speak as intellectual representatives of France. 
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Bardèche would be more resentful and infuriated by this exclusion and its implication for his concept 
of self than any other right-wing intellectual. Every article, book, and memory is colored by his 
resentment of the hegemony of the Left, his desire to prove it unfounded, and his attempts to 
legitimize his own intellectual position. His resentment of this ostracism was essential to his approach 
to engagement and his struggle against it was integral to his understanding of intellectual behavior. 
 Bardèche provided an intimate analysis of his own feelings of exclusion, isolation, and 
marginalization in the intellectual world throughout his post-war writings. Each line is tinged with his 
palpable resentment of the Left for what he called their creation of “a world of intellectual terrorism 
which excluded all discussion.”989 In his Souvenirs, Bardèche wrote of the years after the purge, “I do 
not know if I discovered immediately my isolation, my situation of foreigner within the nation of 
which I carried the name.”990 His understanding of the Occupation and the decisions and motivations 
of the collaborationists, he wrote, would give him a separate “vision of the past and the present” 
which isolated him ideologically from the intellectual Resistance and, because of this, from all public 
affairs. This understanding of the Occupation, he continued “had installed me on a deserted island. In 
truth I was not alone there; I had companions. But I was alone with my companions against an 
apparent unanimity” among the rest of the intellectual field.991 For Bardèche, this perception of 
isolation and exclusion brought with it not resignation but rather a sense of righteous indignation, 
frustration, and resentment toward those who had intentionally ostracized him. 
His resentment of his exclusion and isolation in the new intellectual environment of the post-
war would remain with Bardèche for the rest of his intellectual career. The purge, he wrote later, was 
the beginning of an enterprise of dispossession which…is still pursued at the moment where I write 
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these lines.”992 The intellectuals of the Right had been dispossessed of their positions in academia and 
journalism, of their authority in society, but most importantly, of their very identity as intellectual 
spokesmen and guides for the nation by the hegemonic intellectuals of the Left. “They condemn our 
truth,” Bardèche wrote resentfully, “they declare it radically false. They condemn our sentiment, our 
roots even, our most profound manner of seeing and feeling. They explain to us that our mind is not 
made as it should be; that we have the mind of a barbarian.”993 And Bardèche would not base this 
sense of exclusion and condemnation on perception alone. He fumed later that during the immediate 
post-war years, his failure to conform to the unanimity of the dominant majority had literally 
excluded him from the title and role of the writer and intellectual calling him instead with disdain 
“écrivain sic.”994
Bardèche wrote of the purge that it was not simply a judicial punishment that allowed the 
accused to retain their own views but rather a process for domination, control over important concepts 
like that of the intellectual, and reeducation along left-wing lines. The purge not only eliminated 
significant sources of opposition on the Right, it sought to substitute “one consciousness for another,” 
and impose an “obligatory vision of the past” in order for the Left to legitimize their new position. In 
short, he wrote, it was a calculated attempt at “brainwashing.”995 This brainwashing of both the 
intellectual milieu and the general public followed the postulate that “whoever has not been a resistor 
has been a bad Frenchman.” And no one, Bardèche argued, was “free to think or deduce outside of 
this postulate” if they wanted to be considered a legitimate thinker.996 From this postulate, Bardèche 
continued, in the eyes of the French public, all the intellectuals of the Right were made “exiles” 
outside true French sensibilities and were therefore, by definition, incapable of being French 
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intellectuals.997 What was worse, he wrote, the Left had even convinced some among the intellectual 
Right that they had been intellectual traitors.  
This exclusion of the intellectual Right from the categories of Frenchman and intellectual 
which were so important for their role as social guides, Bardèche wrote, had been blatant and crude 
during the purge. However, it was more insidious in the decades after the purge because it was less 
apparent but more effective. “Nothing is expressly forbidden,” he explained, “but we are forewarned 
that a certain orientation is not good.” The required intellectual values were infused into the 
indoctrination of the youth, Bardèche wrote, as “one taught us to conjugate verbs ‘M. Mandel is a 
great patriot…M. Jean-Richard Bloch is a great writer. M. Benda is a thinker’ and inversely ‘I will 
never be a racist, I curse eternally the SS, Charles Maurras, and Je Suis Partout.”998 And what, he 
asked, of those who refuse these sympathies, whose minds “think through other categories?”999 They 
are labeled intellectual heretics and unpatriotic Frenchmen and are forthwith excluded from authority 
or legitimacy. And the result, Bardèche assured his readers, was that the Left had “created a minority 
which, not seeing history through your glasses and not being able to see it thus, is condemned to 
permanent loss of citizenship…this vilified minority…has neither the means to express itself loyally 
by its journals nor the means to honestly designate representatives.”1000 In short, he raged, the 
intellectuals of the Left had made of the intellectual Right a class of “untouchables and children of 
untouchables…and created on the interior of the nation a heresy and its heretics.”1001 
It was this “intellectual ostracism,” Bardèche argued, which made the hegemony of the Left 
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identity.1002 The intellectual Left, he insisted, was carrying out a modern day war of religion during 
the post-war decades. This war of religion was not simply about tearing down the visible structures of 
the intellectual Right’s power during the occupation. It was about “the installation of a certain optic 
which colors all things, not only politics but morals, habits, judgments which one makes, in a word, 
all of life…a certain manner of being.”1003 The Left was intent on uprooting any of the moral 
qualities, the sensibilities, and the images of man, society, and the moral universe that the Right 
valued. To do this, the Left had realized that it was not effective to carry out purge trials which made 
of the victims national martyrs. “Those who refuse to ‘be in line,” Bardèche wrote, were not sent to 
Siberia but they became citizens of the second zone…One does not prevent them from speaking but 
one arranges it so that no one hears their voice. One does not prevent them from living, but one 
arranges that their lives be useless… One does not persecute them but one ignores them.”1004 In this 
way, he assured readers, the intellectual Left did not need violence or physical exile to accomplish its 
religious cleansing. It simply proclaimed certain ideas, thinkers, and values heretical and outside the 
boundaries of intellectual legitimacy and it eliminated the Right through silent extinction.  
In the years following the occupation and particularly those after Brasillach’s execution, 
Bardèche carried a real sense of shame that he had been only an apolitical observer during the 
occupation while his peers had attempted to change the world. He saw it as his duty in the postwar to 
compensate for this ivory tower isolation by engaging without hesitation in the struggle against the 
dominance of the intellectual Left. This required first that the public be brought to see the hegemony 
and then that it recognize its illegitimacy. In a simple statement explaining the hegemony, Bardèche 
would write, “there is currently a monopoly on political opinion. One only allows those to exist who 
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do not call the fundamental truths of the regime into question.”1005 In this latter group, Bardèche, like 
the interwar Right, would casually lump together communists like Aragon with republicans like Aron 
under the general category of “the Regime” or “the System.” He also referred to the bloc as “the 
intellectual Party,” referencing Peguy’s condemnation of the pre-World War I intellectual hegemony 
of the bloc of the intellectual Left.1006 The hegemony exerted by the “intellectual Party” prevented the 
intellectual Right from fulfilling its role and responsibility by preventing them from reaching the 
public with their ideas. “Only those who serve your truth” he wrote to Mauriac, have the right to 
speak. This manipulation of opinion created what Bardèche called “a divided society where one side 
has the right to carry arms and the other side to receive the blows.”1007 This monopoly of the Left over 
intelligence and opinion was a repression which the Right could not tolerate but also could not 
effectively combat without resources. 
For this reason, he believed, the hegemony was particularly heinous in the press. “The 
resistors declared that since all the French newspapers had committed treason during the 
Occupation,” he wrote, “they were now the masters of all the newspapers. So they took charge of all 
of them—and the presses too. Consequently absolutely all opinion, not only the mass media but the 
whole press was in their hands…there was sort of an intellectual coup d’etat.”1008 During these 
postwar decades, Bardèche explained, the intellectual Right was not even able to protest the 
hegemony. “I did not have a journal through which to respond when one affirmed in 200,000 copies 
that I had applauded the concentration camps,” he wrote angrily. “And I was not able to appeal to the 
judgment of the reader since one prevented him from reading my book himself.”1009 The press, 
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because it excluded the Right, was just as much a reflection of the common front “System” as the 
intellectuals themselves, Bardèche believed. “For ten years,” he complained, “no new daily was able 
to be founded to break the organized blockade around public opinion made by the new press…in the 
essential things, it is the same journal at the foundation of all we read.”1010 Because of this 
“unanimity” in the intellectual world, Bardèche warned the public, “we live in the time of the 
brainwashed.”1011 The true intellectual’s role was not to join in the prearranged chorus but to bring 
new ideas, challenges, and opposition to the System. The intellectual Right alone was capable of 
doing this.  
According to Bardèche, therefore, it was the intellectual Right’s responsibility during the 
postwar to actively reassert the legitimacy of its ideas, values, and writers in order to win back public 
opinion and effect its own vision of change.1012 The first step in legitimizing the reconceived values 
of the intellectual Right was to publicly claim the status, role, and title of the intellectual. “We have 
our intellectuals,” Defense de l’Occident boldly proclaimed in a statement strikingly reminiscent of 
Barrès’ original claim to the term. “The term used does not signify that we have writers, journalists, 
men of letters on our side; this is already evidenced. We want to say that the well known phenomenon 
exists equally in our ranks. We have our men who in writing doctrinal studies and political memoirs, 
can claim to give weight to them because they are intellectuals.”1013 Once the title and role of the 
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intellectual was claimed, the second step in regaining legitimacy and public authority for the 
intellectual Right was to bring together the two concepts that have been so difficult to reconcile: 
fascism and intellectualism. “I am a fascist writer” Bardèche wrote in what has become one of the 
most recognized statements of the intellectual Right in the postwar.1014 In a time where even Bardèche 
admitted “no one consents to being a fascist,” he believed it was his duty to not only claim to be an 
intellectual but to link this to his fascism. And Bardèche did not accept that he was the only fascist 
intellectual. “If I were the only one of my species,” he wrote, “this clarification would not merit being 
discussed… but if the fascist writer, the fascist intellectual is a rare prey…there is still a fascist spirit 
and thousands of men who are fascists without knowing it.”1015 The role of the intellectual then, as 
Bardèche understood it, was to legitimize the new concept of fascism so that these men and these 
intellectuals who shared in the fascist spirit would no longer be resistant to claiming it alongside their 
title of intellectual.  
During the occupation, right-wing intellectuals had styled themselves martyrs, claiming to be 
misunderstood prophets in a society where left-wing intellectual values were thoroughly engrained. In 
the post-war, Bardèche and his peers on the Right would find this pariah status was no longer a useful 
tool but rather an inescapable reality. The hegemony of the intellectual Left was absolute and 
unquestioned over both the institutions and the conceptualization of the intellectual. For Bardèche, 
this exclusion from the intellectual world and isolation from public debate brought with it “a sort of 
living death” for the intellectual.1016 It was vital that the intellectual Right reclaim its right to 
participate as intellectuals and clarify the distinctions that existed between them and the Left. The 
struggle against the hegemonic Left might appear hopeless, he conceded, but they were the only 
option if the Right was to avoid extinction. “Even if the dreams of the promised land seem distant to 
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us,” he concluded, “it has been too long that all which is ours in France has been excluded from 
power for us not to have a desire to throw out the usurpers. Even if we will not do better…we have 
had enough of being in exile for half a century and of being impotent…after all, since we are nothing 
now, what do we have to lose?”1017 
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Political Realism  
 During the preceding decades, the intellectual Right had claimed an exclusive connection to 
“reality” that the Left could not approach because of its love of abstraction and universalism. And it 
had received relatively little contradiction from the intellectual Left. In light of the occupation, 
however, the intellectual Left, and particularly the existentialists surrounding Sartre, would condemn 
their pre-war abstraction and ivory tower intellectualism in favor of a connection to the lived realities 
of French society. To the great frustration of the intellectual Right, which continued to proclaim itself 
the sole spokesman of intellectual Realism, the intellectual Left now began to claim the concept for 
its own and to attach it to its own ideas of intellectual responsibility. The “Presentation” of LTM 
would announce that the contributors saw their role to be conveying a concept of man as it related to 
the particular time and nation.1018 And Beauvoir would proclaim that it was “the ideologies of the 
contemporary Right” which during the post-war were “idealist,” “cut off from the resistance of the 
real world,” and which “substituted abstract Ideas for reality.”1019 Bardèche and the intellectuals of 
the Right would therefore go to great lengths to separate their understanding of Realism and 
delegitimize that described by the Left. 
The Communists’ concept of intellectual reality, Bardèche explained, was tied directly to 
recognition and affirmation of the struggle of the classes and the material needs of the proletariat. 
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This understanding of reality would dictate a concept of intellectual role and responsibility geared 
toward social revolution. The liberals’ understanding was based on the universal equality of man and 
his fundamental human nature. Liberal engagement in “reality” led them to support institutions of the 
universal conscience like the Nuremberg tribunals. The intellectual Right argued that this 
conceptualization of reality as a product of universal class or universal nature was simply a game of 
semantics. Under the name realism, the Left continued the original abstract, universalist concepts of 
man and society that had defined them throughout the century. In opposition to the Left’s “realism,” 
Bardèche outlined his own understanding of intellectual Realism and the role that it dictated for the 
intellectual.  
 The most powerful statement of Bardèche’s differentiation between his concept of intellectual 
Realism and the Left’s was found in his Sparte et les Sudistes. “The opposition between the Right and 
the Left,” he wrote, “puts in light the antinomie of the two temperaments…The men of the Left have 
a rational and abstract definition of man and they want to arrange the force of men in shelves that they 
have prepared.”1020 In contrast, he continued, “the men of the Right do not have a system, they do not 
construct society with a ruler and a compass. They take men as they find them, in the place where 
they have grown, in the unequal bunches that nature has formed.”1021 In short, he was insisting, the 
intellectual Right understood the true role of the intellectual was to begin with man “as he was” rather 
than “as he should be.” The left-wing proponents of liberalism, the third way, or communism all 
believed they were addressing reality by looking at material conditions and class relations, according 
to Bardèche. But they approached these real conditions of France through the lens of their ideology. 
The central ideologies of the Left themselves universalist abstractions which, no matter how they 
tried to claim a connection to a particular society, were always imposed on that society through an 
 





idealized, universal application.1022 “The intellectual mechanism of ideology,” Bardèche began by 
explaining, “consists in isolating one sentiment from the others and…organizing a system” around it 
as the “idée fixe.” Those who devoted themselves to ideology were cut off from “the real world and 
its complexity” and saw only the principles outlined by their abstract model. As such they were 
“detached and separated from the national life.” They were no longer men of their nation, he 
continued, but rather men of a universal religion whose dictates trumped those of the nation.  
In contrast, Bardèche wrote, the intellectual of the Right understood that a responsibility to 
Realism required the intellectual to recognize the needs of the nation in its particular time. It was the 
role of the intellectual, therefore, to nurture a sense of the national consciousness in himself and in the 
public. “The national consciousness,” he wrote, “is the pulsing of the pays reel. It is our history, our 
race, generations of peasants and artisans…who are the sons of the same earth.” In contrast, the 
universal consciousness of a universal humanity was “the dispossession, the expropriation of our 
souls, the uprooting and sterilization of our people.”1023 Those who proclaim that “a principle, an idea 
is superior to the imperatives of national life,” he continued, “strike this energy at its source” and 
destroy the autonomy of the nation.1024 Only armed with an understanding of the national 
consciousness could the intellectual devise social and political programs suitable to the French 
people.  
 Bardèche also deplored the Left’s continued understanding of a universal, abstract humanity 
rather seeing, as the Right did, distinctive races, nationalities, and rooted peoples.1025 In a statement 
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strikingly similar to one by Barrès during the Affair, he wrote, “I know a French youth of French 
parents, I do not know this ‘Personne humaine’ and I do not know the anonymous society called 
‘civilization.”1026 How, he marveled, could the intellectual Left proclaim itself realists and claim to be 
responsibly engaging in the life of the real nation if it continued to conceive of the French citizen as 
one among a homogenous sea of humanity? The “Religion of Humanity” that Bardèche accused the 
liberals and communists of constructing, was designed, he argued, to destroy the reality of national 
consciousness in favor of a universal consciousness based either on democratic ideals or class. It was 
the contradiction of the century, Bardèche believed, that the intellectual of the Left understood his 
role to be both the purveyor of realism, which was inextricable from the particular, and the advocate 
of the universal consciousness, which was its antithesis. 
Bardèche saw the two distinct ideas of realism to have two extremely different results for 
intellectual practice and responsibility. For the Left, he began, “one was able to be a traitor by serving 
the legitimate government if this government was not authorized by democracy” or some other 
universal ideology.1027 In practice, therefore, they would condemn the undemocratic government of 
Vichy. In contrast, the intellectuals of the Right had supported Vichy as the only functioning, 
sanctioned government that French society had at the time. They had worked within the current 
reality, Bardèche wrote, while the Left had created a fantasy government in the resistance or paid 
allegiance to a government in exile. Different approaches to reality would also yield two different 
reactions to the Nuremberg trials. By supporting the punishment of war crimes based on a universal 
standard of morality, the intellectuals of the Left felt they were upholding the role of the engaged 
intellectual. Of course, Bardèche wrote resentfully, the victorious powers claimed they had “erected 
themselves as judges because they represent civilization.”1028 This, he continued, was a sophism 
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because they claimed to determine the qualifications of a universal standard of civilization based on 
the assumption that they themselves epitomized it. In truth, the Left desperately needed to prove its 
own actions moral and its opponents’ heinous or their own war crimes would be equally 
reprehensible. By claiming to be delivering judgment based on the universal consciousness of a 
certain standard of human morality, they could cover this base need with a noble veneer. In truth, 
though, the idea of a universal morality was an affront to true justice which took intentionality and 
circumstances into account.1029 All that judgment based on universal morality accomplished was to 
destroy the sovereignty of the nation. 
In contrast, the intellectual of the Right rejected the judgment of Nuremberg since it annulled 
the authority of the nation and ignored the particular needs, rationales, and interests of the people 
being judged. “We must consider our nations to have ‘moral space,” he mused, “just like there is 
national ‘air space’ and ‘national waters.”1030 An intellectual Realist, he believed, was a national 
relativist. The “human person, in abstracto, in the sense that the Tribunal understands it” had “no 
patrie,” no sense of connection to his roots and his cité. This, Bardèche wrote, was a “citizen of the 
world,” a “dehydrated man” that he refused to recognize as man anymore.1031 These dehydrated men 
were content to be educated, governed, and manipulated by dictates of the “universal consciousness” 
and therefore by the Americans and Soviets who were the puppet masters of the concept. In contrast, 
Bardèche advocated the defense of the human person as product of family, race, nation, and land. 
Only this understanding of man as a particular product of his national consciousness, not as a product 
of a universal class or a universal ideology, was in keeping with the true concept of intellectual 
Realism.  
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Bardèche was also one of the initial intellectual promoters of Holocaust trivialization or 
negationism.1032 His position on this issue clearly separated him from the model of responsible 
intellectual behavior on the Left at the time and that reveals an entirely different set of intellectual 
values and engagements. However, based on the model of intellectual identity constructed on the 
Right, Bardèche and many of his peers were able to see negationism as synonymous with responsible 
intellectual behavior.  
It was Bardèche’s concept of the intellectual as a nationalist rather than an internationalist 
that would most clearly influence his Negationism. The French should be concerned about justice and 
judgment for atrocities committed against their own nation, he argued. There was no universal 
standard of morality, judgment, or even of justice that could be applied to all the situations of the war 
indiscriminately because each action, each perpetrator, each case would be particular in its nature. 
Therefore, Bardèche did not deny the presence of concentration camps but argued, “as for the 
concentration camps, honesty consists for us in demanding justice and reparation for the French 
innocents who had been deported and tortured, not for the others.”1033 Bardèche’s rejection of 
universal morality and international justice were augmented here by his right-wing intellectual values 
of race and rootedness. Despite his disclaimer “I am not an anti-Semite,” this racist approach to 
international politics and morality was a constant in the work of the neo-fascist Right. “What 
becomes apparent,” Bardèche rationalized in Nuremberg ou la terre promise, “is that there was no 
will to exterminate the French but only to exterminate the Jews and while there are no proofs for 
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Nuremberg ou la terre promise in 1948. The work would earn him a trial under the lois scélérates that 
determined him guilty and sentenced him to a fine and one year in prison of which he served only two weeks 
after a pardon. Pierre Milza, “Le negationisme en France,” Relations internationales, (Spring 1991), 27. He 
rebutted this condemnation with his second negationist work Nuremberg II ou les faux monnayeurs in 1952. 
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French extermination there are many proofs for Jewish extermination.” And while the intellectuals of 
the liberal and communist Left might consider the Jews members of the universal human religion and 
therefore deserving of French interference, Bardèche and many on the intellectual Right continued to 
believe that they “should not consider Jews our affair because they were foreigners accepted into our 
nation who have weakened it with their wealth and influence.”1034 He continued, in attempted 
humanitarianism, “I find it sad that one massacred them and persecuted them but my sentiment does 
not change if one adds that they lived in Bordeaux.”1035 For Bardèche, the Jews, whether French 
citizens or not, had been foreigners to France and, therefore, should not be considered by the French 
nation in its demands for justice against Germany. Only the universalists of the Left, he was 
suggesting, due to their idea of abstract morality felt the need to demand justice for all the peoples of 
the earth. 
Bardèche was also quite certain that in questioning the testimony and decisions of 
Nuremberg, he was doing his intellectual duty and that the intellectual Left’s failure to do so was a 
betrayal of responsibility in favor of vendetta. He believed he was searching out the truth of the 
situation more diligently by questioning the evidence and provoking closer consideration of the allied 
claims. “I do not sense myself guilty in any way,” he wrote of the questions he raised about German 
atrocities in his Nuremberg ou la terre promise, “for having done that which I regard as my duty as an 
honest man.”1036 This duty applied particularly to the intellectuals, he wrote, for it was their 
responsibility to fully consider the evidence of the case and provide guidance rather than to be swept 
up like the common crowd in punishing the defeated Germans. “Is it honorable,” he asked, “for men, 
in particular the intellectuals and in particular for the intellectuals of our nation…that none dare to 
demand that a Germany without defense, even one it considered guilty, benefit from the loyal and 
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honest questioning that any accused has the right to demand?”1037 If the intellectuals of the Left were 
blind to this responsibility, Bardèche wrote, he would have to pose the questions himself that the 
entire intellectual community, were it not blinded by ideology, should have posed.  
Bardèche realized that his negationism would make his struggle for intellectual legitimacy 
even more difficult and so made it central to his concept of intellectual responsibility. “It was 
necessary,” he began his second Nuremberg work, “to show that I was neither a monster nor a fool 
and that others had doubts similar to mine.”1038 These doubts, he continued, were based on 
clearheaded examination of the available documents. To add authority to his argument, he listed the 
various international writers and journalists including writers from the Chicago Tribune who had 
questioned the trial evidence alongside him. Other nations, he wrote, did not stifle the free speech of 
their intellectual opposition as France did under the dominance of the former intellectual Resistance. 
It was this intellectual travesty and the loss of moral superiority which accompanied it, Bardèche 
continued, that limited France’s influence in the postwar world. “Such is the result of our fear of the 
truth,” he wrote, “French literature has as much importance today as the French army.”1039 The Left’s 
dominance of the intellectual field allowed them to ignore with impunity not only the opinions and 
ideas of their opponents, but the facts of the case as well.  
It was, Bardèche wrote, the role and responsibility of the intellectual to pursue the truth, no 
matter how unpopular. “Facts need to be confirmed,” Bardèche chided his peers on the Left. And in 
particular, testimony needed to be considered in light of the means used to extract it. He claimed the 
Malmedy affair had uncovered a massacre of American soldiers only by using torture and trickery to 
extract confessions. How, he asked, could the intellectual community, if it were truly impartial as it 
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And, he continued, the testimony needed to be unbiased in its presentation. Witnesses against the 
Germans, he complained, had been upheld as heroes while those who suggested that camp life was 
not as it had been pictured were persecuted and accused of false testimony and hatred of the allied 
justice.1040 The intellectual Left, he warned, was allowing its liberal, communist, and resistance based 
passions to interfere with justice and duty. “Do we condemn ourselves to ignorance or hatred because 
these are easy positions?” he cried, “Is it a crime according to our laws now to try to understand? Is it 
an obligation to accord ourselves without reserve to the official condemnations and the maledictions 
of the journals?”1041 No! he answered. Rather it was the responsibility of the intellectual milieu, 
among whom he seemed to be the only one to continue in his duty, to question the official 
information, to analyze the evidence, to add complexity to the options presented, and to consider the 
moral implications. “This,” he concluded, “is why I have wanted to be that voice raised in this nation 
for that which I believe to be the truth and justice.”1042 Being a responsible intellectual during the 
post-war, according to Bardèche, meant questioning the official account of events and opening up 
debate rather than stifling contradiction. In this way, questioning the Allied presentation of the 
Holocaust and Axis war crimes was in keeping with the role of the intellectual. 
 
Europeanism and Neo-fascism 
 As his fascist and collaborationist predecessors had in the interwar and occupation years, 
Bardèche would maintain that a strong Europe was necessary for international balance between the 
superpowers and that a strong Germany was a requisite for this Europe. America, he claimed, had 
attempted to reconstruct Europe after the war based on its own vision of a strong continent capable of 
serving as a buffer zone against Soviet communism. However, they had simultaneously weakened the 
defeated Germany by imposing a foreign occupation and limiting its military and economic growth. 
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“If,” Bardèche warned, “they want a strong Europe capable of defending itself and building strong 
industry and force to combat bolshevism, they must recognize Germany.”1043 Germany, he believed, 
was the heartland of Europe and had strong ties to all European tradition and history. It had also been 
at the forefront of the struggle against communism. Germany’s defeat and the subsequent 
discrimination against her as a nation in the international community subsequently weakened all of 
Europe. In contrast to the intellectual Left who sought the continued flagellation of Germany, 
Bardèche and the extreme right-wing intellectuals argued in favor of a strong Germany who could 
lead Europe in a reformed fascism.  
 Europe, and France, needed a political ideology that drew from neither the democratic 
ideologies of America or the communist ones of the USSR. It was this, Bardèche believed, that the 
intellectual Left failed to grasp. They continued to promote either liberal democracy under the name 
of Gaullism or communist revolutionary visions that were either openly affiliated with the PCF or 
masqueraded as a third way. The European Community proposed by the liberal Left, for example, 
was touted as providing a united, economically organic Europe, Bardèche wrote. But at its 
foundation, it would be subjected “to all the weaknesses and fatalities of capitalism” and the 
democratic ideology.1044 If Europe were to be economically independent, and therefore militarily and 
diplomatically independent, Bardèche argued, it could not adopt systems that were tied, even 
ideologically, to the capitalist or communist superpowers. It had to create its own European 
alternative.  
The only clear political ideology that was a European product and associated in no way with 
either of the two political poles was that of fascism. It was therefore the intellectual responsibility of 
the extreme Right to recover the vital aspects of fascism, to revitalize it and restore its image before a 
public that was “intimidated by its values and disquieted by its terms,” and reinstate it as the 
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ideological foundation for a new Europe.1045 “Europe,” Bardèche wrote, “had been a bastion of anti-
communist will and faith under fascism. Today this force is lost.”1046 Under fascism its peoples had 
risen in “defensive action” against the bourgeois decadence and disorder of capitalism and 
democracy. If Europe were to regain its lost independence, its economic, military, diplomatic, and 
moral force, it needed to reassert its only natural ideological defense against communism and 
democratic decadence. Bardèche saw this struggle as not only a political one, but a moral and cultural 
one that held European civilization in the balance. “The mission of Europe is not only to be a third 
force,” he wrote, “but to be a third Civilization, the carrier of a third vision of the world.” It was to 
promote a third vision of man and society which is proper to its own history.1047 “We have need of a 
third image of man and of life,” he explained, “to refuse today both Washington and Moscow is not a 
political shock, it is a moral choice.”1048 Such a mission to redefine man, society, civilization, and 
morality, Bardèche continued, was clearly the work of the intellectual elite.  
But the dominant intellectuals of France had failed in this work because they had been 
overtaken by their ideologies. “The liberal press in France is useless,” he wrote, “because it is simply 
a mouthpiece for government theses and refuses to call into question the two opposing versions of 
consumer society: [American] plutocracy and [Soviet] collectivism. In this, it fails in its mission of 
information and its duty of intellectual probity.”1049 It was the intellectual Right, Bardèche was 
suggesting, that carried the burden of this responsibility to outline a third way. It was the intellectual’s 
responsibility to say “We don’t want de Gaulle and we don’t want the system, but what do we 
want?”1050 And, he continued, the true intellectual’s response could only be fascism. But, not be the 
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failed fascism of the past, of the Nazis or of Vichy, but a neo-fascism built on all that had been 
healthy in the fascist idea. “There is currently no fascism in France,” one Defense de l’Occident 
article elaborated, “but only a fascist tradition. It concerns in reality a long intellectual and moral 
reform to produce a form which will be very different from that which the past has known.”1051 It 
was, according to Bardèche and his peers on the Right, the duty of the engaged intellectuals to outline 
the new parameters of fascism. With this understanding of his purpose as an intellectual, Bardèche 
wrote Qu’est-ce que le fascisme?, his most comprehensive effort to transform fascism into a viable 
program for postwar Europe. 
 Bardèche warned readers first that the term and concept of fascism had been so distorted 
during the war and so maligned by the Left after the Liberation that few if any would admit to 
supporting fascism in the postwar world. “In truth,” he wrote, “fascism had been extirpated like a 
heresy, its leaders massacred, its symbols maligned… and this campaign was not the effort of a 
moment, it was continued, methodical, industrial. It endures still and will endure as long as the 
vanquishers of fascism are the exclusive possessors of all the organs of opinion: press, radio, cinema, 
publishing.”1052 But in the fascism which “the intellectuals, journals, and parties call fascism,” he 
explained, “the fascists refuse to recognize themselves.”1053 It was necessary therefore for the fascist 
intellectuals to be persistent in promoting their own concept.  
Bardèche began the process of revitalization by distancing neo-fascism from the failed 
versions of Germany, Italy, and Vichy.1054 Instead, he proposed a “New Fascism” that had no 
dependence on biological racism, no imperative to expansion and war, and no requirement of a 
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“providential man” or chef. The new fascism required only an elite which represented the best of the 
people, served as pioneers of the new ideas, and provided exemplars of the lived ideology.1055 It 
would not be a system of “constraint” as the Left claimed, but one of “discipline” based on an 
understanding of the collective interest of the nation.1056 Fascism would provide a new image of man 
based on heroism, non-conformism, and an idea of liberty that promoted the collective good rather 
than individual rights.1057 Finally, it would realize the mission which had eluded the wartime regimes: 
the construction of a true national socialism. This national socialism would oppose both Marxism’s 
focus on class warfare and the proletariat and capitalism’s materialist decadence and provide a 
nationalist and yet European organic unity.1058 Only an ideology based on these principles of neo-
fascism, Bardèche argued, would revive the French nation so that it could participate fully in 
European politics and withstand the influences of both democracy and communism.  
For Bardèche, being an intellectual of the extreme, non-communist and non-democratic Right 
meant being a fascist intellectual. As such, he believed it was his responsibility to promote the idea of 
European unity based on an unbiased incorporation of Germany and a truly Third way that had no 
influence from American or Soviet ideologies. This purpose, he believed, set him in radical 
opposition to the intellectuals of both the liberal and communist Left who were, he claimed, actually 
betraying their intellectual role.  
 
Colonialism and Racism 
 Although support for a French presence in Algeria and Vietnam during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s did not necessarily divide the intellectual Left and Right, anti-colonialism remained the 
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dominant intellectual value on the Left and colonialism the majority position of the Right. Even 
before 1960, the intellectual Left had made the question of colonialism a determining factor in 
defining intellectual identity. Because of this, the Right, including Bardèche, would be adamant about 
defending their support for French Algeria alongside their identity as intellectuals.1059 
Although colonialism did not clearly divide the intellectual community along Left-Right lines 
until 1960, and even then remained an imperfect separation, the values that informed the Right’s 
support for colonialism would be more divisive. Economic exploitation, racism, and paternalism, in 
particular, were themes on the intellectual Right that did not appear in the arguments of the Left. One 
Defense de l’Occident article summarized quite clearly the economic position of the Right saying “we 
pose the fundamental principle; Algeria is and ought to remain French. We must maintain a presence 
here to maintain access to all of Africa for Africa is indispensable to the new European economic 
ensemble.”1060 The natural and human resources of African colonies needed to be available for 
exploitation by Europe if Europe were to transform into a third superpower that could “resist 
bolshevism” and “return France to a respected place in the first rank of nations.”1061 But, the article 
warned, the idea of a European-African economic partnership was not the same as that of the pro-
colonialists on the Left like Soustelle. Soustelle, the article complained, believed in integration, that 
French Algeria also meant Algerian France. This, the article clarified was not the position of the 
extreme Right which believed that integration was “the corruption of the white continent of 
Europe.”1062 
In contrast, Bardèche would formulate a new concept of “racism” specifically to counter this 
integrationist idea of colonialism. Racism, he argued had been made into a “bogeyman” because the 
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Left did not understand its true meaning or its importance for French culture and nationalism. “For 
the great part of public opinion and particularly for the great part of the ‘intellectuals,” Bardèche 
complained, “racism means uniquely or at least primarily anti-Semitism.”1063 It had been 
“delegitimized” by the Left as the “extermination or destruction of inferior races to assure the empire 
of a privileged race.”1064 This was to attribute one moment of extremism to an entire historical 
concept. But, despite the inaccuracy, the intellectual Left would maintain this “erroneous 
conception… for the ease of polemic” it provided even though it “does not correspond to the 
conceptions held by the ‘racists’ themselves.”1065 This “trembling conformism before the question of 
racism” by the Left, Bardèche charged, was “one of the most curious examples of the childishness 
and even in reality of the cowardice of our ‘intellectuals.”1066 Bardèche argued instead for a concept 
of “neo-racism” which was non-imperialist, had no concept of a superior or elect race, and did not 
entail hatred between races. All races were, however, divided by racial differences and needed to be 
kept distinct entities in order to serve their purpose in the international order. The neo-racism of the 
intellectual Right, according to Bardèche, accepted the “racial realities” of the world and understood 
that the Chinese and the Russians, for example, had not only different skin but different mentalities 
and that their shared communism would not bring fraternity in their international relations because of 
these differences.1067 It was left-wing anti-racism, not right-wing racism, which ignored the real 
human condition.  
Bardèche’s colonialism was based not only on economic need and racism but on a traditional 
European paternalism. The white race had perhaps ruined other civilizations, he admitted, but it was 
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the only race progressed enough to repair this damage. “We are the only guides out of the forest 
where we have lost humanity,” he wrote, “therefore we cannot accept the principle of the equality of 
the races, it is only the white race that can reverse the present world circumstances.”1068 If 
sovereignty, he continued, were to be given to the Muslims of Algeria, they would be incapable of 
capitalizing upon it. “We have not only the right but the duty,” he summarized, “to protect the 
peoples of Africa against their economic and military impotence, against their political 
childishness.”1069 Algeria, according to the intellectual extreme Right, needed to remain French not 
only for the sake of the new France but for its own developmental benefit. 
 The intellectuals of the Right argued for French Algeria and later American intervention in 
Vietnam for reasons of economic benefits, racial segregation, and paternalism. These rationales 
separated it not only from the anti-colonialist majority on the Left but also from the pro-colonialist 
intellectuals of the Left like Soustelle and Camus. These values provided a different understanding of 
intellectual responsibility during the Algerian war that, when put into practice, led intellectuals like 
Bardèche to engage their work in favor of the OAS as passionately as those like Sartre supported the 
FLN. For the Left, being an intellectual meant support for racial equality, the right to political liberty, 
freedom from exploitation, and, at the base of these, a belief in the universal nature of all mankind. 
For the Right, one could not be a true intellectual if one did not appreciate and work with the “racial 
realities” of the world, understand the needs of European civilization in the post-war world, and 
accept that at foundation, there was no universal man but rather men of particular nations and races 
with distinctive mentalities.  
 
Bardèche and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model 
Bardèche’s engagement in the post-war decades was prompted by his resentment of the Left’s 






left-wing dominance, after the Liberation he saw this dominance become an institutionalized 
“enterprise of dispossession” under which it was literally inconceivable to link the terms intellectual 
and fascist. The Right was not simply a political opponent anymore, it was a moral and intellectual 
heresy and a class of “untouchables.” The “intellectual ostracism” of the Right that extended well 
beyond the purge made it nearly impossible to think outside the confines of the Left or to propose an 
alternative intellectual model. Yet, Bardèche would make this struggle against the Left essential to his 
concept of intellectual role and responsibility. “We have our intellectuals too,”1070 his journal proudly 
declared, and then devoted its pages to differentiating and legitimizing these intellectuals of the Right. 
According to Bardèche’s model of the neo-fascist intellectual, the responsible intellectual valued 
realism over universalism, sought the truth behind official interpretations, advocated ideological 
trajectories in keeping with French sensibilities, and accepted the realities of racial segregation and 
inequality. In practice, this meant the role and responsibility of the intellectual was to condemn the 
institution of international tribunals or universal standards of morality, to question Allied accounts of 
German war crimes, to defend the restoration of a strong Germany, to define a neo-fascism that could 
replace the existing political options in Europe, and to support the work of the OAS and any other 
pro-colonialist ventures in Algeria and Vietnam. However, although Bardèche and his peers were 
loathe to dwell on it, in reality, the intellectual positions of the post-war Right translated into a 
defense of the Milice and German war criminals, suspicion of the extent of the Holocaust or refusal to 
condemn it because the Jews were not French, support for the suppression of an independence 
movement, and justification of biological racism. In the post-war era, it was increasingly difficult for 
those outside the extreme Right to accept these values as those of a legitimate intellectual. Despite 
this universal condemnation, other self-proclaimed intellectuals of the Right, like Jacques Laurent, 
would join Bardèche in formulating a model of intellectual identity that was compatible with the 
values and worldviews of the Right. 
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CHAPTER 19 
 
INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY AND THE POSTWAR EXTREME RIGHT: THE CASE OF 
JACQUES LAURENT 
 
In the postwar era which saw the racism of Bardèche and the extremism of Rivarol and 
Occident, Jacques Laurent was not the most radical spokesman of the intellectual Right. He was, 
however, the intellectual “dits à droite” who most directly combated the Sartrian, Gaullist, and 
communist interpretation of intellectual engagement and their dominance over the intellectual field. 
Laurent was not only a master of popular literature, a respected Academician, and winner of the 
Goncourt prize; he was also a prolific journalist, revue director, and one of the four writers dubbed 
the “Hussards.” He was a voice that the previous generation of right-wing writers like Bardèche 
wanted to nurture and that the next generation of right-wing intellectuals recognized as “the most 
active, during the pandemonium of the century, of all the writers of the young literary Right.”1071 His 
legitimacy and omnipresence in the intellectual field and his relative lack of any compromising 
collaborationism during the occupation made him a difficult opponent for the Left to discredit or 
ignore. Most importantly, in his crusades against the intellectual Left, Laurent would effectively 
verbalize the resentment that the intellectuals of the Right harbored against the Left and their desire to 
differentiate their own engagement.  
 Laurent, born in 1919, was connected to the extreme Right by his uncle Eugene Deloncle.1072 
After a brief flirtation with the Jeunesses socialistes as a youth, Laurent would reject all parties of the 
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intellectual Left as the puppets of either communism or the republican regime.1073 At lycée 
Condorcet, he was introduced to the politics and intellectual philosophy of Maurras and the AF. He 
wrote of this new alternative to the intellectual Left, “after having almost enclosed myself in a world 
where man was an abstraction that it concerned modifying in order to render him compatible with 
Marxism, I was able to breathe!”1074 Here he began his journalistic career writing articles for the AF 
student paper L’Étudiant francais and his political activism as a member of the Étudiants de l’AF. It 
was his participation in the AF that would first expose him to what he considered the hegemony of 
the intellectual Left in the university system. His professors, he wrote later, informed him that they 
were “perplexed” by his association with “the extreme Right” since they were convinced that “the 
word culture” was only associated “with the friends of the proletariat.” They were even able to 
convince him for a while of the “intellectual superiority of the Left” despite his own intellectual 
talents and his identification with the Right.1075 But, he wrote, his engagement in the “school of 
thought” that the AF provided would eventually convince him that the Right held equal intellectual 
opportunity, albeit a different one. “In the AF,” he elaborated, “one tried to put the accent on all that 
which separated this movement from the ‘esprit’ of the Left.”1076 This lesson in differentiation and its 
importance for right-wing intellectual legitimacy was one that Laurent would carry with him in his 
own postwar engagement. 
 During the interwar years, Laurent would continue writing for Étudiant français and begin 
collaborating with the non-conformists of Combat and Civilisation. During these years where the Left 
and Right began to polarize over fascism and communism, Laurent wrote, “I knew myself to be of the 
Right because I preferred the civilization of my nation… of that which it had acquired by arms…and 
because I did not hold as sacred among us the health of the proletariat… and because the sacrifice of 
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the individual to the collective which gave me horror was the basis of the thought of the Left.”1077 
During the war and the occupation, Laurent would stay in the southern zone and write briefly for the 
revues Idées and L’Echo des étudiants before withdrawing, disillusioned, from collaboration with 
Vichy. But he emphasized later, this disillusionment would never cause him to question the validity 
of the Vichy government or to find the Gaullists or the Resistance legitimate authorities.1078 
Like his peers on the intellectual Right, Laurent was appalled by the purge and condemned 
the CNE sponsored seizure of the press and the exclusion of the Right from all intellectual 
institutions. By 1947, he had joined with the other intellectuals of the Right who had avoided the 
blacklist in the revue La Table Ronde. This revue and its press would be one of the only organs of the 
intellectual Right for several years after the Liberation. Although the articles were not extremist or 
even overtly political, Laurent’s participation, like that of the other writers there, was an expression of 
defiance against the left-wing hegemony over the press and the literary milieu. It was his participation 
in this journal, Laurent wrote later, that would definitively mark him as “of the Right” in the postwar 
intellectual world.1079 In particular, Laurent would devote his articles in LTR to his new crusade 
against Sartre and the left-wing concept of engagement. This crusade would be crowned in 1951 by 
the publication of Paul et Jean-Paul, a polemical comparison of the work of Sartre and Bourget and a 
clear condemnation of the roman à thèse or any literature dictated by political doctrine. Although 
Laurent would argue during these years against intellectual engagement and politicized literature, he 
would clarify that it was the communist, Gaullist, and existentialist approach to political engagement 
that he opposed, not that of the Right. 
 While Laurent did not oppose intellectual engagement in political affairs in and of itself, he 
would not engage in political polemic himself until the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the first 
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half of the 1950s, Laurent occupied himself by writing “bestsellers” like Caroline chérie under the 
pseudonym Cecil Saint Laurent. He would also create two revues that welcomed intellectual 
contributors from the Right. Both La Parisienne (1953) and Arts (1954) were literary journals, rather 
than political ones, and sought to remain, for the most part, outside the political debates of the time. 
However, like LTR, the very existence of the journals as spaces sympathetic to the values and 
expression of the intellectual Right made them organs of opposition to the dominance of the Left.  
Beginning in the late 1950s, Laurent would end his long political silence in order to speak out 
in favor of French Algeria and to oppose the Gaullist regime which he considered to be part of the 
dominant left-wing “bloc.”1080 He traveled to Algeria in 1958 as a political correspondent for 
L’Aurore and would return a convinced advocate of reform rather than independence. Although his 
engagement revealed an underlying belief in the benefits of European colonialism for Algeria, the real 
force of his arguments lay in his condemnation of the “intellectual dishonesty” he believed to find in 
the Left’s arguments for independence and their manipulation of public opinion. By the early 1960s, 
this accusation would be extended to de Gaulle whom Laurent accused of duplicity in his position on 
Algeria. His outrage against the regime and the mainstream intellectual support for the FLN would be 
such that he would join with other young right-wing intellectuals in propagandizing the actions of 
Sergent and the OAS.1081 During the American involvement in Vietnam, Laurent traveled to South 
Vietnam twice independently claiming that no journal was willing to sponsor reports that did not 
comply with the communist party line.1082 Here he claimed to find, as in Algeria, that the left-wing 
position was not only misguided but intentionally unreceptive to the truth of the conflict because of 
its blind obedience to doctrine. The works which resulted from his travels, Mauriac sous de Gaulle 
1080 Because Laurent perceived de Gaulle and the Republican intellectuals like Mauriac to be part of 
the oppressive left-wing “bloc” and categorized them as “of the Left,” this chapter will also, despite the more 
common historical opinion that Gaullism was a product of the moderate Right.  
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(1964) and Choses vues au Vietnam (1968), would solidify his oppositional engagement and would 
result in his persecution by the government as a “subversive writer.”1083 During these years, Laurent 
was taken to court by de Gaulle for libel and pursued by the police. This activity solidified his self-
identification as a right-wing oppositional intellectual and intensified his resentment. After this flurry 
of engagement, and a brief interest in the student revolutionaries of 1968, Laurent would retire from 
political polemic to focus on his purely literary pursuits until his death in 2000.  
Laurent struggled, more than most on the intellectual Right, to analyze and differentiate his 
own forms of political engagement from that practiced on the Left. His resentment of the dominance 
that the left-wing concept of engagement held over the public’s understanding intellectual legitimacy 
drove him in this struggle to define himself as an intellectual apart from the left-wing model. In this 
way, he helped to construct a new right-wing version of legitimate intellectual engagement, 
responsibility, and identity for the postwar era.  
 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment, and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
 As it had been for Bardèche, the unquestioned dominance of the intellectual Left in the post-
occupation cultural and political world would be a major source of frustration and resentment for 
Laurent, despite his claims to be apolitical. Like Bardèche, he saw the “intellectual Left” to be a 
united bloc of communists, Sartrians, and Gaullists who all worked to exclude and delegitimize the 
expression of any intellectual values that opposed their own. For Laurent and his right-wing peers, 
this hegemony did not end with the literal suppression of writers but extended to a more sinister 
dominance over the concept of intellectual identity. According to Laurent, the Left no longer simply 
monopolized the university or political regime; it annihilated the Right and prevented them from even 
gaining an audience for their views. The general public, Laurent complained, had been so 
“brainwashed” that they could no longer fathom an intellectual who was not of the Left. Even the 
intellectuals of the Right themselves often refused to be identified as right-wing. Laurent believed, 
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however, that it was the responsibility of the intellectuals of the Right to reveal this manipulation and 
the inequity in intellectual affairs and to reassert their own ideas as viable sources for postwar 
France.1084 
Laurent’s personal resentment of what he perceived to be a monopoly over the intellectual 
world was best revealed by the terms he used to describe the two camps. Intellectuals of the Right 
were “pariahs,” he wrote, excluded from intellectual society.1085 It was in the offices of the right-wing 
journals that one “met the excluded, the pariahs, the badly whitewashed, and the suspect.” It was 
therefore on the Right that one was truly among the “camp of the reproved.”1086 Of his own 
experience of intellectual life, Laurent wrote, “Algeria made me first a rebel, then a pariah. Suddenly 
I was no longer a star but an outlaw.”1087 Intellectuals of the Left were, correspondingly, “intellectual 
terrorists,”1088 who exercised a “tyranny” over letters, and “religious fanatics charged with a mission 
of extermination” against the intellectual Right.1089 According to Laurent, this tyrannical monopoly of 
intellectual life was a product of a united front by the camps of the PCF, Sartre, and de Gaulle. “This 
was an era,” he complained, “where the majority of writers, even former communists like Claude 
Roy, sang the praises of de Gaulle,”1090 and where “there was formed between the Left and Gaullism 
a complicity.”1091 This complicit bloc, Laurent believed, had cooperated since the Liberation, despite 
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its internal quarrels, to effectively exclude the Right from French intellectual life. All who were of 
their bloc were “dits à gauche” and intellectually authoritative, all who were opposed were 
automatically “dits à droite” and intellectual outcasts. 
This repression of the Right by a Republican-Left bloc was not a matter of perception, 
Laurent wrote, but of fact. Right-wing writers were suppressed with ease by the regime for any 
opinion which was deemed “subversive.”1092 He complained that several of his friends on the Right 
had been arrested during the Algerian conflict for subversive views and that he himself had been 
“hounded by the police,” put under surveillance, and brought in for interrogation.1093 “What had I 
done?” Laurent demanded resentfully, “Nothing other than to signal in a few articles…my preference 
for a French Algeria.”1094 He was equally outraged that the “subversive” views in his Mauriac sous de 
Gaulle would earn him a trial and result in the censorship of twenty-five pages.1095 Intellectual 
freedom, he wrote, was obviously a facade in France since only the views of the intellectual Left were 
allowed to reach the public. In a more discrete article, he fabricated a conversation with a Spanish 
intellectual who was enamored of the intellectual liberties of the French. During their conversation, 
Laurent was interrupted several times by passing friends. One stopped to commiserate that Laurent 
had been denied a visa to Algeria for his political views, another to report that a fellow writer was 
being pursued for subversive writing, and another to tell of the seizure by the government of two 
right-wing weeklies.1096 The supposed liberties of French intellectual life, Laurent was saying, were 
only granted to the thinkers who supported the values and programs of the Left.  
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Yet, Laurent reminded readers, this tangible oppression of the Right was not the most heinous 
aspect of the Left’s intellectual terrorism. The great coup of the intellectual Left had been first to strip 
the intellectual Right of any cultural authority or moral superiority before resorting to acts of legal 
suppression. In this way, Laurent wrote, they prevented the Right from earning martyrdom and no 
one, not even the intellectuals of the Right themselves, dared defend or identify with it. The purge and 
the omnipotence of the CNE had disappeared in the late 1940s, Laurent wrote, but the great problem 
for the intellectual Right in the 1960s was that the CNE’s “grotesque enterprise” of “intellectual 
terrorism” had not disappeared with it.1097 “The dictates of the CNE had ceased to control letters,” he 
explained, “but letters continued to suffer the effects of a regimentation… a generation of students, 
professors, and critics were formed by what Marxism and Resistantism decided were ethical and 
aesthetic.”1098 As late as 1968, Laurent would lament that “there is in the young intellectuals a desire 
to be fashionable and the fashion is to be of the Left.”1099 The Left’s conceptualization of culture, the 
nation, and intellectual values, Laurent claimed, had been engrained in the public imagination after 
the Liberation. At the same time, the Right’s concepts had been extinguished by their inability to gain 
exposure and their negative association with fascism and defeat. 
It was the Left’s ability to limit the exposure of intellectual expression on the Right that 
seemed to most frustrate Laurent. “The work of the writers called ‘of the Right’ is successful 
enough,” Laurent argued, “but it is ignored. The left has won this battle; that of the faux-savoir. In the 
foreign universities, one learns Camus, Robbe-Grillet, and Duverger by heart but ignores the name of 
Nimier.”1100 A survey of literature textbooks in the decades after 1950 proves his accusation true. 
Only four percent of these texts mentioned right-wing authors like Laurent, and of these, the reigning 
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assessment included the negative description “turned toward the past.”1101 It was to promote exposure 
of the intellectuals of the Right that Laurent would lend his pen to journals like LTR where the 
“pariahs” were able to write. It was also with increased exposure in mind that he would create La 
Parisienne and Arts which both accepted contributions from previously blacklisted writers. Despite 
their efforts to reinsert the right-wing into French intellectual life, Laurent sorrowed, the hegemony of 
the Left was such that the Right was practically eliminated from the intellectual narrative without 
anyone taking notice. 
Laurent admitted that this program to eliminate the Right from the intellectual narrative had 
not begun with the postwar Left. The question “was intelligence and culture on the Right or on the 
Left?” had always been in fashion, he wrote. “And there was an intellectual party which went far 
back, at least to Lucien Herr…and the defeatists of the war of 1914 who had… confiscated the word 
culture to the profit of the friends of the proletariat.”1102 This long running trend had even caused him, 
as a youth, to “hold as evident that nationalism was only good for boors, that a man of mind…was 
pacifist and cosmopolitan” and to “believe evident the intellectual superiority of the Left.”1103 But, he 
continued, during the years of the postwar, this tendency to grant intellectual status to the Left had 
become a sort of religious faith that none dared question. In the journals of the Left, Laurent 
explained, one was able to read statements such as “the PC is the party of France, it is above all the 
party which is always right!” and “All the intellectuals, with rare exception, are Stalinist at this time.” 
And at the tenth congress of the PCF, the communist party was “joyfully proclaimed the ‘Parti de 
l’intelligence francaise’ without making the Sorbonne or the journals collapse with laughter.”1104 
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But, more importantly, as Laurent would note, even the intellectuals of the Right accepted 
this dominance as self-evident and perpetuated the misconception of intellectual identity. “The French 
Right of these past years,” he wrote in frustration, “lets itself be accused of immobility and 
conservatism without saying a word… the Left, since it exists, is believed to have priority, political 
and ideological over the Right.”1105 Unopposed, the Left was able to make of itself a religion, it 
became “Lord of Progress and the general will while the Right,” Laurent complained, “intimidated 
before its enormous religious claims was only able to cry Tyranny!”1106 There was no concerted effort 
by the Right, he was insisting, to counter the claims by the Left to represent all intelligence. And, 
even worse, the intellectuals of the Right, out of frustration with their subordinate status or shame at 
being seen as anti-intellectual, compounded this error by refusing to be labeled “of the Right.” “The 
Right is not stupid or unconscious,” he wrote, “it has shame of the motive which the Left has assigned 
it…Before the question ‘Why am I on the Right?’ the temptation is great to avoid it with an anecdote 
or to doubt if one truly is on the Right.”1107 But this was unacceptable if the intellectual Right was to 
be revived and provide some counterpoint to the monopoly over intelligence by the Left. “A new 
Right searches for itself,” he wrote, “it is not impossible. But here are the conditions for its success: it 
must strip itself of the prejudices and deliver itself from the shame that the Left has imposed on 
it.”1108 Only in breaking with the image of the anti-intellectual Right created by the Left could they 
have a new model for their intellectual identity. 
As they had at every point during the century when they felt they were excluded from the 
legitimizing title of “intellectual,” the engaged writers of the postwar Right would begin their struggle 
to define intellectual identity on their own terms by claiming equal right to the title itself. In a 1954 
 









article in L’Express entitled “À la recherche des intellectuals de droite,” the left-wing journal 
mockingly wrote that, having found no “intellectuals” among the writers of the postwar Right, it 
would have to resort to the works of pre-war writers like Drieu to complete its survey.1109 Laurent 
would pen an immediate response to this challenge in La Parisienne. He chastised the left-wing 
journal for suggesting that the writers who did not construct their novels to influence the elections 
were unworthy of their role. But the Right’s clearest attempts to claim the title and role of the 
intellectual would not come until the Algerian conflict. In a 1960 enquête in Combat questioning the 
role of intellectuals in Algeria and the reaction to the Manifest of the 121, Laurent would give a 
decided response. While defending the “particular duties” incumbent on “intellectuals” that separated 
them from average citizens, Laurent would question whether the left-wing signers of the Manifest 
deserved this distinction. Laurent accused the signers of the anti-colonialist manifest of claiming the 
right to the title and role of the intellectual without meriting it. “The aim of this manifest,” he 
concluded, was in great part to “make it believed that the ‘French elite’ had pronounced itself” in 
favor of an independent Algeria.1110 In fact, he wrote, the “true” French intellectuals were actually 
opposed to the Manifest. The Left’s attempt to “imprison the conscience of France and intoxicate 
public opinion”1111 by claiming to represent all of French intelligence was not only treason to France, 
it was, Laurent wrote, intellectually “irresponsible.”1112 
Laurent greatly resented the post-war trend on the Left of declaring that “all that was 
revolutionary and Marxist was good, all that was reactionary and fascist was bad.”1113 This, he 
charged, was a distortion of the true nature of postwar culture meant to eliminate the Right from 
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French intellectual life. Instead, he and his right-wing peers claimed the right to engage as 
intellectuals and to construct their own version of intellectual role and responsibility. Laurent would 
take great care to note the abyss which existed between his own values for the intellectual and those 
of the Left on issues like intellectual engagement, colonialism, and the historical perspective on 
occupied France.  
 
Differentiation of Intellectual Values: Intellectual Engagement  
 Laurent would initially differentiate his own approach to literature and politics from that of 
the Left by rejecting the idea of engagement and claiming that his own work and revues were 
apolitical. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, he was “essentially the spokesperson for the 
principle of disengagement of intellectuals.”1114 This early position was seen by the intellectual Left 
and by many historians as irreconcilable with his latter engagement in the Algerian and Vietnam 
conflicts. It is important to recognize, however, that Laurent did not understand disengagement as the 
intellectual Left of the pre-war years had. It was not a retreat before the events of the day to an ivory 
tower abstraction or isolationism. Instead, he explained, it was a “refusal of any particular political 
dogmatism” in favor of an “authentic freedom of esprit.”1115 For Laurent and his peers on the young 
new Right, the refusal of “engagement” was actually an act of opposition, a statement of “disrespect” 
for the intellectual expectations of the Left.1116 Since only the Left was allowed to voice its political 
opinion in the intellectual milieu during these years, opposition to engagement was, in reality, only 
opposition to the idea of engagement as it was practiced and defined by the Left. In this way, his early 
espousal of anti-engagement and his later political involvement should be seen not as a discontinuity 
 







but as a continuous effort to oppose and differentiate his own activity from the concept of intellectual 
identity promoted by the Left.  
 This intellectual itinerary is evident in Laurent’s own explanation of his seemingly disjointed 
attitude toward engagement. “In the era where I had attacked ‘engagement,’ he wrote, “it was the 
vehicle of my adversaries. The strikes that I bought against the doctrine of engagement had been 
brought against those who employed it to terrorize literature.”1117 His adversaries on the Left had 
monopolized the conceptualization and practice of engagement during the early 1950s. To oppose it, 
in Laurent’s mind, was to oppose the doctrines and ideas of the Left which were so closely associated 
with it. When he later chose to engage his own work on the side of French Algeria, he explained, he 
would intentionally differentiate his own practice of engagement from that previously conceived by 
the intellectuals of the Left. “Had I practiced engagement?” he asked himself, “No, at least not in the 
sense that Sartre had given it.”1118 He would instead infuse the term with his own intellectual values 
and his alternative, right-wing concept of intellectual role and responsibility. 
Laurent believed this difference was neatly juxtaposed in contrasting issues of LTM and La 
Parisienne that were both devoted to “the Right.” “Take Sartre and Beauvoir,” he wrote, “writers of 
the Left at the head of a revue of the Left they have consecrated an issue to the Right. Against the 
Right they have produced the issue that one would expect of them.” But, Laurent continued, 
“although LTM had mobilized laboriously against the Right all that which one could hope of 
indoctrinated bad faith… La Parisienne, in place of being the counterpart of the LTM issue, is 
independent!”1119 For Laurent and the intellectual Right, therefore, engagement, as it was practiced by 
the intellectual Left, involved two betrayals. First, left-wing engagement required the enslavement of 
intelligence to the demands of a doctrine or political catechism like communism, revolutionary 
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socialism, or Gaullist republicanism. In contrast, the intellectual Right, because it had no strong 
political doctrine or party organization, touted its own engagement as autonomous. Secondly, left-
wing engagement, particularly that of the existentialists, distorted literature by making it polemical. 
Laurent and his peers prided themselves conversely on separating their art from their political writing.  
For Laurent, one of the most essential differences between his own approach to public affairs 
and those of a left-wing engagé was the willingness of a man of the Left to submit his thought to a 
political ideology. “If I have reproved the vogue of engagement,” he wrote in 1956, “it is because it 
implies that the writer is a disciplined servant.”1120 When defining engagement for an article against 
Sartre as early as 1948, he described it as a practice of the Left which “only allowed the freedom to 
critique from a single point of view.”1121 Intellectuals who adhered to the camps of Sartre, the PCF, 
and de Gaulle were all writing according to a doctrine which limited their search for truth. These 
intellectuals, Laurent believed, sacrificed their identity as writers and artists to their identity as 
political men. “There are not communist writers,” he quipped, but writing communists.”1122 But it was 
not only the PCF intellectuals whose engagement Laurent believed was an enslavement of 
intelligence. Laurent rejected Sartre’s engagement of literature in “third way” political programs as 
“the collapse of the writer in favor of the militant” well before he joined the PCF and would reserve a 
particular vitriol for Mauriac and the other Gaullist writers.1123 “The party,” he wrote disdainfully, 
whether it was the PCF or the RPF, “obtains unlimited obedience, and novelists, critics, philosophers, 
and savants are expected to serve on all the fronts according to the same line, with the same 
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words.”1124 Their devotion to a particular political program and worldview would always take 
precedence over their responsibility to literature and disinterested thought.  
This, Laurent believed, was a betrayal of independent thought that separated the Left’s 
engagement from the responsible intellectual engagement of the Right. “I propose,” he would write, 
“to define the writer of the Right as one who writes without referring to a code…without searching 
like Sartre and Camus to express the tendencies of groups or collectivities.”1125 This intellectual 
autonomy, for Laurent, was the hallmark of the right-wing conceptualization of engagement. It linked 
the intellectual Right’s rejection of engagement as it was conceived by the Left in the early postwar 
years to their enthusiastic engagement, according to their own concept, during the colonial wars. “If 
you search a continuity in my enterprise,” he summarized when asked about this seeming rupture, 
“find it in the refusal to enslave intelligence.”1126 Laurent’s views on engagement were echoed 
throughout the post-war Right. In the initial presentation of the right-wing revue La Table ronde, the 
contributors pledged, “the writers of this revue consider themselves as ‘engagés,’ but the word 
engagement would be excessive if it is taken to mean obedience to the instructions that a party 
dictates.”1127 Because they were not part of a larger party, intellectuals of the Right believed they 
were able to engage in political affairs and even take sides on issues like Algeria without betraying 
their responsibility to free, critical thought. 
This contrast between right-wing independent engagement and left-wing “enslaved” 
engagement would also be a factor in Laurent’s accusation that the left-wing engagé conflated 
literature and polemic.1128 This second charge of a betrayal of intelligence would be leveled most 
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prominently against Sartre in Paul et Jean Paul. According to Laurent, Sartre’s existentialist 
approach to literature, in which every piece was valuable for its contribution to the political cause 
rather than for its artistic merit, caused him to “confound literature and didacticism.”1129 “Good 
literature for Sartre,” Laurent warned readers, “is a good prospectus. It concerns selling…several 
political concepts by which literature becomes a publicity poster.”1130 Rather than writing novels and 
pieces that were informed by political affairs and opinions, Laurent wrote, Sartre and the Left 
“believed that ‘roman’ means ‘roman à these.”1131 These works of fiction were manipulations of 
literature and readers where the conclusions were “arrived at in advance” based on the political 
leaning of the author. Characters were black and white figures with no nuance where “only the 
‘friends’ of the author are living characters and the adversaries are monsters or caricatures.”1132 And 
most importantly, the novel was not a personal expression for the Left but a “public service” and a 
“example for the public,” therefore it was always to be “ideological, of universal portent, and of 
immediate interest.”1133 In short, Laurent wrote, the roman à these was a “dishonest enterprise” in 
which authors wrote political opinions under the cover of fiction in order to manipulate readers 
without having to defend their positions.1134 
Laurent’s opposition to the existentialist roman à these, however, was not a rejection of 
intellectual engagement per se, only of the interpretation that Sartre had given it. For Laurent, writers 
could involve themselves in political affairs and lend the weight of their names and intellectual 
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authority to a cause as long as their opinion was expressed in openly political essays. “I did not mix 
the novel with the pamphlet,” Laurent would later emphasize, “Where I ceased to be a novelist, I 
became a polemicist- this is a different enterprise. I did not mix the two as I had accused Sartre of 
doing. He wrote engaged novels, me I engaged myself in my polemical works…and directly attacked 
my objective.”1135 Even with the novels of Cecil Saint Laurent like Agites d’Alger, in which 
characters supported French Algeria, Laurent claimed his engagement remained different from that of 
the Left since he had “attempted to understand all the characters” rather than deeming some black and 
others white.1136 
For Laurent, therefore, there were significant differences between the “engagement” 
conceived by the Left and that practiced on the Right. By opposing the first in the early 1950s and 
defending the second during Algeria, Laurent and the intellectual Right in fact remained consistent. 
Both were efforts to differentiate and legitimize their understanding of intellectual responsibility and 
identity from that of the Left. According to Laurent, while the Left betrayed intelligence by enslaving 
their thought to a political doctrine or party line, the Right remained critical and independent. And, 
while the Left ignored its responsibilities to literature by dishonestly masquerading polemic as fiction, 
the Right preserved the distinction and provided forthright exemplars of both.  
 
Colonialism  
Although a minority on the Left favored a French Algeria, the fact remains that, after 1960, 
support for French Algeria was mainly found on the Right. This division would be even more striking 
during the conflict in Vietnam. Those intellectuals of the Left who continued to support reform and a 
colonial presence were ostracized by the dominant intellectuals of the Left and made to join the 
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pariahs of the Right.1137 A concerted public opinion campaign was waged by the dominant 
intellectuals to exclude both these rebellious left-wing thinkers and the entirety of the Right from the 
status, authority, and title of intellectual. According to the majority on the Left, being an “intellectual” 
meant actively engaging against oppression, racism, and exploitation and in favor of the Rights of 
Man, revolutionary struggle, and independence. For the Right, being an “intellectual” meant 
representing French interests and supporting the spread of French civilization. In particular, Laurent 
would contrast what he considered to be the responsible engagement by the intellectual Right and the 
dishonest, manipulative, and irresponsible engagement of the intellectual Left in the public debates 
over colonialism.  
In his memoirs, Laurent reflected on his support for French Algeria and the image of France 
that his support was founded upon. He had initially, he recalled, been ambiguous on the question of 
colonialism and the superiority of the European civilization. “France had a great empire like England 
and other nations of Europe possessed numerous colonies,” he would write, “this state of things 
seemed normal to me.”1138 He would become more passionate about French Algeria when the conflict 
there threatened to remove it from his image of the French national identity. When “the bombings 
turned into war in Algeria, I reacted without ambiguity,” he explained, “I had a certain idea or rather a 
certain image of France and when I imagined it reduced to a hexagon, I had a crisis of 
claustrophobia.”1139 For Laurent, Algerians were Frenchmen who were being denied their patrimony 
by the French Left who thought revolution and independence were panaceas to all political ills. The 
truly responsible intellectual attitude, he argued, was not to impose a preconceived idea of 
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nationalism and liberty on the people of Algeria but rather to attempt to truly understand the Algerian 
situation.1140 
The intellectuals of the Left demanded independence for Algeria, he wrote, without 
considering the plausibility of this immediate independence or its desirability for the Algerians. 
According to Laurent, the majority of the Algerians had no interest in independence and considered 
themselves Frenchmen. In his Agites d’Alger, one character asked “if the civilians unleash themselves 
and if you are sent to reestablish order, would you shoot men who only manifested in order to remain 
French?”1141 After his journey to Algeria as a correspondent for L’Aurore, Laurent would be 
solidified in his opinion. There was no Algerian nationalism, he wrote, only local, tribal ones.1142 The 
FLN was a handful of “fanatical rebels”1143 who did not represent the majority. The majority wished 
to remain French but their will was misrepresented by the propaganda of the intellectual Left who 
wanted to make Algeria the new model for international decolonization.  
 The Left not only betrayed its intellectual duty by distorting the desire for independence in 
Algeria, it also, Laurent claimed, misrepresented the effects of colonization in order to convince the 
public of its vision. For the Left, colonization was exploitation and racist concept of inferior and 
superior races, for the intellectuals of the Right, as Laurent tried to explain it was a beneficial tutelage 
in civilization that carried no concept of inferior races. “The colonial adventure seemed to me,” 
Laurent wrote, “a happy enterprise for the people who were being developed. I believed in the 
superiority of civilization but no scorn entered into the regard that I had for exotic races.”1144 The 
“happy enterprise” of colonialism, according to Laurent, provided Algeria with more political 
structure and economic possibilities than they could accomplish for themselves as an independent 
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nation. In his Les Passagers pour Alger, professor Demeilhan asks an Algerian about his desire for 
independence. The Algerian’s reply is “that the only true independence is from cold, hunger, 
violence, slavery and that he did not hope for this from an Algerian government.”1145 France, this 
novel explained, had “constructed a civilization which, imperfect as it is, was a thousand times 
superior to that which Algeria would have had had it remained to itself.”1146 If, he summarized 
elsewhere, one considered the national fact paramount, then the French presence there was criminal, 
but “if one considers that civilization is preferable to barbarism, then it is no longer a right which is 
given to us to stay but rather a duty.”1147 The push for decolonization by the intellectual Left, he 
concluded, was not a responsible recognition of Algeria’s preparation for independence but rather a 
betrayal and abandonment, under cover of high principles, of the duty to civilize. 
Laurent found the intellectual irresponsibility and dishonesty of the Left to be even more 
apparent during the Vietnam conflict. Because these intellectuals of the Left engaged according to 
party line and were willing to manipulate the truth for the good of their political cause, he explained, 
they distorted the public’s perception of the war. The bombs that fall on North Vietnam are bad, he 
wrote, but none condemns the rockets launched by the Vietcong.1148 The intellectuals of the Left 
chose to portray the conflict as a Manichean struggle between good and evil in which the “bad was 
represented by the Americans who forced the people of South Vietnam to fight the men of North 
Vietnam who were their best friends and brothers and the good was represented by the North.”1149 
Because it suited their program of decolonization and socialist revolution, the intellectuals of the Left 
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wanted to make the Vietcong the embodiment of all the good human qualities and the Americans its 
suppressors. This polarized view of the combatants, Laurent was convinced, was accepted by the 
intellectuals of the Left as a given, as the starting point in any discussion of Vietnam.  
But this vision, Laurent warned, was not based on reality. There is such a strong urge to 
manifest “for Vietnam,” he wrote, that it seems to these intellectuals “superfluous to know what is 
actually happening there.”1150 The Sartrians, he wrote, “never showed the need to go see a little of 
what occurred over there, they had given themselves as aim, all their life, to close their eyes to reality 
in order to make their ideology triumph.”1151 Laurent would accuse Sartre in particular of proclaiming 
“the Truth does not interest us” and of dampening the West’s critical judgment with the ideologically 
biased reports of the Russell Tribunal.1152 In contrast, Laurent wrote, as a responsible intellectual of 
the Right, he had made the effort to understand the reality of the conflict by traveling to Vietnam 
twice and observing the conflict. The reality, he wrote, was that the war was the result of the North’s 
desire for the economic resources of the South and of the communists’ desire to extend their ideology 
beyond the USSR and China. It was, he concluded, a war of conquest in which the South was 
“content” to have American aid in its defense. Journalists who traveled to Vietnam saw the truth of 
what was happening there, he complained, “but the truth is not appreciated in France [so] they were 
obligated to give the news which corresponded to the pre-established judgments.”1153 Clearly, Laurent 
believed, the intellectuals of the Right more legitimately fulfilled the role of public educator and 
guide. But, because the Left dominated the intellectual milieu and declared its position morally 
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superior, his pamphlet on the truths of Vietnam, which “went against all the received ideas of the 
time,” would gain little exposure.1154 
For Laurent and the intellectuals of the Right, being a true, responsible, and legitimate 
intellectual required thinking critically about the issue of colonization and considering the realities of 
the particular situations. Even more importantly, it meant honestly relaying these realities to the 
public without ideological bias. In practice, it meant accepting that there was little desire for national 
independence among the majority of Algerians and that such autonomy might be disastrous for their 
progress. In Vietnam, it meant recognizing the economic and ideological reasons for the war and 
accepting that the South preferred American protection.  
 
Memories of Vichy and Occupation 
 Laurent had a strong personal “detestation of de Gaulle,”1155 and would critique the President 
directly in works like Mauriac sous de Gaulle and the subsequent Offenses au Chef de l’Etat. But, it 
was his resentment of the intellectual Left’s portrayal of de Gaulle and Vichy that inspired all his 
engaged works.1156 The intellectuals of the Left were constructing the dominant historical narrative of 
the occupation that demonized Petain, Vichy, and the collaborators while portraying de Gaulle as the 
great liberator of France. Laurent, however, declared this narrative to be a distortion of historical 
reality and a manipulation of the truth. The intellectual Left was seeking to advance its own 
ideological agenda by “whitewashing” de Gaulle’s past and luring the public into an uncritical 
admiration of the regime. This, Laurent accused, was a betrayal of the responsibility and integrity of 
the intellectual and made the Left unfit to serve as the representatives of French intelligence. It was 
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the intellectuals of the Right who had the necessary perspective to construct the true memories of 
France. 
 The accurate memory of the occupation, according to Laurent, was of Vichy as the first line 
of Resistance. Laurent’s portrayal of Vichy and Petain as the shield which lessened the impact of 
occupation and initiated clandestine liberation efforts was a common theme in the work of the 
intellectual Right. Its message had a dual purpose: to repair the public’s image of Vichy as the 
“shield” and to undermine de Gaulle’s claims to have been the “first Resistor of France.”1157 The 
intellectuals of the Left, he wrote, “desperately tried to consolidate this fable” of de Gaulle as the core 
of the Resistance. But this manipulation could not long mask the truth, Laurent wrote, that “the first 
Resistors were the French who did not flee their nation in danger, they did not live in London, they 
were not Gaullists. The first resistor was Petain and the resistance was Vichy.”1158
In an interview years later, Laurent would recall the necessity of posing this alternative vision 
of Vichy and the Resistance to the dominant, left-wing narrative. Here he claimed that his 
interpretation which “called into question all the habits of thought and all the education of a 
generation” was based on “incontestable testimony” rather than “fabricated on an immense lie” as the 
vision of the Left was.1159 In short, in his construction of this right-wing memory of Vichy, Laurent 
would portray himself as the more responsible historian and intellectual who marshaled real evidence 
rather than ideology. He paraded quotes from Eisenhower saying it was Boisson, Vichy’s 
representative, not de Gaulle who had saved French Africa and he highlighted the work of Jeantet’s 
Amicale de France which he claimed had aided the Liberation while remaining devoted to Petain.1160 
His most concerted effort to portray the right-wing memory of Vichy as the true one, however, was in 
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his Année 40 where he collected and commented on documents that he believed “put to light the 
double game of Petain and the insignificant role of de Gaulle in the opposition to the Germans.”1161 
De Gaulle’s only accomplishments, he wrote, had been justifying the English attack at Mers-el-Kébir 
and the raid on Dakar, and endangering French relations with England while being the friend of the 
communists.”1162 In truth, Laurent argued, had he not endangered and betrayed France in these ways, 
he would be completely insignificant in history. “De Gaulle,” Laurent explained, “has changed 
nothing in the history of France. With or without de Gaulle, France would have been liberated on the 
same day.” This alternative vision was important to promote, he concluded, because “it is the defense 
of the truth” which the intellectuals of the Left had betrayed.1163 
“Our future is in our intelligence,” Laurent lamented, but “the unsuitability of the regime that 
we submit to is that it has as its principle strategy the corruption of the information and the minds 
which have to analyze it.”1164 Gaullism, he claimed, exercised a certain power over writers and 
savants which led them to “mold the facts, denature them, erase and disfigure them” to the benefit of 
the regime.1165 This great betrayal of intellectual responsibility and integrity was no where more 
apparent than in the work of Mauriac. In his Mauriac sous de Gaulle, Laurent accused Mauriac of 
having more reverence for the personage of de Gaulle in his latest biography than he had held “when 
treating the Son of God” in a previous work.1166 Mauriac, Laurent wrote, “had renounced himself 
completely” and lost his ability to critique when faced with the embodiment of the political ideology 
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he had adopted.1167 He accused Mauriac of deleting passages of de Gaulle’s speeches in order to 
“paint a rosy picture” and of deliberately ignoring evidence that contradicted his image of de Gaulle’s 
regime. Mauriac was entitled to his opinion, Laurent wrote, but “he ought to submit them without 
reprieve to the proof of facts and the study of documents, which he has not done.”1168 Instead, Laurent 
continued, he had denatured the truth because he was less “preoccupied with his duty, with the truth, 
than with making his apologetic work.”1169 Mauriac is, Laurent concluded, like all those who defend 
and support him with their writing, one of “de Gaulle’s servants.” When Mauriac “wrote flattery and 
lies” while claiming to write a true history, Laurent concluded, he endangered the minds of the 
French and subsequently relinquished his right to the role of intellectual.1170 
The collective memory of Vichy and the Liberation, as Henry Rousso has shown, continued 
to be a source of division and debate well after 1945. It is no surprise, therefore, that the construction 
of this national narrative revealed deep divisions within the intellectual milieu and led to a struggle to 
produce the authoritative version. For the Gaullist Left, responsible intellectuals could never engage 
in support of collaborationists, Vichy, or Petain. Being an intellectual meant unreservedly denouncing 
these elements of France’s past and engaging in unquestioning support of their antithesis: de Gaulle 
and the Republic. For Laurent and the Right, being a responsible intellectual meant providing a voice 
of opposition to de Gaulle and the Republic, questioning the revealed truths that came out of the 
Resistance, and resisting the influences on art of political power. 
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Laurent and the Right-Wing Intellectual Model 
 Jacques Laurent was a vocal opponent of the hegemony of the post-war Left and devoted 
much of his work to redefining the identity of the intellectual according to right-wing standards. His 
engagement, like that of his right-wing predecessors, was driven by a resentment of the Left’s 
“intellectual terrorism” and a desire to legitimize his own political values as those of the intellectual 
elite. He approached engagement in the debates over Algeria and Vietnam, therefore, with the 
mentality of the oppressed minority. This approach to engagement meant, according to Laurent, it 
was necessary first to justify his participation as an intellectual and validate the ideas of the Right 
before entering into a particular debate. In particular, he would seek to distance his concept of the 
intellectual’s values and role from that modeled by the intellectual Left. According to Laurent’s 
model of intellectual identity, the responsible post-war intellectual was one who engaged 
independently, without accepting the dogma of a party line, and who separated this engaged work 
from pure literature rather than using art to camouflage politics. The intellectual of the Right 
envisioned France as an empire that extended beyond the hexagon and believed he had a 
responsibility to educate, civilize, and govern this empire. The abstract ideas of revolution and 
independence behind the Left’s decolonization were, to the intellectual of the Right, incompatible 
with the real circumstances of the colonies. And, the intellectual, as defined by the Right, had a 
certain memory of the war and Liberation that neither vilified Vichy nor glorified de Gaulle. This 
perspective, Laurent believed, meant the Right discovered historical evidence that the Left obscured 
and formed opinions without coercion from the regime. As a result, the intellectual of the Right was 
responsible to historical truth while the Left betrayed it for political gain. Laurent’s alternative image 
of the responsibility and values of the intellectual excluded him from the intellectual communities and 
networks that were once again dominated by the Left. To give his engagement collective force, 




THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD OF THE POSTWAR RIGHT: COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS, 
AND THE INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE 
 
During the occupation, the intellectual Right had felt itself an ideological minority despite its 
actual dominance over the positions of power in the intellectual field. After the Liberation, the 
perception of isolation and alienation became a tangible reality as the Right was purged from these 
places of cultural power and found that even their interwar spaces and outlets were closed to them. In 
order to regain even a small foothold in French cultural life, they formed communities, spaces, and 
socio-professional networks that could serve as support structures for their return to active 
engagement. And, because the communities, organizations, and organs which had been their support 
structure during the interwar and occupation years were outlawed or seized for the Left, these 
communities had to be completely recreated. Even after the purge proper had ended, the ideas, values, 
writers, and organizations labeled “of the Right” were immediately suspect and shunned by the 
intellectual community as fascist or racist well into the 1960s. Before the Liberation, the Right had 
felt marginalized in intellectual society and had constructed alternative communities in protest. 
During the post-war years, from the purge to the colonial debates, they were literally prevented from 
practicing and identifying as intellectuals and they created their segregated communities in order to 
survive.  
 The intellectual Right would not have the party discipline that the PCF gave to the communist 
Left or even the ideological coherence that Sartre and de Gaulle gave to their camps.1171 But this did 
not prevent them from forming small communities of like-minded thinkers whose shared opposition 
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to the dominant politics of the day provided them with a common mission. In the early years of the 
purge, several right-wing groups like de Jonquière’s Ligue des intellectuels independents, to which 
Bardèche belonged, would unite right-wing intellectuals in a protest of the purge and a defense of 
Vichy and the collaborators.1172 There was also the Comité national francais, of which Bardèche was 
a co-founder, which was an “umbrella organization” for numerous smaller efforts on the extreme and 
neo-fascist Right. Although the French Right was not able to hold the mass meetings and congresses 
that it had during the interwar and occupation years, French intellectuals including Bardèche would 
attend the 1951 Malmö congress in Sweden. Here basic tenets of right-wing thought and political 
positions were agreed upon including the necessity of a strong Germany and anti-communism.1173 
During these early decades of the postwar there were few organized alternatives for intellectuals on 
the Right, but, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, Bardèche and other right-wing intellectuals would 
be drawn to the efforts of new groups that were beginning to redefine the political and intellectual 
extreme Right like Ordre Nouveau, the Front national, and GRECE.1174 
The basic building blocks of these collective communities was the network of socio-
professional and personal relationships that formed in the adversity of the purge and continued to be 
fostered by the polarized environment of the following decades. Bardèche would recall that in the 
years of the purge, he and his family were stripped of their property and homes and were forced to 
rely on “the professional solidarity which was established so rapidly among the delinquents” in order 
to find new lodging.1175 He explained that there was a surprising readiness among the oppressed to 
share their resources and influence to help their fellow outcasts. While he was excluded from the 
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company of the republican and left-wing university professors he had enjoyed before the war, he 
recalled that he was “touched by the young men unknown to us who came to offer their friendship to 
replace those that had been lost to us.”1176 Bardèche in particular would also find “a whole new circle 
of international friends” through the Association internationale des Amis de Robert Brasillach created 
in 1968. Here he formed personal and professional networks through years of correspondence with 
intellectuals sympathetic to neofascism and collaborationism throughout Europe.1177 The one 
community of intellectuals to which Bardèche did not create a strong link was the Hussards. This 
failure to create a network with these younger intellectuals, he wrote, was one of his “great regrets” 
since he knew and liked their work and felt he “shared many ideas” with them.1178 
The group known as the Hussards would develop its own network of relationships in the 
larger intellectual Right community. The term Hussard was actually introduced by the left-wing 
writer Bernard Frank in an effort, Laurent claimed, to tar a group of right-wing writers with the label 
“fascist.” In reality, Laurent would write, there was no firm organization, simply a group of “men 
who were, during this time, united against the sort of intellectual consensus which came from the 
opposing side.”1179 The category was intended to include the young oppositional writers Roger 
Nimier, Antoine Blondin, Michel Deon, and Laurent. These writers shared a common worldview, 
contributed to the same journals, wrote in the same style, and formed both personal and professional 
ties. Most importantly, however, the hussards would share the same disrespect for the established 
political values and concept of engagement. They formed, “the contestatory pole opposite the group 
from LTM” and as such “invented their own way of life” on the Right.1180 The hussards were seen by 
both the members themselves and the intellectual Left as a separate “community” of intellectuals on 
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the Right.1181 As one young admirer of the group wrote, it was a “resplendent family” of right-wing 
intellectuals.1182 Here, he continued, a young right-wing writer, excluded and marginalized in other 
intellectual communities, “walked into a group of young men seated around tables laughing” and felt 
that he had been immediately made “a member of the family.”1183 
These “families” of writers and socio-professional networks of ostracized intellectuals were 
quick to coalesce around independent revues and journals that could amplify their individual efforts 
to engage. It was in the shared practice of oppositional journalism and the sense of sociability created 
by the close knit revue team that much of the collective identity of the intellectual Right was formed. 
Revues provided a supportive space where the writers of the right-wing opposition could express their 
political and cultural values without fear of repression. These right-wing revues and journals also 
created a social space where writers could congregate and form both professional and personal ties 
outside the networks of the Left. The writers of LTR, for example, would form what Laurent later 
referred to as, “a Table ronde clan, an ensemble, a literary life” separate from the intellectual society 
of the Left.1184 The revue was also a space for mentoring the next generation of right-wing 
intellectuals and introducing them to opposition journalism. Before Mauriac became a devotee of de 
Gaulle and alienated himself from the more extreme writers, a group of young LTR contributors 
gathered “nearly every Monday to dine at five or six around Mauriac in one of the little restaurants. 
All the personnel [of LTR] came…they allocated a little room to us which became our office.”1185 
The revue team was therefore a key contributor to the formation of a distinctly right-wing collective 
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intellectual identity. It surrounded authors with other like-minded right-wing thinkers, giving them a 
sense of validation, and connected them to others in the right-wing community. And, most 
importantly, right-wing revues were truly right-wing spaces, isolated from and opposed to the ideas 
and authors of the Left. 
Despite the blacklist and the limits placed on right-wing expression, the Right would create 
several journalistic outlets for its remaining writers that were clearly spaces of the intellectual Right 
where no left-wing or republican writer would think of contributing. The Action Francaise students 
would continue the royalist presence by creating Documents nationaux and Aspects de la France, but 
royalism attracted few of the postwar intellectuals. The “first periodical of the postwar Opposition 
Nationale” was Perspectives, a small bulletin created by Rene Malliavin which would change its 
name to Questions actuelles before the end of 1944, then to Ecrits de Paris in 1947. The team of 
Ecrits, including such notable figures of the Right as Malliavin, Tattinger, Jacques Isorni, Jouvenel, 
and Paul Morand would also start the extremist hebdo Rivarol by 1951 which served as a rallying 
point for the most radical of the right-wing engagés.1186 Although Laurent found this journal too 
extremist, even during the height of his engagement, his fellow hussard Blondin would be one of its 
most prolific contributors. Rene Binet, who radicalized the CNF to the point that even Bardèche 
broke off to create a separate Committee, would also direct a right-wing journal, La Sentinelle.1187 
One of the most significant revue teams to provide a haven for right-wing writers and offer a 
mentoring space for young writers of the Right was that of Bardèche’s Defense de l’Occident.
Contributors to Defense de l’Occident included Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Paul Serant, and Jean-Marie 
Le Pen among others of the extreme Right.1188 The journal promoted the ideas of neo-fascism, the 
new racism, and negationism, republished the works of collaborationists, opposed Sartre, 
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communism, and the Gaullist Republics, and advocated French Algeria.1189 It would be a “training 
ground” for the young intellectuals who would form the next generation of the extreme-Right. 
Despite Defense’s popularity with the more extremist, neo-fascist Right, the most influential and 
respected intellectual journal of the immediate postwar years was the more moderate La Table ronde.
The monthly La Table ronde was created in 1948 by Mauraic and Maulnier specifically to 
counter the power of Sartre’s Les Temps modernes and to provide an outlet for the right-wing writers 
like Giono, Montherlant, Celine, and Jouhandeau who had been silenced by the Liberation press. 
Initially, the journal included contributions from both sides of the political spectrum and had a 
committee of moderate anti-communists: Mauriac, Paulhan, Camus, Malunier, Aron, and Malraux. 
The journal presented itself as preserving the “responsibility of the métier” by promoting unity in the 
postwar and advocating freedom of expression for all, not just the Resistance Left.1190 By 1954, these 
moderates had been edged out by their more extremist, more right-wing contributors like Bardèche 
and the hussards. Mauriac would write of this unexpected mutiny, “never did a hen hatch so many 
non-conformist extreme right-wing ducks.”1191 In the latter years of the post-war, under the more 
extremist influence, the journal supported French Algeria and opposed Sartre and communism. 
After growing disinterested in the direction of LTR themselves, the “hussards,” who “had a 
horror of the sanctuary of revealed truths” which was the mainstream media, formed a vast, 
interconnected network of journals that were outside the intellectual world of the Left and provided 
what Laurent would call “a breath of fresh air.”1192 Hussard signatures were found in the right-wing 
journals Combat, Armée Nation, Opera, Esprit public, and, most prominently, in the journals created 
by Laurent: La Parisienne, Arts, Au Contraire, and 168. The covers of each of these journals even 
cross-promoted one another by saying that readers could find more from the same authors in the other 
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journals. While Arts and LP were both originally advertised as apolitical literary revues, LP would 
often break this mold in order to comment on the affairs of the day. In particular, one issue was 
devoted to reviving the work of Drieu la Rochelle, while another was dedicated to “La Droite” in a 
clear counterattack on the LTM issue on the Right. Esprit public was much more actively engaged 
and gathered the hussards along with other right-wing intellectuals for a crusade in favor of French 
Algeria and opposition to de Gaulle.1193 Finally, the short lived 168 and Au Contraire were both 
intended to continue the crusade against de Gaulle that Laurent, Laudenbach, and others of the 
hussard community believed Esprit public had lost sight of in the years after the Algerian conflict.  
Although revues provided some of the most prolific of the segregated communities for the 
intellectual Right, they were not the only intellectual spaces that would be divided down left-right 
lines. Publishing houses, particularly in the years after the Liberation, followed the dictates of the 
CNE and refused to publish blacklisted authors. In order to survive as intellectuals, the Right had to 
create its own presses in order to publish its work. The largest publishing house for the Right would 
be the firm of La Table ronde which was one of the few firms to publish right-wing authors 
immediately after the Liberation. Bardèche created the firm Sept Couleurs in 1949 in order to publish 
the complete works of Robert Brasillach. Although Bardèche would originally publish his own work 
with Calmann-Levy, the other left-wing writers in this house, Bardèche recalled, “were indignant 
about my presence among them,” and eventually convinced Calmann to drop him from the 
catalogue.1194 Sept Couleurs would become an important fixture on the Right after this, publishing the 
majority of Bardèche’s own works in addition to those of other right-wing authors like Pierre 
Fontaine. The Hussards would also find their own favorite publisher in Charles Fremanger.1195 
1193 Laurent, Au Contraire.
1194 Bardèche, Souvenirs, 233. 
 
1195 Vandromme, Bivouacs d’un hussard, 193. 
 
493 
The postwar would also see the rise of the segregation of intellectual cafes reminiscent of the 
turn of the century divisions. Sartre, Beauvoir, and their camp made a habit of writing and meeting 
friends in the cafes of Deux Magots and Flore during the postwar decades and created something of 
an intellectual fortress in these cafes for the extreme Left. Laurent recalled the extent to which the 
intellectuals of the Right were ostracized from even these seemingly neutral spaces. “Claude Roy had 
said that it was necessary for me not to return to Café de Flore, because this was a sacred place!” 
Laurent wrote. In fact, he continued, the entirety of Saint-Germain des Pres seemed overtaken by the 
intellectuals of the Left and “when I walked in the Saint-Germain des Pres, I went for a walk among 
enemies—which amused me for I loved to provoke them.”1196 In opposition to these left-wing 
intellectual strongholds, the Right would gather at Brasserie Lipp where Laurent was often found 
writing and at the Bar at Pont Royal where the LTR team would meet after hours and where the 
hussards and supporters of Captain Sergent’s OAS propaganda would congregate.1197 The cafes of 
Paris could, therefore, literally be divided into two camps during these years based on the political 
leanings of their most devoted intellectual clientele.1198 
A final space where intellectuals, though engaging in the same sort of practice, found 
themselves in clearly divided, politically polarized communities was that of the petition. As they had 
in all previous periods of intellectual debate, manifests and petitions provided a forum to amplify 
individual engagement that united its signers in a community of shared values and sense of 
intellectual responsibility. Although the signers might never have any true social contact, they were 
brought together through the petition into an imagined community that extended beyond the bounds 
of physical interaction. The Left would begin its manifests as early as the 1944 Manifeste des 
ecrivains francais calling for the purge, but the Right, for obvious reasons, had little success mounting 
an effective petition campaign until the crisis in Algeria. The greatest of these petition wars would be 
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that between the left-wing Manifest of the 121 and the right-wing Manifeste des intellectuels francais. 
The latter was signed by over three hundred right-wing, self-proclaimed “intellectuals” including all 
four hussards, Gaxotte, Massis, and Maulnier among others. The right-wing manifest stated that the 
signers had gathered to protest the Left’s attempt to “make it believed that the great part of our 
intellectual elites condemn the action of France in Algeria.”1199 They denied the Left the right to 
“pose as representatives of French intelligence” if they were going to advocate desertion in the 
military and support the revolutionary efforts of “fanatics.”1200 The Right would produce very few 
additional petitions after this effort during Algeria. One of the few was organized by Suzanne Labin 
to show support for South Vietnam’s rejection of communism in 1972 and included, for the most part, 
the same names as the petition for Algeria.1201 Despite the limited number of petitions on the Right, 
the imagined community that it created during the Algerian conflict would be influential in building a 
sense of collective intellectual identity during the postwar. 
The intellectuals of the Right, because they were so adamantly excluded from the intellectual 
networks and spaces controlled by the Resistance and the Left, were forced to create their own 
communities. These right-wing communities provided them with supportive social networks and 
spaces, an array of journals and revues that were sympathetic to their intellectual values, and forums 
where their individual engagement could be part of a collective force. The segregation of intellectuals 
into two mutually exclusive societies created a real sense of collective identity within the camps. 
Participating in one of these networks or communities on the Right became an important part of being 
a right-wing intellectual. But a set of shared intellectual values and a network of intellectual 
communities were not the only factors in creating a distinctive intellectual identity on the Right.  
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The Post-War Right-Wing Intellectual Experience 
The relationships of daily intellectual life on the Left and Right, particularly those with the 
places of power in the government, university, and publishing world, would be distinct enough that 
the very experience of being an intellectual became different between the two camps. The influence 
on government affairs of the former Resistance, CNE, and PCF in the immediate postwar years made 
the relationship of the State with the former collaborationists one of hostility. During the years of the 
purge, intellectuals like Brasillach, Drieu, and Chateaubriant were sentenced by the regime to death 
for intellectual treason while others like Maurras were given prison terms and suffered a state 
mandated national degradation. Although this more severe relationship between the state and the 
extreme Right would be ameliorated after the purge, the memory of the occupation years and the 
purge would remain strong for both parties and the mutual hostility did not disappear for decades.1202 
The inequity between the “pariahs” of the Right and the “tyrants” of the State that Laurent described 
as late as 1960 was, therefore, not a matter of perception; it was a verifiable repression justified by the 
Right’s association with wartime collaboration. In particular, the intellectual Left’s exclusive 
relationship with the republican regime allowed them to deny the Right access to legitimizing cultural 
institutions and practices through State sanctioned exclusion. Maurras, Hermant, and Bonnard not 
only lost their seats in the Academy after the Liberation, but new nominees like Paul Morand were 
continually denied a seat due to de Gaulle’s insistence that only Resistors be accorded this honor. 1203 
Right-wing intellectuals would even be excluded from intellectual honors like a State burial. “It is 
easy to see who the state honors and who it neglects,” Laurent wrote resentfully, “Claudel yes, 
Montherlant no, Mauriac yes, Cocteau no. Good writers are rewarded with commendation, 
decoration, and national honors. Bad writers are forbidden from publishing, from giving lectures and 
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from holding public posts.” But, Laurent, emphasized, “how does the state decide good and bad? 
Nothing is more dangerous than personal politics mixing with the judgment of lettres by lettres.”1204 It 
was instances like these, Laurent insisted, that revealed the exclusion of the Right and the dominance 
of the Left was not simply a perceived inequity but rather an organized, institutionalized hegemony 
sanctioned, authorized, and even carried out by the State.  
 This same antagonism between the Right and post-war power continued in the university 
system. The Right was quickly ejected from the professorships and especially the chairs that it had 
filled in the universities and the ENS during the occupation. University instruction would once again 
become a left-wing dominated intellectual practice leaving the intellectuals of the Right to search 
alternative trajectories and mentoring opportunities. Bardèche in particular blamed the loss of his 
profession on the dominance of the Left. When he left his position at the Sorbonne, he claimed he had 
been driven out by liberal professors who had learned he was related to Brasillach. When later he lost 
his position at the University of Lille, he wrote that he felt alienated from the entire university system 
and the former friends there and turned instead to the community of pariahs in the right-wing 
publishing world. Although the Right had not shown a strong tendency toward the university for 
several decades, the complete alienation of the Right from the university during the post-war would 
turn them even more decidedly toward professions in journalism and literature. 
However, even publishing and literary milieu, which had once been the stronghold of the 
intellectual Right, was closed to the Right in the initial years of the postwar. This would lead many on 
the intellectual Right, in contrast with the intellectual Left for whom all literature was engaged 
literature, to advertise their work as apolitical. Jouhandeau, Giono, and other respected litterateurs of 
the prewar Right were denied access to journals well into the 1950s except for organs like LTR, 
Opera, Carrefour and La Parisienne that claimed to be apolitical in order to provide a space for right-
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wing writers.1205 Laurent and the Hussards would studiously affect an indifference to political affairs 
in order to write and publish despite their right-wing affiliations. In particular, they turned to 
seemingly apolitical novels in order to write without censorship. The honors and awards that the 
intellectual community had always seen as a mark of legitimacy and prestige would also, according to 
the intellectuals on the Right, be denied them for political reasons. Laurent claimed that his novel had 
been passed over for a literary prize in favor of a piece by Camus which had not yet even been 
published, a consideration which had only been made for political reasons. With each slight, the Right 
became increasingly bitter about intellectual honors and began to deem them marks of subservience 
to the regime. Although Laurent would happily accept both the Goncourt prize and entry into the 
Academy later, the majority of the intellectual Right learned to disconnect intellectual honors and 
literary recognition from its concept of intellectual identity.  
The most basic practices of intellectual life, from having work published to producing a play 
would also be made increasingly difficult for the Right well into the 1950s. Publishing firms were 
hesitant to challenge the CNE or flaunt the majority opinion by publishing authors labeled fascist or 
extremist. And, the new right-wing firms that agreed to publish these authors faced an uphill battle to 
compete with the established houses. Published works and productions were also labeled as 
subversive in order to limit their sales or, as Laurent’s Mauriac sous de Gaulle, censored to remove 
the oppositional thought. Bardèche found that as late as 1957, when a play by Brasillach was to be put 
on in Paris, the intellectuals of the Resistance were able to successfully prevent its production.1206 The 
postwar government was also slow to authorize the journals and revues of the Right while 
immediately sanctioning those of the Resistance. Once right-wing journals received authorization, 
they still were retarded in their development for years by the lack of materiel. While left-wing 
journalists and journals seized and converted the offices, printing materials, presses, and even 
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established papers of the pre-war and occupation Right, the journalists of the Right were forced to 
build their journals and publication process from the ground up. In previous decades, the Right had 
been able to boast of large circulations for its journals like Action Française, Gringoire, and Gerbe.
In the postwar years, the Right would accept smaller circulations with pride, claiming the small 
numbers were an indication, not of limited public interest, but of their status as a persecuted, 
opposition press.  
Even the practice of petition signing would show marked discrepancies between the Left and 
Right. The Left, which had produced only limited and unsigned manifests during the occupation 
would return triumphantly to petition signing in the postwar while the Right, defeated and persecuted 
in turn, remained silent. The intellectuals of the Right would admittedly reemerge in full force during 
the conflict in Algeria, but the fact remained that “in the war of petitions and the mobilization of 
clercs, the Left and extreme-Left imposed themselves and were even in a hegemonic situation” well 
into the 1970s.1207 Intellectuals of the Right were extremely hesitant to sign their names to documents 
expressing right-wing values or manifests including the names of more extremist thinkers that could 
be deemed “fascist” by the government and the Left. As an alternative to the practice of signing 
petitions, the intellectuals of the extreme Right, particularly the student youth, would turn to an old 
practice of the opposition: street violence. The student activists of Occident would create a new force 
on the intellectual Right by organizing protest marches, breaking up left-wing manifestations like the 
1967 Etats generaux de l’universite de Paris pur la paix au Vietnam, and generating a general unease 
among the Left with its violence.1208 During the postwar period, therefore, limitation of the practices 
essential to the daily life of the intellectual from petitioning to publishing, censorship of intellectual 
expression, and the refusal of legitimizing honors all combined to create a very different experience 
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of intellectual life on the Right and Left. As old practices were denied them, the Right developed new 
perspectives on what sort of experience truly made one “an intellectual.”  
 
The Right-Wing Intellectual Model During the Post-War Decades 
In the decades leading to World War II, the intellectuals of the Right had perceived 
themselves to be marginalized and discredited as intellectuals by the Republic and the 
extreme Left. They had therefore adopted the language and mentality of the persecuted, 
minority, opposition. During the postwar, however, this perception became a verifiable 
reality. The Right did not just perceive itself at a disadvantage in the public’s understanding 
of intellectual identity, it literally could not pose itself before the public as an alternative. By 
the 1950s, it had become inconceivable to pair the adjectives “fascist,” “collaborationist,” or 
“right-wing” with the term intellectual. This mindset would carry over into the post-war 
histories of all twentieth-century intellectual life. What Bardèche termed a “dispossession” of 
the intellectuals of the Right and Laurent called “intellectual terrorism” had effectively 
divorced the extreme Right from the practice of intellectual life and the identification as 
intellectuals as defined by the Left. More than any period before it, the postwar was a time of 
left-wing dominance over the intellectual field and of the right-wing struggle for intellectual 
legitimacy. As such, it was also a time in which the intellectuals of the Right made an effort 
to redefine for themselves and the public their concept of true intellectual responsibility, role, 
and identity. As before, their understanding of their identity as intellectuals was closely 
linked to their own fundamentally different intellectual values and political visions from 
political Realism, negationism, and neo-fascism to colonialism and a new definition of 
“engagement.” The alternative concept of the intellectual and of intellectual responsibility 
that men like Laurent and Bardèche created around these values would be strengthened and 
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validated for them by the community of like-minded intellectuals with which they 
surrounded themselves. From these communities of dispossessed, ostracized intellectuals of 
the extreme Right would come not only a new collective identity for the intellectual of the 
Right, but also a new set of practices and experiences drawn from the Right’s alienation from 
the State, university, and publishing world. Throughout the post-war decades, therefore, the 
intellectual of the Right was alienated from public affairs and identification as the intellectual 
elite. After 1968, however, this isolated and alienated Right would evolve under the 
leadership of GRECE and the Nouvelle Droite in an effort to reinsert itself into public affairs 
and intellectual leadership. 
SECTION VII 
CONCLUSION: ALAIN DE BENOIST AND THE NEW MODEL OF INTELLECTUAL 
IDENTITY  
 
This study has proposed a model of the intellectual of the Right based on the testimony and 
behavior of ten intellectuals from 1898-1968. However, if the model is to continue to be a useful tool 
for historians of French intellectual life, it must be able to speak to contemporary intellectuals of the 
Right as well. It seems necessary, therefore, to consider in closing whether the pattern of 
characteristics laid out here as the distinctive model of right-wing intellectual engagement can 
accommodate the intellectuals “dits à droite” today. 
Alain de Benoist has been the recognized master theoretician of the Nouvelle Droite and its 
self-proclaimed laboratory of ideas, GRECE, since the latter’s creation in the late 1960s.1209 As a 
student, he was involved in both the anti-Semitic journals of Henry Coston and the monarchist efforts 
of the Action Française and he would later write for the neo-fascist Defense de l’Occident of 
Bardèche. However, Benoist’s approach to political and cultural affairs would quickly evolve beyond 
these standard positions of the “old Right” into a new right-wing ideology. While continuing to 
advocate for nationalism, rootedness, and traditionalism, and to engage against communism and 
republican democracy, Benoist would outline a new intellectual program for the Nouvelle Droite that 
was proclaimed to be separate from monarchism, anti-Semitism, and fascism. The vehicle for this 
new intellectual program of the Right would be the intellectual “community” GRECE, created by 
Benoist and thirty nine other right-wing thinkers in 1968. In particular, Benoist has sought to use 
GRECE and its journals to create a “Gramscism of the Right” by which the intellectual Right could 
counter the metapolitical hegemony of the intellectual Left. As the public face of this new right-wing 
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metapolitics, Benoist has been the key figure in the promotion and legitimization of the intellectual 
Right. But, it is his ability to insert the ideas, thinkers, and journalism of the New Right into the 
mainstream media that has most antagonized the Left against him and made him and GRECE the 
crucible for debates over intellectual identity and the right-wing in the global age.  
 Before considering whether Benoist fits the pattern and characteristics of the prototypical 
intellectual of the Right as identified in this study, it is necessary first to be certain that he is both “of 
the Right” and a self-identified intellectual. It is important to recognize that Benoist’s thought has 
undergone a transformation since the 1960s and to acknowledge that he himself is today often 
reluctant to identify as a member of the political Right. This hesitation is multifaceted. Most often, 
Benoist argues that he cannot be categorized as Right or Left because his work is cultural rather than 
political in nature. However, this is a disingenuous defense since both he and GRECE acknowledge 
that engagement in cultural affairs has political transformation as its final goal. More significantly, 
Benoist is hesitant to claim right-wing identity today since he was distanced from many on the post-
war extreme Right when he determined that communism was a dying ideology and that the 
intellectual Right should instead focus its opposition against liberalism and Americanism. He rejects 
many of the foundational tenets of the “old Right,” including racism, the idea of a Chef, social 
hierarchy, and negationism. Finally, Benoist has expressed admiration for many components of new 
Left thought like the concept of “difference” and the assault on capitalism, while continuing to 
distinguish his own ideas on the concepts. In this endeavor, he claims to be undertaking the project of 
a Third Way where the splinters of the now useless categories of Right and Left can find new 
unity.1210 However, despite this seeming break with the traditional Right, Benoist acknowledges the 
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continuities that he maintains with the Right: the ideas of a federal Europe, opposition to 
universalism, and rejection of egalitarianism.1211 
It is these continuities and his absolute rejection of the worldview of the intellectual Left that 
place Benoist, in the final analysis, on the Right. As he admits, “The ND declares itself on the Right 
because it rejects the ‘ideas’ of the Left, it is on the Right by the very fact that it designates the 
intellectual Left as its principal adversary.” In perhaps his most concise statement of his identification 
with the intellectual Right, Benoist would conclude, when asked why he called himself “of the 
Right,” “essentially because the Left has a conception of the world that I do not share, of which I 
refuse the essential postulates.”1212 The very project of combining the concepts of the New Left with 
those of the New Right into a Third Way is even described by GRECE and Benoist as a project for 
the intellectual Right.1213 And, significantly, he explains that he defines being of the Right as having a 
consistent attitude in favor of diversity and against the homogenization that results from 
egalitarianism. This definition could be equally applied to being a member of GRECE or a follower 
of Benoist. So, although they are often treated as ideological traitors by segments of the intellectual 
Right like the Club d’Horloge, Benoist and GRECE self-identify as members of the intellectual Right.  
And, perhaps even more importantly, they are identified as right-wing by the intellectual Left 
who excluded them from intellectual debate and public influence because of it. This is nowhere more 
apparent than in the “Appeal for Vigilance” in Le Monde in July 1993 where self-identified 
intellectuals of the Left warned readers not to be seduced by GRECE. Although they seemed to have 
respect for left-wing positions and to reject many tenets of the old Right, it warned, GRECE and 
Benoist were simply employing a “strategy of legitimization” to cover their extreme Right wing 
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nature.1214 Any attempt to engage in a dialogue with members of GRECE, it continued, would be 
viewed as a betrayal of French intellectual and cultural standards. As such, the signers of the Appeal 
agreed not to participate in any public dialogue, tv programs, or journals connected with GRECE, 
Benoist, and the far Right. Even liberal intellectuals like Pierre-André Taguieff who sought to 
understand and debate with Benoist were tarred as traitors to intellectual life.1215 Benoist’s recent 
protests against participation in the wars in Iraq, a position shared by the intellectual Left, have even 
been viewed as intellectually suspect and attacked for promoting the right position; that of the Left, 
for the wrong reasons; those of the Right. In this way, the intellectuals of the Left continue their 
century-long refusal to recognize a possible convergence between right-wing identity and intellectual 
identity.  
However, Benoist and the members of GRECE not only identify as right-wing, they also 
identify themselves as “intellectuels.” In an unmistakable claim to the title and role, Benoist has 
stated, “I am an intellectual.”1216 When replying to the “attack” on him in the Le Monde Appeal, 
Benoist would proudly write, “I know that I am the only intellectual today who is treated in this 
way.”1217 In the same way, GRECE is presented as a cultural and intellectual community and defined 
as a “laboratory of ideas” and a “society of thought.”1218 In claiming equal right to the role of the 
public intellectual while continuing to identify with right-wing values and programs, Benoist and the 
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members of GRECE are continuing a century-long struggle by the Right for recognition and 
legitimacy in an intellectual world dominated by the Left.  
 
Perception of Hegemony and Exclusion, Resentment and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
Since 1898, the model of the intellectual of the Right has been marked by a certain 
resentment and hostility toward what it perceives to be a bloc of Republican and left-wing 
intellectuals. They feel that this “Left” has dominated and defined not only the intellectual space, but 
the very conceptualization of intellectual values, responsibility, and behavior. And, because these 
dominant values and programs are quite different from those advocated by the Right, right-wing 
thinkers have been excluded from the prevailing concepts of the intellectual and forced to struggle for 
legitimacy. Benoist’s work shows that he too has been formed by this resentment of the Left and 
perception of his own repression and exclusion. When the New Right emerged in 1968, he wrote, “no 
one claimed openly to be part of the Right” since there was “a Left hegemony, quite evident within 
university circles and, generally speaking among intellectuals.”1219 Today, he continued, this blatant 
hegemony of the Left has been replaced by a “quiet hegemony of former leftist intellectuals now 
more or less tied to the dominant political system… who extended their influence beyond universities 
to journals, publishing houses, and the media in general.”1220 The intellectual Right’s resentment of 
this exclusion and marginalization has led them to see their own engagement as a struggle for public 
legitimacy and a redefinition of intellectual mores according to right-wing values. This struggle to 
“reconstitute” the ideas, discourse, and concepts surrounding intellectual life is one that Benoist 
believes “has not yet been achieved” thirty years later. It remains a central objective for Benoist and 
GRECE and “gives life” to their social and political engagement.1221 Resentment and struggle for 
 







legitimacy, two defining characteristics of right-wing intellectual engagement from the Dreyfus 
Affair to the postwar, therefore, continue to be a powerful influence on the nature of the intellectuals 
of the Nouvelle Droite and of Benoist in particular.  
Benoist has been quite clear about the left-wing hegemony he believes to exist in the 
intellectual and cultural field. “For at least thirty years in France,” he writes, “that which one calls by 
convention the Left and the extreme Left have never attained political power. By contrast, they have 
enjoyed a quasi-monopoly in the cultural domain. This is not contested by anybody.”1222 This 
hegemony of the Left over the cultural domain has allowed it to exclude any competing influences 
and to eliminate alternatives in intellectual values, political programs, and even moral judgment. 
“This intelligentsia has had the actual direction of the general ideas and implicit values, and above all 
of the social myths of which the spirit of the time was nourished,” he writes, “it incarnated culture, 
knowledge, and the moral conscience.”1223 In short, Benoist writes, the intellectual Left has succeeded 
in making of its members the organic intellectuals envisioned by Gramsci. The metapolitical 
dominance of these intellectuals in the cultural field allowed them to steer leftward, unperceived by 
the public, the very fundamental values and belief structures of France.1224 
This, Benoist explained, was the subversive purpose of the Left’s cultural monopoly. The 
political progress of the Left was owed to “the general climate it had foreseen to create 
metapolitically and by relation to which its political discourse sounds more and more true.”1225 If a 
student did not have very strong reasons to reject this dominant ideological undertow, Benoist 
continued, it would be nearly impossible for him not to be “mentally affiliated” with the liberal and 
Marxist egalitarianisms. This was because, he warned, the ideology of the Left “no longer forms a 
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doctrine among others, it forms the very framework on which all constituted thought is inscribed.”1226 
So engrained was the mentality of the Left, it required an act of conscious will on the part of the 
intellectual to even think outside the prescribed thought of the Left. “One speaks of repression,” he 
explains, but it is not a gross political censure. Rather it is in the psychoanalytical sense; the perfect 
murder. The idea that one rejects spontaneously, which is unthought because it is effectively 
unthinkable by relation to the dominant ideology of the Left, the idea that one rejects without even 
having the sense of rejecting it.”1227 This was the new totalitarianism of thought for Benoist: an 
autocensure so engrained and automatic that it was not even recognized. 
And for those who, like Benoist and the intellectuals of GRECE, had broken out of the 
mental molds created by the Left and recognized the hegemony, the struggle was not yet over. The 
metapolitical hegemony of the Left depended not only on saturation of the intellectual superstructure 
but also on its ability to prevent any oppositional thought from reaching the public. But this was not 
the crude repression of before that made martyrs of the suppressed Right. Today, Benoist wrote, the 
objective of the Left is to eliminate the intellectual Right by denying its existence. The goal, he 
explained, is “above all not to give ‘them’ any publicity, to do things in a way that one does not know 
that ‘they’ exist. To travesty cultural discourse as political ambitions, to maintain at any price the 
image of a group of thinkers who have no thought, who are not able to have it, who ought not have 
it… exclusions, anathema, the final aim is to prevent debate.”1228 By refusing to debate the 
intellectuals of the Right as peers or equals, Benoist continued, or even consider their ideas as viable 
opponents to their own, the left-wing intellectual bloc was attempting to deny it publicity and 
legitimacy. “Today,” he concluded, “one decrees that there are ideas which have no value as ideas, 
opinions which are not opinions but crimes—in the eyes of the dominant ideology. As always, it 
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admits all opinions…except those which are not opinions.”1229 To deny the status of thought or 
intellectual identity to the intellectuals of the Right, Benoist argued, was the ultimate form of 
“intellectual terrorism.”1230 
This intellectual terrorism that was the new censorship would take many forms depending on 
the power of the idea to be refuted. The first form, Benoist writes, is the strategy of silence “where it 
pretends that intelligence is ‘hemiplegique.”1231 Any representative of the Right already has a “hard 
life” and must “crawl” in order to have his work published since the publishing houses and revues are 
“normally all on the Left.”1232 But if the representative manages to get published, the strategy is “not 
to write a single line on his work.” If the work becomes popular despite this campaign of silence, the 
“next level of attack is to attribute certain lines out of context” or to lie about the contents.1233 Here 
the “new police of intellectual moeurs, the culture cops” at left-wing papers like Nouvel Observateur 
effectively stifle right-wing ideas by misrepresenting them.1234 All works by right-wing authors that 
question or oppose certain tenets of the Left are, in this stage, accused of intellectual parochialism. “If 
one does not support such or such work of the avant garde,” Benoist explains, “it is because one does 
not understand it… there are those who understand and then there are the others. The first are 
intelligent and culturally developed and the second are only able to be half-wits.”1235 If all else fails, 
Benoist claims, the intellectual Left turns to “the major excommunication: the accusation of 
fascism.”1236 This trump allows the intellectual Left to “demonize the ideas of the New Right. These 
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ideas are rejected from the start as emanating from a subject, individual (Benoist) or collective 
(GRECE) which already has been submitted to a reductio ad hitlerum by insinuation.”1237 In one of 
the more blatant attempts at this form of censure, Le Canard enchaîné even invented a letter from Dr. 
Mengele that was intended to connect him to Benoist.1238 This array of strategies forms a veritable 
wall between the intellectual Right and the public, ensuring the Left’s ideological dominance by 
keeping the Right’s “intellectuals forever excluded from the legitimate space of debate.”1239 
There is one final strategy, most often employed by modern historians, that Benoist does not 
identify but that continues the pattern of repression by denying him and GRECE intellectual 
legitimacy. This strategy is to claim that the intellectual Right’s efforts to cross political divides and 
utilize concepts like “difference” in its cultural discourse are facades. The accusation is that any 
seemingly legitimate discourse actually has “clandestine meaning” for right-wing readers who know 
how to decode it.1240 Likewise, any effort by GRECE to debate intellectuals of the Left or to include 
left-wing contributors in its revues is simply a way to trick the public into seeing its journals, and 
therefore its right-wing contributors, as intellectually legitimate. In keeping with this strategy, one 
historian asks how it was that the ideas of the ND ever gained an audience and surmises that perhaps 
they were so well cloaked in left-wing discourse that the critical Left did not at first recognize 
them.1241 The clear insinuation here is that the intellectual Right can only find intellectual legitimacy 
by masquerading in the ideas of the Left and associating with the intellectual Left community.  
The perception, by Benoist and GRECE, that the Left exercises hegemony over the role and 
identity of the intellectual has dramatically marked their own approach to engagement and intellectual 
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life. As the above samples of Benoist’s work show, resentment and opposition to the Left’s 
metapolitical dominance has clearly become an organizing principle of the New Right’s thought and 
colors almost every article and interview. The fight against the ever-growing hegemony of the 
intellectual Left is the very foundation for the existence of GRECE and the engagement of the 
intellectuals of the ND.1242 The Right continues to identify itself as the unfairly suppressed minority 
whose engagement must be active and combative in order to reverse the indoctrination of the public. 
The perceived hegemony of the Left has therefore sparked yet another defining characteristic of right-
wing intellectual identity: a distinctive mentality of engagement that has legitimacy as its ulterior 
motive. For Benoist and GRECE, the struggle for intellectual legitimacy demands the creation of a 
“counter-metapolitics,” a “Gramscism of the Right.”1243
As it did for the intellectual of the Right over the century, resentment of the hegemonic Left 
and perception of exclusion have permeated the very role and responsibility that Benoist has outlined 
for the intellectual of the Right. The “metapolitical strategy” that involves “denouncing the 
intellectual terrorism of the Left and presenting a new Gramscism of the Right” would be a new 
responsibility for the Right, since the intellectual Right had, according to Benoist, previously 
“abandoned the intellectual-cultural field to the Marxist Left.”1244 As one interview of Benoist 
summarized of the strategy: “the historical significance of the New Right consists in having 
established a right-wing intellectual hegemony after a long tradition of left-wing liberal hegemony in 
France.”1245 According to Benoist, the ND would succeed in this endeavor because it alone 
 
1242 The “reason for being of GRECE resides,” one article says, “in being an “enterprise of 
metapolitical action.. an action to respond to the cultural power (of the Left) on its own terrain with a counter-
cultural power.” Benoist, Le grain de sable, 41. As one pamphlet published in 2000 puts it, “the manifest of 
GRECE. A fatal virus for the dominant ideology!” BNF Tolbiac 2000. 
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understood the importance of “beating the adversary on his own ground.”1246 Rather than attempting 
to force a shift in hegemony and legitimacy by influencing politics directly, as right-wing intellectuals 
had for decades, GRECE would infiltrate the cultural field, infusing its values into the literature, 
cinema, fashion, and mores of society. This “metapolitical reconquest” would allow the ideas and 
visions of the intellectual Right to slowly penetrate the public mentality until the engrained republican 
and communist worldviews were driven out and replaced with the right-wing alternative.1247 Only 
then, with a new set of intellectual and cultural values and views in the general public, would the 
political and social climate shift to the Right.  
Although the proposed “Gramscism of the Right” was supposedly a new strategy of 
legitimization for the intellectual Right, the desire to differentiate right-wing values remained an 
essential component of this struggle. Engagés of the Left and Right were not all a common group of 
“intellectuals” who simply had different political opinions, they were distinctive, differentiated, 
“types” of intellectuals whose very identity was a product of their different values and worldviews. 
The set of intellectual values that right-wing intellectuals identified over the century as those 
distinctive to their community and foreign to the Left continue to be themes of the new intellectual of 
the ND. These include a rejection of universalism and egalitarianism, a claim to be the sole 
representatives of intellectual realism, and an anti-Jacobin approach to nationalism.  But, it was not 
enough to separate the ND from the ideas and programs of the Left, Benoist believed; it was 
necessary to “provide a real alternative, a complete ideological and theological corpus that would 
provide a real substitute.”1248 The stated goal of GRECE was therefore to “construct a new culture, a 
new view of the world and a new ideological project.”1249 Its promise to provide an “alternative vision 
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of the world,”1250 was based on Benoist’s belief that “there are different ways of seeing the world and 
of being in the world, ways of the Right and ways of the Left, which encompass the pure knowledges, 
intuitive beliefs, emotions, implicit values, daily choices, artistic sentiments, etc.”1251 The intellectuals 
of GRECE were quite certain that their “specific world view” separated their cultural and intellectual 
pursuits from those of the intellectuals of the Left. This ideological separation between Right and Left 
infused every aspect of the intellectual’s life and made not only his values and programs different, but 
his very identity as a cultural being. It created, as one writer described Benoist, “a new type of French 
intellectual, fundamentally different from the dogmatic prototype identified with Sartre.”1252 
Rejection of Universalism and Egalitarianism in Favor of a Right to Difference 
As early as Barrès and the intellectual Right of 1898, a rejection of universal abstraction and 
democratic egalitarianism or leveling have been hallmarks of the intellectuals of the Right. Benoist 
and the intellectuals of the New Right continue in this tradition while adding a new variation on the 
theme: the right to difference and the rejection of global homogenization. As Benoist explains, “I 
define the Right as that attitude which wants to take into consideration the diversity of the world. 
Consequently the relative inequalities which necessarily follow from this diversity are good. The 
homogenization extolled in the discourse of egalitarian ideology is evil.”1253 According to Benoist, the 
intellectual Left, by contrast, opposes this diversity in favor of an universalism and egalitarianism 
based on man as an abstraction. 
Anti-egalitarianism has been the most dominant and the most consistent of the themes of ND 
thought and has been one of the intellectual trademarks of Benoist’s work from the 1960s to today. 
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For the ND intellectuals, egalitarianism is the root evil that created both liberalism and Marxism. 
“The enemy,” according to GRECE, “is all the doctrines, all the praxis which represent and incarnate 
a form of egalitarianism.”1254 It is for this reason, that the ND has broken with the Club d’Horloge and 
others of the liberal Right who focus their attacks on communism while abiding liberalism, 
Americanism, and democratic republicanism. But, for Benoist and GRECE, the problem is not the 
political form but the intellectual mindset. Whether it takes the form of communism or liberalism, the 
illusion of a natural equality of men and the subsequent demand for equal rights comes from the same 
decadence: the desire to no longer have leaders or a recognized elite. When all want to lead and none 
to follow, Benoist warns, civilizations are on the verge of collapse.1255 Instead of this false equality, 
the intellectuals of the ND propose instead to measure man “by the responsibilities that each assumes 
related to his concrete aptitude.”1256 A hierarchy of rights, in other words, corresponds to the 
hierarchy of social responsibilities. 
Benoist’s rejection of the Left’s egalitarianism and leveling of society is connected directly to 
his opposition to the very principle of universal abstractions. If there is no abstract humanity, there 
can be no universal or natural rights but only rights of particular men in relation to their particular 
cultural communities. By their very nature, these particularities prevent the idea of a homogenized 
equality of men. In a statement reminiscent of his predecessors on the extreme Right over the century, 
Benoist writes, “men exist but man in himself, abstract man, universal man, this man does not exist. 
He is only a construction of the mind utilized to oppose the peoples a pure operatory concept destined 
to be the negative interpellation of the Real.”1257 Reality, Benoist believes, has shown that man is a 
particular creation whose nature is determined by his particular environment and biology. It is this 
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belief of the intellectual Right that he believes distinguishes the intellectual worldview of the Right 
from that of the Left. He clarifies this distinction as that between the left-wing universalist and the 
right-wing nominalist.  
For the universalist, he explains, all reality is founded on an intellectual order. There are 
general principles and absolute truths that pre-exist the individual. For the nominalist, on the other 
hand, “there exists nothing but the individual, the particular.”1258 According to Benoist, the 
intellectual of the Left does not act in the name of himself, his nation, or any other finite form but in 
the name of the universal order. In believing that he has understood the “intellectual order of reality,” 
he believes it is his responsibility as an intellectual to “convert all those who have not yet had the 
revelation of these universals.” Those who oppose him in this mission are not, therefore, expressing a 
personal difference, but committing a falsehood against an absolute, revealed truth. The intellectual of 
the Right, however, knows that though universalism seems a superior theory since it claims to reveal 
the common essence among men, “it is superior only in theory, in reality it has never existed.”1259 
They deny themselves, therefore, the easy authority that the Left has accumulated as representatives 
of universal truth and instead take the more arduous path of speaking the French truth. For the 
nominalist intellectual of the Right, diversity is the fundamental fact of the real world. There is no 
common essence, no absolute truth, no universal abstraction, no general humanity, no natural rights, 
and no unmitigated equality. Individuals are valued for their differences rather than for their ability to 
incarnate “an abstract concept of the universal individual.”1260 
According to Benoist, respect for these differences and recognition of cultural and racial 
particularities is a defining characteristic of the Nouvelle Droite intellectual which separates him from 
the intellectual Left. While the intellectual Left prefers to seek what equalizes men, the intellectual 
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Right prefers to focus on what distinguishes them. At its most basic level these differences are found 
in race, ethnie, and nationality. While the intellectual Left warns the public that this discourse of 
difference is a cloaked form of racism and xenophobia, Benoist defends the “right to difference” as 
the true “anti-racism.” A celebration and exploration of what makes each people different, he claims, 
is not racism. For example, he continues, the Black Power movement in the US recognized the loss of 
their distinctive culture in the American melting pot and sought to re-root themselves in their African 
heritage rather than suppressing their differences through integration. The real racist, according to 
Benoist, is the intellectual Left which seeks to eradicate these racial and national families in order to 
create a single, homogenized mass that has the qualities it deems desirable. Only the universalist, who 
has a “global paradigm outside mankind,” can believe that difference implies imperfection or 
inferiority.1261 From now on, he contends, the struggles and wars of the world will not be between 
men on different sides of a border but between opposed world views and ways of being, a 
differentialist way and a universalist way, an anti-egalitarian way and an egalitarian way, a way 
which aspires to an organic society where diversity is always recognized or a mechanical society 
where homogeneity reigns.1262 
It is this homogenization that Benoist believes is the greatest threat to the intellectual integrity 
of France and world cultures. Americanization of pop culture, the “McWorld” phenomenon of multi-
national corporations, and the globalization achieved by technology are all to blame for this 
progressive disappearance of cultural diversity and the leveling and reduction of cultures to a 
common, mediocre denominator. But it is the intellectual desire for this homogeneity behind the 
corporations and technology that most distresses the ND. The fundamental question, he writes, “is 
whether it is better to have a planet where different human types and varied cultures exist, or where a 
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single culture and in the end a single type of people exists.”1263 It is a question, Benoist believes, that 
the intellectual Left and the intellectual ND answer differently. As recently as its 2000 Manifest, the 
ND and Benoist have declared the right to difference and to traditional cultural identities one of the 
major positions which differentiates it from the rest of the intellectual movements in France, 
particularly those of the Left.1264 
This “right to difference” campaign in the name of respect for foreign cultures and a 
“differentialist anti-racism” provides a seemingly new theme to the anti-egalitarianism and anti-
universalism that has been a continuing intellectual value on the extreme Right. In practice, the ND 
presents itself as the defender of African and Asian ethnic groups and regional cultures against the 
“Western imperialism” advocated by the universalist Left. However, this claim is made in 
conjunction the ND position on immigration which it finds to create an “imbalance” that is not 
desirable for the host or the immigrant population. Assimilation and the abolition of “the distinction 
between nationals and foreigners” undermines, Benoist writes in a passage reminiscent of Barrès, 
both French and foreign cultural and national identities.1265 He advocates instead that economic 
incentives and reforms be provided to the African and Asian nations so that their populations will 
remain in their own “environment” rather than relocating.1266 In the final analysis, although the ND 
does not admit it directly, the respect for difference and the rejection of cultural homogenization in 
the global world is also a call for cultural, racial, and national segregation. So, although the language 
of difference and cultural plurality may be a new addition to the traditional right-wing combat against 
universalism, egalitarianism, and abstraction, the underlying desire for distinctive, rooted, cultural 
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and national identities is reminiscent of the calls for enracinement and closed nationalism that have 
marked the discourse of the extreme Right since 1898. 
 
Intellectual Realism 
In the tradition of the intellectual Right from Barrès to Bardèche, Benoist and the intellectuals 
of GRECE claim an exclusive connection to intellectual Realism that the intellectuals of the Left, no 
matter what they might claim, are unable to share. “To the holders of absolute concepts,” Benoist 
explains, “to the intellectual terrorists, we oppose a reality ceaselessly changing.”1267 Observation and 
experience of real life, he claims, show that there is no immutable, absolute truth or any abstract 
humanity. Reality presents change, particularity, inequalities, and concrete examples. The 
intellectuals of GRECE believe their devotion to the Real rather than to the intellectualized 
abstraction or theory separates their world-view from the Marxists and Liberals whose concepts are 
all rooted in the “immutable truth” of egalitarianism. For ND intellectuals, egalitarianism is the 
antithesis of intellectual Realism. Egalitarianism, Benoist explains, is premised on the natural equality 
of men but modern science and DNA studies have shown that man is different “down to the finest 
structures of his being.”1268 Diversity is therefore a fundamental fact of real life. Homogenization and 
equality are only possible in the realm of theory. Here is the basis that Benoist believes exists for the 
separation between the intellectual Right and Left. While the intellectual Left, both liberal and 
Marxist, increasingly attempts to level the real differences between men, the intellectual Right of 
GRECE “on the contrary, searches to have a better knowledge of the facts of the Real,” of the 
diversities and differences between men, and to apply them to political practice.1269 
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The Right, he continues in his effort to explain this difference, is “the representative of a 
party of the reality of things” and “does not believe in single explanations of reality based on class 
struggle, race, economics etc.”1270 In contrast, he writes quoting Thomas Molnar, “the philosophy of 
the Left suffers from a radical divorce with the Real.”1271 This divorce is proven by the fact that the 
programs and political visions of the Left always involve a mutation or abolition of the existing social 
reality. Marxism in particular seeks to change the world as it is into something idealized in theory. 
What can be assumed from this, he asks, but that the “intellectual Left is the party of those who are 
unhappy with being what they are” and therefore “radically denounce existing reality.”1272 The Right, 
on the other hand, he continues, “is the opposite,” its programs and projects are “rooted in reality.” 
The problem for the Right, however, is that while the Left has been able to promote its idealism 
through very real methods from revolution to media propaganda, the Right has not been able to grasp 
the need to support its realistic projects and visions with real action and methods. Because of this, the 
Left has monopolized the press and popular movements while the Right has found itself excluded 
from popular culture.  
The great irony in this, Benoist writes, is that because the intellectual Left monopolizes these 
cultural organs and excludes the Right, they have been able to proclaim their own idealistic programs 
those of the intellectual while labeling those realistic ones of the Right “anti-intellectual.” As 
nominalists, he explains, the intellectuals of the Right postulate that “ideas are true only so much as 
they are incarnated, that is to say lived… which, for us, comes back to saying that there is no reality 
outside the real.” It is this rejection of abstract theorization and utopianism and attachment to the real 
experience of life rather than the fabrications of the intellect that have excluded them from 
categorization as intellectuals. “Our ‘anti-intellectualism,” he writes scornfully, “comes from this 
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conviction that life is always better than the idea that one makes of it, that there is a pre-eminence of 
the soul over the mind, of character over intelligence, of sensibility over intellect, of image over 
concept, of myth over doctrine.”1273 
The concept of reality shares many attributes with that of the right-wing intellectuals from 
Barrès to Bardèche who believed an appreciation for reality meant an appreciation for distinctive 
races, nationalities, and enracinement rather than the abstraction of universal humanity. These 
intellectuals have all claimed to know no “men,” only “Frenchmen.” The ND concept of realism also 
shares many elements with that of Drieu, Fernandez, Bonnard, and Châteaubriant who glorified the 
complete man, exposure to real life experiences, and favored an appreciation for action, sentiment, 
and character over intellectualism and mental acrobatics. For these intellectuals, ideas cannot come 
from “sterile” abstraction but only from lived experience. This understanding of reality, the nature of 
intelligence, and the relationship that a true intellectual must have to the Real is something that the 
intellectuals of the Right have, over the century, believed to separate them from the intellectuals of 
the Left. The intellectual Left’s tendency to label them anti-intellectual because of this approach to 
realism and rejection of abstraction has only strengthened the perception of a separation.  
 
Anti-Jacobin Nationalism 
 One final component of Nouvelle Droite intellectual values that shows a strong continuity 
with the right-wing model over the century and a clear separation from the intellectual Left is that of 
an anti-Jacobin concept of nationalism and Europeanism.1274 According to Benoist, the intellectuals of 
the Left believe nationality is a product of civil ceremony and legal rights rather than history, 
ethnicity, or family. Civic concepts of nationality require no rooting in the history, language, religion, 
or land of the nation but only an agreement to abide by the laws of the country and they therefore 
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allow for massive immigration. The problem, according to Benoist, however, is that immigration and 
legal naturalization do not really accomplish the assimilation they claim. Groups remain separate, 
pluralities within the nation, weakening its unanimity. Instead, he proposes a new concept of 
nationalism that is expanded to a European nationalism.1275 This European alliance would not be 
founded on the Jacobin ideal of legal rights and civic ties but on the Barrèssian concept of 
enracinement and cultural legacy. The European “Empire” would be a cooperative federation of 
culturally rooted nations large enough to compete with the continental superpowers of the global age 
and united by its common Indo-European cultural heritage.1276 
The new Europe would also, according to Benoist, more accurately reflect the reality of 
difference in the modern world.1277 The “frontiers of blood and of history are realities,” he writes, 
they cannot, therefore, be ignored by arbitrary lines of civic national borders.1278 Nor, he continues, 
should anyone desire that these frontiers be erased. The world, he argues, is not made of 
interchangeable individuals but of rooted peoples and the defense of these distinctive roots is essential 
to the preservation of a people’s identity in an increasingly homogenized world.1279 Nations and the 
European federation that they compose must therefore be built around the realities of difference in 
race, ethnicity, religion, history, and cultural tradition rather than the arbitrary administrative borders 
agreed upon by colonizing powers or the United Nations. Nationality, for the Nouvelle Droite, is not a 
function of “abstract politico-administrative borders” as it is for the Jacobin Left but of culture and 
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but only of western Europe because he finds America to be foreign to the European mentality. 
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biology.1280 It is, Benoist writes in a description reminiscent of Barrès’ “Earth and the Dead,” “a 
living entity, an ensemble exceeding the sum of its parts and including the dead and the unborn.”1281 
This is directly connected to the different understandings of man and of Reality on the Left and Right. 
For the Left, the nation can be constructed as a civic, theoretical, abstract concept out of whatever 
peoples populate a certain area since man is a universal, homogenous entity. For the Right, the nation 
can only be the result of shared, lived experience since men are distinctive products of their history, 
culture, and biology.  
 Whether it is the value given to culture and history in the concept of nationalism, the belief 
that intellectual responsibility requires a devotion to lived experience and realities above theoretical 
abstractions, or the opposition to egalitarianism and universalism in favor of a recognition of 
difference, Benoist and the intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite have maintained the tradition of right-
wing intellectual values that extends back to the anti-Dreyfusards of 1898.  
Their engagement and identity as intellectuals has been formed by their resentment of left-wing 
hegemony, their mentality of engagement that involves struggle for legitimacy, and a common set of 
essential right-wing intellectual values. But the model of identity is not complete without the 
collective identity component. The intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite, like their predecessors over 
the century, formed communities and socio-professional networks of like-minded peers where the 
distinctive experience of being a right-wing intellectual was fostered. It was through the experience of 
daily life in these segregated, polarized communities that the perception of a separate and 
oppositional intellectual identity became a reality.  
 
Communities, Networks and the Intellectual Experience 
The final component of the model of right-wing intellectual identity is a tendency to feel 
ostracized from the socio-professional communities and networks dominated by the intellectual Left. 
 




Directly resulting from this feeling of exclusion is the creation of an alternative, sympathetic 
intellectual community where right-wing intellectual values are reinforced and even radicalized and 
right-wing engagés are welcomed, mentored, and promoted. From these segregated communities 
came distinctly right-wing practices and experiences that made “being an intellectual” entirely 
different on the Right. Like their predecessors over the century, the ND has constructed alternative 
intellectual communities, in response to the left-dominated mainstream, where their own thinkers are 
able to engage as a collective. Such a segregation of intellectual society has been both a reflection and 
a cause of the two different experiences of intellectual life on the Left and Right and the two different 
understandings of what it means to be an intellectual in the global era.  
The intellectuals of the ND have been quite clear about the importance that their alternative 
intellectual communities, particularly those around GRECE, have had on their engagement and 
experience as intellectuals. The Manifest of GRECE perhaps states the importance of community 
most clearly when it introduces its raison d’être by saying, “From the beginning, the French New 
Right has brought together people interested in participating in the development of a community. It 
constitutes a community of work and reflection whose members are not necessarily all intellectuals, 
but all of whom are interested, in one way or another, in the battle of ideas.”1282 The ND has found it 
essential to create its own intellectual and cultural spaces where it can foster its own engagés and 
educate the general public according to its own values. Jean Varenne, past president of GRECE, has 
explained the importance of GRECE as a place of sociability and professional community where like-
minded intellectuals can amplify the effectiveness of their engagement. “Having taken conscience,” 
he writes, “that the cultural power…in France belonged to the Marxists and their following, it 
appeared that the first thing to do was to reconquer this lost territory. It was necessary therefore to 
create a society of thought, that is to say an organism permitting the assembly of those who had the 
same vision of things in order to permit them to act more effectively. Thus was born GRECE…which 
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gave itself the task of ideological formation of its members and the diffusion of a certain view of the 
world in the intellectual milieux.”1283 
In GRECE, therefore, the ND has intended to create not only a “laboratory of ideas,” but also 
a community that can provide a place of sociability, a professional network, a mentoring process, an 
educational organ, and a platform for engagement in the “battle of ideas.” It is perhaps the closest that 
the intellectual Right has come to repeating the success of the Action Française phenomenon since the 
1920s. One of GRECE’s forty founders, Jean-Claude Valla would write, “GRECE was not to be a 
simple addition of individuals which would have in common only the signature of a membership pass 
but aspired rather to transform itself…into a true community.” It was to be a “community of work and 
thought” that would provide “support in daily life, professional facilities, and a certain duty of 
solidarity” for its members. GRECE was not, therefore, an accidental conglomeration but a 
calculated, organized, and structured attempt to create an alternative intellectual society with the 
support structures necessary to be a real force in engaged thought.  
In the tradition of the right-wing communities since the Ligue de la Patrie, some of the most 
important “professional facilities” offered by GRECE to its community of intellectuals are 
sympathetic publishing firms like Copernic and its later replacement Labyrinthe. Since the ND 
intellectuals, like their predecessors over the century, believed themselves excluded and unwelcome 
at the firms seen as sympathetic to the dominant Left, they needed a space where their works would 
be published without censorship. The two firms, both directed by Benoist for several years, have been 
the primary publishing firms for the ND intellectuals and the only source for the published transcripts 
of the GRECE colloquia.1284 Labyrinthe in particular would create the Livre-club du Labyrinthe 
which published by subscription those works “which do not situate themselves in the line of the 
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dominant ideology.”1285 These publishing firms are not only vital organs for the dissemination of the 
thought of the right-wing community, they are also a source of imagined community among all those 
who share a space in its catalogue. Next to the publishing houses, the most influential places of 
community are GRECE’s numerous revues and professional networks of journalists.  
In particular, the central revue for GRECE, Elements, born as a simple bulletin in 1968, has 
been vital in spreading the ideas of the ND and welcoming the ostracized right-wing writer. It has 
created both a real community of writers among its regular columnists and editing team like Benoist, 
Jean-Claude Valla, and Pierre Vial, and an imaginary community including all its contributors and 
subscribers.1286 It is in Elements, more than any of the other GRECE organs, that one finds 
advertisements for works by Grecist authors, summaries of the recent colloquia and debates offered 
by GRECE, and cross promotion of other GRECE journals. To this main revue have been added over 
the years the interior bulletin GRECE-Traditions, the theoretical organ Etudes et Recherches, and the 
short-lived Panorama des idées actuelles. Of great importance is the Nouvelle Ecole, a publication 
intimately tied to the program and ideas of GRECE and founded and directed since 1969 by Benoist. 
It is here, more than in the other journals of GRECE, that Benoist lays out his own ideas and excerpts 
his larger works. Linked to these main journals through common contributors, the influence of 
Benoist, and a similarity of ideology are the right-wing influenced journals Figaro-Magazine, Valeurs 
actuelles, and Spectacle du Monde. Further along in the network of journals were those that shared a 
few contributors like Bardèche at Defense de l’Occident, Robert Poulet at Rivarol, and Alain Sanders 
at Aspects de la France.
Although these revues and networks have been vital to the successes of GRECE in reaching 
the public and baiting the intellectual Left, they are not the only sources of sociability and collective 
engagement for the ND. Just like its predecessor the Action Française, GRECE has created an entire 
intellectual society for itself complete with educational and mentoring opportunities for students, 
 
1285 Duranton-Crabol, Visages de la Nouvelle Droite, 225. 
 
1286 Vial, Pour un renaissance culturelle, 14. 
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leisure activities, clubs, and public discussions where the intellectual Left is the minority. GRECE 
provides its members with annual colloquia such as the one held in 1983 with the theme “Face au 
vide intellectuel, la troisième voie.” In the colloquia, for over 33 years now, GRECE intellectuals 
including Benoist, Vial, and Guillaume Faye mentor the public and particularly the right-wing student 
youth on timely political issues. Then there are the group meetings, a series of lectures and debates 
open to the public, appointed days of study and special educational seminars led by GRECE 
intellectuals. Finally, there are the group voyages, organized vacations, a cinema club, and a summer 
Université européene du GRECE where right-wing student youth participate in GRECE sponsored 
conferences, courses, and activities.1287 For the adults there are the “Cafés philo” which offers 
seminars and conferences for the general public around themes like that of the internal contradictions 
of liberalism. There is even an imagined community created specifically for those members of 
GRECE who are not able to participate and engage in these numerous social communities. The Club 
de Mille is a community for those who are unable to give of their time and so contribute to the 
GRECE community with monthly financial pledges.1288 
All of these collective communities created for the intellectuals of the ND fostered a sense of 
separation between these intellectuals and those of the Left. The fundamental objective of GRECE 
and the intellectual ND, to create a counter-discourse and a counter-concept of intellectual life to rival 
that dominated by the Left, made such a separation and sense of division unavoidable. But the 
separate communities created on the margins of this dominant intellectual milieu reinforced and made 
into tangible reality what had before been only the perception of difference, opposition, and 
incompatibility. Just as their right-wing predecessors over the century, the intellectuals of the ND, 
raised in this separate, isolated intellectual environment since 1968, have had a different experience 
of daily intellectual life.  
 
1287 GRECE documents BNF Tolbiac 2000. Since its creation in 1968, in each of these forums, the new 
names of the intellectuals of GRECE are mixed with familiar names of the traditional extreme Right like 
Bardèche, Lucien Rebatet, Paul Serant, Marcel Jouhandeau, Jean Cau, and Jean Giono. 
 
1288 Ibid., piece no. 2. 
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The New Right’s practice and experience of daily intellectual life has been, as it was for the 
intellectual Right over the century, a product of its relationships to the State and university. the 
University has, as Benoist pointed out in a 2003 interview, been traditionally dominated by the 
intellectual Left and so this professional trajectory relied upon by the emerging intellectual of the Left 
has been relatively unappealing to the young intellectual of the Right. Since ND intellectuals are 
hardly welcomed as professors in the state university system, they have, as their predecessors did for 
over a century, relied on journalism and literary publication as their primary means of engagement 
and expression. This professional focus has allowed the relatively small number of ND intellectuals to 
produce a prolific number of revues, articles, books, and interviews and to make a greater impact on 
public affairs and journalistic debate than they might otherwise have had.1289 As it did for the previous 
generations of right-wing intellectuals, however, this avoidance of the university has made the 
necessary mentoring of the youth a more difficult task. GRECE has provided a different experience of 
intellectual mentorship for both the intellectual and the youth by arranging summer institutes and 
“university” courses, colloquia, and lecture series that move the experience of mentorship outside the 
traditional university setting.  
The daily and necessary practice of educating the general public has also proven a different 
experience for the intellectual Right. The new media of television talk shows and political interviews 
has been, Benoist suggests, mastered by “the young wolves of the intellectual Left” like Bernard 
Henri Levy who make it a regular practice to do televised appearances both in France and abroad to 
popularize their ideas. In contrast, when the “representative of the Right” is fortunate enough to gain 
this platform, he remains passive, ineffective, and simply “smiles without realizing the game he is 
getting ready to enter.”1290 When they do enter these new public forums aggressively, as Benoist has 
done, and attempt to debate the intellectuals of the Left, they face further difficulties, in particular, the 
 
1289 Benoist, for example, has published over 50 books, 4000 articles, and has conducted over 300 interviews. 
 
1290 Benoist, Vu de droite, 17. 
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absence of an opponent. The intellectual of the Left is able to refuse to debate the intellectual of the 
Right without appearing intellectually cowardly by proclaiming that they do not want to “play the 
game of the Right.”1291 With this they are suggesting that any legitimate argument by the Right would 
be a distortion of its true position and that the intellectual of the Left should not be forced to dignify it 
with a response. Here Benoist argues that, as with the other elements of French metapolitics, the 
intellectual of the Right has not experienced life as the “media darlings” as the intellectual of the Left 
has. It is clear, therefore, that beyond the different experience inherent in their position as a minority, 
oppositional, and dominated camp, the intellectual of the Right has developed a distinctive collective 
identity from the different daily experience of intellectual life in the segregated communities of the 
Right.  
Despite their recent resistance to the categorization of Left and Right, Benoist and the 
community of intellectuals around GRECE seem, on the contrary, to provide evidence of its 
continued viability, at least in the case of intellectual identity. In particular, they are exemplars of the 
distinctive model of right-wing intellectual identity constructed over the century and outlined in this 
study. While it is impossible to continue to ignore the presence of right-wing intellectuals in the 
narrative of 20th century French intellectual engagement, it is equally unacceptable to reinsert them 
into history as politically deviant imitations of their left-wing peers. It is necessary, therefore, to have 
a new concept, a new model of the intellectual that recognizes these two very distinctive intellectual 
camps.  
 
The Right-Wing Intellectual Model  
The purpose of this study has been first to dismiss the perception among historians today that 
“intellectuel de droite” is a “contradiction in terms.” In both scholarly circles and the general public, 
the concept of the intellectual has become practically inconceivable outside of left-wing and 
republican values and intellectual communities. “Intellectual” has become synonymous with an 
 
1291 Benoist, Le grain de sable, 98. 
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engagé who values universalism, abstraction, idealism, internationalism and Enlightenment principles 
from egalitarianism and individualism to the romance of popular revolution. Studies of intellectuals 
seek their exemplars in the Ligue des Droits de l’homme, the University, the NRF, the SFIO and PCF, 
and Les Temps modernes. However, what is today an expected and almost automatic omission of the 
right-wing engagé from the narrative of the intellectual is the result of a more calculated, century-long 
crusade by the Center and Left intellectuals to dominate the role of intellectual guide. The second 
purpose of the study has therefore been to uncover this struggle to define intellectual identity and to 
examine its impact on the creation of a distinctly right-wing intellectual model. The Left, over the 
century, worked to ensure that the public believed “intellectuals of the Right have no right to the title 
of intellectuel.”1292 This was met with increasing resentment by a Right whose own efforts to redefine 
the title and role of the intellectual became something of an obsession. Resentment, struggle against 
exclusion, and the effort to be seen as separate yet legitimate were central, formative experiences for 
the Right that recurred over the century. They permeated and influenced the Right’s mentality of 
engagement, values and discourses, choice of communities and practices, and, as a result, their very 
model of true intellectual identity. As they internalized this ostracism, they responded by segregating 
themselves, radicalizing their values and opinions, and alienating themselves ever further from the 
intellectual mainstream. In the end, this model of the Right has continued to be labeled “anti-
intellectual” by historians and excluded from the historical narrative of engagement while the 
intellectual of the Left has become the sole model of intellectual identity.   
 Those few historians who have recognized the legitimacy of the intellectuals of the Right 
have made great strides in reversing this conflation of the terms intellectuel and intellectuel de 
gauche. However these studies have tended to define the intellectual only by common behaviors and 
have resulted in such broad definitions as “producer or consummator of an ideology,” and “the man 
of culture put in the situation of the man of politics.” These generalized definitions of the French 
intellectual do allow the reinsertion of the intellectual of the Right into the historical picture, but they 
 
1292 Jaures’ accusation found in Charle, Naissance des “intellectuels,” 163. 
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are too vague to be useful and gloss over what the Right believed were important differences in its 
identity. Instead, it is necessary to propose a new conceptualization of the intellectual that reinserts 
the engagés of the Right into the historical narrative while recognizing that their intellectual identity 
is too distinctive from the Left’s to be conflated in such a generalized definition.This new approach to 
the intellectual demands that both Left and Right thinkers be included in the historical narrative since 
both engaged their cultural capital in French affairs and exerted influence over public opinion. But it 
also recognizes that while Left and Right both claimed the title and role of the intellectual, their 
intellectual identity and the mentality, values, perception of responsibility, and collective identities 
that construct this identity were very different. Because the predominant concept of the intellectual is 
based on a left-wing or republican model, this different conceptualization of intellectual identity on 
the Right has been misinterpreted as “anti-intellectualism” by historians and has caused the exclusion 
of the right-wing from historical analyses of intellectual engagement. The new concept of the 
intellectual demands that historians recognize not only the model of intellectual identity created by 
the Left but the alternative model, constructed in opposition to this, on the Right. It is this alternative 
model that the ten case studies have attempted to outline. 
 The ten writers selected for case study reveal significant changes in the values, programs, and 
visions for France on the extreme Right over the century. Barrèssian nationalism was replaced for 
many on the Right by Maurrassian monarchism and then by French fascism and Europeanism. But 
these changes are outweighed by the continuities that reveal a certain pattern or model over the 
century. It has become clear that there are certain common characteristics and experiences that are 
essential to being an intellectual of the Right, no matter the time period, and that distinguish these 
right-wing intellectuals, whether they be nationalists, monarchists, or fascists, from their counterparts 
on the republican Center and extreme Left. From these case studies, it can be argued that right-wing 
intellectuals are not just left-wing intellectuals with different political opinions, but their own 
category of engagé. Their concept of role and identity has been uniquely formed by their perception 
530 
of exclusion and their resentment of marginalization. They have a different conception of their place 
in society and intellectual affairs, a different relationship to the university and the State, a different 
mentality of engagement, a whole different system of intellectual, cultural, and social values, a 
different worldview and conception of “True France,” a different set of intellectual spaces, socio-
professional networks, and professional trajectories, a different community of peers and organizations 
for mentorship, publication, education, and socialization. All together this has resulted in a very 
different experience of intellectual life and a distinctive understanding of what it means to be an 
intellectual.  
 The intellectual of the extreme Right from the Dreyfus Affair to the Algerian conflict has 
been marked by an incredible resentment of what he perceives as a left-wing hegemony over the 
intellectual field. In its most blatant form, this hegemony has emerged in the Left’s refusal to 
recognize the engagés of the Right as “intellectuals.” The effectiveness of the Left’s effort to exclude 
the Right from the title, role, and practices of the intellectual was due in part to its close ties to what 
the Right referred to as the “official world.” The Right perceived itself to be in a hostile and even 
persecutory relationship with the “official world” of the State and its republican institutions like the 
University. In the mind of the right-wing intellectual, the extreme Left and Republican Center 
intellectuals formed a majority that was allied in a bloc or front against them. This bloc, according to 
the Right, had been able to effectively dominate and infiltrate the government, the university, 
mainstream intellectual organizations and the official organs of the press. In contrast, the intellectual 
Right had been excluded, ostracized, and ejected both literally and figuratively from these places of 
power and influence. For Brunetiere, it was expulsion from his position at the ENS, for Bardèche, 
ostracism from the CNE dominated publishing firms, but all perceived themselves rejected and 
oppressed. In particular, they believed that their exclusion was self-perpetuating since the left-wing 
intellectual model was engrained in the education system, and therefore in the minds of the next 
generations. The Right, therefore, saw its exclusion as a vicious cycle. Denied the title and identity of 
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the intellectual, they were more easily excluded as “anti-intellectual” from places of power within the 
intellectual world. Denied participation in these spaces of intellectual power and legitimization, they 
were further alienated from the public’s perception of intellectual identity. 
 Over the century, this hostile relationship to the “official world” has become essential to the 
right-wing intellectuals’ perception of their place in French society and intellectual affairs. This, in 
turn, has affected their perception of themselves as intellectuals, their understanding of the role of the 
intellectual, and their mentality of engagement. The Right internalized and reappropriated the Left’s 
language of exclusion to make it an essential, and positive, component of their self-identification as 
intellectuals. Bardèche identified himself as “a foreigner” within the nation and intellectual world, a 
member of the class of intellectual “untouchables,”  and an intellectual “heretic,” while Laurent saw 
himself as the “pariah,” the “outlaw,” the “excluded,” and the “suspect.” Even when the Right 
monopolized the field during the Occupation, Drieu identified dramatically with the wandering 
hometown prophet speaking the truth to a resistant crowd while Châteaubriant saw himself as one of 
the misunderstood minority. Whether the Right was empowered or not, they identified themselves, as 
Maurras was famous for doing, as the often unpopular “intellectual opposition” to the dominant, 
mainstream Left. Unlike the intellectuals of the Left who often enjoyed a profitable relationship with 
the government, the university, and official thought, the intellectual of the Right believed himself 
oppressed, excluded, and ostracized from these relationships and therefore identified intellectual 
responsibility and role with resistance, struggle, and opposition to the mainstream.  
 Because the intellectuals of the Right had been labeled “anti-intellectual” as early as 1898, 
their engagement was always burdened with an underlying desire to legitimize their own right-wing 
values and claim superior right to the title of “intellectuel.” Ever since Barrès and Brunetière declared 
that “not all the intellectuals were on one side,” the intellectual of the Right has associated 
engagement with struggle for intellectual legitimacy and authority. Claiming and effectively 
redefining the title and role of the intellectual, which they saw to be increasingly denied to them by 
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the Left, became something of an obsession for the engagés of the Right. They saw themselves as 
having a double mission in their engagement. The Right engaged in order to manipulate public 
opinion on the current political or social question just like the Left. But it also engaged in order to 
counter the perception by the public that the dominant intellectuals on the Left spoke for the entire 
body of intellectual elite. It is not surprising that Barres’ 1898 claim to the title and role of the 
intellectual was echoed over the century by his successors even as late as the 1963 reproach: “We 
have our intellectuals too.”  
 This approach to engagement also caused more subtle shifts in language that have been, over 
the century, markers of the intellectual of the Right. The experience of being part of the marginalized 
Right affected the very themes and vocabulary they used in their work. Their struggle to throw off the 
label of “anti-intellectual” led to the recurrent discourse on the Right of “true intellectuals” and 
“intellectual responsibility.” The true intellectuals, they argued understood their responsibility to 
society, culture, and intelligence according to right-wing values while the “false intellectuals” 
remained mired in the values and visions of the Left. And, since their ideas and values were 
repeatedly proclaimed not only “anti-intellectual” but “anti-French,” much of their engaged work is a 
defense of their ideas as the best representatives of the history and traditions of France. The concept 
of the nation would also be an important source of legitimization since the Right refused to portray 
itself as the representatives of the universal, as the Left did. Because of this, the definition of “True 
France” and its true values became an essential theme in the language of engagement on the Right. 
Since it enjoyed a fruitful relationship to the State and a secure claim to the title of intellectual, the 
Left had no ulterior motive to secure legitimacy and, until the Occupation, displayed none of the 
Right’s obsession with intellectual responsibility or True France. As a result, the discourse of 
legitimacy, struggle, True France, and true intellectual responsibility essential to the Right’s 
discussion of engagement have been overlooked by historians.  
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 Resentment of their exclusion and an underlying rejection of the left-wing value system also 
led the Right intentionally to differentiate their own, alternative values and world views. Right-wing 
engagés wanted to claim the title, role, and responsibilities of the intellectual, but not to adopt or be 
seen as supporting the values and programs associated with this title by the Left. Because of this, they 
went to great lengths to differentiate their own intellectual values and advertise their intellectual 
guidance as an alternative worldview. In short, they wanted it quite clear that they were intellectuals, 
but of a very different type than those on the Left. Although the specific programs and positions of 
the Right changed over the century, reacting to and precipitating changes on the intellectual Left, 
several core values and worldviews have remained constant identifying marks of the intellectual 
Right. The intellectual of the Right, no matter the decade, can be identified by his rejection of 
universalism, devotion to Realism, opposition to internationalism in favor of a rooted concept of 
nationalism, and rejection of egalitarianism.  
 One of the most significant distinctions in intellectual values between the Left and Right was 
the conflict over universalism. For the intellectuals of the Left, particularly during the first half of the 
century, intellectual responsibility coincided with the ability to isolate abstract, universal laws and 
absolute truths from the confusion of reality and utilize these ideals in the formation of theories. The 
intellectual was to be above the real world, isolated by his ability to think in general rather than 
particular terms and able to see the world as it could be rather than as it was. The intellectual was 
defined as the defender of the abstract absolutes of Truth, Justice, and the Rights of Man. This 
universalism was linked to the equally essential ideas of egalitarianism and internationalism, based on 
the idea of a universal humanity and the abstract idea of man. When put in practice, this universalism 
resulted in engagement extending from a defense of Dreyfus’ right to a retrial to decolonization and 
international war crimes tribunals. For the intellectual of the Right, however, intellectual 
responsibility required that the intellectual remove himself from the ivory tower of abstractions to 
construct real solutions based on real societies.  
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 For the intellectual of the Right, there were no universals, only particulars, no single 
humanity but nations, peoples, and races, and no absolute truths, only relative ones. Barrès’ 
declaration that he did not know “man” but only particular men living in particular places in times 
would be repeated over the century by right-wing thinkers from Brunetière to Bardèche. His belief 
that truths were relative to the nations that constructed them would find echoes in the monarchist, 
fascist, collaborationist, and neo-fascist search for a third way. Third way ideologies were proclaimed 
to be suited to the French national character in contrast with democratic or communist ideologies that 
were internationalist and universalist in their approach. Even during the post-war years when the 
intellectual of the Left laid equal claim to the representation of Realism, the intellectual of the Right 
would distinguish its own claim as the rightful one. The realism of the Left, whether it was in the 
Communist dictatorship of the proletariat or the democratic republic of equals, Bardèche and Laurent 
argued, was still based on an approach to man “as he could be,” an idealized, universal man, rather 
than man “as he is” a rooted product of his own time and place. Right-wing concepts of Realism 
would elicit particularly strong condemnation for anti-intellectualism because they claimed to draw 
inspiration from the “complete” or “total” man rather than from the intellect alone. Beginning with 
Brunetière and Barrès and echoed most strongly by the fascists, the intellectual of the Right identified 
himself as a Realist because his assessments were based on the elements of real life experience: 
praxis, character, emotion, sensibility, and will rather than abstract intelligence and rationalism alone. 
This, he believed, also made him a more effective intellectual. 
 The intellectual of the Right also differentiated himself from the intellectual model of the 
Left by his anti-internationalism and support for a rooted concept of nationalism. From Barrès and 
Brunetière to the fascist sympathizing intellectuals of the 1930s, internationalism was intimately 
linked to the concept of the left-wing intellectual and associated with the anti-nationalist forces of 
Marxist socialism, Judaism, cosmopolitanism, and the League of Nations. Cosmopolitanism implied 
rejection of the rootedness, traditionalism, regional and national pride, and cultural relativism that the 
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intellectual of the Left considered detrimental to the detached intellectual. But for the intellectual of 
the Right, there was no universal culture or genius, but only national and regional ones so a lack of 
roots and relativism meant a detachment from one’s source of inspiration and truth. Representation 
and guidance of intelligence and culture therefore required the intellectual to be grounded in these 
particularities and attached to the history, tradition, and ancestors from which this national genius 
evolved. The internationalism of the university intellectual was seen as destructive of French culture, 
genius, and style. Intellectuals of the Right, rather than urging France to become more open, both 
figuratively and literally, to foreign influences and thought, prided themselves on preservation of the 
purely French. Even the Europeanism of the fascist, collaborationist, and postwar intellectuals of the 
Right was understood not as internationalism but as a new approach to the idea of nationalism. In a 
world of superpowers and continental forces, Europe would be the means for the survival of the 
autonomous nation and the preservation of its shared indo-European culture in an increasingly 
globalized world. 
 To this anti-internationalism was tied a distinctly rooted concept of nationalism. For the 
intellectual of the Left, the concept of the patrie was a legal, rather than a racial or historical one, and 
nationalism was a civic, not an integral construct. For the intellectual of the Left, the French nation 
was born in 1789 with the Revolution and solidified by the Declaration of the Rights of Man. 
Nationalism was a product of citizenship and the contractual obligation to protect the patrie in return 
for a guarantee of rights. In this way, the intellectual of the Left could reconcile his universalist view 
of man, his egalitarianism, and his cosmopolitanism with a certain level of national pride and duty. 
He identified primarily as an international intellectual, a citizen of the world, and secondarily as a 
French citizen. For the intellectual of the Right, however, the nation was a living essence, not a legal 
concept. It was created by its distinct history, language, races, religion, traditions, cultures, regions, 
and political experience. It was the product of Roman antiquity, generations of ancestors, a line of 
kings, and military triumphs. To be French was to be endowed with a distinctive essence that those of 
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foreign nations did not share, no matter their legal status or attempt at assimilation. In practice, this 
meant that the intellectual of the Right was easily attracted to anti-Semitism, opposed international 
organizations like the UN, and opposed all supranational ideologies. The intellectual of the Right, in 
the final analysis, identified primarily as a Frenchman, as a product of French genius, and secondarily 
as a member of a broader intellectual community.  
 Finally, the intellectual of the Right can be identified over the century by a clear opposition to 
the left-wing principle of egalitarianism and to its political incarnations as both democratic 
republicanism and communism. The left-wing model of intellectual identity and role has been 
intimately tied to the principles of the Rights of Man and the ideals of the Enlightenment, particularly 
that of equality. For the Dreyfusards, this meant defense of the equal rights of Dreyfus, for the 
universitaires of the Nouvelle Sorbonne, it meant democratization of the educational system, for the 
Communists it meant bringing down the bourgeoisie and exalting the prole, and for the anti-
colonialists it meant demanding equal rights to self-determination. The intellectual of the Right, 
however, rejected egalitarianism in all its forms as a sort of unnatural leveling and homogenization of 
the naturally occurring hierarchy.  
Men, the intellectual of the Right believed, were not born equal nor should they be forced 
into a false equality by political ideology. During the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates, the intellectual of 
the Right identified not with the democratization of education but with the formation of an educated 
elite. Leveling society by promoting the mediocre and hindering the exceptional only stunted the 
growth of French civilization. According to both the monarchists and the fascists, egalitarianism was 
particularly dangerous when it was allowed to influence political affairs. The nation, they argued, 
should be run by its elite or by a naturally selected head, either monarch or chef, not by the masses. 
Both democracy and communism placed the power of the nation in the hands of the masses and 
majority rule in the belief that all men had equal abilities to determine civic affairs. This leveling of 
political and cultural talents by means of a legislated equality, the intellectual Right argued, had led to 
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political disasters and a failure to thrive as a civilization. The Right identified their responsibility with 
defense of the natural inequality of man, construction of a social hierarchy to preserve order, and 
support for an elite or a chef to lead the nation. These positions, paired with a rejection of democracy 
and communism, the two principle ideologies of the intellectual of the Left and Center, would quickly 
label the Right “anti-intellectual.”  
Certainly these characteristic values of the extreme Right, when viewed as components of a 
right-wing intellectual program, indicate certain inconsistencies and internal contradictions in right-
wing thought. The intellectuals of the Nouvelle Sorbonne debates who claimed to be intellectual 
Realists promoted classicism instead of the technology and science most applicable to real modern 
society. The anti-universalists of the interwar years were willing to adapt fascist ideologies 
constructed outside France and promoted a Europeanism that was only with great difficulty 
distinguished from internationalism. The position of the extreme Right on its German neighbor would 
vacillate over the decades switching from hostility and cultural isolation during the Affair and 
Nouvelle Sorbonne years to fascination, emulation, and exchange during the interwar and war years. 
The post-war advocates of French Algeria blithely mixed their anti-universalism with a sincere belief 
in the applicability of French civilization to the rest of the world. And holocaust trivializers like 
Bardèche somehow juxtaposed Europeanism with a closed nationalism that expressed an interest only 
in French affairs and rejected European-wide institutions and tribunals. These inconsistencies and 
lapses in logic are apparent now to the historian, but were considered part of a distinctive, cohesive 
intellectual itinerary by the engagés of the extreme Right at the time.  
 Because they felt that these worldviews distinguished them from the Left and excluded them 
from left-wing intellectual communities, the intellectual of the Right sought new intellectual spaces 
and networks where their own values could be nurtured. The Left associated being an intellectual 
with participation in left-wing collective communities like the Ligue des droits de l’homme during the 
Dreyfus Affair, the university and its presses during the Sorbonne debates, the NRF and AEAR or 
CVIA during the 1930s, the Resistance press during the occupation, or the CNE and Les Temps 
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Modernes in the post-war. But the Right, which felt itself excluded from these communities, social 
networks, and professional channels, congregated instead in its own, alternative and competing 
groups. They constructed a different set of intellectual spaces, socio-professional networks, and 
professional trajectories that provided them with a different community of peers and organizations for 
mentorship, publication, education, and socialization. When they were excluded from the Dreyfusard 
ligues and petitions, they created their own. When they found themselves increasingly a minority 
presence in the university system, they created their own personal mentoring relationships and 
organized summer institutes and courses to educate the youth in their own values. When they were 
not steered toward the professional life of the universitaire, they swelled the ranks of the professional 
journalists in order to remain politically and professionally influential. When they felt ostracized from 
social and governmental affairs, they formed their own anti-Republican political parties and cultural 
organizations like the PPF. And when they were denied all access to the public through traditional 
intellectual channels during the postwar, they congregated in sympathetic publishing houses and 
revues like LTR. The intellectual of the Right, like that of the Left, constructed his concept of 
individual intellectual identity in part from these collective communities, networks, and trajectories to 
which he belonged. But these communities created by the intellectual Right were not those of their 
left-wing peers that had been equated for so long with intellectual life.  
 These intellectual communities of the Left and Right were polarized by their values and 
ideologies and therefore quite segregated in their memberships. Members of the Ligue des droits de 
l’homme would not be found in the ranks of the Ligue de la Patrie, as the latter’s manifest had made 
clear, and devotees of the PCF would not dream of writing for Défense de l’Occident. These 
communities were therefore separate intellectual worlds coexisting within Paris. In these separate 
intellectual spaces, like-minded intellectuals formed social attachments, arranged professional 
relationships, and created mentoring ties to the youth. They found themselves surrounded by other 
intellectuals who shared their basic value system, supported the same political programs, and 
advocated the same social changes. This family of thought tended to reinforce and even radicalize 
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intellectuals in their decision to engage their work; intellectuals who might, had they felt themselves 
isolated and alone, have tended to remain silent. The communities were, therefore, essential to the 
amplification of individual efforts to engage. Most important, though, was the fact that these 
communities and networks of like-minded intellectuals provided a collective, something larger than 
themselves, with which the intellectual could identify. They identified as part of a certain revue team, 
signers of a certain petition, participants in certain educational efforts, partisans of a political party, or 
followers of a certain ideologue. They shared not only the same socio-professional spaces but the 
same mission and sense of purpose as intellectuals. It was within these socio-professional 
communities, therefore, that intellectuals were able to create a collective identity for themselves. And 
this collective identity would be as distinctive on the Left and Right as the communities themselves. 
These segregated intellectual communities and the separate collective identities that they 
encouraged led to a very different experience of intellectual life on the Left and Right. Although they 
often engaged in many of the same basic behaviors as the intellectuals of the Left, from publishing 
books to mentoring the student population, the intellectual of the Right usually went about these daily 
activities differently. However, once again, the Right’s distinctive experiences do not indicate anti-
intellectualism but rather an alternative experience of intellectual life that needs to be accounted for in 
historical narratives of intellectual life. 
It is necessary, therefore, to introduce this new model of intellectual identity to the historical 
narrative of the French intellectual; one that recognizes the omnipresent influences of resentment and 
struggle for legitimacy, incorporates an alternative set of intellectual values and socio-political 
worldviews, accepts membership in a different network of intellectual communities, and respects as 
viable this alternative experience of daily intellectual life. This new model is not intended to replace 
the traditional model of the left-wing intellectual but to be paired with it as an alternative 
representative of intellectual identity. The narrative of French intellectual history must include the 
Right as a contributor to the meaning of the terms “intellectuel” and “engage.” Understanding the 
existence of two very different but influential camps of intellectuals will allow historians of French 
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and intellectual history to fully appreciate the complexity of the intellectual debates that occurred 
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